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Major Problems in American History

Major Problems in American History Since 1945

FOURTH EDITION



DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS EDITED BY
NATASHA ZARETSKY • MARK ATWOOD LAWRENCE
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Ideas can be
consistently represented in
the same way, but their presentation
can vary from formal to informal, or
tango somewhere in between.

(?) * you have to wonder if there was
something in Stalin's younger life,
that triggered such brutality.

5 → 1

4 → 2

1 → 3

3 → 4

2 → 5

MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN HISTORY SERIES

GENERAL EDITOR

THOMAS G. PATERSON



Major Problems in American History Since 1945

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FOURTH EDITION

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Preface

Historians are often skeptical of “watersheds.” That is, they question the existence of unique moments or turning points that draw clear lines of demarcation between historical eras, between “before” and “after.” Instead, historians tend to highlight currents that run deeper and flow across alleged breaking points. It seems beyond dispute, however, that the United States entered a decidedly new era in 1945. Coming out of World War II with unparalleled military, political, and economic power, the United States in the early postwar years produced more than half of the world’s manufactured goods, accounted for more than 40 percent of the world’s income, possessed an ideology with broad appeal to peoples throughout the globe, and held a monopoly on atomic weapons. The nation thus emerged for the first time as a global superpower, a breakthrough that would shape not only the subsequent history of the United States but also the larger history of the postwar world.

This sea change raises a host of questions for the historian of the modern period. What did Americans choose to do with their nation’s vast power? How did the dominant place of the United States on the world stage shape not only American foreign policy but also the social, cultural, and political life of the nation? In what ways did Americans reap the rewards of expanded U.S. power and prosperity, and in what ways did they challenge the hegemonic assumptions that accompanied this expansion? What was the relationship between American hegemony and domestic struggles over race, gender, and rights? How did the fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the transformation of the United States into a lone superpower revise the nation’s place in the world after 1989? Finally, has American power declined or simply been reinvented in the midst of the recurring upheavals of the last four decades—terrorist attacks, grueling wars, painful economic recessions and financial meltdowns, political polarization, and energy and environmental crises?

Our aim in this volume is not to offer definitive answers to any of these questions. The very contemporaneity of the issues under discussion means that

definitive interpretations remain elusive, at least for now and likely for a long time to come. But the elusiveness and contested nature of the recent past—as well as its obvious relationship to present-day trends and controversies—makes the field of U.S. history since 1945 especially exciting and dynamic and lends itself particularly well to the Major Problems series. Our aim with this new edition of *Major Problems in American History since 1945* is to highlight some of the most illuminating and vigorous debates within the field and to encourage readers to think for themselves about the broad contours of American history since World War II. Taking our inspiration from an ever growing body of historians (some of whose scholarship is reflected here) who work on the post-1945 period, we have selected a series of essays and documents that attempt to bring together the themes of culture, society, foreign policy, and political economy in innovative ways that will spark the curiosity of our readers and inspire them to learn more.

This volume builds on previous editions in two crucial ways. First, it updates its coverage of the first postwar decades by replacing older scholarship with newer, innovative works published in recent years. Consistent with this goal, this edition also contains numerous fresh documents that dovetail with the new essays. Second, the book extends its consideration of the period since the 1960s by adding two entirely new chapters and substantially reconfiguring others. In this way, this edition devotes far more attention to the 1970s, a period that has received especially notable scholarly scrutiny in the last few years, and to the period since the end of the Cold War than did the third edition. All in all, three-quarters of the essays and more than 60 percent of the documents are new for this edition.

In addition, two new editors have joined the team responsible for the first three editions. Sadly, Robert Griffith passed away in 2011. Paula Baker elected to retire from the project. Consequently, Natasha Zaretsky of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale and Mark Atwood Lawrence of the University of Texas at Austin were invited to come aboard and build on the superb work of their predecessors.

In other respects, this book closely resembles earlier editions and other entries in the Major Problems series. Each chapter begins with a brief introductory essay designed to orient readers to the major issues under consideration. We then present a handful of documents that highlight how individuals in the past thought about the problems that confronted them and to suggest how scholars can draw different interpretations from reading the same material. Each chapter then offers two essays that lay out different approaches to, or interpretations of, a key historical problem presented in that chapter. In some cases, the essays present conflicting points of view, while in others the essays complement each other by analyzing different aspects of the problem in question. Suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter provide additional resources for readers who wish to delve further into particular topics.

Like earlier editions, this book begins by addressing classic issues raised by America's rise as a global economic and military power in the wake of World War II. Chapter 1, focusing on the emergence of the Cold War, moves beyond old debates about who was to blame—the Soviet Union or the United States—for the East–West antagonism, emphasizing instead recent research suggesting

that the rivalry sprang from complex sources that defy easy generalizations. Melvyn P. Leffler examines international sources of the Cold War, while Ellen Schrecker explores the rise of anticommunism within the United States. Chapter 2 turns to the emergence of a mass consumer-based society in the 1950s, exploring the fantasies and limits of postwar middle-class consumption, the creation of a segmented marketplace, and how Americans' relationship to consumer society differed along lines of race, class, and culture. Returning to foreign policy, Chapter 3, featuring recent works by George C. Herring and Julian E. Zelizer, examines the reasons why the Cold War grew strikingly more dangerous in the late 1950s and early 1960s, culminating in major U.S.-Soviet confrontations over Berlin and then Cuba. Chapter 4 is devoted to the mid-twentieth century Civil Rights Revolution. Its essays by Charles Payne and Thomas Sugrue focus on local grassroots activism rather than the nationally prominent leaders and organizations that have dominated narratives of the movement, while the documents highlight the prominent role African-American women played in the struggle, as well as the rise of black power.

Chapter 5 explores the roots of controversies that continue to reverberate through American politics in the twenty-first century. The essays and documents explore why liberalism, emphasizing government-led solutions to major social problems, triumphed in the early 1960s, but also why liberal reform programs came under attack almost as soon as they were enacted. Chapter 6 goes further in addressing the latter question, examining why radicals rejected the liberals' faith in moderate reformism during the 1960s and 1970s and called, with notably little success, for a far more sweeping overhaul of American society. New material in Chapter 7 suggests that the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s was not a single movement, but rather was made up of multiple movements with their own tactics and goals. Women's liberation and women's rights were two distinct articulations of feminism, and activists struggled to understand the relationship between sexism, racism, and homophobia. Chapter 8 focuses on the Vietnam War, which profoundly reshaped American politics and foreign policies. Essays by political essayist Michael Lind and historian Fredrik Logevall address above all why Americans believed a little-understood country on the far side of the world was so important to U.S. interests, and whether they were right to believe as they did.

The remaining five chapters of the book focus on the period since 1968. A new chapter analyzes the 1970s as the decade when the postwar boom came to a close and many Americans were forced to confront an era of economic, political, and environmental limits. The end of postwar expansion contributed to the growing influence of the conservative movement, a theme explored from two different vantage points by historians Jefferson Cowie and Meg Jacobs. Chapter 10, "Political and Popular Cultures of the 1980s," moves readers away from an exclusive focus on Ronald Reagan (whose transformative presidency often dominates accounts of the decade) and toward other significant but often overlooked aspects of the 1980s: the nuclear freeze movement, the advent of the personal computer, and the AIDS crisis. Chapter 11 turns to the ways that globalization has transformed the experience of work for many Americans, as

service and information-based jobs have replaced the industrial work of the early twentieth century. Chapter 12 focuses on the 1990s, a decade in which the United States confronted the profound question of how to reconfigure national priorities following the Cold War. Essays and documents address parallel debates concerning foreign and domestic policies. In Chapter 13, we explore the contradictions that characterize racial politics in the contemporary United States. The year 2008 witnessed something many believed was a political impossibility: the election of the nation's first African-American president. But the chapter's essays by George Sanchez and Heather Ann Thompson suggest that this move toward racial progress has been undermined by other troubling trends in American political life: the scapegoating of immigrants, the heightened vulnerability of minorities during states of emergency, and the staggering rates of incarceration among African American and Latino men. Finally, Chapter 14 delves into the nation's response to the cataclysmic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, an event that shocked Americans into focusing anew on international affairs. Selections from recent books by historian Niall Ferguson and journalist Thomas L. Friedman, the latter writing in collaboration with political scientist Michael Mandelbaum, offer sharply different assessments of U.S. choices to undertake wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, more generally, to play an unprecedentedly ambitious role on the international stage.

A project like this inevitably requires teamwork, and we are eager to express our gratitude to numerous individuals who helped in myriad ways. Above all, we would like to thank the readers who provided extremely thoughtful commentary on the third edition and offered helpful advice that has shaped this book in innumerable ways: Kathy Cooke, Quinnipiac University; Tracey Deutsch, University of Minnesota; Mustafa Gokcek, Niagara University; Warren Goldstein, University of Hartford; Jason Newman, Cosumnes River College; Ellen Salzman-Fiske, University of Hartford; James Spiller, The College at Brockport, SUNY; and David Valone, Quinnipiac University. We would also like to thank again the many readers who provided helpful suggestions and comments on the first three editions: Numan V. Barley, Laura A. Belmonte, Roger Biles, William Brinker, Mark S. Byrnes, Rodney Carlisle, Jeff Charles, Frank C. Costigliola, John D'Emilio, Gregory Field, Richard M. Fried, Cheryl Greenberg, Samuel Hand, Susan Hartmann, James Hilty, Caroline Hoefflerle, Norman Markowitz, Gary May, Philip I. Mitterling, Mary Beth Norton, Chester Pach, Pam Pennock, Thomas G. Ryan, David F. Schmitz, John Sharpless, Philip W. Warken, and Theodore A. Wilson. We also wish to thank Thomas G. Paterson, the General Editor of the *Major Problems in American History* series; the wonderful group at Cengage Learning (Jeffrey P. Greene, Senior Product Manager Ann West, Associate Content Developer Megan Chrisman, Senior Rights Acquisition Specialist Jennifer Meyer Dare, and Product Assistant Liz Fraser); Terri Wise, our development editor; and from PreMediaGlobal, Senior Project Manager Rathi Thirumalai and Text Permissions Project Manager Kristine Janssens. We are also indebted to our colleagues and co-workers at the University of Texas at Austin and Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. We dedicate this book to our students, who through their curiosity and passion constantly challenge us to rethink the contours of the recent past.

CHAPTER 1



The Origins of the Cold War Era

Germany's final defeat in the spring of 1945 ended an era in which European nations had dominated world politics through their vast colonial empires and commercial networks. The United States and the Soviet Union took the lead in the new era. The United States, which alone among the great powers had escaped the devastation of war on its own soil, was in 1945 unquestionably the most powerful nation in the world, and the prospect of a new American-led world—what magazine publisher Henry Luce had called an American century—seemed realistic. The U.S.S.R., although it had suffered enormous losses during the war, remained the most powerful military presence on the European continent, and propelled by its own history and ideology, soon challenged American leadership. The conflict between these two powerful nations, what came to be called the Cold War, would not only shape international relations for the next forty-five years but would also deeply affect both nations' political, economic, and cultural life.

The Cold War began in Europe, just as it would end there more than four decades later with the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was in Europe that the U.S. vision of a postwar world of American-led nations ran up against the Soviet Union's fears for its own security and its determination to refashion much of Eastern Europe in its own image. But Cold War tensions spilled far beyond Europe by the late 1940s, enveloping first the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and then East and Southeast Asia. Above all, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 signaled that East–West confrontation had become global. Yet the Cold War was not only a military and diplomatic challenge for the United States. Fears of communism also escalated within the nation's borders, giving rise in the late 1940s and early 1950s to a period of intense anxiety about communist and “fellow travelers” subverting the United States from within.

There is an enormous amount of historical literature on the early years of the Cold War, filled with conflicting interpretations. Was conflict precipitated by an aggressive and expansionist U.S.S.R., as most early “orthodox” interpretations of the Cold War insisted? Or, as later generations of “revisionist” historians have argued, was the United States, in its efforts to create a postwar world that reflected its own interests, also responsible? What were the sources of U.S. policy? Domestic politics? A need to secure foreign markets? Strategic and geopolitical considerations? What role did misperception play in shaping U.S. and Soviet responses? To what extent did allies and clients successfully

maneuver the great powers? Could the Cold War have been avoided, or its enormous costs in lost lives, distorted priorities, and political regression somehow minimized? Why did Americans fear communism so intensely, and what were the effects of the “red scare” on American society?

DOCUMENTS

By the end of May 1945, the United States was well on its way to constructing an atomic bomb, a stunning technological achievement. The questions that confronted American leaders were whether and how to use the bomb in combat against Japan, America's only major adversary after Germany's surrender on May 9, and whether to share information about the weapon with the Soviet Union, which was allied with the United States during the Second World War but loomed as a potential rival for global power after the end of the fighting. In Document 1, a summary of a meeting held on May 31, top officials in the Truman administration ponder those crucial matters and weigh the general significance of the new weapon. The eventual dropping of A-bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August—a monumental display of American power—unquestionably antagonized Moscow. More important causes of U.S.–Soviet tension, however, were sharply conflicting goals for the future of Germany and Eastern Europe. On February 22, 1946, senior U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan voiced the concerns of a growing number of senior U.S. officials in what would come to be known as the “Long Telegram” (Document 2). Kennan's warnings about the unchangeable nature of Soviet hostility to the West quickly became the basis for the emerging U.S. policy of containment.

Not everyone agreed with Kennan. In July 1946, Secretary of Commerce and former Vice President Henry A. Wallace appealed to Truman (Document 3) to reverse what Wallace believed was the warlike drift of U.S. policy. When Wallace delivered a speech that same month, repeating the points he had made in his letter, Truman unceremoniously fired him. Meanwhile, the Soviets were reaching conclusions that mirrored those of American leaders, as in the report that the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, sent to Moscow on September 27, 1946 (Document 4). On March 12, 1947, Truman publicly announced the Truman Doctrine, calling for economic and military assistance to suppress a rebellion in Greece and promising to support “free peoples” throughout the world (Document 5). The Truman Doctrine marked a major departure in the history of American foreign relations, committing the United States to an expansive new diplomacy. The implementation of the Truman Doctrine was quickly followed by a bold program to aid the economic reconstruction of Europe—the Marshall Plan—and then in 1949 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The new diplomacy was accompanied by a strident new policy of anti-communism in which Republican conservatives such as Senator Joseph McCarthy (Document 6) accused the Truman administration of being “soft on

communism.” It also led to a massive expansion of the U.S. military and other bureaucracies concerned with national security. In April 1950, the president’s advisers laid out the rationale for such a build-up in a document known as National Security Council paper 68, or NSC-68 (Document 7). The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, only heightened pervasive anxiety in the United States about communism and encouraged “red hunters” such as McCarthy, who stepped up their efforts to rout out subversives. Among the Americans who resisted congressional investigations into communist activities in the United States was Lillian Hellman, an essayist and screenwriter known for her left-wing views. Document 8 is a letter that Hellman sent on May 19, 1952, to John Wood, the chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, objecting to demands that she testify about radicalism in Hollywood.

1. Confronting the Implications of the Atomic Bomb, May 1945

The Secretary [of War Henry L. Stimson] expressed the view, a view shared by [Army Chief of Staff] General [George C.] Marshall, that this project should not be considered simply in terms of military weapons, but as a new relationship of man to the universe. This discovery might be compared to the discoveries of the Copernican theory and of the laws of gravity, but **far more important than these in its effect on the lives of men**. While the advances in the field to date had been fostered by the needs of war, it was important to realize that the implications of the project went far beyond the needs of the present war. It must be controlled if possible to make it an assurance of future peace rather than a menace to civilization....

[Physicist] Dr. [Ernest O.] Lawrence expressed his great appreciation for the fact that the leaders of the Government had been willing to take the chances inherent in the development of this program. He expressed a view that if the United States were to stay ahead in this field it was imperative that we knew more and did more than any other country. He felt that research had to go on unceasingly....

In considering the problem of controls and international collaboration the question of paramount concern was the attitude of Russia. [Physicist] Dr. [J. Robert] Oppenheimer pointed out that Russia had always been very friendly to science and suggested that we might open up this subject with them in a tentative fashion and in the most general terms without giving them any details of our productive effort. He thought we might say that a great national effort had been put into this project and express a hope for cooperation with them in this field. He felt strongly that we should not prejudice the Russian attitude in this matter.

At this point General Marshall discussed at some length the story of charges and counter-charges that have been **typical of our relations with the Russians**, pointing out that most of these allegations have proven unfounded. The seemingly

“Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting,” May 31, 1945, in Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, eds., *The Manhattan Project* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991), pp. 105–120.

uncooperative attitude of Russia in military matters stemmed from the necessity of maintaining security. He said that he had accepted this reason for their attitude in his dealings with the Russians and had acted accordingly. As to the post-war situation and in matters other than purely military, he felt that he was in no position to express a view. With regard to this field he was inclined to favor the building up of a combination among like-minded powers, thereby forcing Russia to fall in line by the very force of this coalition. General Marshall was certain that we need have no fear that the Russians, if they had knowledge of our project, would disclose this information to the Japanese. He raised the question whether it might be desirable to invite two prominent Russian scientists to witness the test.

Mr. [Secretary of State James F.] Byrnes expressed a fear that if information were given to the Russians, even in general terms, Stalin would ask to be brought into the partnership. He felt this to be particularly likely in view of our commitments and pledges of cooperation with the British. In this connection Dr. [Vannevar] Bush [(Director of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development)] pointed out that even the British do not have any of our blue prints on plants. Mr. Byrnes expressed the view, which was generally agreed to by all present, that the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in production and research to make certain that we stay ahead and at the same time make every effort to better our political relations with Russia....

It was pointed out that one atomic bomb on an arsenal would not be much different from the effect caused by any Air Corps strike of present dimensions. However, Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the visual effect of an atomic bombing would be tremendous. It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet. The neutron effect of the explosion would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile.

After much discussion concerning various types of targets and the effects to be produced, the Secretary [of War] expressed the conclusion, on which there was general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. [James B.] Conant [(Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee and president of Harvard University)] the Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses.

There was some discussion of the desirability of attempting several strikes at the same time. Dr. Oppenheimer's judgment was that several strikes would be feasible. [Manhattan Project director] General [Leslie R.] Groves, however, expressed doubt about this proposal and pointed out the following objections: (1) We would lose the advantage of gaining additional knowledge concerning the weapon at each successive bombing; (2) such a program would require a rush job on the part of those assembling the bombs and might, therefore, be ineffective; (3) the effect would not be sufficiently distinct from our regular Air Force bombing program....

General Groves stated that the program has been plagued since its inception by the presence of certain scientists of doubtful discretion and uncertain loyalty.

It was agreed that nothing could be done about dismissing these men until after the bomb has actually been used or, at best, until after the test has been made. After some publicity concerning the weapon was out, steps should be taken to sever these scientists from the program.

2. U.S. Diplomat George F. Kennan Warns of an Implacable Enemy, 1946

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced west, fear of more competent more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevik regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs....

When you run a dictatorship, mistrust is inherent. Don't know who is your friend or foe.

It may be expected that component parts of [the] far-flung apparatus [for extending Soviet power] will be utilized, in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(A) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc. *larger groups disassembled are easier to defeat that way*

(B) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of western powers of colonial, backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of western powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(C) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage.)

(D) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent—such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

(E) Everything possible will be done to set major western powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited....

(F) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet

instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when communist power is dominant. But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command or key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in gauging Soviet motives....

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force is undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve—and that without recourse to any general military conflict....

3. Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace Urges a Conciliatory Approach, 1946

How do American actions since V-J Day appear to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete things like \$13 billion for the War and Navy Departments, the Bikini tests of the atomic bomb and continued production of bombs, the plan to arm Latin America with our weapons, production of B-29s and planned production of B-36s, and the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that

these actions must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at the conference table. These facts rather make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had ten thousand-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coast lines and we did not?

Some of the military men and self-styled "realists" are saying: "What's wrong with trying to build up a predominance of force? The only way to preserve peace is for this country to be so well armed that no one will dare attack us. We know that America will never start a war."

The flaw in this policy is simply that it will not work. In a world of atomic bombs and other revolutionary new weapons, such as radioactive poison gases and biological warfare, a peace maintained by a predominance of force is no longer possible....

Insistence on our part that the game must be played our way will only lead to a deadlock. The Russians will redouble their efforts to manufacture bombs, and they may also decide to expand their "security zone" in a serious way. Up to now, despite all our outcries against it, their efforts to develop a security zone in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East are small change from the point of view of military power as compared with our air bases in Greenland, Okinawa and many other places thousands of miles from our shores. We may feel very self-righteous if we refuse to budge on our plan and the Russians refuse to accept it, but that means only one thing—the atomic armament race is on in deadly earnest....

I should list the factors which make for Russian distrust of the United States and of the Western world as follows: The first is Russian history, which we must take into account because it is the setting in which Russians see all actions and policies of the rest of the world. Russian history for over a thousand years has been a succession of attempts, often unsuccessful, to resist invasion and conquest—by the Mongols, the Turks, the Swedes, the Germans and the Poles. The scant thirty years of the existence of the Soviet government has in Russian eyes been a continuation of their historical struggle for national existence. The first four years of the new regime, from 1917 through 1921, were spent in resisting attempts at destruction by the Japanese, British and French, with some American assistance, and by the several White Russian armies encouraged and financed by the Western powers. Then, in 1941, the Soviet state was almost conquered by the Germans after a period during which the Western European powers had apparently acquiesced in the rearming of Germany in the belief that the Nazis would seek to expand eastward rather than westward. The Russians, therefore, obviously see themselves as fighting for their existence in a hostile world.

Second, it follows that to the Russians all of the defense and security measures of the Western powers seem to have an aggressive intent. Our actions to expand our military security system—such steps as extending the Monroe Doctrine to include the arming of the Western Hemisphere nations, our present monopoly of the atomic bomb, our interest in outlying bases and our general

support of the British Empire—appear to them as going far beyond the requirements of defense. I think we might feel the same if the United States were the only capitalistic country in the world and the principal socialistic countries were creating a level of armed strength far exceeding anything in their previous history. From the Russian point of view, also, the granting of a loan to Britain and the lack of tangible results on their request to borrow for rehabilitation purposes may be regarded as another evidence of strengthening of an anti-Soviet bloc.

Finally, our resistance to her attempts to obtain warm water ports and her own security system in the form of “friendly” neighboring states seems, from the Russian point of view, to clinch the case. After twenty-five years of isolation and after having achieved the status of a major power, Russia believes that she is entitled to recognition of her new status. Our interest in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, where democracy by and large has never existed, seems to her an attempt to reestablish the encirclement of unfriendly neighbors which was created after the last war and which might serve as a springboard of still another effort to destroy her.

If this analysis is correct, and there is ample evidence to support it, the action to improve the situation is clearly indicated. The fundamental objective of such action should be to allay any reasonable Russian grounds for fear, suspicions and distrust. We must recognize that the world has changed and that today there can be no “one world” unless the United States and Russia can find some way of living together. For example, most of us are firmly convinced of the soundness of our position when we suggest the internationalization and defortification of the Danube or of the Dardanelles, but we would be horrified and angered by any Russian counterproposal that would involve also the internationalizing and disarming of Suez or Panama. We must recognize that to the Russians these seem to be identical situations....

It is of the greatest importance that we should discuss with the Russians in a friendly way their long-range economic problems and the future of our cooperation in matters of trade. The reconstruction program of the USSR and the plans for the full development of the Soviet Union offers tremendous opportunities for American goods and American technicians....

Many of the problems relating to the countries bordering on Russia could more readily be solved once an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence is established and some form of economic arrangements is worked out with Russia. These problems also might be helped by discussions of an economic nature. Russian economic penetration of the Danube area, for example, might be countered by concrete proposals for economic collaboration in the development of the resources of this area, rather than by insisting that the Russians should cease their unilateral penetration and offering no solution to the present economic chaos there.

This proposal admittedly calls for a shift in some of our thinking about international matters. It is imperative that we make this shift. We have little time to lose. Our postwar actions have not yet been adjusted to the lessons to be gained from experience of Allied cooperation during the war and the facts of the atomic age.

4. Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Novikov Sees a U.S. Drive for World Supremacy, September 1946

The foreign policy of the United States, which reflects the imperialist tendencies of American monopolistic capital, is characterized in the postwar period by a striving for world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles: that the United States has the right to lead the world. All the forces of American diplomacy—the army, the air force, the navy, industry, and science—are enlisted in the service of this foreign policy. For this purpose broad plans for expansion have been developed and are being implemented through diplomacy and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases stretching far beyond the boundaries of the United States, through the arms race, and through the creation of ever newer types of weapons....

Europe has come out of the war with a completely dislocated economy, and the economic devastation that occurred in the course of the war cannot be overcome in a short time. All of the countries of Europe and Asia are experiencing a colossal need for consumer goods, industrial and transportation equipment, etc. Such a situation provides American monopolistic capital with prospects for enormous shipments of goods and the importation of capital into these countries—a circumstance that would permit it to infiltrate their national economies.

Such a development would mean serious strengthening of the economic position of the United States in the whole world and would be a stage on the road to world domination by the United States....

The foreign policy of the United States is not determined at present by the circles in the Democratic party that (as was the case during Roosevelt's lifetime) strive to strengthen the cooperation of the three great powers that constituted the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition during the war. The ascendance to power of President Truman, a politically unstable person but with certain conservative tendencies, and the subsequent appointment of [James F.] Byrnes as Secretary of State meant a strengthening of the influence on U.S. foreign policy of the most reactionary circles of the Democratic party. The constantly increasing reactionary nature of the foreign policy course of the United States, which consequently approached the policy advocated by the Republican party, laid the groundwork for close cooperation in this field between the far right wing of the Democratic party and the Republican party....

At the same time, there has been a decline in the influence on foreign policy of those who follow Roosevelt's course for cooperation among peace-loving countries. Such persons in the government, in Congress, and in the leadership of the Democratic party are being pushed farther and farther into the background. The contradictions in the field of foreign policy existing between the

From Nikolai Novikov, *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946*, ed. Kenneth M. Jensen; trans. Kenneth M. Jensen and John Glad. Copyright © by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 1991. Used with permission by the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

followers of [Henry] Wallace and [Senator Claude] Pepper, on the one hand, and the adherents of the reactionary "bi-partisan" policy, on the other, were manifested with great clarity recently in the speech by Wallace that led to his resignation from the post of Secretary of Commerce. Wallace's resignation means the victory of the reactionary course that Byrnes is conducting in cooperation with [Senator Arthur] Vandenberg and [Senator Robert] Taft.

Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world dominance are also to be found in the increases in military potential in peacetime and in the establishment of a large number of naval air bases both in the United States and beyond its borders.

In the summer of 1946, for the first time in the history of the country, Congress passed a law on the establishment of a peacetime army, not on a volunteer basis but on the basis of universal military service. The size of the army, which is supposed to amount to about one million persons as of July 1, 1947, was also increased significantly. The size of the navy at the conclusion of the war decreased quite insignificantly in comparison with wartime. At the present time, the American navy occupies first place in the world, leaving England's navy far behind, to say nothing of those of other countries.

Expenditures on the army and navy have risen colossally, amounting to 13 billion dollars according to the budget for 1946-47 (about 40 percent of the total budget of 36 billion dollars). This is more than ten times greater than corresponding expenditures in the budget for 1938, which did not amount to even one billion dollars.

Along with maintaining a large army, navy, and air force, the budget provides that these enormous amounts also will be spent on establishing a very extensive system of naval and air bases in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. According to existing official plans, in the course of the next few years 228 bases, points of support, and radio stations are to be constructed in the Atlantic Ocean and 258 in the Pacific....

The establishment of American bases on the islands that are often 10,000 to 12,000 kilometers from the territory of the United States and are on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans clearly indicates the offensive nature of the strategic concepts of the commands of the U.S. army and navy. This interpretation is also confirmed by the fact that the American navy is intensively studying the naval approaches to the boundaries of Europe. For this purpose, American naval vessels in the course of 1946 visited the ports of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, and Greece. In addition, the American navy is constantly operating in the Mediterranean Sea.

All of these facts show clearly that a decisive role in the realization of plans for world dominance by the United States is played by its armed forces.

One of the stages in the achievement of dominance over the world by the United States is its understanding with England concerning the partial division of the world on the basis of mutual concessions. The basic lines of the secret agreement between the United States and England regarding the division of the world consist, as shown by facts, in their agreement on the inclusion of Japan and China in the sphere of influence of the United States in the Far East, while the

United States, for its part, has agreed not to hinder England either in resolving the Indian problem or in strengthening its influence in Siam and Indonesia.

In connection with this division, the United States at the present time is in control of China and Japan without any interference from England....

In recent years American capital has penetrated very intensively into the economy of the Near Eastern countries, in particular into the oil industry. At present there are American oil concessions in all of the Near Eastern countries that have oil deposits (Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). American capital, which made its first appearance in the oil industry of the Near East only in 1927, now controls about 42 percent of all proven reserves in the Near East, excluding Iran. Of the total proven reserves of 26.8 billion barrels, over 11 billion barrels are owned by U.S. concessions. Striving to ensure further development of their concessions in different countries (which are often very large—Saudi Arabia, for example), the American oil companies plan to build a trans-Arabian pipeline to transport oil from the American concession in Saudi Arabia and in other countries on the southeastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea to ports in Palestine and Egypt....

The "hard-line" policy with regard to the U.S.S.R. announced by [Secretary of State James F.] Byrnes after the rapprochement of the reactionary Democrats with the Republicans is at present the main obstacle on the road to cooperation of the Great Powers. It consists mainly of the fact that in the postwar period the United States no longer follows a policy of strengthening cooperation among the Big Three (or Four) but rather has striven to undermine the unity of these countries. The objective has been to impose the will of other countries on the Soviet Union. This is precisely the tenor of the policy of certain countries, which is being carried out with the blessing of the United States, to undermine or completely abolish the principle of the veto in the Security Council of the United Nations. This would give the United States opportunities to form among the Great Powers narrow groupings and blocs directed primarily against the Soviet Union, and thus to split the United Nations. Rejection of the veto by the Great Powers would transform the United Nations into an Anglo-Saxon domain in which the United States would play the leading role.

The present policy of the American government with regard to the U.S.S.R. is also directed at limiting or dislodging the influence of the Soviet Union from neighboring countries. In implementing this policy in former enemy or Allied countries adjacent to the U.S.S.R., the United States attempts, at various international conferences or directly in these countries themselves, to support reactionary forces with the purpose of creating obstacles to the process of democratization of these countries. In so doing, it also attempts to secure positions for the penetration of American capital into their economies....

One of the most important elements in the general policy of the United States, which is directed toward limiting the international role of the U.S.S.R. in the postwar world, is the policy with regard to Germany. In Germany, the United States is taking measures to strengthen reactionary forces for the purpose of opposing democratic reconstruction. Furthermore, it displays special insistence

on accompanying this policy with completely inadequate measures for the demilitarization of Germany.

The American occupation policy does not have the objective of eliminating the remnants of German Fascism and rebuilding German political life on a democratic basis, so that Germany might cease to exist as an aggressive force. The United States is not taking measures to eliminate the monopolistic associations of German industrialists on which German Fascism depended in preparing aggression and waging war. Neither is any agrarian reform being conducted to eliminate large landholders, who were also a reliable support for the Hitlerites. Instead, the United States is considering the possibility of terminating the Allied occupation of German territory before the main tasks of the occupation—the demilitarization and democratization of Germany—have been implemented. This would create the prerequisites for the revival of an imperialist Germany, which the United States plans to use in a future war on its side. One cannot help seeing that such a policy has a clearly outlined anti-Soviet edge and constitutes a serious danger to the cause of peace....

5. President Harry S. Truman Declares World Split Into Two Ways of Life, 1947

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress.

The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.

The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.

I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious, peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.

When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five percent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings.

As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible....

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.

Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore order to the government throughout Greek territory.

Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy....

No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents 85 percent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.

The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.

Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.

Since the war Turkey has sought additional financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the *status quo* is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the *status quo* in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

*Contagious +
can spread*

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war. *to deny them asst. would be detrimental*

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East....

6. Senator Joseph McCarthy Charges the Democrats Are "Soft on Communism," 1950

The great difference between our western Christian world and the atheistic Communist world is not political, gentlemen, it is moral. For instance, the Marxian idea of confiscating the land and factories and running the entire economy as a single enterprise is momentous. Likewise, Lenin's invention of the one-party police state as a way to make Marx's idea work is hardly less momentous.

Stalin's resolute putting across of these two ideas, of course, did much to divide the world. With only these differences, however, the east and west could most certainly still live in peace.

The real, basic difference, however, lies in the religion of immoralism—invented by Marx, preached feverishly by Lenin, and carried to unimaginable extremes by Stalin. This religion of immoralism, if the Red half of the world triumphs—and well it may, gentlemen—this religion of immoralism will more deeply wound and damage mankind than any conceivable economic or political system.

Karl Marx dismissed God as a hoax, and Lenin and Stalin have added in clear-cut, unmistakable language their resolve that no nation, no people who believe in a god, can exist side by side with their communistic state.

Karl Marx, for example, expelled people from his Communist Party for mentioning such things as love, justice, humanity[,] or morality. He called this "soulful ravings" and "sloppy sentimentality."

While Lincoln was a relatively young man in his late thirties, Karl Marx boasted that the Communist specter was haunting Europe. Since that time, hundreds of millions of people and vast areas of the world have come under Communist domination. Today, less than 100 years after Lincoln's death, Stalin brags that this Communist specter is not only haunting the world, but is about to completely subjugate it.

Today we are engaged in a final all-out battle between communistic atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as the time, and ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down—they are truly down.

Lest there be any doubt that the time has been chosen, let us go directly to the leader of communism today—Joseph Stalin. Here is what he said—not back in 1928, not before the war, not during the war—but 2 years after the last war was ended: “To think that the Communist revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of a Christian democracy, means one has either gone out of one’s mind and lost all normal understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the Communist revolution.”

This is what was said by Lenin in 1919—and quoted with approval by Stalin in 1947:

“We are living,” says Lenin, “not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with Christian states for a long time is unthinkable—one or the other must triumph in the end. And that before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.”

Ladies and gentlemen, can there be anyone tonight who is so blind as to say that the war is not on? Can there be anyone who fails to realize that the Communist world has said the time is now—that this is the time for the slowdown between the democratic Christian world and the communistic atheistic world?

Unless we face this fact, we shall pay the price that must be paid by those who wait too long.

Six years ago, at the time of the first conference to map out the peace, there was within the Soviet orbit, 180,000,000 people. Lined up on the anti-totalitarian side there were in the world at that time, roughly 1,625,000,000 people. Today, only 6 years later, there are 80,000,000,000 [*sic*] people under the absolute domination of Soviet Russia—an increase of over 400 percent. On our side, the figure has shrunk to around 500,000 [*sic*]. In other words, in less than 6 years the odds have changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 1 against us.

This indicates the swiftness of the tempo of Communist victories and American defeats in the cold war. As one of our outstanding historical figures once said, “When a great democracy is destroyed, it will not be from enemies without, but rather because of enemies within.”

The truth of this statement is becoming terrifyingly clear as we see this country each day losing on every front.

At war’s end we were physically the strongest nation on earth—and at least potentially the most powerful intellectually and morally. Ours could have been the honor of being a beacon in the desert of destruction—shining proof that civilization was not yet ready to destroy itself. Unfortunately, we have failed miserably and tragically to arise to the opportunity.

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores—but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate, or members of minority groups who have been traitorous to this Nation—but rather those who have had all the

benefits that the wealthiest Nation on earth has had to offer—the finest homes, the finest college education and the finest jobs in government we can give.

This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been most traitorous.... And, ladies and gentlemen, while I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as active members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205—a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State [Dean Acheson] as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.

One thing to remember in discussing the Communists in our Government is that we are not dealing with spies who get 30 pieces of silver to steal the blueprints of a new weapon. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.

7. The President's Advisers Urge Military Expansion (NSC-68), April 1950

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions—the Russian and the Chinese—of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires—the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese—and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.

On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions....

Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.

This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid and contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are trying to do.

The policy of striving to develop a healthy international community is the long-term constructive effort which we are engaged in. It was this policy which gave rise to our vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations. It is of course the principal reason for our long continuing endeavors to create and now develop the Inter-American system. It, as much as containment, underlay our efforts to rehabilitate Western Europe. Most of our international economic activities can likewise be explained in terms of this policy.

In a world of polarized power, the policies designed to develop a healthy international community are more than ever necessary to our own strength....

A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives. It would probably involve:

1. The development of an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives.
2. A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks listed [below].
3. A substantial increase in military assistance programs, designed to foster cooperative efforts, which will adequately and efficiently meet the requirements of our allies for the tasks referred to [below]...
4. Some increase in economic assistance programs and recognition of the need to continue these programs until their purposes have been accomplished.
5. A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.

6. Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.
7. Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.
8. Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.
9. Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.
10. Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs.
11. Increased taxes....

Conclusions and Recommendations

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In turn, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development....

In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans, however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States' political, economic, and military objectives which is now imperative.

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in

the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discovered one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments....

The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin—for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.

8. Hollywood Screenwriter Lillian Hellman Defies Anticommunist Investigators, 1952

As you know, I am under subpoena to appear before your Committee on May 21, 1952.

I am most willing to answer all questions about myself. I have nothing to hide from your Committee and there is nothing in my life of which I am ashamed. I have been advised by counsel that under the Fifth Amendment I have a constitutional privilege to decline to answer any questions about my political opinions, activities and associations, on the grounds of self-incrimination. I do not wish to claim this privilege. I am ready and willing to testify before the representatives of

Hellman letter to John Stephen Wood, House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, "Hearings Regarding Communist Infiltration of the Hollywood Motion-Picture Industry," May 21, 1952, in Ellen Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1994), 201–202.

our Government as to my own opinions and my own actions, regardless of any risks or consequences to myself.

But I am advised by counsel that if I answer the Committee's questions about myself, I must also answer questions about other people and that if I refuse to do so, I can be cited for contempt. My counsel tells me that if I answer questions about myself, I will have waived my rights under the Fifth Amendment and could be forced legally to answer questions about others. This is very difficult for a layman to understand. But there is one principle that I do understand: I am not willing, now or in the future, to bring bad trouble to people who, in my past association with them, were completely innocent of any talk or any action that was disloyal or subversive. I do not like subversion or disloyalty in any form and if I had ever seen any I would have considered it my duty to have reported it to the proper authorities. But to hurt innocent people whom I knew many years ago in order to save myself is, to me, inhuman and indecent and dishonorable. I cannot and will not cut my conscience to fit this year's fashions, even though I long ago came to the conclusion that I was not a political person and could have no comfortable place in any political group.

I was raised in an old-fashioned American tradition and there were certain homely things that were taught to me: to try to tell the truth, not to bear false witness, not to harm my neighbor, to be loyal to my country, and so on. In general, I respected these ideals of Christian honor and did as well with them as I knew how. It is my belief that you will agree with these simple rules of human decency and will not expect me to violate the good American tradition from which they spring. I would, therefore, like to come before you and speak of myself.

I am prepared to waive the privilege against self-incrimination and to tell you anything you wish to know about my views or actions if your Committee will agree to refrain from asking me to name other people. If the Committee is unwilling to give me this assurance, I will be forced to plead the privilege of the Fifth Amendment at the hearing.

❖ ESSAYS

The United States and the Soviet Union formed a formidable alliance during the Second World War, when the combination of American industrial prowess and the tenacity of the Soviet military gradually eviscerated Nazi Germany. When Germany surrendered in May 1945, the two countries promised to maintain their partnership and to build a new era of world peace. Within a few years, however, the United States and the Soviet Union had become bitter enemies in a new global confrontation dubbed the Cold War. The two superpowers opposed each other in Europe, the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and ultimately many other spots around the world. But they also waged the cold war at home, devoting enormous energy to stamping out suspected espionage and sabotage within their own borders.

Why did the United States commit itself to fight communism with such vigor in the years following the Second World War? The question has generated a massive body of writing over the years. The following essays, drawing on newly available source material, offer clear but balanced interpretations of matters that remain contentious. In the first selection, Melvyn P. Leffler of the University of Virginia explains the process by which Washington and Moscow abandoned their wartime partnership and became fierce rivals. Leffler strives not to blame either side for the outbreak of the Cold War but to show that U.S.-Soviet hostility resulted from the interplay of irreconcilable goals for the postwar international order. In the second essay, Yeshiva University historian Ellen Schrecker shifts the focus to the domestic sphere, explaining why Americans became consumed by fears of communism in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the heyday of "McCarthyism."

Incompatible Visions of the Postwar Era

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

Like most Americans during [World War II], Truman focused his attention on the spectacular rise in America's defense production, industrial capability, and strategic power. By the end of 1942, the United States was producing more arms than all the Axis states together. During 1943 it made almost three times as many armaments as did Soviet Russia. During the remainder of the conflict, the United States turned out two-thirds of all the Allied military equipment used in the war: 297,000 aircraft, 193,000 artillery pieces, 86,000 tanks, 2 million army trucks. By the end of the war, it had the capability to produce almost 100,000 planes and 30,000 tanks a year. In four years, overall industrial production doubled; the machine-tool industry trebled. In 1945, the United States had two-thirds of the world's gold reserves, three-fourths of its invested capital, half of its shipping vessels, and half of its manufacturing capacity. Its gross national product was three times that of the Soviet Union and more than five times that of Great Britain. It was also nearing completion of the atomic bomb, a technological and production feat of huge costs and proportions.

Truman went to the Potsdam Conference knowing these facts. He was not eager to cross the ocean to meet his wartime allies, Churchill and Stalin. "How I hate this trip," he confided in his diary. "But I have to make it ... and we must win." The war in Europe was over, and it was critical to begin talking about postwar settlements for Germany and eastern Europe. It was even more critical to talk to Stalin about the war in the Pacific. Truman wanted Stalin to make good on his promise at Yalta to declare war on Japan within three months of Germany's defeat. If Russians attacked Japanese troops on the Chinese mainland, the Japanese emperor would have fewer troops to kill Americans when they invaded the home islands. This was of utmost importance to Truman, as his

plans for the Potsdam Conference were made before the atomic bomb was secretly and successfully tested in New Mexico on 16 July.

Yet Truman was not comfortable fighting wars and planning peace. He knew little of these matters. He read report after report, memo after memo, but diplomacy baffled him. He was inexperienced, and he knew it. "I was so scared," he wrote Bess from Potsdam. "I didn't know whether things were going according to Hoyle or not." His closest associates recognized that he was nervous, uneasy, and insecure. Sometimes he answered so quickly, almost before they finished their questions. At such points, Truman thought he was demonstrating strength, but he was revealing weakness, at least to those who cared most about him.

Truman wanted to get along with Stalin. Some advisers, such as W. Averell Harriman, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union; Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal; and Admiral William Leahy, the wartime chief of staff, wanted him to take a tough stand against the Soviet Union. They told Truman that the Russians were looting eastern Germany and imposing communist regimes in eastern Europe. But Truman felt no passion about these matters, no deep empathy for peoples he neither knew nor understood. Stalin was a dictator, for sure, but one who, Truman felt, had the support of the Russian people. If not, they would not have fought so tenaciously; so let's get along, he jotted in his diary. Truman knew the Soviets were looting eastern Europe, but they had also been "thoroughly looted by the Germans over and over again and you can hardly blame them for their attitude." Truman knew the Soviets were seeking to set up police governments, but he felt that Stalin would eventually bow to American pressure on this issue. He had seen the Kremlin make concessions on the eve of Potsdam. "Yesterday was a hectic day," he wrote to his wife on 7 June 1945. "Had both good news and bad. Stalin agreed to our interpretation of the veto at San Francisco and a reconsideration of the Polish question, but we lost the election in Montana and the Republicans are jubilant over it."

Equating the travail of the Polish people with the disappointment of Democrats in Montana, as he did, he was perfectly well disposed to deal with Stalin. "I want you to understand," he told his good friend Joseph Davies, the pro-Soviet former U.S. ambassador to the Kremlin, "that I am trying my best to save peace and to follow out Roosevelt's plan." The plan was to sustain cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union and to avoid a postwar rift. But Truman's gut instincts demanded that agreement be on American terms. He told Harriman, "We could not, of course, expect to get 100 percent of what we wanted but... on important matters... we should be able to get 85 percent." Truman intended to protect American interests, even if he didn't have a precise definition of them. He had no particular sense of gratitude to the Russians for their war losses, no particular reverence for Churchill or the British for their heroism, no particular empathy for the plight of European people engulfed by the Depression and war. After several days of meetings at Potsdam with Stalin and Churchill, he wrote, rather proudly, to his wife:

We had a tough meeting yesterday. I reared up on my hind legs and told 'em where to get off and they got off. I have to make it perfectly

plain to them at least once a day that so far as this president is concerned Santa Claus is dead and that my first interest is U.S.A., then I want the Jap War won and I want 'em both in it. Then I want peace—world peace and will do waht can be done by us to get it. But certainly am not going to set up another [illegible] here in Europe, pay reparations, feed the world, and get nothing for it but a nose thumbing. They are beginning to awake to the fact that I mean business.

Business meant getting along with the Russians and protecting U.S. interest. "I like Stalin," he wrote his wife. "He is straightforward. Knows what he wants and will compromise when he can't get it." Differences over important issues were to be expected. Truman felt no outrage about Stalin's record of repression. Not all the horror of Stalin's rule, of course, was then known, but the purges and killing of high party officials were a matter of public record, as was the ruthless suppression of kulaks and other opponents of the regime. Yet none of this mattered too much to the president. Even many years later, he acknowledged that at the time "I liked him a lot.... Stalin was a very gracious host, and at the table, he would grasp what was going on as quickly as anybody I ever came in contact with." Those who believe the Cold War was inevitable because of Western horror at Stalin's cruelty are disregarding the contemporary record; those who believe that Truman immediately started the Cold War because of the advice and pressure of anti-Soviet advisers are mistaken. Stalin, Truman thought, was someone you could deal with. He would respect American power. Agreement was still possible.

Truman believed in American power and American righteousness. So did his newly appointed secretary of state, James F. Byrnes. Byrnes was a long-time Washington power broker, a former conservative senator from South Carolina, Supreme Court justice, and wartime overlord of the American economy. Truman liked Byrnes, who had befriended him as a new senator in the mid-1930s, and thought him shrewd, knowledgeable, and tough. He let Byrnes do most of the contentious bargaining at Potsdam on German reparations, Polish borders, and the composition of the new governments in Eastern Europe. Once Stalin agreed in the first days of the conference to attack Japan, Truman felt satisfied. "I've gotten what I came for," he confided to Bess on July 18. "Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it.... I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed. That's the important thing."

To Truman and Byrnes, the atomic bomb meant more than the weapon that could defeat Japan and save American lives. It was a vast new instrument of American power. Truman went to Potsdam not knowing it would work; Admiral Leahy said it wouldn't; Byrnes thought it might "but he wasn't sure." By all accounts, and there are many, news of the successful testing of the bomb enormously buoyed Truman's self-confidence. It "took a great load off my mind," he confided to Joe Davies. The president did not order the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima to impress the Russians, as some historians claim;

did not want to be the one to start war on Japan
Compassion
man

not the sole reason but an additional factor

but nevertheless he believed that it would impress them and make them more manageable.

At Potsdam, Truman quietly took Stalin aside and elliptically mentioned that the United States had a powerful new weapon to use against Japan. Nothing more needed to be said. Nor did all the pressing issues have to be resolved at Potsdam. Truman was eager to go home. He grew impatient with the incessant haggling at the conference. Stalin, he thought, was stalling. He “doesn’t know it,” Truman again wrote his wife, “but I have an ace in the hole and another one showing—so unless he has threes or two pair (and I know he has not) we are sitting all right.” The “atomic bomb,” Byrnes also was thinking, “had given us great power, and... in the last analysis, it would control.”

When Truman ordered that atomic bombs be dropped on Hiroshima and then Nagasaki, these were not tough decisions for him. They were necessary, in his mind, to save American lives. They vividly demonstrated American power; they confirmed that enemies of America would pay for their transgressions. The Japanese did pay, and then they capitulated, unconditionally, except for the preservation of the emperor. They had little choice, for Stalin’s troops attacked at the same time, seized parts of Manchuria, invaded northern Korea, and set their sights on Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost home island.

The war ended. The American people celebrated. Truman breathed a sigh of relief. He now eagerly delegated the responsibility for peacemaking to Secretary of State Byrnes, who he thought had performed ably at Potsdam. Truman wanted to turn his own attention to demobilization, reconversion, and the domestic issues he knew and understood. Byrnes for his part was eager to take command of the nation’s foreign policy. He was sure of himself. The atomic bomb, he told his closest colleagues, was a great weapon that could be used to exact concessions from potential adversaries. But experienced colleagues in the State and War departments had their doubts. They deeply resented Byrnes’s attempts to monopolize American diplomacy. Many of them left office in September and October 1945, however, exhausted from years of wartime responsibility, and Byrnes was now in charge.

Byrnes was not as shrewd as he thought he was, nor was the Soviet Union easily threatened. At the first postwar meeting of foreign ministers in London in September, Byrnes thought he could outmaneuver Molotov and arrange for more representative governments in Romania and Bulgaria. But Molotov chafed at Byrnes’s procedural moves and sneered at his not very subtle efforts to use America’s atomic monopoly to leverage concessions. In fact, the Soviet foreign minister was willing to negotiate on some of these points—that is, until Stalin ordered him to stiffen his resolve. Let the conference end in deadlock, Stalin wired Molotov....

By the end of 1945 Stalin and Truman were eyeing each other warily. They were both angry with their foreign ministers for inclining toward compromise. They felt that their respective nations had the power and the right to forge a new international order that would enhance their security and their ideals. They were not inclined to tolerate opposition. But they also grasped that confrontation made little sense. They had more to gain from sustaining the alliance

than from rupturing it, though cooperation was logical only if it served national interests. During 1946, they wavered between toughness and conciliation.

Stalin distrusted capitalists, and fear of encirclement by them was a constant in his thinking. Nonetheless, he had worked collaboratively with Roosevelt and Churchill during the war, thinking the conflict would end with Germany's dismemberment and a secure periphery. But then, suddenly, Roosevelt had died and Truman dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, Stalin was shaken by Roosevelt's passing. He was wary of Truman, but not disinclined to cooperate with him. Yet Truman had great power and used it.

Stalin immediately interpreted Hiroshima as atomic blackmail against the U.S.S.R. "Hiroshima has shaken the whole world," he said. "The balance has been destroyed." He thought the Americans and the British were backtracking on the promise they had given at Yalta to allow the Russians to rule their sphere as they liked. "They want to force us to accept their plans on questions affecting Europe and the world. Well, that's not going to happen," Stalin told his closest confidants. Even before Truman told Byrnes to stop babying the Soviets, Stalin told Molotov that in dealing with the Americans and the British, "we cannot achieve anything serious if we begin to give in to intimidation or betray uncertainty. To get anything from this kind of partner, we must arm ourselves with the policy of tenacity and steadfastness."

On 9 February 1946, Stalin gave a famous "election" address at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow, transmitted by radio to every part of the Soviet Union. Reviving the ideological language that was his lodestar, he said the war had not been an accident, nor was it the product of the mistakes of statesmen. "The war arose in reality as the inevitable result of the development of the world economic and political forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism." Perhaps peace could be preserved if capitalists redistributed markets and raw materials without conflict, "but this is impossible under the present capitalist development of the world economy."

The Soviet Union had become ensnared in this intracapitalist conflict, but World War II was "radically different" from World War I. The fascist states had extinguished "democratic liberties" in their own countries, established "cruel, terrorist regimes," and sought "world domination." "As far as our country is concerned," Stalin said, "the war was the most cruel and hard of all wars ever experienced in the history of our motherland." But it proved the superiority of the socialist system, the vitality of the multinational state, and the resiliency and heroism of the Red Army. The war also demonstrated the wisdom of collectivization and industrialization. "The party remembered Lenin's word that without heavy industry it would be impossible to safeguard the independence of our country, that without it the Soviet system could perish." Hence the need "to organize a new mighty upsurge of the national economy," seeking the production of fifty million tons of pig iron annually, sixty million tons of steel, five hundred million tons of coal, and sixty million tons of oil. Alluding implicitly to the atomic bomb, Stalin said that science, too, had to be promoted "to surpass the achievements" of other countries. "Only under such conditions will our country be insured against any eventuality."

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Stalin's ideological preconceptions and personal paranoia made him suspect enemies everywhere. As the war drew to a close he confided: "The crisis of capitalism has manifested itself in the division of the capitalists into two factions—one fascist, the other democratic.... We are currently allied with one faction against the other, but in the future we will be against the first faction of capitalists, too." Suspicious of the capitalists, fearful of Germany and Japan, and proud of Soviet achievements, he would be satisfied with nothing less than a friendly periphery. He wanted "to consolidate Soviet territorial gains, establish a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe, and have a voice in the political fate of Germany and—if possible—of Japan." He wanted security, and hoped to get it without rupturing the grand alliance.

This explains why he was so furious with Churchill's speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, when the former British prime minister declared that Stalin was building an iron curtain from the Baltic to the Balkans. "The following circumstances should not be forgotten," Stalin stated in a *Pravda* interview. "The Germans made their invasion of the USSR through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Germans were able to make their invasion through these countries because at the time, governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries." As a result millions of people in Russia died, many more than from the United States and the United Kingdom combined. Perhaps Churchill was inclined to forget these colossal sacrifices, but Stalin could not. "What can be surprising," Stalin fumed, "about the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, is trying to see to it that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries?"

Stalin thought the Americans and the British were maneuvering to squeeze the Soviet Union out of Germany, undermine its position of power in eastern Europe, and deny it the ten billion dollars in reparations it thought it had been promised at the Yalta Conference. Soviet officials looked cynically upon the four-power German demilitarization treaty that Byrnes repeatedly proposed. Even Maxim Litvinov, the prewar foreign minister who was known for his pro-Western orientation, expressed dismay about U.S. motives. In July 1945, Litvinov had noted that the Ruhr and other industrial parts of western Germany, now in French, American, and British hands, produced 75 percent of Germany's coal and 70 percent of its steel and pig iron. The industry of the Ruhr, he warned, could be completely restored within one year and could support an army of several million soldiers. "If a serious conflict escalates between us and Western states, we will not be able to prevent the Western powers from turning the Ruhr region into a supply base either for Germans, whom they would enlist as Allies, or for their own armed forces." The Americans, Litvinov believed, were seeking to dupe the Russians by creating the impression that Soviet security could be guaranteed through this demilitarization treaty. In his view, which Stalin shared, Byrnes was trying to lay the groundwork for the most dangerous scenario imaginable, a premature termination of the occupation of Germany.

It was not only that Stalin imagined threats; there *were* threats. Famine stalked his country. Unrest pulsed through the lands he annexed. Low-scale insurgencies and guerrilla war challenged his rule in the countries the Red

Army occupied. Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian documents make it clear that Stalin and his internal security services "were profoundly concerned" with how Churchill's Fulton speech might buoy the morale of rebels and insurgents. Speculation about a third world war between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians percolated through the resistance movements against Soviet power and inspired Ukrainian and other nationalists to imagine that in a new world conflict they might be liberated. "Throughout Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, Churchill's Fulton speech was like a call to arms," or so it seemed inside the Kremlin and among Stalin's police chieftains.

Ideology conditioned Stalin's thinking, but his suspicions were reinforced by experience and reality. In Romania, Poland, the Balkans, Ukraine, and Turkey, British and American officials conducted clandestine operations, albeit on a small scale, to nurture unrest and establish ties with opposition leaders. Of course, Stalin's brutal repression, his transfer of subject nationalities, and his wrangling for bits of Iranian and Turkish territory also fomented instability and encouraged the policies that exacerbated his suspicions.

Yet Stalin was not embarked on a cold war. He was vacillating, saying contradictory things, pursuing divergent policies. Historians violently argue about Stalin's motivations and his goals precisely because his rhetoric and his actions were so inconsistent. In 1993, when Soviet documents from this period were first becoming available, the Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad wrote, "Stalin's foreign policy is not as much inexplicable in its parts as incoherent in its whole." This description seems even truer now, in view of still more documents that have been brought to light.

For although Stalin delayed the withdrawal of his troops from northern Iran, asked for new rights in the Turkish Straits, and installed progressively more communist governments in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, he also withdrew Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and from the island of Bornholm in the Baltic; allowed free elections in the Soviet occupation zone in Austria and in parts of Hungary and Czechoslovakia; pulled Soviet troops out of Manchuria; and continued to discourage revolution or communist seizures of power in Greece, Italy, and France. In Germany, Stalin consolidated the Soviet hold over the Soviet occupation zone yet talked repeatedly, both privately and publicly, about honoring the Potsdam pledges to keep Germany unified and demilitarized. He told the German communists whom he had placed in power in Berlin to cease radical actions and plan for a unified Germany. He instructed them to join with Social Democrats in a new Socialist Unity Party (SED) and to position themselves to win elections in all four occupation zones. Yet the actions of Soviet armies in eastern Germany brutalized the people and eroded any popular support the communists might have garnered. Stalin, writes Norman Naimark, an eminent historian of Stalin's European policies, "had no firm plan for post-war Europe, not even what we would call today a 'road map.' ... He was too tactically inclined for that" and too responsive to local circumstances and unforeseen developments.

Stalin did not want a rift with the Western powers. Agreement with the United States, he told Polish communists in late 1945, was still possible. Knowing that his election speech of 6 February 1946 had been interpreted in the West

to mean that he was surrendering the wartime alliance and resuming an ideological offensive, Stalin made repeated public and private efforts to clarify his views. After telling the new U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Walter Bedell Smith, that he believed the United States and Britain were united to thwart Soviet Russia, he insisted that he wanted to cooperate with them. "We should not be alarmed or apprehensive," said Stalin, "because of differences of opinion and arguments which occur in families and even between brothers because with patience and good will these differences would be reconciled." He said the same to Labour delegates and to journalists from Great Britain. There will be no war, he told Alexander Werth, the correspondent of Britain's *Sunday Times*. "I absolutely believe," he said, in the possibility of long-standing cooperation with his wartime allies. "Communism in one country is entirely possible, especially in such a country as the Soviet Union." If he had been seeking to orchestrate opinion against the Americans and British, it is hard to comprehend why he would have permitted such interviews to be printed in the Soviet press. And in his last meeting in January 1946 with departing U.S. ambassador Averell Harriman, just two weeks before his Bolshoi speech, Stalin told him, "As to our foreign policy conceptions, the Soviet Union and the United States can find a common language." He then inquired whether it might still be feasible to get a large loan from the United States, as previously had been promised. He made clear that he would not make political concessions in return for the loan, but the money was still needed for postwar reconstruction. It would take six or seven years, he admitted, to restore the devastated districts of western Russia.

But Stalin wanted Western cooperation also in order to control the possible revival of German and Japanese power. He was angered that the United States so blatantly monopolized the occupation of Japan, a nation that he deemed a perennial threat to Russia, and he could not accept American indifference to his strategic imperatives. He wanted to be treated as a partner, albeit a junior one. In Germany, understanding that the Western allies would not agree to dismembering the country into separate zones and believing they were maneuvering to harness the Western zones' latent power to serve Western interests, Stalin shifted course. In mid-1945, he started to champion German unification and to favor German economic revival. His aim was a unified, demilitarized Germany in the Soviet sphere of influence, which he now believed would compete with Britain and America and constrain their domination of the international economy. Still, a unified, revived Germany might also maneuver out of control and join a Western capitalist alliance against Soviet Russia, or it might act independently, rearm, and aim for revenge and territorial revision. Conciliating the Germans, Stalin grasped, might make Germany less revanchist, but it would be risky. Hence cooperation with the Americans and the British was imperative, however suspicious he might be. At the very least, he knew that cooperation was indispensable if he was to get reparations from the western zones of Germany, which he desperately wanted for Russian reconstruction.

A unified Germany, with all its attendant uncertainties, also made it more imperative to dominate the Soviet Union's Eastern European borderlands. Hence throughout 1946 and 1947, Stalin ordered Molotov to work with Byrnes

and British foreign minister Ernest Bevin to complete peace treaties with the Eastern European nations that had fought with Germany during the war. Stalin wanted, writes one of Hungary's leading Cold War historians, to foster a communist "takeover in East Central Europe by peaceful means, while preserving Soviet-Western cooperation as well."

Truman did not know how to deal with these twists and turns in Soviet policy, with the signs of truculence and the contrary evidence of self-restraint. In February 1946, his ablest diplomat in Moscow, George F. Kennan, sent a long telegram to Washington, saying that "at the bottom of the Kremlin's view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity." The Soviets, Kennan concluded, did not believe in the possibility of any permanent reconciliation with the West. But Ambassador Harriman left Moscow at about the same time with a typically ambivalent view of the Soviet dictator:

It is hard for me to reconcile the courtesy and consideration that he showed me personally with the ghastly cruelty of his wholesale liquidations. Others, who did not know him personally, see only the tyrant in Stalin. I saw the other side as well—his high intelligence, that fantastic grasp of detail, his shrewdness and his surprising human sensitivity that he was capable of showing, at least in the war years. I found him better informed than Roosevelt, more realistic than Churchill, in some ways the most effective of the war leaders.... I must confess that for me Stalin remains the most inscrutable and contradictory character I have known—and leave the final word to the judgment of history.

President Truman did not have the luxury of waiting for the judgment of history, of course. He had to make decisions in real time. He, too, wavered. He was angry with Byrnes's temporizing. He was outraged by news of Soviet wartime espionage against the Allies. He liked Churchill's tough words in his Fulton address. He told the Soviets to get out of northern Iran. He instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up contingency war plans. He encouraged Byrnes to unite the British and American zones in western Germany, to ameliorate conditions there, and to win the support of the German people. If the Kremlin objected to Anglo-American moves, their views could be ignored.

But Truman did not seek a showdown. He recognized the unrepresentative, Soviet-imposed governments in Romania and Bulgaria. In late 1945, he asked General George C. Marshall, the renowned wartime army chief of staff, to go to China to work out a settlement between the Communists and Nationalists there. He encouraged Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and his aides to work on a plan for the international control of atomic energy. He continued to oversee the demobilization of U.S. forces. He instructed Byrnes, much as Stalin instructed Molotov, to finish the peace treaties regarding Eastern Europe, Italy, and Finland. He wanted General Lucius D. Clay, the deputy military governor in Germany, to keep meeting with his Soviet, British, and French counterparts on plans for the nation's unification. Truman's closest aides, Clark Clifford and George Elsey, drew up a long report in the summer of 1946 claiming that the Soviet Union was not simply chiseling on its earlier agreements, as the

president already believed, but intent on world domination. When Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace remonstrated against this view and spoke publicly in behalf of a more conciliatory policy toward the Kremlin, Truman fired him. Yet at the same time, the president locked the Clifford-Elsey report in a safe and bided his time.

Truman was not eager to sunder the great wartime coalition he had inherited from Roosevelt. A breakdown would complicate his domestic priorities and weaken his party. Strife with the Soviet Union, Truman knew, would require foreign aid to beleaguered countries, more defense spending, fewer tax reductions, and spiraling inflation. Republicans were already lambasting him for rising prices, labor unrest, and high taxes: Notwithstanding the consensus among his foreign-policy advisers that the Soviet Union was a great threat, Truman did not quite know what to do. After his party suffered a humiliating defeat in the congressional elections of November 1946, he asked General Marshall to become his secretary of state, but gave him no marching orders, and the general himself was known for his prudence and restraint. Marshall did not want confrontation. He wanted to negotiate a German peace treaty with the Russians. Before he arrived in Moscow, however, worsening international conditions dashed any lingering hopes for a sustained *détente*....

Neither Truman nor Stalin wanted a cold war. Yet it came. Why?

The Cold War came because conditions in the international system created risks that Truman and Stalin could not accept and opportunities they could not resist. Neither the president of the most powerful country the world had ever known nor the cruelest dictator the world had ever witnessed was in control of events. And the beliefs and experiences of both men magnified their perception of threat and fear of betrayal. Each felt he had to act because danger loomed. Each felt he had to act because opportunity beckoned.

From the time World War II drew to a close, nothing frightened American policymakers more than the economic plight and social strife that the war had bequeathed. In April 1945, as the fighting in Europe was in its last stages, John J. McCloy, the influential assistant secretary of war, returned from a trip to Europe and presented an apocalyptic account of conditions. "There is a complete economic, social and political collapse going on in Central Europe, the extent of which is unparalleled in history." The situation in Germany, he told Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, was "worse than anything probably that ever happened in the world." Writing in his diary, Stimson noted that he "had anticipated the chaos, but the details of it were appalling."

A few months later, in July, Dean Acheson presented a similar view to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency: "There is a situation in the world, very clearly illustrated in Europe, and also true in the Far East, which threatens the very foundations, the whole fabric of world organization which we have known in our lifetime and which our fathers and grandfathers knew." In liberated Europe, Acheson reported, railway and power systems had ceased to operate, "financial systems are destroyed. Ownership of property is in terrific confusion. Management of property is in confusion." Not since the eighth century, when the Muslims split the world in two, Acheson said, had conditions

been so serious. Europe's industrial and social life had "come to a complete and utter standstill." The "whole fabric of social life," Acheson warned, "might go to pieces unless the most energetic steps are taken on all fronts."

People suffered. People endured. People yearned for a better future. People discussed, disputed, and imagined alternative political and economic orders. Capitalism was blamed for the Depression, the war, and genocide. Describing conditions in Czechoslovakia, the historian Igor Lukes writes that after the war, "Many in Czechoslovakia had come to believe that capitalism... had become obsolete. Influential intellectuals saw the world emerging from the ashes of the war in black and white terms: here was Auschwitz and there was Stalingrad. The former was a by-product of a crisis in capitalist Europe of the 1930s; the latter stood for the superiority of socialism. In November 1945, the British historian A. J.P. Taylor commented: "Noboby in Europe believes in the American way of life—that is, in private enterprise." People, he said, "want Socialism, but they also want the Rights of Man."

This was not mere rhetoric. What concerned U.S. officials was what was happening on the streets and in the voting booths. Everywhere in Europe, communist and socialist support seemed to be mounting. In Belgium, the Communist Party grew from 9,000 in 1939 to 100,000 in November 1945; in Greece, from 17,000 in 1935 to 70,000 in 1945; in Italy, from 5,000 in 1943 to 1.7 million at the end of 1945; in Czechoslovakia, from 28,000 in May 1945 to 750,000 in September 1945. In France, Italy, and Finland, communists were already getting 20 percent of the total vote; in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Sweden, it was close to 10 percent. In Eastern European countries, 20 to 50 percent of the populace aligned with leftist parties. Support for socialist parties made the left appear even more threatening to those in the center and on the right. In Great Britain, the Labour Party emerged triumphant in July 1945 and, to the astonishment of Americans, unseated Winston Churchill. Everywhere, people seemed to be clamoring for land reform, social welfare, and nationalization of industry. "They have suffered so much," said Acheson, "and they believe so deeply that governments can take some action which will alleviate their sufferings, that they will demand that the whole business of state control and state interference shall be pushed further and further." To many Americans, private enterprise and free markets appeared endangered by a resurgent left.

Conditions in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa were no more reassuring. In Japan, fifteen million people were homeless and the economy near collapse, China was engulfed by political strife and civil war. In South Asia, the Congress Party under Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru was continuing India's long struggle for independence. In Southeast Asia, revolutionary nationalist movements were blossoming. The communist leader Ho Chi Minh clamored for France's recognition of Vietnam's independence. Achmed Sukarno pleaded for Dutch recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty. Indeed, embedded in the entire international system was the problem of Europe's former colonies in Asia and Africa that now wanted independence; the solution to this problem would gradually reconfigure the international order, kindling in Moscow immense

hopes for progress and change and generating in Washington immense fear and never-ending frustration.

U.S. officials hoped conditions would improve. In many places they did, but not enough to allay officials' apprehensions. In March 1946, Acheson told a congressional committee, "The commercial and financial situation of the world is worse than any of us thought a year ago it would be. Destruction is more complete, hunger more acute, exhaustion more widespread than anyone then realized. What might have been passed off as prophecies have become stark facts." At cabinet meetings, Truman's advisers discussed food shortages and the social disorder and political upheaval they were engendering. "More people face starvation and even actual death," the president acknowledged, "than in any war year and perhaps more than in all the war years combined."

What hovered over these deliberations were fears that Stalin would try to capitalize on these conditions. There would be "pestilence and famine in Central Europe next winter," Secretary of War Stimson had told President Truman on 16 May 1945. "This is likely to be followed by political revolution and Communistic infiltration." The next month, Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew gave the president a long report on the international communist movement. "Europe today," it concluded, was a breeding ground for "spontaneous class hatred to be channeled by a skillful agitator." Over the next two years, while Soviet and American officials wrangled over Eastern Europe, Iran, and Turkey, this perceived threat did not abate. The "greatest potential danger to U.S. security," the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency concluded in September 1947, "lies ... in the possibility of the economic collapse of Western Europe and of the consequent accession to power of elements subservient to the Kremlin."

Heavy snows and frigid temperatures during January and February 1947 transformed alarm to action. British officials confided that financial exigencies would force His Majesty's government to withdraw from the eastern Mediterranean, thereby exposing Greece and Turkey to additional risk. "The reins of world leadership," Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton wrote, "are fast slipping from Britain's competent but now very weak hands. These reins will be picked up either by the United States or by Russia. If by Russia, there will almost certainly be war in the next decade or so with the odds against us." Clayton feared that the Greek communists would gain power and align Greece with the Soviet Union. The success of the communists in Greece would have a bandwagon effect throughout Europe. President Truman put it this way:

If we were to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic Communist parties in such European countries as France and Italy, where they already were significant threats. Inaction ... could result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them.

Truman took action. He delivered a special address to Congress on 12 March 1947, setting forth what became known as the Truman Doctrine.

Truman used Truman Doctrine - prophecy

Thereafter, it "would be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." He asked Congress to allocate four hundred million dollars in aid for Greece and Turkey. A "fateful hour" had arrived. Nations had to choose "between alternate ways of life.... If we falter in our leadership," Truman warned, "we may endanger the peace of the world."

Three months later, after failing to make headway on a German settlement at a conference in Moscow, Secretary of State Marshall gave a commencement address at Harvard in which he proposed that the United States help to fund Europe's reconstruction should Europeans design a satisfactory plan for it. The Soviet Union was not acting aggressively, but it was consolidating its influence in Eastern Europe and maneuvering to capitalize on mounting unrest in Western Europe. "Europe is steadily deteriorating," said Assistant Secretary Clayton on 27 May. "Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving.... Without further and substantial aid from the United States, economic, social, and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe." In the western zones of Germany, rations were cut to twelve hundred calories per day per person. Marshall and his assistants feared that without additional food deliveries they would lose "the great struggle ... to prevent [Germany] going communistic."

Truman understood that he needed to put events in a context that the American people could comprehend if they were to support the initiatives he was now contemplating. He explained that it was a struggle between alternative ways of life. It was not a military struggle but a political one, an ideological struggle, a spiritual struggle. Nations in much of the world, Truman stated in a speech at Baylor University just days before he announced the Truman Doctrine, were heading toward central planning. Free enterprise was challenged everywhere. And where free enterprise was endangered, so were other cherished freedoms, such as freedom of speech and of religion. In the president's view, all these freedoms were indivisible. They were at risk because of the devastation wrought by the war, because of people's yearnings for a better future. They were at risk because strong communist parties were competing successfully for office, because armed minorities were willing to use force to seize power, and because the Kremlin hovered in the background willing to give succor to such efforts and eager to capitalize on them.

America's own future was at risk. "Our deepest concern with European recovery is that it is essential to the maintenance of the civilization in which the American way of life is rooted," Truman explained. "If Europe fails to recover, the people of these countries might be driven to the philosophy of despair [of totalitarianism]. Such a turn of events would constitute a shattering blow to peace and stability in the world. It might well compel us to modify our own economic system and to forgo, for the sake of our own security, the enjoyment of many of our freedoms and privileges."

U.S. officials were motivated to act, then, not because Stalin was an evil dictator, killing millions of people in his own country and subjugating peoples on the periphery of the Soviet Union, but because of conditions in the international system, and out of fear that social turmoil and economic paralysis in

Europe would play into communist hands, affording Stalin new opportunities to expand Soviet power. They also feared that floundering occupation policies in Germany and Japan might allow those countries to gravitate into a Soviet orbit and that decolonization in the third world would be exploited by the Kremlin. They had learned that once a totalitarian government possessed great power, it was likely to wage war, and even if it did not wage war, its control of huge resources and markets throughout Eurasia meant that it endangered America's free political economy. "If communism is allowed to absorb the free nations," Truman subsequently explained, "then we would be isolated from our sources of supply and detached from our friends. Then we would have to take defense measures which might really bankrupt our economy, and change our way of life so that we couldn't recognize it as American any longer."

No country was more critical than Germany. The integration of Germany into the postwar international system was the overriding issue. "The only really dangerous thing in my mind," said George Kennan in 1946, "is the possibility that the technical skills of the Germans might be combined with the physical resources of Russia." From the moment the war ended, top U.S. officials recognized that the revival of German coal production was essential for the economic revival of the rest of Europe, on which, in turn, social peace depended. During the Potsdam Conference, President Truman had ordered General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then commander of American troops in Europe, to make the production and export of twenty-five million tons of coal the number one priority of U.S. occupation policy in Germany (other than the health and safety of U.S. troops themselves). This priority had far-reaching implications. The successful large-scale mining of coal, acknowledged General Clay, meant "some restoration of the German economy, and some industrial activity to support coal mining."

But the economy in the British, French, and American occupation zones floundered during 1946, causing immense consternation in Washington. When officials went to work designing the Marshall Plan, Kennan and his associates in the State Department maintained that reviving German production was the key to European recovery, yet they feared that a revived Germany might not be within their power to control. There was no certainty how it would behave once the occupation was over or how it would orient itself in the international system. When Marshall went to Moscow to discuss the future of Germany at the big Four Council of Foreign Ministers in March 1947, he took John Foster Dulles, the prominent Republican foreign-policy spokesman, with him. Germany's economic potential, Dulles told Marshall, had to be integrated into western Europe without "giving economic mastery to the Germans." This was a daunting challenge, as Dulles recognized. Once they began recovering, he acknowledged, the Germans would "almost certainly be dominated by a spirit of revenge and ambition to recover a great power status." They might align with the Soviet Union or act independently. Either way, danger lurked.

But it could not be avoided. Steps had to be taken to expedite coal production in the Ruhr. No reparations in the form of raw materials, machine tools, or anything else should be given to the U.S.S.R. German resources had to be harnessed for the recovery of western Europe. The Moscow conference partly

founded on this issue of reparations. Although Marshall hoped to sustain war-time cooperation, he told Stalin, he could not continue to haggle about the future of Germany. Action was imperative. At a meeting on 3 July, Secretary of State Marshall, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal agreed "Germany must cooperate fully in any effective European plan, and that the economic revival of Europe depends in considerable part on a recovery of German production—in coal, in food, steel, fertilizer, etc., and on efficient use of such European resources as the Rhine River." A week later, General Clay was instructed to boost the level of industrial production in the western zones.

The American offensive—the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the rebuilding of western Germany—was a reaction to the anarchy in the international system, upon which the United States believed the Kremlin might capitalize. Fear drove policy. Truman and his advisers understood they were placing the reconstruction of western Europe and the cooptation of western Germany over their desire to sustain their wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union. They did not seek to provoke Stalin or to endanger Soviet security, but they believed they had to act as they did, even if it meant that the U.S.S.R. would feel provoked. Prudence demanded action.

Stalin was not surprised. The capitalists were acting as capitalists, seeking to form a bloc against Soviet Russia. Initially, he pondered Soviet participation in the Marshall Plan. He sent Molotov and a hundred technical advisers to a conference in Paris in July 1947 to discuss Marshall's overture for the European Recovery Program. But while Molotov negotiated, Stalin changed his mind. He saw encirclement. He believed, quite rightly, that the terms for participation included the opening of the east European nations where the Red Army was still enforcing Soviet control. The financial credits would prove illusory, he said, and would form a pretext to isolate the Soviet Union. The Americans were trying to maneuver their way into Eastern Europe. They were seeking to harness German power against the Soviet Union. Stalin ordered the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which were mightily enticed to participate, not to permit themselves to be lured by the American offer.

But Stalin did much more than pressure his allies to rebuff American overtures. Seeing danger, he orchestrated a new round of purges in Eastern Europe, reshuffled the composition of governments, and planted his minions in power more firmly. Soviet delegates walked out of the Allied Control Council that was supposed to be governing Germany. The Kremlin tightened controls over access to Berlin, and suppressed opponents of the SED in the Soviet zone in eastern Germany. In Czechoslovakia, Stalin supported a communist seizure of power in February 1948; almost overnight a democratically elected government was transformed into a "People's Democracy." With other nations on the Soviet periphery, Stalin negotiated defense agreements. Inside his own country, he boosted military expenditures. "We do not wish for war," he said, "but we are not afraid of it."

Stalin believed the capitalists had thrown down the gauntlet. Although he had been planning the move for quite some time, he convened a meeting in Poland in September 1947 and established the Communist Information Bureau

Policy
by
Stalin

(Cominform) to improve his control over and coordination among European communist parties. At this meeting, his representatives announced that the world was being divided into two camps. Peaceful coexistence was impossible. Western capitalist initiatives had to be thwarted. The Marshall Plan had to be defeated. Efforts to unite and reconstruct the western zones of Germany had to be challenged....

Truman and Stalin could and did articulate the reasons for national self-restraint. They could and did warn friends and potential allies not to fuel the suspicions of sensitive and powerful adversaries. But they could not control their own fears and instincts, their passions and aspirations. The structure of the international system and their ideological mind-sets overcame their initial desire to sustain their nations' collaboration.

The condition of the international system engendered fears and opportunities. At the end of the war, international society was astir with demoralized peoples yearning for a better future after decades of depression, war, genocide, and forced migration. In the center of Europe and in northeast Asia the defeat of Germany and Japan left huge vacuums of power. In time—and not a very long time, contemporaries assumed—the occupations would end and the Germans and Japanese would reconstitute their governments and political economies. They would then decide how they would configure themselves in the international system, but their future trajectory was a huge, unsettling question mark. Elsewhere in the world—in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East—local leaders and indigenous elites felt emboldened to seek independence as they witnessed their colonial masters' strength erode. They were inspired by the rhetoric of freedom and the affirmations of the principle of national self-determination. They wanted to modernize their countries, overcome the humiliations of dependency, and extinguish the misery that came with poverty. Would they choose free enterprise and liberal democracy, or planned economies and the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Stalin and Truman had to make sense of these realities, to integrate them into belief systems that comported with their rational calculations of national self-interest, the exigencies of domestic politics, and the aspirations and sensibilities of potential friends and clients. They were agents of change and shapers of international history. But they were enveloped by structure and belief....

Anticommunism at Home

ELLEN SCHRECKER

During the mid-50s, everybody who applied for a permit to fish in the New York City reservoirs had to sign a loyalty oath. In 1957, nearly three years after the United States Senate censured Joe McCarthy, the state's commissioner of water supply, gas and electricity refused to grant fishing permits to two Communists.

Absurd as such provisions may seem today, at the time they had considerable logic. The commissioner was simply protecting the city's drinking water from possible saboteurs who might poison it while pretending to troll for trout.

It is all too easy to dismiss such seemingly irrational behavior as the symptom of a mass emotional aberration, the political by-product of the nation's underlying psychic insecurities. But such measures as the banning of communist fishermen from the New York City reservoirs also reflected an, albeit unsophisticated, attempt to deal with what was then perceived as a serious threat. Americans at every level of society genuinely believed that Communism endangered the nation. The perceived threat was quite specific: subversion, espionage, and sabotage. Communists would try to overthrow the government or at least undermine its policies on behalf of their Soviet masters. They would spy for the Kremlin. And if war came, they would try to sabotage the nation's defense industries and other vital facilities.

Whatever the reality of the communist threat may have been—and in the light of the new evidence that has emerged from Moscow's and Washington's formerly closed archives it turns out that the Kremlin's undercover operations may well have been more extensive than many historians had previously assumed—what is important for understanding the political repression of the McCarthy period is the way in which that threat was perceived. At that moment in the late 1940s when the superstructure of anticommunism was being erected, there were enough instances of supposed subversion, espionage, and sabotage to convince political leaders and ordinary citizens alike that Communists endangered the United States and required a drastic response. It was the plausibility of the threat—based on the connection between the commonly exaggerated image of Communism and an equally exaggerated notion of the nation's vulnerability to it—that spurred American policymakers to protect internal security by cracking down on domestic Communists.

The main danger, of course, came from abroad. In the crucial early years of the Cold War, as the struggle with the Soviet Union came to dominate American foreign policy, federal officials increasingly came to view domestic Communism as part of a worldwide Soviet conspiracy. Accordingly, communist activities that had previously been opposed for political and ideological reasons now became matters of national security. The perception that domestic Communism was a threat evolved in tandem with the growing confrontation with the Soviet Union. The two, in fact, fed each other, their preexisting antagonism to Communism intensifying the hostility and suspicion with which some American policymakers regarded the Russians....

Stalin's obvious determination to control Eastern Europe as well as what the Americans viewed as his expansionist moves toward the Middle East convinced most of the important military and civilian policymakers within the Truman administration that the Soviet Union endangered international stability. The Kremlin's rhetorical embrace of a worldwide revolution was another source of concern. American policymakers worried that Moscow was encouraging European communist parties to block the restoration of the capitalist economic system that most U.S. officials considered vital to their nation's, as well as the

world's, well-being. Since Truman and his advisers viewed all of postwar Europe (not to mention the Third World) as peculiarly vulnerable to a communist takeover, the situation seemed dire indeed. The Soviets were challenging the United States on every front: ideological, economic, and strategic. Or so it seemed....

Over the next few years, the Cold War escalated as both the United States and the Soviet Union took ostensibly defensive actions that looked ever more threatening to the other side. The USSR solidified its hold over Eastern Europe, imposing communist governments throughout the region largely in order to ensure its own security. Truman and his advisers, however, assumed that the Kremlin's desire for expansion had no limits; and they came to view all American foreign policy within the context of a worldwide struggle against Communism. Containment shaped every program, whether it was the economic aid to Western Europe envisioned under the Marshall Plan or military assistance to the French in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, as the antagonism intensified, containment took on an increasingly military cast—and an increasingly global one. Washington exaggerated the Kremlin's power and assumed that Stalin was orchestrating every anti-imperialist or revolutionary struggle from Vietnam to South Africa. Outside of Eastern Europe, this was not the case; most of the insurgencies that Washington claimed were run by Moscow had indigenous roots, even if, as in Vietnam, they were led by Communists. In 1949, the communist victory in China and the detonation of a Soviet atomic device heightened the sense of crisis. Could the United States be losing the Cold War? Truman ordered the development of the hydrogen bomb and requested a major reassessment of American foreign policy. That reassessment, enshrined in the National Security Council report of April 1950, known as NSC-68, viewed the Kremlin as a threat to all of Western civilization and called for a massive military buildup to save the world.

By the time the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, the United States had become so ideologically mobilized that there was no debate about the Soviet Union's responsibility. Though the invasion was actually the culmination of a festering civil war, most American policymakers and ordinary citizens assumed that Stalin was testing the nation's resolve. Determined to avoid a replay of the West's prewar appeasement of Hitler at Munich, they would not capitulate to an aggressor. This time, Washington would resist the supposed Soviet advances even if it required direct intervention in Korea or increased aid to the French in Indochina, where another struggle was looming. Of course, both conflicts were far more complicated than that and were to involve the United States in years of bloody, fruitless warfare. But in the face of all the stereotypes and oversimplifications that had developed with regard to the Soviet Union, a more realistic assessment of the situation in Korea and Southeast Asia was out of the question. Moreover, the growing anticommunist repression within the United States that accompanied the intensification of the Cold War ruled out any serious debate about foreign policy.

The linkage is obvious. In a crude but not incorrect way, McCarthyism can be seen as the home front of the Cold War. As the confrontation with Soviet Communism escalated, so, too, did the campaign against domestic Communism.

The intensification of the Cold War made it increasingly easier for Hoover and the other members of the anticommunist network to convince the rest of the Washington political establishment that the internal threat had also grown. Not only was there evidence that made the existence of the threat seem plausible, but the deepening sense of crisis engendered by the conflict with Moscow made it possible to put a damaging spin on activities that had once been considered harmless.

By 1950, American policymakers tended to view American Communism as just another weapon in Stalin's arsenal. They assumed that the Soviets, who were implacably committed to the destruction of the capitalist world, would do whatever they could to weaken the United States. The openness of American society made the nation peculiarly vulnerable to the Kremlin's advances. As the authors of the influential NSC-68 described it, the threat, though dire, was quite specific; it was "serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity."

The most obvious Soviet agents were, of course, Russians. And, in fact, even before the Cold War escalated, there was considerable concern about the activities of Russian nationals in the United States. The FBI, which seems to have kept Soviet diplomats under routine surveillance, assumed that they and their compatriots in other Russian agencies were involved in espionage. Late in 1946, Hoover became upset about a group of Soviet engineers who were supposedly looking at air compressors in Ohio but were actually "taking copious notes, obtaining blueprints, diagrams and photographs of electrical, sewage, gas and water systems, power plants, transportation terminals, bridges and other strategic points in such cities as Washington, New York, Chicago and Philadelphia." The FBI director was sure they were up to no good and he communicated his concern to the White House, where it was also taken seriously....

The activities of Soviet diplomats and other Russians were, of course, only a subsidiary aspect of the internal security problem and one that could be handled mainly as a matter of routine counterintelligence. The main danger, and the one that was to transform the concern about Soviet operations in the United States into the pretext for a wave of domestic political repression, was the fear that thousands of American citizens might also be working for the Kremlin.

Several key assumptions undergirded that fear and shaped the government's approach to internal security. One was that the Soviet Union exercised complete control over Communist parties throughout the world and used them as instruments in its struggle for international hegemony. Another dehumanized individual Communists and posited that their robotlike obedience to party discipline made them all potential Soviet agents, "requiring," as Clark Clifford put it in 1946, "only the direct instruction of a Soviet superior to make the potentiality a reality." This formulation appears with astonishing regularity in the official correspondence of the period. FBI reports routinely recycle it either as a direct warning from Hoover or else as the testimony of one or another of the major ex-Communist informers: "Every American Communist should be considered a potential agent for Soviet Russia."

As a result, once the Cold War transformed the Soviet Union into an enemy, it took little imagination to see American Communism as a threat to national security. It became commonplace to view all the CP's activities if not as actual efforts to undermine the United States at least as preparations for doing so. Moreover, since party members were active in so many areas, alarmists could detect the Kremlin's hand everywhere.

One alleged threat was political subversion. While no one in a position of authority seriously worried that the CP would overthrow the government, communist propaganda directed against the nation's defense and foreign policies was another matter. The party's supposed attempts to subvert the military seemed particularly menacing. The danger came from the Leninist doctrine of "revolutionary defeatism" that urged Communists to take advantage of the opportunity presented by an unpopular war to turn the army against the government and mount a revolution. Though obviously useful to the Bolsheviks in the war-torn Russia of 1917, such a program was absurd with regard to the stable American political system of the 1940s and 1950s. Nonetheless, concern about subversion of the military surfaced whenever the CP opposed United States foreign policy, first during the Nazi-Soviet pact period and then during the Cold War.

References to revolutionary defeatism grace the big communist trials of the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1947 perjury trial of Carl Marzani, a New York City undercover policeman testified that Marzani had urged young Communists to join the army during the Nazi-Soviet pact period "so that we can disintegrate the morale of the men." Similar charges surfaced during the 1949 Smith Act trial of the CP's leading officials. Not only did the prosecutors read into the transcript the most damaging passages on revolutionary defeatism in the works of Lenin and Stalin, but they also had FBI informers testify about meetings at which party leaders discussed "the possibility, feasibility, and so forth ... of turning a war into a civil war through the medium of civil disobedience."

Communists, it seemed, did more than just talk about subverting the military. As the Soviet Union tightened its grip on Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II, Truman and his advisers began to worry that the rapid demobilization of the United States's armed forces was weakening the nation's ability to oppose the Kremlin's advance. Because of the widespread clamor for the return of American soldiers, it would have been politically suicidal in 1945 and 1946 for the government to have urged the retention of large numbers of troops overseas. But, for some policymakers, the demand for rapid demobilization concealed something more ominous than mere homesickness. Early in 1946, American GIs in Europe, the Philippines, and Hawaii mounted demonstrations to dramatize their desire to go home. The presence of alleged Communists among the organizers of these protests convinced both military intelligence and the FBI that Moscow was involved.

Another activity that seemingly indicated subversion within the armed forces was what the Joint Chiefs of Staff called "anti-caste" agitation, i.e., protests against racial discrimination. Such charges surfaced in Marzani's trial; he was reputed to have been working "to sow resentment and discontent among Negroes." These

allegations were not new; the CP had long been accused of taking advantage of the grievances of African Americans and using them for its own purposes. The Cold War transformed such accusations into a matter of national security. Again, there seemed to be evidence, especially after Paul Robeson, perhaps the most well known African American in the party's orbit, made the widely reported remark at a communist-sponsored peace conference in Paris in 1949 that if war broke out between the United States and the Soviet Union, American blacks did not have to fight for their country.

Few public officials or politicians expressed much concern about the CP's open opposition to American foreign policy. Its covert impact, however, was assumed to be more dangerous. Secret party members might gain influence within the government and use their positions to further Soviet objectives. Such a scenario aligned the new Cold War concern about communist subversion with the highly partisan Communists-in-government issue and gave credibility to the damaging allegations of Joe McCarthy and his allies that Communists and fellow travelers had penetrated the New Deal and were still directly influencing policy.

There was little, if any, evidence for such allegations. The Truman administration certainly never took such charges seriously. But its opponents did—or at least claimed to. The FBI and the rest of the anticommunist network assembled enough pieces of circumstantial evidence for the administration's conservative enemies to construct a number of ostensibly plausible scenarios that purported to show how highly placed communist agents had subverted American foreign policy. Most of these scenarios either identified particular individuals as party members or else cited specific incidents in which officials had come into contact with alleged Communists and then implemented policies that supposedly hurt American interests. Since the contacts had existed and since Communism was assumed to be peculiarly virulent and contagious, it is possible to understand why even the most outrageous charges of someone like Senator McCarthy could have a certain patina of plausibility.

In 1946, several years before he was to accuse the former State Department official Alger Hiss of espionage, Whittaker Chambers told Raymond Murphy, the department's security officer, that the main job of his underground party unit "was to mess up policy." Chambers repeated these allegations before HUAC in August 1948, claiming that the Communists he worked with had entered the government not "for the purpose of espionage, but for the purpose of infiltrating the government and influencing government policy by getting Communists in key places." When pressed by the FBI to give examples of how the members of his underground unit had influenced policy, he mentioned NLRB decisions, farm mortgages in Oklahoma, and an attempt "to influence a decision regarding sugar beet workers."

Chambers did not offer any substantive evidence that Hiss or the other alleged Soviet agents had subverted American foreign policy. But for Republican critics of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, Hiss's presence within the American delegation at the Yalta conference in 1945 was proof enough. After all, Yalta had been the place where, so these critics claimed, Eastern Europe

and China had been sold out to the Russians. Hiss had never made policy, however. The highest official linked to the supposed ring of communist agents was Harry Dexter White, an assistant secretary of the Treasury during and immediately after World War II. White was responsible for much of the Treasury Department's postwar international financial planning. He played an important role in establishing the International Monetary Fund and was its first American director. He was, so the FBI charged, "in a position to secure favorable consideration for the U.S.S.R. in financial matters" and "would have the power to influence to a great degree deliberations on all international financial arrangements."

Later on White was also charged with having helped the Communists take over China. For those members of the anticommunist network who believed that the CP had infiltrated the policy-making levels of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the "loss" of China in 1949 definitively confirmed their suspicions. According to the scenario, which Alfred Kohlberg, Joe McCarthy, and the other professional anti-Communists pushed during the early fifties, the State Department had let Mao Zedong take over China because the officials who dealt with East Asian affairs were under the CP's influence. Though it was true that many of the nation's China hands were critical of Chiang Kai-shek, they neither favored the Chinese Communists, nor, more important, had anything to do with their eventual triumph. Chiang's Nationalist regime was perfectly capable of losing China on its own. But, as we shall see, there was enough circumstantial evidence for Kohlberg and his allies to construct a plausible case that communist influence within the State Department had caused the loss of China.

The other sensitive area of American politics in the 1950s was nuclear weapons. Naturally espionage was a concern; but there were policy considerations as well. Again, the allegation that there had been communist influence at the highest levels was used by people with other agendas. The main target here was J. Robert Oppenheimer, the nation's most famous atomic scientist. Oppenheimer was completely loyal, but he did question both the development of the hydrogen bomb and the air force's enthusiasm for strategic bombing. Moreover, Oppenheimer's past had been suspicious enough to raise some eyebrows.

He had come out of Berkeley, which even in the 1930s was a hotbed of radical politics. Oppenheimer had not been in the party, but many of his friends and students, as well as his ex-girlfriend, brother, and sister-in-law, were. And his wife (whose first husband had been killed in the Spanish Civil War) was a friend of Steve Nelson's, the party's local organizer during the late thirties and early forties. Though he abandoned his left-wing politics in 1942 when he became the Manhattan Project's scientific director, Oppenheimer remained an object of suspicion. Worse yet was an incident in which a Berkeley friend named Haakon Chevalier had conveyed a request to spy for the Russians. Oppenheimer had rejected the proposition out of hand but when he informed the Manhattan Project security people about the incident, he initially tried to shield Chevalier and said that three unnamed individuals had made the approach. He soon told the truth but the original lie continued to hurt him.

The FBI had been on Oppenheimer's trail for years. In 1941 it put him on its list of potential subversives to be picked up for custodial detention. In the years that followed, Hoover repeatedly warned the military authorities and the Truman administration about the distinguished physicist's "Communist affiliations." Nonetheless, it was not until 1953 that his enemies within the defense establishment finally got his security clearance revoked. In the November 1953 letter to J. Edgar Hoover that officially triggered Oppenheimer's fall, William L. Borden, the former executive director of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, claimed that "more probably than not," the physicist "acted under a Soviet directive in influencing United States military, atomic energy, intelligence, and diplomatic policy." ...

Naturally, the FBI had a strong investment in proving that such spying took place and in exaggerating its importance. Counterespionage had always been the Bureau's main mission in the field of internal security and its activities in that area had expanded enormously during World War II. Peace, therefore, posed a problem; the FBI would have to reduce its operations unless there was a new enemy to protect the nation against. Soviet spies certainly fit the bill. Given J. Edgar Hoover's ideological predilections as well as his agency's institutional needs, it is easy to see why the Director and his men emphasized the threat of espionage and stressed that all party members would spy for the Russians if given the chance. The message got through, largely because the big spy cases of the early Cold War amplified and legitimized the FBI's contentions, convincing most Americans—public officials and ordinary citizens alike—that the Communist party was breeding spies.

These cases have yet to be completely resolved. The end of the Cold War has opened many previously sealed Soviet and American records. As the evidence accumulates, it does seem as if many of the alleged spies had, indeed, helped the Russians. Though the FBI and its informers may have embroidered the details a bit in order to get publicity, preserve a witness's credibility, or—most important—get a conviction, it is clear that some kind of espionage took place during the 1930s and 1940s. However, because the data is so incomplete, it is hard to assess how extensive that spying was. The U.S. intelligence agencies that released the Venona translations claim that they mention two hundred Americans. But not all the individuals can be identified. In addition, most of the names are aliases and we have to rely on the intelligence agencies' assertion that the cover name "Liberal," for example, actually refers to Julius Rosenberg. It took years to decode the KGB's telegrams and the agencies involved have not indicated when the documents were first deciphered nor how the identifications were made.

Though the FBI seems to have operated on the assumption that anybody who had been in or near the Communist party and then associated with people who associated with Russians was involved with espionage, many of the records that have been released do not reveal whether the transmission of secrets actually occurred or whether American intelligence agents just assumed that it had. In a sense, it makes little difference. Because Communism had been so thoroughly demonized, it did not take much evidence to convince most Americans that

Communists spied for Russia. As a result, whether true or not, the espionage scenarios were believable. They amplified the perceived threat of American Communism, thus allowing many moderates and liberals to acquiesce in and justify forms of political repression that under other circumstances they would never condone....

McCarthy gave [the anticommunist] movement its name and, in return, [it] gave him his agenda and ammunition. As the point man of the anticommunist network, he brought to the cause enormous energy, a genius for publicity, and a refusal to play by the rules. He had always been a renegade. After entering politics as a local judge, he switched parties, lied about his military record, and then won election to the Senate in the Republican sweep of 1946 as a traditional Midwestern conservative. Since red-baiting was a common GOP campaign practice that year, McCarthy's use of the tactic against his Democratic opponent was unexceptional. Nor, except for his sleaziness, did he distinguish himself during his first few years in Washington. Under attack in Wisconsin for illegal campaign practices, he also took money from companies whose interests he furthered and he defended the German SS men responsible for the 1944 massacre of unarmed civilians and American POWs in Malmédy, Belgium. Throughout, he displayed the same crudeness, dishonesty, and lack of principles that later got labeled as McCarthyism. But until he latched onto the Communist issue, he remained largely unknown.

All that changed on February 9, 1950, when he announced to the annual Lincoln Day Dinner of the Ohio County Women's Republican Club in Wheeling, West Virginia, that he held in his hand a list of 205 Communists in the State Department. He continued to allude to his lists over the next few days as he traveled through the Rocky Mountain states on a speaking tour for the Republican party. Pressed for specifics, he began to change the numbers and the charges. Perhaps it was only fifty-seven Communists, as he told reporters in Salt Lake City on February 10, or eighty-one, as he explained to the Senate ten days later. Maybe they weren't really "card-carrying" Communists, but "loyalty risks" or "people with Communist connections." His allegations would probably have been dismissed as just so much Republican hot air had Truman and the State Department not scrambled to rebut them, demanding that he supply them with every name he had. As a result, by the time McCarthy returned to Washington, he had thrown the administration onto the defensive and reinvigorated the GOP's charge that the Democrats were soft on Communism.

Because he was such a flagrant self-promoter, the sincerity of McCarthy's commitment to anticommunism has long been open to doubt. He certainly came to it late—identifying himself with the Communists-in-government issue several years after other politicians had taken it up. At times, he even told his friends that he had embraced the issue to enhance his career. But he had never shied away from red-baiting and, if he was not at first a true believer, he soon became one. Long after expediency would have dictated greater moderation, he clung to the cause, determined to root out the Communist conspiracy that, he claimed, threatened the United States.

If misrepresentations, threats, or outright lies were needed, he had no qualms about employing them. “I don’t enjoy this task,” he announced. “It is a dirty, disagreeable job, but a job which must be done.” And he would liken it to his boyhood chore of killing the skunks that menaced his mother’s chickens, “a dirty, foul, unpleasant, smelly job. And sometimes after it was done, people did not like to have us sit next to them in church.” He gloried in his toughness, his image as an Irish barroom brawler who “deals with Commies via the fist” and “fights like a truck driver.” Because of his notoriety, it became common to equate him with the use of unfair tactics against Communists. But, as we have seen, J. Edgar Hoover and many of the other professional anti-Communists also bent the rules where Communism was concerned.

Even so, Joe McCarthy was noisier, more impulsive, and more skillful in gaining publicity than the rest of the anticommunist network. Newspapers were still the nation’s leading source of information and McCarthy knew how to get his message on the front pages. He played for headlines, recognizing the importance of feeding reporters with the 1950s version of sound bites. He knew how to time his public statements to meet the wire services’ constant demand for updated stories and how to provide the concrete details, names, and numbers that made his charges seem fresh. The more sensational his allegations, the better. “McCarthy was a dream story,” the head of the *Chicago Tribune’s* Washington bureau recalled. “I wasn’t off page one for four years.” ...



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CHAPTER 2



The Consumer's Republic: Mass Culture, Consumer Markets, and Identity in the 1950s

For many Americans, the 1950s were a decade of unprecedented prosperity, economic expansion, high employment, and suburban growth. After the crises of the Great Depression and World War II, many working people were able to enter the ranks of the U.S. middle class for the first time. The decade's economic prosperity was rooted in two transformations: the continued development of the defense industry spurred by the Cold War and the spread of a consumer society that relied on the widening availability of affordable, mass-produced consumer goods. Indeed, the 1950s witnessed the birth of a full-fledged "consumer's republic" that had several features: its economy was driven by mass consumption rather than industrial production, it assigned heightened importance to advertising and mass communication, it placed the consumption of goods and services at the center of political and cultural identity, and it both created and appealed to new kinds of consumer markets. Among the most powerful of these new markets was the "youth market"—comprised of the "baby boomer" generation born between 1946 and 1964.

The prosperity of the 1950s was a source of both cultural optimism and anxiety. On the one hand, the economic expansion of the decade underscored the power of the United States on the world stage in the years after World War II. The nations of Europe and Asia had come out of that war with their economies and infrastructures in tatters, but the war had done the opposite for the United States: it had propelled the country out of the Great Depression of the 1930s, securing its ranking as the world's strongest economy. And with the advent of the Cold War, the nation's status as an affluent, consumer society appeared to confer its superiority over the Soviet Union. Yet percolating beneath the upbeat veneer of the 1950s was an array of cultural anxieties. The end of World War II had not seen the outbreak of peace, but rather the birth of the Cold War and an arms race that raised the terrifying specter of nuclear annihilation. The Cold War also had profound domestic implications, unleashing fear, paranoia, and suspicion during the McCarthy era. Meanwhile, there were millions of Americans who remained excluded from the promises of the affluent society: the nation's poor (especially

those in remote rural communities and in inner cities); the country's African Americans, who remained systematically excluded from the nation's dominant political, economic, and cultural institutions; and women, who were lauded for their domestic roles as wives and mothers but were denied access to the nation's public life. At the same time, affluence itself emerged as a potential threat to the integrity of the nation. Commentators from across the political spectrum feared that mass consumption might make Americans soft and conformist, and that it was contributing to social problems like juvenile delinquency. Still others worried that the modern world of advertising was manipulating people's desires and turning American citizens into vapid, puppet-like consumers. Thus the "consumer's republic" of the 1950s contained multiple ambiguities. It promised to bring the good life within reach of millions of Americans and served as a formidable symbol of American power on the world stage. Yet, by placing consumption at the center of the nation's cultural and economic life, it threatened to undermine ideals of industry, hard work, and thrift that had long been seen as essential to the American character.



DOCUMENTS

The documents that follow illustrate the complexities of American consumer culture in the postwar era. They address four dominant themes: how the postwar economy was celebrated and tied to national strength; the ways Americans' relationship to the consumer economy was mediated along lines of race and class; the creation of market segmentation; and, finally, the cultural fears unleashed by the growth of mass consumption during this period. To begin, prosperity itself was a relatively new phenomenon, especially for Americans who had emerged from depression and war. Postwar business leaders feared that fresh memories of the Depression might fuel a revival of New Deal reform, a prospect they sought to avoid. They thus spent millions of dollars on campaigns to convince Americans of the benefits of the U.S. economic system. Document 1, an excerpt from a pamphlet titled "The Miracle of America," was part of an effort launched in 1948 by the Advertising Council, a non-profit organization that works with advertising agencies, media outlets, and corporate advertisers. While mass consumption fueled the postwar economy, it also became the object of cultural anxiety. For example, some observers feared that the very popular medium of television was making Americans increasingly passive (Document 2). More than any other demographic, young people in the 1950s were recognized as constituting a powerful consumer market with its own distinct desires and tastes (see the advertisement featured in Document 3). The spread of advertising provoked fears that consumers were being transformed into victims of psychological manipulation, a theme Vance Packard explored in his 1957 book *The Hidden Persuaders* (excerpted in Document 4). Mass consumption also raised questions about whether racial groups could maintain their unity and cultural integrity, issues E. Franklin Frazier raised pointedly in his 1957 book *Black Bourgeoisie: The Rise of a New Middle Class* (excerpted in Document 5). By the early 1960s, advertisers were waking up to the lucrative potential of the African-American urban market, the subject of Document 6. Taken together, these documents reflect both the hopes and the fears that surrounded consumer culture in the 1950s.

1. U.S. Business Celebrates the “Miracle of America,” 1948

It all started ... when Junior looked up from his homework:

“It says here America is great and powerful on account of the American economic system. What’s our economic system, Dad?”

Dad put his paper down and appeared to be thinking hard.

“I’d like to know, too,” Mother put in. “I think in these times *every* American ought to be informed about what makes up the American way of life.”

“So do I,” Sis added.

“Well, I could give you all sorts of answers,” Dad said. “But maybe we ought to get the story straight from the one who knows it best.”

“Who’s that?” asked Junior.

“You’ll recognize him all right,” Dad said. “Let’s go!”

So they did....

Junior gasped. “Gee whiz—I know *him!*”

“Uncle Sam,” Dad began, “my boy here wants to know what makes America great. You know—our economic system and all that. Fact is, I guess we all do.”...

“In the early days, men and animals did most of our work.

We even used the wind to run our machines.

Then we began to use water power to turn millstones and run looms. But in some places no water power was to be had.

We needed something better. Our inventors and business men kept testing and trying. There would be big rewards in our free market for reliable power that could be used *anywhere*.

At last we had it—thanks to an ingenious Scotsman—James Watt. He invented an engine driven by steam made from coal!

Later still Americans developed engines run by gasoline and electricity.

Now we’re looking for ways to use atomic power....

Americans are known as inventive people. Why? Because we have had the incentive to profit by making improvements—and backing them with our savings.

When our people realized that they were free to shape their own destinies, they began to devise machines which multiplied each man’s work power.

In 1799, Eli Whitney, inventor of the cotton gin that did 50 men’s work, made history with an order for muskets awarded by the U.S. Army. Instead of building each gun separately, he turned out standard parts which could be used interchangeably on *any* gun.

Hearing of this, the clocksmith Eli Terry started to make clocks on the same principle. With all the laborious fitting eliminated, he found that he could sell clocks for \$10 apiece instead of the regular \$25. In three years, he and his partner, Seth Thomas sold 5,000.

Eli Terry saw that if he cut his costs by mass production, and distributed a bigger volume more widely, he would benefit more people and make more money. And it worked out exactly that way!

Pins had long been made by hand, selling as high as 20 cents each. Then a Connecticut man perfected machines to make *two million pins a week!*

Down through the years, Americans invented hundreds of thousands of work-saving machines.

Of course, it takes money to make and install those new, labor-saving machines in factories—more money than any one man could afford. A machine for one worker often costs thousands of dollars. So the owner took in many *partners*—thrifty men and women who received *stock* in exchange for their money. All these *partners* joined to form a *company* which they owned together. In order to make a profit in competition with other companies, they had to turn out better and less expensive products.

The same new freedoms that made Americans ingenious and inventive made us better and better workers—no matter what our jobs.

The planners and managers of industry found new and improved ways of designing factories and work flow—so that goods were turned out more quickly and cheaply.

They found new and better ways to get those goods from the factories to the stores and into the homes. Advertising and selling opened up bigger markets by telling the story to millions.

And the individual worker became steadily more skillful at his job. He realized that the more he could produce during the hours he worked, the more he would increase his own value. When many workers did that, it added up to national prosperity!

Labor unions and collective bargaining strengthened the worker's sense of security and improved working conditions. The result is that America gradually developed the greatest group of skilled workers and technicians the world has ever seen....

It is because we Americans *produce* so much better for every hour we work that we *earn* more and can *buy* more....

... and the end is not yet. We have learned that *in the long run, when output per hour goes up, prices drop, so more people can buy and all of us gain.*

"But when output per hour goes down, prices rise, so fewer people can buy and all of us lose.

Of course, there are unusual periods when these principles don't seem to work—times when business is far above or far below normal. But over the long pull you'll find that these rules of productivity *do* apply.

On the average, productivity has increased in the United States almost one-fifth every 10 years since 1850. We topped this in the 20 years 1920–1940, and we can do it again!"

"Can we keep right on doing it?" Dad asked.

"We certainly can!" Uncle Sam replied. "If everybody who plays a part in making things will team up to do it, we can raise productivity so far and so fast that we can share the benefits and have real security for *all* our people."

2. *U.S. News and World Report* Assesses the Perils of Mass Culture and the Evils of Television, 1955

The biggest of the new forces in American life today is television. There has been nothing like it in the postwar decade, or in many decades before that—perhaps not since the invention of the printing press. Even radio, by contrast, was a placid experience.

The impact of TV on this country has been so massive that Americans are still wondering what hit them. Has the effect been good or bad? What permanent effects on the American way of life may be expected? These and other questions are considered in this survey.

Probably there are some people in the U.S. who have never seen a television program, but you would have to go into the hills to find them. Two out of three U.S. families now own their own sets, or are paying for them. In 32 million homes, TV dials are flicked on and off, from channel to channel, at least 100 million times between 8 A.M. and midnight.

Everywhere, children sit with eyes glued to screens—for three to four hours a day on the average. Their parents use up even more time mesmerized by this new marvel—or monster. They have spent 15 billion dollars to look since 1946.

Now, after nearly 10 years of TV, people are asking: “What hath TV wrought? What is this thing doing to us?”

Solid answers to this question are very hard to get. Pollsters, sociologists, doctors, teachers, the TV people themselves come up with more contradictions than conclusions whenever they start asking.

But almost everybody has an opinion and wants to air it.

What do these opinions add up to? People have strong views. Here are some widely held convictions, both against and for television:

That TV has kept people from going places and doing things, from reading, from thinking for themselves. Yet it is said also that TV has taken viewers vicariously into strange and fascinating spots and situations, brought distinguished and enchanting people into their living rooms, given them a new perspective.

That TV has interfered with schooling, kept children from learning to read and write, weakened their eyesight and softened their muscles. But there are those who hold that TV has made America’s youngsters more “knowing” about life, more curious, given them a bigger vocabulary. Teaching by TV, educators say, is going to be a big thing in the future.

That TV arouses morbid emotions in children, glorifies violence, causes juvenile crime—that it starts domestic quarrels, tends to loosen morals and make people lazy and sodden. However, it keeps families together at home, provides a realm of cheap entertainment never before available, stimulates new lines of conversation.

That TV is giving the U.S. an almost primitive language, made up of grunts, whistles, standardized wisecracks and clichés—that it is turning the average American into a stereotype. Yet it is breaking down regional barriers and prejudices, ironing out accents, giving people in one part of the country a better

understanding of people in other parts. That TV is making politics "a rich man's game," turning statesmanship into a circus, handing demagogues a new weapon. But it is giving Americans their first good look at the inside of their Government, letting them judge the people they elect by sight as well as by sound and fury.

That TV has distorted and debased Salesmanship, haunting people with singing "commercials" and slogans. However, because or in spite of TV, people are buying more and more things they never before thought they needed or wanted.

These are just some of the comments that people keep on making about TV. The experts say that it probably will be another generation before there is a firm basis of knowledge about television's impact on America.

Today's TV child, the boy or girl who was born with a TV set in his home, is too young to analyze his feelings. Older people, despite their frequent vehemence about TV, are still far from sure whether they have all Aladdin's lamp or hold a bear by the tail....

What Is It?

Why do people want TV? A \$67.50-per-week shoe repairman in San Francisco, puts it about as plainly as anyone can. "TV," he says, "is the only amusement I can afford." That was the reason he gave for paying four weeks' wages for his set.

The cobbler's comment explains TV's basic lure. It is free entertainment except for the cost of [the] set, and repairs and electricity. It becomes so absorbing that a broken set is a family catastrophe. People will pay to have the set fixed before they will pay the milk bill, if necessary.

What does TV do to people? What do people do with TV? The researchers are digging into these questions all the time. In general, they come to theories, rather than conclusions. There are three main theories:

THEORY "A": This is widely held by people whose professions bring them into close contact with juveniles—judges, district attorneys, police officers, ministers. It assumes that TV is bound to be affecting the American mind and character because it soaks up one to five hours a day or more that used to be spent in outdoor play, in games requiring reasoning and imagination, or in reading, talking, radio listening, or movie-going.

Even the more passive of these pursuits, the theory runs, required more exercise of brain than does TV watching. Then, too, many TV programs, the theorists say, are violent or in questionable taste.

Net effect, according to these people, is a wasting away or steady decline in certain basic skills among American youngsters. Children lose the ability to read, forfeit their physical dexterity, strength, and initiative....

THEORY "B": Mainly held by sociologists, communications economists, pollsters. This is that television is changing the American mind and character, although nobody knows for sure just how. The evidence is too fragmentary. The analysts are disturbed by some aspects of TV's effect on viewers. Some think TV is conditioning Americans to be "other directed," that is, getting the ideas from someone else. The early American, by contrast, is supposed to have been "inner directed," a man who thought things out for himself on the basis of his own reasoning.

A fancy name for this suspected effect of TV is "narcotic disfunction." This means that more and more men come home in the evening, drop into a chair in front of the TV set after supper and slip into a dream world of unreality.

However, the same researchers confess that TV can have a broadening influence, bringing to the masses a taste of the arts and sciences, a peek into government that they couldn't get any other way.

THEORY "C": This is what the TV people themselves like to think. It is that television is rapidly becoming "one more service" to the U.S. public, another medium such as newspapers, magazines, radio. Some people watch TV a lot, others very little. Most people want a set around, but some don't lean on it.

The TV people minimize the idea that TV is dominating American life. It is almost as if they were afraid their own baby is getting too big. What they usually say is that the people who allow their lives to be controlled by television were similarly dominated by radio and the movies—and that they are only a small minority....

What's on TV

What do people get on TV? What do they want? Three out of every four TV programs are entertainment shows.... In a typical week of the peak TV season, in January of last year, crime, comedy, variety, and Western shows accounted for 42.7 per cent of all TV program time on New York City screens. News accounted for 6.1 per cent of TV time—about the same share of time as was taken by quiz, stunt, and contest shows. Other informational types of TV shows, such as interviews, weather reports, travelogues, children's instructional programs, and cooking classes, got 16.2 per cent of the time.

Rating figures tend to show that people are getting just about what they want, in the opinion of the broadcasting industry. According to the "popularity" ratings of top shows, comedy and drama and straight entertainment are out pulling everything else.

What about information? The popularity cards seem to indicate the reaction is a stifled yawn. In a two-week period last June, when two comedy programs, the "George Gobel Show" and "I Love Lucy," were at the top of the list, each reaching more than 13 million homes, the top-ranking informational programs were way down the line. The "March of Medicine," for example, was No. 62, reaching 6.57 million homes; "Meet the Press" was No. 150, getting to 1.14 million families.

Studies also have been made of how long various programs hold their audiences. Love and adventure performances, it develops, will keep about 85 per cent of the audience to the end. By contrast, the most gripping historical sketches hold only 65 per cent, and many hold less than one third of their starting viewers. Informational programs, again, rank near the bottom in "holding power."

Television critics, who write about TV programs in newspapers and magazines, are frequently harsh in their remarks about violence, sadism, bad taste on the screen. However, Dallas W. Smythe, a professor of communications economics at the University of Illinois, analyzed New York City programs for 1955 and concludes that programs which critics liked best seldom drew the biggest audiences.

The public is fickle. Top rating is hard to hold. The viewers tire rapidly of a particular show unless the producers manage to come up with fresh material, new appeals.

3. 7-Up Appeals to the Teen Market, 1957



"Fresh up" with Seven-Up!


THE ALL-FAMILY DRINK!

Enjoy sparkling, crystal-clear 7-Up . . . often. Seven-Up is so pure, so good, so wholesome that everybody—from tiny tots to grandmas and all ages in between—may "fresh up" to his heart's content. And 7-Up makes food taste extra good. So have a Stackwich with chilled 7-Up. Buy 7-Up wherever you see those bright 7-Up signs.

You like it ... it likes you!



Get a family supply of 24 bottles. Buy 7-Up by the case. Or get the new 7-Up Family Pack.



4. Vance Packard Warns against the “Hidden Persuaders,” 1957

The use of mass psychoanalysis to guide campaigns of persuasion has become the basis of a multimillion-dollar industry. Professional persuaders have seized upon it in their groping for more effective ways to sell us their wares—whether products, ideas, attitudes, candidates, goals, or states of mind.

This depth approach to influencing our behavior is being used in many fields and is employing a variety of ingenious techniques. It is being used most extensively to affect our daily acts of consumption. The sale to us of billions of dollars' worth of United States products is being significantly affected, if not revolutionized, by this approach, which is still only barely out of its infancy. Two thirds of America's hundred largest advertisers have geared campaigns to this depth approach by using strategies inspired by what marketers call “motivation analysis.”

Meanwhile, many of the nation's leading public-relations experts have been indoctrinating themselves in the lore of psychiatry and the social sciences in order to increase their skill at “engineering” our consent to their propositions. Fund raisers are turning to the depth approach to wring more money from us. A considerable and growing number of our industrial concerns (including some of the largest) are seeking to sift and mold the behavior of their personnel—particularly their own executives—by using psychiatric and psychological techniques. Finally, this depth approach is showing up nationally in the professional politicians' intensive use of symbol manipulation and reiteration on the voter, who more and more is treated like Pavlov's conditioned dog.

The efforts of the persuaders to probe our everyday habits for hidden meanings are often interesting purely for the flashes of revelation they offer us of ourselves.... The findings of the depth probes provide startling explanations for many of our daily habits and perversities. It seems that our subconscious can be pretty wild and unruly.

What the probes are looking for, of course, are the *whys* of our behavior, so that they can more effectively manipulate our habits and choices in their favor. This has led them to probe why we are afraid of banks; why we love those big fat cars; why we really buy homes; why men smoke cigars; why the kind of car we draw reveals the brand of gasoline we will buy; why housewives typically fall into a hypnoidal trance when they get into a supermarket; why men are drawn into auto showrooms by convertibles but end up buying sedans; why junior loves cereal that pops, snaps, and crackles.

We move ... into the chilling world of George Orwell and his Big Brother, however, as we explore some of the extreme attempts at probing and manipulating now going on.

Certain of the probers, for example, are systematically feeling out our hidden weaknesses and frailties in the hope that they can more efficiently influence our behavior. At one of the largest advertising agencies in America psychologists on the staff are probing sample humans in an attempt to find how to identify, and beam messages to, people of high anxiety, body consciousness, hostility, passiveness, and so on. A Chicago advertising agency has been studying the housewife's menstrual cycle and its psychological concomitants in order to find the appeals that will be more effective in selling her certain food products.

Seemingly, in the probing and manipulating nothing is immune or sacred. The same Chicago ad agency has used psychiatric probing techniques on little girls. Public-relations experts are advising churchmen how they can become more effective manipulators of their congregations. In some cases these persuaders even choose our friends for us, as at a large "community of tomorrow" in Florida. Friends are furnished along with the linen by the management in offering the homes for sale. Everything comes in one big, glossy package.

Somber examples of the new persuaders in action are appearing not only in merchandising but in politics and industrial relations. The national chairman of a political party indicated his merchandising approach to the election of 1956 by talking of his candidates as products to sell. In many industrial concerns now the administrative personnel are psycho-tested, and their futures are charted, by trained outside experts. And then there is the trade school in California that boasts to employers that it socially engineers its graduates so that they are, to use the phrase of an admiring trade journal, "custom-built men" guaranteed to have the right attitudes from the employer's standpoint.

What the persuaders are trying to do in many cases was well summed up by one of their leaders, the president of the Public Relations Society of America, when he said in an address to members: "The stuff with which we work is the fabric of men's minds." In many of their attempts to work over the fabric of our minds the professional persuaders are receiving direct help and guidance from respected social scientists. Several social-science professors at Columbia University, for example, took part in a seminar at the university attended by dozens of New York public-relations experts. In the seminar one professor, in a sort of chalk talk, showed these manipulators precisely the types of mental manipulation they could attempt with most likelihood of success.

All this probing and manipulation has its constructive and its amusing aspects; but also, I think it fair to say, it has seriously antihumanistic implications. Much of it seems to represent regress rather than progress for man in his long struggle to become a rational and self-guiding being. Something new, in fact, appears to be entering the pattern of American life with the growing power of our persuaders.

In the imagery of print, film, and air wave the typical American citizen is commonly depicted as an uncommonly shrewd person. He or she is dramatized as a thoughtful voter, rugged individualist, and, above all, as a careful hardheaded

consumer of the wondrous products of American enterprise. He is, in short, the following of twentieth-century progress and enlightenment.

Most of us like to fit ourselves into this picture, and some of us surely are justified in doing so. The men and women who hold up these glowing images, particularly the professional persuaders, typically do so, however, with tongue in cheek. The way these persuaders—who often refer to themselves good-naturedly as “symbol manipulators”—see us in the quiet of their interoffice memos, trade journals, and shop talk is frequently far less flattering, if more interesting. Typically they see us as bundles of daydreams, misty hidden yearnings, guilt complexes, irrational emotional blockages. We are image movers given to impulsive and compulsive acts. We annoy them with our seemingly senseless quirks, but we please them with our growing docility in responding to their manipulation of symbols that stir us to action. They have found the supporting evidence for this view persuasive enough to encourage them to turn to depth channels on a large scale in their efforts to influence our behavior.

The symbol manipulators and their research advisers have developed their depth views of us by sitting at the feet of psychiatrists and social scientists (particularly psychologists and sociologists) who have been hiring themselves out as “practical” consultants or setting up their own research firms. Gone are the days when these scientists confined themselves to classifying manic depressives, fitting round pegs in round holes, or studying the artifacts and mating habits of Solomon Islanders. These new experts, with training of varying thoroughness, typically refer to themselves as “motivation analysts” or “motivation researchers.” The head of a Chicago research firm that conducts psychoanalytically oriented studies for merchandisers, Louis Cheskin, sums up what he is doing in these candid terms:

“Motivation research is the type of research that seeks to learn what motivates people in making choices. It employs techniques designed to reach the unconscious or subconscious mind because preferences generally are determined by factors of which the individual is not conscious.... Actually in the buying situation the consumer generally acts emotionally and compulsively, unconsciously reacting to the images and designs which in the subconscious are associated with the product.” Mr. Cheskin’s clients include many of America’s leading producers of consumer goods.

These motivational analysts, in working with the symbol manipulators, are adding depth to the selling of ideas and products. They are learning, for example, to offer us considerably more than the actual item involved. A Milwaukee advertising executive commented to colleagues in print on the fact that women will pay two dollars and a half for skin cream but no more than twenty-five cents for a cake of soap. Why? Soap, he explained, only promises to make them clean. The cream promises to make them beautiful. (Soaps have now started promising beauty as well as cleanness.) This executive added, “The women are buying a promise.” Then he went on to say: “The cosmetic manufacturers are not selling lanolin, they are selling hope.... We no longer buy oranges, we buy vitality. We do not buy just an auto, we buy prestige.”

The reason why I mention merchandisers more frequently than the other types of persuader in this exploration is that they have more billions of dollars immediately at stake and so have been pouring more effort into pioneering the depth approach. But the others—including publicists, fund raisers, politicians, and industrial personnel experts—are getting into the field rapidly, and others with anything to promote will presumably follow....

The motivational analyst and symbol manipulator pooling their talents, and with millions of dollars at their disposal, make a fascinating and at times disturbing team. Results of their maneuvers indicate they are still quite a way from being infallible. Many of them are quick to admit their techniques are still not precise. But startling beginnings are being made.

These depth manipulators are, in their operations beneath the surface of American life, starting to acquire a power of persuasion that is becoming a matter of justifiable public scrutiny and concern.

5. E. Franklin Frazier Critiques the Black Bourgeoisie, 1957

The black bourgeoisie, as we have seen, has created a world of make-believe to shield itself from the harsh economic and social realities of American life. This world of make-believe is created out of the myth of Negro business, the reports of the Negro press on the achievements and wealth of Negroes, the recognition accorded them by whites, and the fabulous life of Negro "society." Some of the middle-class Negro intellectuals are not deceived by the world of make-believe. They will have nothing to do with Negro "society" and refuse to waste their time in frivolities. They take their work seriously and live in relative obscurity so far as the Negro world is concerned. Others seek an escape from their frustrations by developing, for example, a serious interest in Negro music—which the respectable black bourgeoisie often pretend to despise. In this way these intellectuals achieve some identification with the Negro masses and with the traditions of Negro life. But many more middle-class Negroes, who are satisfied to live in the world of make-believe but must find a solution to the real economic and social problems which they face, seek an escape in delusions.

They seek an escape in delusions involving wealth. This is facilitated by the fact that they have had little experience with the real meaning of wealth and that they lack a tradition of saving and accumulation. Wealth to them means spending money without any reference to its source. Hence, their behavior generally reflects the worst qualities of the gentleman and peasant from whom their only vital traditions spring. Therefore, their small accumulations of capital and the income which they receive from professional services within the Negro

community make them appear wealthy in comparison with the low economic status of the majority of Negroes. The delusion of wealth is supported by the myth of Negro business. Moreover, the attraction of the delusion of wealth is enhanced by the belief that wealth will gain them acceptance in American life. In seeking an escape in the delusion of wealth, middle-class Negroes make a fetish of material things or physical possessions. They are constantly buying things—houses, automobiles, furniture and all sorts of gadgets, not to mention clothes. Many of the furnishings and gadgets which they acquire are never used; nevertheless they continue to accumulate things. The homes of many middle-class Negroes have the appearance of museums for the exhibition of American manufactures and spurious art objects. The objects which they are constantly buying are always on display. Negro school teachers who devote their lives to “society” like to display twenty to thirty pairs of shoes, the majority of which they never wear. Negro professional men proudly speak of the two automobiles which they have acquired when they need only one. The acquisition of objects which are not used or needed seems to be an attempt to fill some void in their lives.

The delusion of power also appears to provide an escape for middle-class Negroes from the world of reality which pierces through the world of make-believe of the black bourgeoisie. The positions of power which they occupy in the Negro world often enable them to act autocratically towards other Negroes, especially when they have the support of the white community. In such cases the delusion of power may provide an escape from their frustrations. It is generally, however, when middle-class Negroes hold positions enabling them to participate in the white community that they seek in the delusion of power an escape from their frustrations. Although their position may be only a “token” of the integration of the Negro into American life, they will speak and act as if they were a part of the power structure of American society. Negro advisers who are called into counsel by whites to give advice about Negroes are especially likely to find an escape from their feelings of inferiority in the delusion of power. Negro social workers, who are dependent upon white philanthropy, have often gained the reputation, with the support of the Negro press, of being powerful persons in American communities.

However, the majority of the black bourgeoisie who seek an escape from their frustrations in delusions seemingly have not been able to find it in the delusion of wealth or power. They have found it in magic or chance, and in sex and alcohol. Excessive drinking and sex seem to provide a means for narcotizing the middle-class Negro against a frustrating existence. A “social” function is hardly ever considered a success unless a goodly number of the participants “pass out.” But gambling, especially poker, which has become an obsession among many middle-class Negroes, offers the chief escape into delusion. Among the black bourgeoisie it is not simply a device for winning money. It appears to be a magical device for enhancing their self-esteem through overcoming fate. Although it often involves a waste of money which many middle-class Negroes cannot afford, it has an irresistible attraction which they often confess they cannot overcome.

Despite the tinsel, glitter and gaiety of the world of make-believe in which middle-class Negroes take refuge, they are still beset by feelings of insecurity, frustration and guilt. As a consequence, the free and easy life which they appear to lead is a mask for their unhappy existence.

6. Advertisers Discover the African-American Urban Market, 1964



The Art of being a Woman:

An interest You and your Avon Representative share

Beauty is important to your neighborly Avon Representative. How to put on makeup, what's new in color, fashion, complexion care—these are her interests, too. Every day your Avon Representative perfects the art of being a woman,

at home. Then, when she calls on you—she shares her time and knowledge with you. She always brings beauty ideas, cosmetics and fragrances to please you. So take a little time for yourself. Have an Avon beauty chat.

AVONcosmetics

ROCKEFELLER PLAZA NEW YORK
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✦ ESSAYS

Perhaps more than any other decade of the twentieth century, the 1950s is associated with the idea of upward class mobility—that is, the notion that more Americans were able to successfully enter the ranks of the middle class than at any time either before or since. These two essays explore the theme of class mobility from two different directions. In the first essay, the late Roland Marchand, a prominent historian of advertising, shows how a wide range of popular cultural texts celebrated “classless prosperity”—the idea that postwar prosperity was leveling class distinctions in American society. In the second essay, historian Lizbeth Cohen, in contrast, focuses on the reality of persistent class inequality in the 1950s, suggesting that upward economic mobility was neither as extensive nor as far reaching as many scholars have assumed.

Visions of Classlessness

ROLAND MARCHAND

The constraints and sacrifices of World War II did not prepare Americans to meet the realities of the postwar era with equanimity.* Expectations ran high, despite underlying anxieties about atomic perils and the possibility of a postwar depression. Wartime discourse resonated with acclamations of equality and promises of the coming of a better, technologically wondrous life for all. The common man, idealized in nostalgic imagery, would carve out a future of unobstructed independence. Centralized controls, bureaucratic complexities, diminished autonomy for the individual—these were largely dismissed as the temporary conditions of war. Postwar popular culture reflected these expectations, expressing complacent satisfaction in the realization of some and providing vicarious compensations for the intense disappointment of others.

World War II came closer than any other twentieth-century phenomenon to enacting the drama of the melting pot in the United States, as disparate groups and values seemed to fuse into a composite national culture. Four years of war brought unprecedented national consolidation. Vast wartime migrations—to the armed forces and to war industries and boomtowns—undermined regional loyalties and broadened provincial horizons. Class barriers, and even some of the outward identifying marks of class, seemed to disappear. The nation’s dramatists of popular culture, its persuaders and performers, enlisted in the task of uniting the nation behind common assumptions.

The explicitly democratic themes of wartime popular culture promoted unity. Morale-builders stressed the idea of equal sacrifices and personalized the war through such democratic figures as G. I. Joe, Rosie the Riverter, Norman

“Visions of Classlessness, Quests for Dominion: American Popular Culture,” by Roland Marchand, from *Reshaping America: Society and Institutions, 1945–1960*, ed. Robert H. Bremner and Gary W. Reichard (Ohio State University Press, 1982). Reprinted by permission of the Estate of Roland Marchand.

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Rockwell's everyman figure in the "Freedom of Speech" poster, and Rockwell's Willie Gillis (the common man as G.I.). The war years also prolonged the modest redistribution of income from rich to poor that had begun during the 1930s. Although this process was to come to a standstill in the late 1940s, Americans emerged from the war confident of a snowballing trend toward economic democratization and a classless culture.

Meanwhile, in what Frank Fox has characterized as "World of Tomorrow" advertising, business interests painted stirring images of the technological future. Wartime research, when applied to consumer products, would bring new power and comfort to the common man in a "thermoplastic, aerodynamic, supersonic, electronic, gadgetonic" postwar world. Popular anticipation of a precise watershed moment—when the war would end and the "future" begin—took on a millennial cast. In style these wartime visions paralleled themes of the General Motors Futurama at the 1939 World's Fair. The message was one of man's technological dominion over nature, of machines as social solutions. Yet another wartime message, infused in advertising and other forms of popular culture, promised that victory would restore a cherished version of the true American way of life, based on the small town, the corner drugstore, and the close-knit family—an image aptly described as "American Pastoral."

Instead, the postwar world brought bureaucratic complexity, cold war insecurity, and a shrunken sense of individual mastery. It produced a technology of atomic peril as well as material comfort. Inspired by the sweeping democratic promises of wartime ideology and a hunger for security and stability, Americans welcomed the notion of classless prosperity. Enticed by expectations of increased power and control, they reacted with dismay as they found themselves slipping into a condition of greater vulnerability and dependency. In response they embraced popular culture reveries that seemed to enhance their sense of personal dominion.

The postwar period saw the emergence of a popular culture more homogeneous than Americans had previously known, as the cold war reinforced the trend toward consolidation. This greater homogeneity also reflected changes in demography, increasingly centralized production of popular culture images and artifacts, and more effective dissemination of popular culture by the media.

One measure of increasing homogeneity was a decline in competition from ethnic cultures. By the time of World War II, unrestricted immigration had been cut off for a full generation. Between 1940 and 1960 the percentage of foreign-born declined from 8.8 percent to 5.4 percent, and the percentage of Americans with at least one parent of foreign birth fell from 17 percent to 13.5 percent. A decline in carriers of ethnic culture such as foreign-language newspapers, theaters, musical organizations, and social halls reflected these demographic changes. Commercial entertainment increasingly outrivaled the attractions of ethnic folk culture and filled the new increments of leisure time. Network radio expanded its nationalizing and homogenizing influence, and radio sets in use increased right up to the advent of an even more powerful agent of common popular culture—television. Between 1940 and 1950 the "big four" popular periodicals, *Life*, *Reader's Digest*, *Look*, and *Saturday Evening Post*, increased their combined total circulation by 105 percent. Although some

groups did maintain "taste subcultures," more and more Americans read, heard, and saw the same popular fare.

Another measure of homogeneity was the decline of class and regional differences in clothing and recreation. During the late 1940s sales of traditional work clothes fell precipitously, with the production of men's casual pants and shirts rising almost as rapidly. More workers wore casual clothes on the job, and off work men of different classes seemed indistinguishable on the street. *Life* referred matter-of-factly in 1949 to blue jeans as part of a national teenage "uniform." By the 1950s these classless, vaguely "western" progeny of democratic G.I. dungarees had come to symbolize the triumph of denim as an equalizing casual wear for virtually all Americans. Steady increases in the length of paid vacations for workers had also begun to equalize the distribution of formal leisure time. The Bureau of Labor Statistics even argued that by 1950 the earlier, distinctively "working class" patterns of spare-time activities and expenditures had almost disappeared among urban workers.

Signs of a national culture abounded. In the early 1950s, as journalist Russell Lynes remarked, Sears, Roebuck ceased publication of regional catalogs on the grounds that tastes in furniture had become identical throughout the country. *Fortune* reported that tastes in food were "flattening" regionally. Merchandising consultants began to talk about a "standard middle-majority package," a laundry list of home furnishings and other consumer goods that should be marketable to all families. One suburb looked pretty much like another; what Louise Huxtable has characterized as "Pop Architecture" dominated the landscape everywhere. Local bowling palaces, motels, and auto showrooms quickly copied the flash, glitter, and eccentric shapes of Las Vegas's "architecture of the road." Even where franchised chains did not proliferate, the designers of shopping centers and the entrepreneurs of a thousand "miracle miles" created uniform visual imagery.

The leveling of styles was in many ways a leveling *down*—a fact that did not escape the champions of high culture. In their search for the culprits of cultural debasement, they excoriated first the threats to literacy, order, and good taste coming from the comic book industry, and then the affronts to high culture by the new monster, TV. No previous mass medium, not even radio, expanded its audience so explosively as television. Households with TV sets mounted from fewer than one million in 1949 to more than 46 million in 1960, at which point 90 percent of all American homes were consuming TV programming at an average rate of five hours per day. The convenience of TV and the national standards of performance it set were devastating to provincial commercial entertainment and much of ethnic culture.

The 1950s would later seem a golden age of diversity and cultural quality on TV. But, fixing their gaze on Hopalong Cassidy, Milton Berle, wrestling matches, and formula westerns, contemporary critics denounced the new medium as an attack on culture and literacy. With the advance of TV, homogenized franchise operations, and organizational bureaucracy, a major debate erupted among intellectuals over the prospects and perils of mass culture. Even political concerns seemed to fade before the social menace of mass culture. Did a debased mass culture involve passivity, conformity, and a stifling of creativity in the audience and a formulaic,

manipulative, whatever-will-sell attitude by the producer? Then TV seemed to its critics to have unquestionably triumphed as *the* mass culture medium.

Actually, TV probably served more to nationalize and homogenize than either to uplift or degrade. Television advertising embedded slogans, brand names, and affective imagery into the national consciousness with a new intensity, creating symbols for a more uniform national language. Television also helped promote the "common language" functions of national sports spectatorship. Together with convenient air travel, TV made attractive the nationalizing of the professional sports leagues. Minor league baseball declined as did a multitude of more significant local institutions—ethnic clubs, local union meetings, local political clubs—contributing, in Martin Mayer's view, to individual feelings of anomie and powerlessness....

The dream of suburban comfort and microcosmic control was a striking instance of upper-middle-class myopia. "Everybody" was *not* moving to the suburbs, despite impressions conveyed by Sunday supplements, TV advertisements, and popular sociology. Most housing developments were priced out of the range of those below the median income. The migration that inundated the suburbs came primarily from those among the top 40 percent in family income, especially those of the professional and technological elites who made impressive gains in income after 1945. Moreover, the most highly publicized sociological studies of suburbia focused on areas that were even more affluent than average—thus exaggerating "typical" suburban prosperity. Since writers, academics, and advertising executives came from the very segment of society making the most rapid gains, they found it easy to believe everyone was riding the same wave of prosperity. The idea of a consummated classlessness struck them with the force of a revelation.

The celebration of this "classless prosperity" permeated the popular culture that other Americans of the era consumed. Russell Lynes helped popularize the new "obsolescence" of class with his essay "High-brow, Low-brow, Middle-brow" in 1949. *Life* magazine's version carried a striking two-page chart depicting the cultural tastes of Lynes's various "brows" in ten categories ranging from furniture to entertainment. Economic classes were obsolete, Lynes insisted; people now chose their pleasures and consumer goods strictly on the basis of individual taste. Sociologist William Whyte noted the "displacement of the old class criterion" by "the impulse to 'culture' and 'good taste.'" Values were "coming together," he concluded, and the suburbs had become the "second great melting pot."

"The distinction between economic levels in the ownership of tangibles is diminishing," the Bureau of Labor Statistics noted, thus "breaking down the barriers of community and class." Sportswriters celebrated the supposed democratization of golf: "Class lines are eliminated," they argued, "when the nation wears sports clothes." Producers of the big-money TV quiz shows nurtured popular enthusiasm for illusions of equality by creating such folk heroes as the "cop who knew Shakespeare." The sponsor of "The \$64,000 Question" explained: "We're trying to show the country that the little people are really very intelligent...." Winners were prototypes of the common man and woman, symbols of democratized intelligence. Advertisers now cast affluent suburban families not only as models of appropriate consumer styles but also as realistic portrayals of *average* Americans. In the 1920s and 1930s, Americans had known that they

were seeing explicit models of high society “smartness” in many ads. Now they were encouraged to see the advertising models as mirrors of themselves.

Such images and perceptions of classlessness eventually found expression in the language itself. The 1961 *Webster's International Dictionary* acknowledged the existence of a new word not recognized in earlier editions: *life-style*. This new term, which gradually replaced the older phrase “way of life,” conveyed nuances of classlessness.... Behind the rise of the word *life-style* lay the assumption that increases in real income, the equalizing qualities of new synthetic fabrics and suburban amenities, and the expansion of automobile and appliance ownership had created a totally middle-class society in which all significant differences were simply free expressions of personal tastes.

This vision reflected some real changes in American society. During the 1950s the average income of all families and individuals rose 26 percent in real dollars, and increased installment buying allowed many families to raise their living standard at an even greater rate. Still, as Richard Parker has pointed out, “among those who called themselves middle class, perhaps a majority have always lacked the money to be in fact what they believe they are.” It was those of high income, as ever, who consumed the bulk of popular culture products and services—whether sports event admissions, frozen foods, cars, or hi-fi components. And the gains that *were* achieved by median and marginal sectors of the society did not represent gains in relative wealth or power. In fact, those below the top 40 percent remained stationary in their proportion of national income during the 1950s, and all but the wealthiest lost in relative power. Despite the National Advertising Council's puffery about “people's capitalism,” corporate assets were more narrowly held in 1960 than in 1945.

Americans appreciated their new material comforts, but many no doubt sensed an erosion of independence and control as large organizations in media, government, and business overshadowed or preempted their spheres of competence and power....

... Americans of the postwar era sought solace from anxieties and frustrations by turning their search for dominion inward. Both religion and popular psychology flourished in the postwar era, as did hybrids of the two.

Church membership advanced steadily during the late 1940s and early 1950s until it reached the unprecedented level of 63 percent of all Americans. Works on religion, from the Revised Standard Bible to Catherine Marshall's *A Man Called Peter*, were nonfiction best-sellers. The religious novels of Lloyd Douglas and Sholem Asch gained a comparable place in popular fiction. Billy Graham, using every modern device from the card file to the television set, built upon his 1949 triumph in a Los Angeles evangelical crusade to gain a place among America's ten most-admired men by the mid-1950s. Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen adapted his theatrical style to the new media, and in 1953 was named television's man of the year. Church construction advanced at record rates, and the appearance of drive-in churches seemed to augur the assimilation of religion to a car culture that had already produced the drive-in restaurant and the drive-in movie.

In the atmosphere of a cold war against “atheistic” communism, religion tended to merge with patriotism. In the mid-1950s Congress sought to formalize the union by adding “under God” to the pledge of allegiance and establishing a prayer room in

the Capitol. The physical mobility of the 1940s also enhanced the church's role as social anchor in the midst of social disruption, a place where new residents in a community might make social contacts. Theologian Will Herberg concluded that the three major faiths, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism, had come to serve as a new American "triple melting pot" for third-generation immigrants as ethnic subcultures declined. But Herberg and other religious leaders also worried about the quality of the new "religious awakening." What could one make of an enthusiasm for faith in which 86 percent of all Americans declared the Bible to be the word of God, yet 53 percent could not name a single one of the four Gospels? Perhaps the answer lay in a 1957 Gallup poll in which 81 percent affirmed their expectation that "religion can answer all or most of today's problems."

Postwar piety was paralleled by a surge of psychology. The prewar decades had witnessed a considerable popularization of the concepts of psychology and psychiatry, especially among the well-educated. World War II increased popular awareness of applied psychology and its contributions to personnel selection and "adjustment." Familiarity with psychological jargon—neurosis, inferiority complex, schizophrenia, maladjustment—was already widespread. But in the postwar years, psychology became a popular mania. Publishers responded to a thirst for self-analysis quizzes, how-to-do-it manuals, and psychological advice. A typical issue of *Reader's Digest* contained at least two articles of the "What's Your Personality?" and "Do You Think like a Man or a Woman?" variety.

Among books and films one could almost predict that if it was "serious," it was also psychological. Even the durable western tended to become a stage setting for the playing out of psychological dramas. Advertisers threw themselves headlong into motivation research and "depth interviews" in a search for those "deep-lying habits, feelings, aversions, inner compulsions, and complexes" that might inhibit the buying impulse. Artzybasheff included in his fanciful cartoon of "Improved Design for Modern Man" for *Life* in 1951 a hole in the side of the modern woman's head labeled "Aperture for easy access to brain compartment by psycho-analyst." When Lucy set up her "Psychiatric Help—5¢" booth in Charles Schulz's popular "Peanuts" comic strip, it simply marked with mild satire a logical conclusion to the trend toward universal dissemination of popular psychology.

The craze for the psychological explanation did not reflect unequivocal acceptance of psychological techniques. True, psychologists were much in demand to provide explanations of juvenile delinquency, rock 'n' roll music, marriage problems, personal aptitudes, and college panty raids. Even the Kinsey Reports on sexual practices were accepted as useful by a majority of Americans. But the frequency with which psychology and psychoanalysis served as topics for humor attested to deep ambivalence about psychology's "contributions." Although psychology promised a kind of control, an opportunity to reshape one's personality or gain a form of dominion by understanding and manipulating others, it also awakened fears that one might be the *object* rather than the *agent* of manipulation.

In *The Hidden Persuaders* (1957), Vance Packard found a large audience for his warnings about dangers embedded in motivation research and subliminal suggestion by advertisers. Americans might have been more alarmed if they had been fully aware of such new psychological "machines" and techniques as the "People

Machine," Galvanic Skin Response, "Simulmatics," and "aroma mood music," to which some ad agencies were giving curious, if skeptical, attention. William Whyte, in *The Organization Man*, described the pressures toward conformity embodied in the proliferating personality tests given by business organizations. Whyte even appended a subversive chapter on "How to Cheat on Personality Tests" as his meager contribution to the preservation of personal dominion. Americans worried about "brain-washing," and 1950s science fiction movies were sometimes as concerned with loss of personal control, with invasion or infiltration by some alien force, as they were with the specter of atomic warfare. As the autonomy of the individual seemed to shrink, psychology, for all its fascination, still did not offer unequivocal assurance of gaining dominion over self.

Millions of Americans, however, hopefully sought such assurance from a fusion of psychology and religion. A major element in postwar popular culture was the "cult of reassurance," promoted most effectively by the Presbyterian minister Norman Vincent Peale. An amalgam of psychology and religion, the cult gained its initial postwar impulse from Rabbi Joshua Liebman's prescriptions for the cure of inner tensions in *Peace of Mind* (1946). Liebman's book topped the best-seller list in 1947 and eventually sold a million copies. Peale advanced the movement's momentum with his best-selling *A Guide to Confident Living* (1949) and then with *The Power of Positive Thinking* (1952), which dominated the nonfiction best-seller charts from 1952 to 1955, soon surpassing two million copies....

A popular culture of reassurance was not everybody's answer to powerlessness. It was true that certain consolidating tendencies—the influences of network television and the common language and repetitious visual landscapes of national advertising, pop architecture, and restaurant and motel chains—worked to reinforce the "adjustment" theme of applied psychology. And it was true also that the "packaging" craze in popular culture, from shopping centers to entertainment "worlds" like Disneyland, helped push forward the process of homogenization by offering convenience and relief from individual decision-making. In fact, the whole Disney empire, from the "disneyfication" of children's classics to TV's Mickey Mouse Club and the Davy Crockett craze, strikingly epitomized the trend toward uniformity. But consolidation in popular culture did not advance undisturbed. As regional, ethnic, and visible class divergences began to fade, new fissures appeared. Some pursued the quest for dominion not through adjustment and reassurance but rather through excitement, diversity, and vicarious rebellion.

The most obvious, and to contemporaries the most shocking, new breach in society was an apparently increasing division based on age. Juvenile delinquency had appeared to rise during World War II and afterward. The striking increase in disposable income and free time among teen-agers in the late 1940s stamped adolescence as a social phenomenon rather than simply a stage in individual development. "The brute fact of today," Dr. Robert Linder warned a Los Angeles audience in 1954, "is that our youth is no longer in rebellion but in a condition of downright active and hostile mutiny." In "a profound and terrifying change," youth now acted out its "inner turmoil."

Psychological analyses of juveniles, both delinquent and normal, abounded. The film industry, reacting to the loss of its mass audience to television, began to

produce specialized films for minority audiences—one of which was teen-agers. Radio followed the same pattern. Advertisers soon recognized the existence of a massive teen-age market. Eugene Gilbert built a large marketing business by providing advertisers with inside information on teen-age consumers. His trick was spectacularly simple: employ teen-agers themselves to quiz other teen-agers about their wants and needs. Eventually *Life* confirmed the discovery of a teen-age market in an article entitled "A New \$10 Billion Power: The U.S. Teen-age Consumer." *Life* personalized the story by featuring pictures of the loot accumulated by "the businessman's dream of the ideal teen-ager," Suzie Slattery from (where else?) California.

Attempts by the media to explore the rebellious aspects of the teen-age culture created new fissures in popular culture. In the movie *Rebel without a Cause* (1955), the plot and dialogue comprise a virtual textbook of popular psychology. The police lieutenant is an amateur psychologist; the hero's mother, a castrating female. The father's multiple complexes make him a complete buffoon. The hero's friend is a self-destructive neurotic, abandoned by his parents; and the heroine's father panics at her emerging sexuality and treats her with alternating rage and condescension. *Rebel without a Cause* was a "lesson" movie for parents: be careful and understanding, or this (rebellion) could happen to you. But James Dean's portrayal of the teen-age hero, his most influential acting role, diverted attention to the style and mannerisms of the misunderstood "rebel." Youths made the movie theirs. Vicarious rebels adopted the James Dean image as an expression of contempt for the satiated and challengeless life of middle-aged suburban America.

The evolution of popular music revealed even more vividly the process of disruption, the fraying of social nerves by age conflicts. Before the 1950s producers of popular music had largely ignored age differences, and the songs of adults and teen-agers were the same. As late as 1951 Gallup polls on favorite vocalists showed little variation among age groups. Far more significantly, the pollsters did not record responses for persons under 21. Yet teen-agers were already a major buying public for records, and the average age of purchasers continued to fall during the 1950s. With the rise of the 45 rpm record (cheap, unbreakable, easy to transport and change) and the transformation of radio in the early 1950s, the weight of teen-age preferences tipped the scales toward diversity in this form of popular culture.

Even earlier, fragmentation had begun to appear within the popular music industry. A boycott by radio stations in the early 1940s had broken the monopoly of the "big three" record companies. Radio disc jockeys gained new power, and technological advances meant that production of quality recordings was no longer confined to a handful of studios in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Independent companies, the primary producers of "race" and "hillbilly" music, gained new opportunities. Still, the resulting tremors in the industry were relatively minor. From 1946 to 1953 the six dominant recording companies—Decca, Columbia, Victor, Capitol, MGM, and Mercury—recorded all but 5 of the 163 records that sold over a million copies.

Radio, in reaction to the abrupt abduction of its general audience by TV, cast about for minority tastes to satisfy. One market for subcultural programming was teen-agers. Specialized radio stations now gave them a medium of their own. Some argue that teen-age audiences created "rock 'n' roll." Others explain that

TV, that powerful consolidating force in popular culture, was also, inadvertently, the cause of this vehicle of dissent and fragmentation. Both are largely correct; together these two forces set the stage for a popular culture explosion.

By 1953 certain ingredients of rock 'n' roll had been fermenting for several years. Migrations out of the South had increased national familiarity with "hillbilly" and black styles in music. In the late 1940s *Billboard* magazine, the arbiter of pop music, bolstered the respectability of both styles by rechristening the "hillbilly" category as "country and western" and race music" as "rhythm and blues." Elements of each style began to appear in pop hits. Meanwhile, with the postwar demise of the big bands, the individual singer gained prominence. Frank Sinatra epitomized the trend, winning the adulation of young "bobby-soxers" in the early 1940s and sustaining his popularity by projecting qualities of sincerity and involvement. Meanwhile, country singers Roy Acuff and then Hank Williams won huge followings with their sincere, emotional styles.

Against the backdrop of a pallid, taken-for-granted prosperity and cold war perils about which youth could do little, a thirst arose among the young for forms of popular culture that would permit expressions of highly personalized emotion. Frankie Laine ("Jezebel," "Your Cheatin' Heart," "I Believe") "sold Emotion ... with a capital E" even more explicitly than did Sinatra. In 1951, Johnnie Ray stirred up a riotous teen-age response and set new standards for emotion and involvement in his popular hit "Cry." Ray, unlike Sinatra, was neither smooth nor controlled. He exposed an emotional vulnerability as he abandoned himself to the song's despair, "quivering, sobbing, crying and finally collapsing on the floor." Here were intimations not only of the impending rock 'n' roll performer as oracle of unconcealed emotion but also of the sensitive hero as victim.

It was in 1953 that Cleveland disc jockey Alan Freed, intrigued by his discovery that white adolescents were increasingly buying "rhythm and blues" records, initiated his "Moondog's Rock and Roll Party," playing records by black singers for a largely white teen-age radio audience. *Billboard* noted Freed's success. Record companies rushed to find white performers to "cover" (copy) up-tempo, heavy beat, rhythm and blues hits. Bill Haley and His Comets made the national pop charts with "Crazy Man Crazy" in 1953. The next year Haley's cover of "Shake, Rattle, and Roll" ranked in the top ten for twelve weeks, followed by an even longer run for "Rock around the Clock," the theme song from the popular film on juvenile delinquency *Blackboard Jungle*.

A mystique emerged that fused elements of Marlon Brando's role in *The Wild One*, James Dean's portrayal in *Rebel without a Cause*, J. D. Salinger's Holden Caulfield in *Catcher in the Rye*, the rebels of *Blackboard Jungle*, and the driving energy and aggressive sexuality of the new heroes of rock 'n' roll into a single image. The mystique emphasized a hunger for authenticity and sensitivity. In emotional expressiveness it ranged from moody insecurity to fierce independence with nuances of sexuality, pain, and violence. Raucous, exhibitionist rock 'n' roll singers disdained the "cool" of James Dean, but both expressed a contempt for hypocrisy and conventionality and used body language to convey emotion.

In 1956, the polarizing assault by rock 'n' roll on popular music (and on American culture generally) culminated. A black original, Little Richard's strident "Long

Tall Sally," outsold Pat Boone's bland cover version. With his frantic movements and raucous shouts, Little Richard, in Charlie Gillett's words, was "coarse, uncultured, and uncontrolled, in every way hard for the musical establishment to take." The lines were being drawn largely on the basis of age, although the preference of many white teen-agers for "black" music added another dimension to the rift.

Critics of the new music and of the mixed-up, misunderstood hero decried the new mystique. The tough, self-pitying "sad-bad-boy" figures represented an "apotheosis of the immature." "Rock 'n' roll used a jungle strain" to provoke a "wave of adolescent riot." How could a prosperous, middle-class nation find satisfaction in such moronic lyrics and "quivering adolescents"? *Time* compared rock 'n' roll concerts to Hitler's mass meetings, and other critics denounced the new music as nauseating and degenerate, an appeal to "vulgarism and animality." Could a consolidating popular culture even begin to bridge the gap suggested by such reactions?

Extreme views would remain irreconcilable. But 1955 elevated to stardom a versatile performer who brought the rock 'n' roll movement to a climax yet ultimately helped partially to reconcile rock with mainstream popular culture. Elvis Presley, the "hillbilly cat," as Greil Marcus writes, "deeply absorbed black music, and transformed it...." The style of his early singles was "rockabilly"—"the only style of early rock 'n' roll that proved white boys could do it all—that they could be as strange, as exciting, as scary, and as free as the black men who were suddenly walking America's airwaves...." Even as Elvis moved up to RCA and national fame in 1955 and 1956 with "Heartbreak Hotel" and "You Ain't Nuthin' But a Hound Dog," he continued to evoke sexuality, exhibitionism, and a defiance of restraint. Elvis projected emotional involvement; he encompassed the prized qualities of both toughness and vulnerability.

But Elvis not only fulfilled the image of frustrated, sensitive, rebellious hero for the new teen-age generation; he was also "hellbent on the mainstream." By the end of the 1950s, he had achieved hits with gospel songs and sentimental ballads. Eventually, one of his best-selling albums was "Blue Hawaii." His style encompassed schmaltz as well as rebellion, Las Vegas as well as Memphis. Along with Pat Boone, Bobby Darin, Bobby Rydell, Paul Anka, Ricky Nelson, and a host of new teen-age crooners, and with the added influence of Dick Clark's "American Bandstand" on TV, Elvis eased rock 'n' roll's way into the mainstream. The aura of challenge and threat in rock was overshadowed by the sentimentalities of teen-age love. By 1960, the popular music industry was fragmented. The venerable and consensus-based "Your Hit Parade" had expired after a period of senility, spurred on by rock 'n' roll. More concerned with the style of performance than with the song itself, the new rock audience was bored by interpretations of hit rock numbers by "Hit Parade" regulars. But, thus far, the fissure created in American popular culture by rock 'n' roll and generational stress had proved to be a crevice rather than a chasm.

Teen culture and rock 'n' roll, however, were not the only signs in the late 1950s of a possible countermarch in popular culture away from homogeneity toward segmentation. In reaction to the severe inroads of TV, movie-makers had sought specialized audiences that included intellectuals as well as teen-agers. Radio had fully adopted specialty programming. Gated, exclusive suburban developments gained in popularity. Portents of a difficult future for the great

mass-circulation, general-audience magazines began to appear, as both *Life* and *Saturday Evening Post* lost advertising. Despite the “whitewardedly mobile” messages of middle-class black magazines like *Ebony*, inklings could be found in the eventual movement of blacks to a more protective, conserving attitude toward the distinctive qualities of their own culture. On top of everything, enclaves of “beatniks” now flaunted a life-style even more irreconcilable with mainstream popular culture than that associated with rock ‘n’ roll.

One prospect for popular culture at the end of the 1950s was fragmentation, with increasing specialization in production and participation. But in one significant way, the consolidating process in American popular culture continued to move ahead. The history of modern popular culture is more characteristically an aspect of the history of business than an aspect of the histories of art, literature, music, or architecture. And the business interests that determined the available choices for *most* popular culture consumers had not been verging toward fragmentation or diversity. The “popular culture establishment”—in the form of CBS, NBC, and ABC, or General Motors, Walt Disney Enterprises, MGM, and *Time-Life*, or the J. Walter Thompson, Young and Rubicam, and other great advertising agencies—certainly wielded a more extensive control over the range of products and images available to the public in 1960 than in 1945. These giants, like most of the small popular culture entrepreneurs, watched the sales figures, the Nielsen ratings, and the audience surveys and produced what would sell itself or sell the sponsor’s goods....

Beset by cold war fears and organizational complexities, Americans found solace in a popular culture that provided hopeful visions of an emerging classlessness and vicarious compensations for a hedged-in, manipulated feeling. Popular culture provided the fantasies, evasions, material artifacts, and vicarious experiences through which Americans tried to recapture a sense of dominion.

Lessons in Class

LIZABETH COHEN

President Eisenhower endorsed the making of a mass middle class when he addressed the first joint AFL-CIO convention upon the merger of the two national labor federations in 1955: “The Class Struggle Doctrine of Marx was the invention of a lonely refugee scribbling in a dark recess of the British Museum. He abhorred and detested the middle class. He did not foresee that, in America, labor, respected and prosperous, would constitute—with the farmer and businessman—his hated middle class.” Eisenhower’s words may have been only rhetoric, but postwar federal policies supported his commitment by rewarding workers for displaying the middle-class consciousness of aspiring consumers over the working-class consciousness celebrated by a militant labor movement during the 1930s and World War II. What historian Samuel Hays has labeled a

“social service state for the benefit of the mass middle class” evolved in the postwar era, distributing individual benefits by way of the GI Bill, government subsidies, and tax breaks accrued to homeowners, consumers of durable goods, credit borrowers, and male-breadwinner taxpayers. In contrast, the alternative-empowerment as a unionized, class-conscious working class—was hindered, even delegitimized, by Congress’s passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.

A counterrevolution with long-lasting consequences, the act reestablished much of the managerial authority that the New Deal’s pro-labor Wagner Act of 1935 had challenged and put new shackles on labor. Taft-Hartley expanded the list of prohibited “unfair labor practices” to include such critical organizing strategies as mass picketing, sympathy strikes, and secondary boycotts, where a union takes action against a company not itself involved in a labor dispute in order to pressure another firm with which the union is disputing. The act empowered employers—and even the government—to acquire anti-strike injunctions and to resist the union shop through state “right-to-work” laws. The act barred the organization of supervisory personnel like foremen and purged communists, many of them members of the founding generation of the CIO, from union leadership. By all these measures, Taft-Hartley set out to torpedo the wartime explosion of union power, and to a large extent it succeeded. American union membership never surpassed its end-of-war height of 35 percent of the workforce and remained largely contained within the economic sectors and regional territories and that it had conquered during its rise in the 1930s.

The actions and words of postwar unions themselves seemed to reinforce this shift from militant workers to the more middle-class purchasers as citizens desired in the Consumers’ Republic. To begin with, labor was obsessed with expanding workers’ purchasing power; hardly a publication or speech failed to hail it as the ideal route to—and outcome from—full employment, high wages, and economic growth. By injecting workers so centrally into the macroeconomics of the postwar mass consumption economy, CIO and AFL labor leaders like Philip Murray, Walter Reuther, and George Meany inevitably drew attention to workers as consumers with material desires and ambitions. In the wake of the 1946 strikes and the restrictions imposed by Taft-Hartley a year later, labor leaders reoriented their bargaining objectives away from demanding a greater say in shop floor operation and company decision-making from employers and more extensive social provision from government toward maximizing workers’ purchasing power, by pegging wages to consumer prices through automatic cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) and to productivity through annual improvement factors (AIFs). By the early 1960s the COLA/AIF principle had spread from the auto industry to more than half of all union contracts nationwide. Meanwhile, unions focused within their own organizations on programs such as credit unions and consumer counseling clinics that better equipped members to participate in the commercial marketplace. They also relentlessly called on the government to aid their consuming rank and file, if not through an expanded welfare state then more modestly through implementing price controls and loosening credit controls during the Korean War, cutting taxes for lower-income filers, and improving housing provision through greater federal spending, higher construction standards, and the extension of rent control.

Another way that unions supported the Consumers' Republic was by endorsing its gender prescriptions, in particular using the growing emphasis on consumption to strengthen male authority in the family. Labor had long endorsed a traditional ideal of the family through its demand for a "family wage": adequate earnings for the male breadwinner to support non-wage-earning dependents. After a depression that had undermined the ability of many male breadwinners to provide adequately for their families, and a war that had lured more women than ever before into the industrial labor force, unions were eager to reestablish the principle of the "family wage." "The American standard of living is based upon the earnings of the main breadwinner," the United Steelworkers of America asserted emphatically in 1945. "[I]t rejects the concept that other members of the family have to work in order to provide the family with the necessary living essentials." Thus, as labor's attention to consumer matters grew during and after World War II, unions made sure to move their management out of the female realm of the auxiliaries, where it had been parked in the 1930s and early 1940s when more concerned with consumer rights and protections, and into the more male-dominated territory of mainstream union business. Precious purchasing power became inseparably linked to the family wage. "Unless a worker's earnings can support his family, we [will] find our whole capitalistic set-up deprived of the market for the great production of which it is capable," was how the New Jersey State CIO Council put it in 1947.

CIO women's auxiliaries that had begun the postwar era boasting that "we manage the family pay envelope" soon were shifted to a new assignment: assisting the CIO's political action committee in recruiting "the family voter," meaning other women, to strengthen labor's influence at the polls. While the more traditional craft-oriented AFL auxiliaries continued to promote union label-buying campaigns and consumer cooperatives, their merger with the CIO auxiliaries in the mid-1950s put a damper on these activities. Under male unionists' control, invigorating purchasing power became not only the best route to prosperity for workers and the nation but also a sign of successful masculine stewardship within families. Headlines like "Can Mr. Consumer Hold His Own?" and cartoons depicting male worker-consumers carrying market baskets and towering over their buying-unit families littered the postwar labor press. Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers skillfully interwove the interests of men, workers, and the nation with mass consumption when he exhorted the 1946 CIO convention: "We make this fight in the CIO not only because Joe Smith needs more money to buy his kids food and get them adequate clothing and provide decent shelter, but in the aggregate millions of Jones[es] and Smiths throughout America need this greater purchasing power because the nation needs this greater purchasing power." As unions increasingly sought to put female shoppers under the supervision of newly important male consumers, they extended the patriarchal reach of reconversion across class lines.

It is not hard to see how many observers at the time, and scholars since, have concluded that the era of the mass middle class had indeed arrived. More equitable distribution of home ownership, household equipment, apparel, and automobiles seemed to have broken down the "barriers of community and

class" that the Department of Labor claimed in its *How American Buying Habits Change* of 1959 had characterized the prewar nation. The Labor Department went on to assert: "The wage-earner's way of life is well-nigh indistinguishable from that of his salaried co-citizens;" with which the business press enthusiastically concurred. A *Business Week* headline blared "Worker Loses His Class Identity," while *Fortune* gushed that "the union has made the worker to an amazing degree a middle-class member of a middle-class society,"? What social scientists have since labeled the "embourgeoisement" of workers also implied a trade-off: rewards of material prosperity and social integration in return for ceding shop floor control and company governance to management, and for accepting private corporate welfare such as pensions and health insurance in place of an expanded and more social democratic welfare state. Whether called a "Fordist compromise," the "new social contract," or the "Treaty of Detroit" in reference to the United Auto Workers paradigmatic contract with General Motors in 1950, the deal was supposedly the same: corporate America got industrial stability, and workers learned to derive increasing satisfaction and status from the lives they created outside of work, thanks to high wages and generous fringe benefits. The well-paid steelworker in Pittsburgh or Youngstown, Ohio, enjoying all the accouterments of middle-class life, became the icon of the postwar "affluent worker."

The ideal promoted by the Consumers' Republic, however, should not be confused with the actual lives of American workers during the postwar period. What the Eisenhower administration's Department of Labor and the business press claimed were the new rules of the game—essentially, the integration of working-class Americans into a mass middle class—did not necessarily reflect the reality of working-class life, nor how working people viewed it. Uncovering the "real rules" requires deeper investigation into how the structures of the Consumers' Republic, intended to facilitate upward social mobility, actually worked.

The vehicle most often credited with moving working-class Americans into the postwar middle class through higher education and easy capital—the GI Bill—orchestrated much less social engineering than it promised and has been given credit for. Despite the rampant rhetoric of social mobility surrounding the bill, evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the better off a GI was going into the war, the better off VA benefits made him after it. The reasons were twofold: first, the programs themselves favored vets who already had educational and financial resources; and second, the joint public-private structure of the GI Bill meant that the federal government channeled its dollars through existing institutions—the real estate industry, banks, private colleges—and thereby underwrote rather than challenged longstanding discriminatory practices. A closer look at education programs and financial benefits, the core GI Bill programs, reveals how they worked—or didn't—to make workers middle class.

A number of factors converged to make it difficult for working-class GIs, many of whom did not hold high school diplomas, to use their benefits to propel themselves into middle-class occupations. To begin with, multiple investigations confirmed that veterans who had graduated from high school or had some college education before the war were more likely than their less educated

comrades-in-arms to be among the half of all veterans who took advantage of GI educational benefits, and when they did, they overwhelmingly favored academic over trade education. Sixty-five percent of World War II vets had been working full-time in a regular job before entering service. About 20 percent had been attending school full-time. But among the students, demand for GI educational benefits was much higher than among the workers: 70 percent made use of them, broken down into 71 percent of high school graduates, 82 percent of those who had been enrolled in college, and 55 percent of those who already were college graduates. The GI Bill thus helped many vets already on the college track to return to it. Among 10,000 vets enrolled in select colleges soon after the war, only 10 percent told investigators that they “definitely” could not have attended college without the GI Bill, and another 10 percent said “probably” not. “Given that 55 percent of World War II vets had less than a high school education at discharge, not surprisingly three times as many vets used their benefits for vocational training as for formal schooling, but that got them better-paid working-class jobs, not middle-class ones. A Louis Harris survey of aging veterans in 1983 confirmed that twice as many vets had worked as better-paid skilled craftsmen or foremen than factory operatives or unskilled laborers, a revealing reversal of the balance in the general male population.

Moreover, the structure of the GI Bill in World War II, whereby the government made payments directly to schools approved by the states (a system changed with the Korean War because of flagrant abuses by proprietary schools), worked against the vocational student. It was much harder for vets seeking apprenticeships, skill instruction, and on-the-job training to find acceptable, quality placements than for college- and graduate school-bound vets, whose tuition payments went uncontested to reputable institutions. Colleges, too, proved to be much better equipped and more reliable in educating veterans than other, often fly-by-night and for-profit, schools and programs. Furthermore, in contrast to later wars, when less generous benefits would force most vets into public, particularly community colleges, the amount allocated under the Second World War’s GI Bill was sufficient to pay tuition at a high-prestige college, granting even more privilege to those who already enjoyed some. “Why go to Podunk College, when the government will send you to Yale?” *Time* magazine only half joked, as 50 percent of all vet students enrolled in private institutions of higher learning, which only 21 percent would do by the Vietnam era. This is not to say that no working-class veterans expanded their career possibilities. A comparison of the Rutgers University class of 1942 and 1949, for example, found the latter to be more plebeian than the former. But most often, it was the already better educated, middle-class veteran who parlayed GI benefits into a college or graduate degree and a middle-class occupation, while his less educated, lower-class fellow serviceman advanced only within the working class.

Monetary benefits through mustering-out pay, bank loans, and home mortgages proved no more effective than education in giving working people the greater life options that middle-class Americans enjoyed. Burdened with inflated living costs after the lifting of price controls, working-class veterans without any

other financial cushion found themselves forced to use up their mustering-out pay quickly. When the New Jersey CIO surveyed vets in its ranks in 1947, it discovered that only one veteran in ten could afford to let his terminal leave bonds remain uncashed, drawing interest; three-quarters had to apply the proceeds to current living expenses, and half had to use at least part of the funds to pay debts incurred over the past year.

Securing new capital was not much easier for working-class vets than holding on to what little they already had. Many unions and veterans complained that the GI Bill's business and home loan program, administered as it was through private banks and savings and loan associations, gave government backing to profit-seeking lending institutions, which then proceeded to discriminate against those who did not qualify as traditionally defined "good credit risks." As one union leader cynically put it, "The GI Bill of Rights is a wonderful piece of legislation but it is meaningless.... Take loans for instance. A fellow has to be a Philadelphia lawyer to go in there and ask for a loan. Then he has to fill out about 999 forms and, in the end, he doesn't get anything." Max Roller of the liberal American Veterans Committee agreed, recalling that from newspaper articles promoting VA business loans he had thought "all the GI had to do was to go to the bank, present his discharge, and get \$2000. So I came home. I spoke to the bank about it.... They asked me: 'What security can you offer?' Well, frankly, the average GI hasn't got any security for he doesn't make any money in the army."

Banks' admission that they turned down a majority of veteran loan applicants—purportedly to protect vets from ruinous debt—only substantiated the limited effectiveness of VA loans in facilitating upward mobility. For example, the thirteen member banks of the Newark Clearing House Association, which coordinated VA loan applications in the city, complained that government propaganda had created a widespread belief among GIs that loans were "a sort of reward for their military service," granted solely on that basis. Faced with 6052 loan applications already by December 1946, "Newark decided to put on the brakes for the veterans' own protection; the Newark War Veterans Service Bureau explained to City Hall. After reviewing candidates "courteously but searchingly," only 605 loans were granted, 10 percent of total applications. "Newark bankers were deeply interested in government loans to veterans, but not at the expense of the veterans' inexperience and folly," or, they might have added, at too much risk to themselves!

Labor saw the hand of the real estate and banking industries all over the GI Bill's loan program, but had little success challenging their powerful Washington lobbies. Groups such as the National Association of Home Builders opposed any government involvement to spur low-cost homes other than loan guarantees as "socialized housing." By 1953, when banks were less "veteran-conscious" and less attracted to the lower rate of interest stipulated for government-guaranteed loans, many even stopped bothering with them, which left needier borrowers with still fewer alternatives to rising commercial interest rates. It came as no surprise that the Bradley Commission concluded in 1956 that use of the loan guaranty had been highest among veterans who had

worked in fairly well-paid occupations before entering service—professional and technical workers, craftsmen, and sales workers—or if in school, had finished a year or more of college.

A remarkable document, an in-depth study of an anonymous “typical small mid-western city” in the aftermath of World War II by the University of Chicago’s Committee on Human Development, confirmed that the GI Bill offered little social mobility to working-class veterans. *The American Veteran Back Home: A Study of Veteran Readjustment*, published in 1951, substantiated that by and large, those who entered colleges or universities were young men who would have gone on to higher education anyway. Others did take courses at trade schools, but a number who dropped out, as well as men who failed to claim any education or training benefits at all, identified as their chief reason the limited subsistence offered a man with a family to support. “What good is the GI Bill going to do me? No married man could afford it, unless he’s got lots of dough,” one ex-serviceman grumbled, while another observed, “Except for the fellows that want to go to school, it seems to help very few.” Nor, the interviewers concluded, was full-time schooling an option for less privileged veterans, as “a large majority had not completed their high school education.” For older, poorly educated vets in particular, the “years of adult living that separated them from their last experience with school made the possibility of further education a vague, difficult, and even unpalatable consideration.” Not surprisingly, very few—vets in this city founded businesses or bought homes with GI Bill loans either; six veterans with good collateral had managed to, leaving “the overwhelming majority of veterans ... convinced that the Midwest banks ‘were not in favor of it, because they didn’t make as much on their money.’”

The Chicago researchers told a story of dashed hopes. “Although a great number of these men had returned with a higher level of vocational aspiration, relatively few of them were able to make the necessary emotional or familial or financial adjustments involved in obtaining more education.... It would seem that GI Benefits, while they *might* have played an important role in giving veterans advantages ... in climbing the socioeconomic ladder, actually played a very minor role.” Further evidence that working-class vets quickly scaled back their ambitions comes from a study of almost 100,000 enlisted men processed through Fort Meade in Maryland at their separation from the army between June and November 1945. When men were asked what they were planning to do upon discharge, over the course of six months the proportion of those seeking a new job and those willing to return to an old job completely switched, while those voicing uncertainty remained constant at about 20 percent. Whereas at first, half the returning vets came home bursting with new ambitions, it seems within six months, a decrease in job opportunities, the immediate necessity of making a living, and a declining confidence in the possibility for upward mobility inverted the statistics. By late 1945 half of the vets told separation counselors they would settle for getting their old jobs back. So as the clock ticked within the lives of individual working-class vets as well as in historical time, reentry into civilian society involved coming to terms with less class mobility than the designers of the GI Bill had seemed to promise.

The assumption that workers' and their unions' growing concern with consumption marked their automatic ascension into the American middle class falters on more than the structural limitations of the GI Bill of Rights. Even after the initial difficulties of reconversion, workers' opportunity to achieve middle-class affluence—to acquire a home, the latest-model car, and a credit card or to send their children to college—was constantly dampened by economic uncertainty. Wages of unionized workers grew, even doubled in some cases, but still earnings for many fell short of minimum requirements for a “moderate standard of living” as defined by the Department of Labor Statistics, while even more undermining, workers could never put worries about plant closings and job layoffs far out of mind. During the recession of 1957–58, one of the worst of the postwar era, layoffs were rampant. With 300,000 autoworkers unemployed, it took almost seventeen years of seniority to retain a job in Detroit's auto plants. Nor did COLA contract provisions always keep up with inflation. During the raging inflation of the Korean War, workers' ability to consume suffered from climbing prices, as well as from the Federal Reserve's raising of interest rates to curb credit purchase and hence inflation. In the mid-1960s inflation again ate into workers' buying power, despite rising wages. And it hardly need be said that workers outside of the unionized manufacturing sector—often young, minority, and female—found employment even less stable and lucrative.

In 1955, the same year that President Eisenhower hailed working-class Americans as members of the respected and prosperous middle class, *Life* magazine profiled the travails of John and Sophie Michalewicz of Detroit, who had almost lost the home they were building after a Chrysler layoff in 1948, had barely held on to their new television in 1950 when short work weeks cut earnings, minimally celebrated Christmas in 1954 due to another layoff, and now had just learned that John's department at Chrysler was shutting down temporarily. For families like the Michalewicz, credit dried up along with wages during layoffs, the combination severely constricting workers' participation in the Consumers' Republic. As embittered Whirlpool employees in Findlay, Ohio, explained as late as 1974, after seven years of living with seasonal layoffs, “It's hard for the ordinary worker to get credit in town because everyone knows that the company hires and fires every year. Try buying or renting when no money comes in for three or four months!” As employers prized flexible payrolls and controlled costs above all else, intentionally or not they subverted workers' purchasing power and upset the fragile underpinnings of the demand economy that they themselves, as well as labor and government, had in principle endorsed.

Even when workers had sufficient money to spend, consuming did not necessarily require a trade-off between working-class identity and material aspirations. In the late 1950s several pioneering studies by marketing researcher Pierre Martineau and sociologists Lee Rainwater, Richard Coleman, and Gerald Handel identified distinctive patterns in working-class purchasing, an insight that marketers would seize upon in the 1960s and 1970s. Extensive interviewing led Rainwater, Coleman, and Handel to argue that “the saving and spending habits of the working class differ.... Here is a vast group of consumers who have their

own special dreams and desires, their own value systems, their own way of reacting to products, to advertising, or to sales messages.”

When two other sociologists—Ely Chinoy and Bennett Berger—set out in the 1950s to test how participation in a mass consumer society affected the class identity of automobile workers, they too concluded that workers displayed a distinctive constellation of values and choices that differed from middle-class ones. Chinoy argued that workers in “Autotown, USA” (Lansing, Michigan), finding work meaningless, sought personal fulfillment through consumption outside of work, shunning opportunities for upward social mobility on the Job: “as long as possessions continue to pile up the worker can feel that he is moving forward.” As one welder interviewed by Chinoy put it, “My next step is a nice little modern house of my own. That’s what I mean by bettering yourself—or getting ahead.” Lest Chinoy’s findings suggest that workers who shunned advancement on the job nonetheless became middle class through purchasing homes, the experience of Berger’s Ford workers indicated otherwise. For these autoworkers dwelling in suburban homes, surrounded by consumer goods, in Milpitas, California, buying a house in a “working-class suburb” reinforced rather than undermined working-class identity. A year later, Rainwater and Handel confirmed Berger’s findings. After interviewing working-class Americans in five metropolitan areas (Camden, Gary, Chicago, Louisville, and Denver), they concluded that “one indication that the worker’s increased prosperity which enables him to buy a new house is not being utilized as an effort to become middle class is the fact that many of these new housing areas are largely working class.” Working Americans could enjoy a decent standard of living, even purchase a home, without abandoning an awareness that they had more in common with workers on the next shop machine than those in the upstairs office, nor forgetting that their economic interests differed substantially from their bosses’.

Other evidence, moreover, confirms that consumption was not always an escape from work that “tamed” American workers, in the language of sociologist Daniel Bell writing in the early 1960s. Rather, workers often appreciated the interconnectedness of their lives as consumers and assertive workers. For example, Local 410 of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE), which represented production and maintenance workers at the Westinghouse Lamp Division plant in the industrial town of Bloomfield, New Jersey, launched a buying campaign to pressure local stores to carry Westinghouse-made products, particularly the electric light bulbs manufactured in their own plant. As the local wrote to the chairman of the board of The Great A & P Company, “It is most disappointing to us, after purchasing our food at our favorite A & P, not even to have a choice of buying in your stores the very product which pays for our groceries. We sincerely believe that your handling of our lamps will contribute to the industrial growth of the community.” The union even went so far as to contact the top Westinghouse lamp salesman when A & P stressed the importance of stronger personal contact between Westinghouse salesmen and A & P store buyers: “We sincerely hope that you will be able to swing A & P. We are depending on you—we are all on the same team in this.” Similarly, when a Bamberger’s Department Store ad

featuring thirteen appliances, none Westinghouse, appeared shortly thereafter in the *Newark News*, the local's president, Richard Lynch, penned a poisonous rebuke: "I am shocked at the inconsideration of Barns for the 10,000 Westinghouse workers in New Jersey." The next month, Lynch reminded his own executive board, "The greater the total sale of Westinghouse products, the greater the profit and the job security for Westinghouse union members. And the greater the profits, the greater the opportunity for additional and overdue benefits in next year's contract." Although weekly issues of *The Torch*, the local's newsletter, were filled with postwar labor's "party line" of the necessity of sustaining worker purchasing power, shop floor concerns such as foremen abuses, illegal subcontracting of work, too frequent layoffs, and encroaching automation of the production process regularly appeared as well, as did frustrations with national politics and limitations in state social and labor policy on occasion. Buying power may have become an obsession with members of Local 410 IUE, but they did not sell out their commitment to improving their work lives-or advocating a more progressive government-in the process.

Workers who owned homes and bought televisions not only worried about workplace issues in the privacy of their union newsletters, they were sometimes willing to stand up to employers by striking, and even by "wildcat striking," unauthorized job actions that violated the union contract. As workers risked the wrath of their union leaders as well as their bosses when they undertook these protests over such issues as shop conditions, pay scales, production standards, staffing, and health and safety provisions, they confirmed the fallacy of assuming worker contentedness during the supposedly prosperous and pacific era of the Consumers' Republic. At Ford in 1953, for example, in the heyday of the Treaty of Detroit, 127 wildcat strikes occurred, involving 20,603 workers and 7,120,056 lost production hours. By 1960, 60 percent of a sample of 150 major employers listed workers' wildcat striking over local plant issues as one of the most serious labor relations problems they faced.

Government, corporate, and labor interests that collaborated in designing the Consumers' Republic may have rhetorically promised working-class Americans that social integration and material equality as members of a mass middle class would accompany their expanded purchasing power, but other aspects of state policy and social reality continued to reinforce class distinctiveness: labor legislation like the Taft-Hartley Act kept organized labor in a straightjacket; the GI Bill offered only limited upward mobility; the tax structure became increasingly less progressive as the postwar era went on; and evolving residential and commercial patterns would increasingly reinforce class segmentation rather than class integration. Even as the white-collar job sector grew, so that by 1957 for the first time it outnumbered the blue-collar sector of 25 million by half a million employees, many Americans held on to their working-class identity. According to polls, in 1952 only 37 percent of Americans identified as middle class, and as late as 1964 it was still only 44 percent.

The ideology of the Consumers' Republic that provided the blueprint for reconversion may have heralded the arrival of class integration while it implicitly endorsed gender differentiation and even inequality, but in the end working-class

Americans suffered from some of the same discrimination as did women of all classes. The universal prosperity and equality assumed to be intrinsic to a vital mass consumption economy succeeded more in making promises than in ensuring delivery. Even where a rising standard of living increased workers' capacity to consume, doing so did not necessarily mean mass mobility into the more secure life of the middle class....

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CHAPTER 3



To the Brink: Berlin, Cuba, and the Threat of Nuclear War

The death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the end of the Korean War later the same year brought about a relaxation of Cold War tensions. In 1955, for the first time since the East–West struggle began, U.S. and Soviet leaders met to discuss their differences. The warming trend did not last, however. Numerous developments later in the decade and in the early 1960s rekindled Cold War hostilities and pushed the two superpowers closer to the brink of nuclear war than they had ever been.

Tensions escalated in 1957, when the Soviet Union launched an unmanned satellite dubbed Sputnik into orbit, leading many Americans to believe—wrongly, as it turned out—that Moscow had gained a dangerous advantage in military and space technologies. U.S. leaders called for a major buildup of American military power. Meanwhile, the rapid crumbling of European colonial empires and the powerful assertion of nationalism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America created new arenas for competition between the superpowers, each of which sought to win developing nations over to its side of the East–West struggle.

Perhaps most important of all, new tensions resulted from changes in leadership in both Moscow and Washington. In the Soviet Union, the volatile Nikita Khrushchev proved far more willing than his predecessors to provoke the United States. On the U.S. side, President John F. Kennedy sought to project a new spirit of liberal activism and eagerness to wage the Cold War more vigorously.

Activism and ambition on both sides fueled a series of dangerous crises that raised the specter of a war that might destroy humanity. One flash point was Berlin, the German city whose western half had been occupied by U.S., British, and French troops since the end of the Second World War. When Khrushchev announced in 1958 that he aimed to end Western occupation rights, U.S. leaders responded defiantly, and in 1961 the confrontation escalated to a full-blown crisis. The Kennedy administration bolstered American military forces in Europe, and war seemed a real possibility. The crisis eased only in August,

when the communists ordered construction of the Berlin Wall, sealing off the Western sector of the city from communist-dominated East Germany.

An even bigger crisis centered on Cuba. Cuban revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro overthrew a U.S.-backed dictatorship in 1959 and, over the following two years, formed a partnership with Moscow. Cuba's accession to the communist bloc alarmed American leaders, who viewed Cuba, just 90 miles from Florida, as part of the U.S. sphere of influence. In April 1961, the Kennedy administration backed an invasion by Cuban exiles intent on overthrowing the Castro regime. The invasion was a humiliating failure for Kennedy and had the counterproductive effect of tightening the bond between Moscow and Havana. Indeed, the Soviet government decided in 1962 to install nuclear missiles on the island to help protect the Cuban regime and offset U.S. nuclear superiority worldwide. When American spy planes discovered the Soviet plan, the Cuban missile crisis—13 days of tense standoff between Moscow and Washington—ensued, ending only when the two sides struck a bargain that has only been fully understood in recent years.



DOCUMENTS

By the late 1950s, many Americans sensed that their nation was losing ground in the competition with the Soviet Union. Especially worrisome were Soviet advances in military technology, a fear strongly reinforced by the *Sputnik* launch on October 4, 1957. American anxiety about expanding Soviet military capabilities is well captured in Document 1, a report by a high-level advisory committee sent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower a month after *Sputnik* was launched. Eisenhower took such warnings seriously and devoted more resources to national security. But he also worried about going too far in building up American military power. In his farewell address before stepping down from the presidency in January 1961 (Document 2), Eisenhower warned that the United States risked destroying individual freedoms and concentrating too much authority in the hands of an unrepresentative “military-industrial complex” if it focused too much on the Soviet challenge.

The new president, John F. Kennedy, showed no such anxiety as he entered the White House. On the contrary, he used his inaugural address on January 20, 1961 (Document 3), to issue a sweeping call for greater exertions to combat communism and to wield American power around the world. Although Kennedy did not always act with such boldness while president, his rhetoric suggested that the country had entered a new era of grand ambition at home and abroad. No challenge seemed to lie beyond the enormous capabilities of a determined and activist nation.

Hardly had the Kennedy administration taken office, however, when it suffered a major setback at the Bay of Pigs (Playa Girón) on the southern shore of Cuba. On April 17 and 18, 1961, Cuban émigrés trained by the Central Intelligence Agency failed miserably in their attempt to invade Cuba and spark a rebellion against the Castro government. In Document 4, the report of a committee

charged with investigating the failure, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk reflects on various flaws in the invasion plan.

Chastened by their failure, U.S. leaders responded assertively when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev threatened in June 1961, as he had done periodically over the previous three years, to end Western occupation rights in Berlin. In a chilling speech to the nation on July 25, 1961 (Document 5), Kennedy pledged to defend the American position in the city and urged Americans to prepare themselves for the possibility of war.

Fears of nuclear war peaked in October 1962 after U.S. aircraft overflying Cuba photographed Soviet workers installing launch sites for nuclear missiles. Document 6 is taken from the transcripts of two meetings on October 16 in which Kennedy and his top aides discussed possible responses to the Soviet initiative. Although many advisers urged the president to order an immediate attack on the missile sites, the president opted to blockade the island and demand that Moscow remove the weapons. A peaceful end to the crisis was assured only after the two sides reached a bargain on October 27, when the president's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, met alone with Anatoly I. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington. The exact nature of their agreement became apparent only after the Cold War, when Russian authorities made public Dobrynin's telegram to Moscow reporting on the meeting (Document 7). The Soviets agreed to remove the missiles in exchange for Washington's promise not to invade Cuba and to remove U.S. nuclear missiles based in Turkey. The latter U.S. concession was so sensitive that both American and Soviet authorities kept it secret for decades.

1. White House Committee Urges Military Build-up, 1957

We have found no evidence in Russian foreign and military policy since 1945 to refute the conclusion that USSR intentions are expansionist, and that her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts of Soviet defense. We have, therefore, weighed the relative military and economic capabilities of the United States and the USSR in formulating our broad-brush opinions, basing our findings on estimates of present and future Russian capabilities furnished by the Intelligence community.

The evidence clearly indicates an increasing threat which may become critical in 1959 or early 1960. The evidence further suggests the urgency of proper time-phasing of needed improvements in our military position vis-a-vis Russia...

The Gross National Product (GNP) of the USSR is now more than one-third that of the United States and is increasing half again as fast. Even if the Russian rate of growth should decline, because of increasing difficulties in

management and shortage of raw materials, and should drop by 1980 to half its present rate, its GNP would be more than half of ours as of that date. This growing Russian economic strength is concentrated on the armed forces and on investment in heavy industry, which this year account for the equivalent of roughly \$40 billion and \$17 billion, respectively, in 1955 dollars. Adding these two figures, we get an allocation of \$57 billion per annum, which is roughly equal to the combined figure for these two items in our country's current effort. If the USSR continues to expand its military expenditures throughout the next decade, as it has during the 1950's, and ours remains constant, its annual military expenditures may be double ours, even allowing for a gradual improvement of the low living standards of the Russian peoples.

This extraordinary concentration of the Soviet economy on military power and heavy industry, which is permitted, or perhaps forced, by their peculiar political structure, makes available economic resources sufficient to finance both the rapid expansion of their impressive military capability and their politico-economic offensive by which, through diplomacy, propaganda and subversion, they seek to extend the Soviet orbit.

The Soviet military threat lies not only in their present military capabilities—formidable as they are—but also in the dynamic development and exploitation of their military technology. Our demobilization after World War II left them with a great superiority in ground forces, but they had no counter in 1946 for our Strategic Air Force nor for our Navy. They had no atomic bombs, no productive capacity for fissionable materials, no jet engine production, and only an infant electronics industry. This situation was compatible with a then-backward country, so much of whose most productive areas had suffered military attack and occupation. Their industrial base was then perhaps one-seventh that of the United States.

The singleness of purpose with which they have pressed their military-centered industrial development has led to spectacular progress. They have developed a spectrum of A- and H-bombs and produced fissionable material sufficient for at least 1500 nuclear weapons. They created from scratch a long-range air force with 1500 B-29 type bombers; they then substantially reequipped it with jet aircraft, while developing a short-range air force of 3000 jet bombers. In the field of ballistic missiles they have weapons of 700 n.m. [nautical miles] range, in production for at least a year; successfully tested a number of 950 n.m. missiles; and probably surpassed us in ICBM development....

Since the prevention of war would best protect our urban population, we assign the highest relative value to the following measures to secure and augment our deterrent power. These would protect our manned bombers from surprise attack, increase our forces available for limited military operations, and give us an earlier and stronger initial operational capability (IOC) with intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles....

But this is not sufficient unless it is coupled with measures to reduce the extreme vulnerability of our people and our cities. As long as the U.S. population is wide open to Soviet attack, both the Russians and our allies may believe

that we shall feel increasing reluctance to employ SAC [Strategic Air Command nuclear forces] in any circumstance other than when the United States is directly attacked. To prevent such an impairment of our deterrent power and to ensure our survival if nuclear war occurs through miscalculation or design, we assign a somewhat lower than highest value, in relation to cost, to a mixed program of active and passive defenses to protect our civil population....

A nationwide fallout shelter program to protect the civil population. This seems the only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the hazards of radiation. The Panel has been unable to identify any other type of defense likely to save more lives for the same money in the event of a nuclear attack.

The construction and use of such shelters must be tied into a broad pattern of organization for the emergency and its aftermath. We are convinced that with proper planning the post-attack environment can permit people to come out of the shelters and survive. It is important to remember that those who survive the effects of the blast will have adequate time (one to five hours) to get into fallout shelters. This is not true of blast shelters which, to be effective, must be entered prior to the attack....

The measures of highest value, to strengthen our deterrent and offensive capabilities, are estimated to cost over the next five years (1959-1963) a total of \$19 billions.

Additional measures of somewhat lower than highest value, for the protection of the civil population, include a strengthening of active defenses, a fallout shelter program, and the development of a defense system to protect cities from missile attack. The estimated costs of these items total \$25 billions over the next five years....

These several defense measures are well within our economic capabilities. The nation has the resources, the productive capacity, and the enterprise to outdistance the USSR in production and in defense capability. This country is now devoting 8.5% of its production to defense, and 10% to all national security programs. The American people have always been ready to shoulder heavy costs for their defense when convinced of their necessity. We devoted 41% of our GNP to defense at the height of World War II and 14% during the Korean War. The latter percentage is somewhat higher than would be required to support all our proposals....

The measures advocated by the Panel will help to unite, to strengthen and to defend the Free World, and to deter general war which would expose our cities and bases to thermonuclear attack. They would improve our posture to deter or promptly to suppress subversion or limited war, which may be more likely in the years immediately ahead. No one of these lesser enemy moves might directly threaten our survival. Yet, if continued, they might nibble away the security of the Free World as Germany undermined the superior military power of Great Britain and France between 1936 and 1939.

If deterrence should fail, and nuclear war should come through miscalculation or design, the programs outlined above would, in our opinion, go far to ensure our survival as a nation.

2. President Dwight D. Eisenhower Warns of a "Military-Industrial Complex," 1961

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research—these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs—balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage—balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been over-shadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

3. President John F. Kennedy Declares Sweeping Global Ambitions, 1961

Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans—born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage—and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

John F. Kennedy inaugural address, January 20, 1961, in *Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 1–3.

This much we pledge—and more.

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do—for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom—and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.

To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.

To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge—to convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support—to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective—to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak—and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.

Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.

We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.

But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course—both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war.

So let us begin anew—remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate....

In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded, each generation of

Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need—not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, “rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation”—a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself....

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility—I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it—and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

4. Secretary of State Dean Rusk Examines U.S. Failures at the Bay of Pigs, 1961

After a few introductory remarks Secretary Rusk was asked his estimate of the probability of success of the Zapata Plan.

Secretary Rusk: It was in the neighborhood of fifty per cent. It appeared the landing might be followed by further uprisings. If this failed the force could become guerrillas.

Mr. [Allen] Dulles [director of the Central Intelligence Agency]: I think we all looked upon this as a pretty risky operation.

Secretary Rusk: The risks of the operation were accepted, however, because the importance of success was fully appreciated. Time was running out. It was the last chance in some time to have this job done by Cubans. Otherwise we might have to do this with American personnel and this would be less desirable. Castro's police power was increasing and he was also receiving a large inflow of Soviet arms. Further, it should be pointed out that when we talked about the possibility of failure we talked about far more disastrous results than actually occurred. For example, we had discussed the possibility of such things as being ousted from the OAS or censure by the UN, and lively and adverse reaction by our allies in Europe. The results that developed were not as serious as those that we had considered.

¹“Memorandum for the Record (testimony by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the Cuba Study Group), May 4, 1961, in *U.S. Department of States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. X, Cuba 1961–1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 450–454.

Question: What was the feeling of the likelihood of a popular uprising following the landing?

Secretary Rusk: There was a very considerable likelihood of popular uprisings.

Question: How essential was such an uprising regarded for the success of the operation?

Secretary Rusk: It was believed that the uprising was utterly essential to success in terms of ousting Castro. At one point we discussed the possibility of putting these men in as guerrillas. However, this concept was rejected on the basis of the fact that it would not spark an uprising.

Question: What was your understanding of the requirements for sufficient shock to spark uprisings?

Secretary Rusk: The impression existed that 1,200 highly trained men expected to get ashore and run into some militia units and beat the hell out of them. This would be the kind of a bloody nose that would get things moving. The feeling was that there would be no fighting on the beach. It seemed that this area was virtually empty. There was a good chance the invasion force could get well ashore without being discovered.

Question: What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful lodgment but there was no uprising?

Secretary Rusk: In that case they would commence guerrilla operations, move into the swamps and then into the hills. This swamp area was stated to be the home of guerrillas.

Question: Was the point made that this area had not been used for guerrilla operations in this century?

Secretary Rusk: I don't recall.

Question: Was the possibility of a sea evacuation of the force considered?

Secretary Rusk: I don't recall. At least, it didn't make an impression on me. Let me point out that there was a minimum of papers....

Question: Was it understood that control of the air was considered essential to the success of the landing?

Secretary Rusk: Yes, it was understood that it was essential to the success of the landing, but there was an inadequate appreciation of the enemy's capability in the air....

Question: What was the understanding of the ability of the landing force to pass to a guerrilla status in an emergency?

Secretary Rusk: The impression was that the ability of this force to pass to guerrilla activities presented no difficulty. At the beginning of the second day the President and I discussed the question of whether it was time to move the force out as guerrillas. However, it appears there was a delay in turning to this because they didn't have this action in mind.

General [Maxwell D.] Taylor: They were told to fall back to the beaches so that they could be evacuated from the sea.

Secretary Rusk: Guerrilla actions were regarded as far more feasible than they turned out to be. I do regret, however, that consideration was not given to another alternative. I suggested earlier that they land in the eastern portion

of Cuba and then get a position with Guantanamo behind them. However, our military friends didn't want to spoil the virginity of Guantanamo.

Question: What was the understanding of the ammunition situation at the end of April 18? Was the importance of air cover for the returning ammunition ships understood?

Secretary Rusk: It was apparent that it was critical. The requirement for air cover wasn't as apparent as for air drops and getting the ships back in there, particularly in regard to getting them some tank ammunition.

Question: Was it known at your level that two of the ammunition ships had taken off from the beach area and kept going south?

Secretary Rusk: No.

Question: What degree of nonattribution was sought and why? Were the operational disadvantages arising from some of the restrictions imposed by the efforts to achieve nonattribution clearly presented and understood?

Secretary Rusk: We were hoping for the maximum. In retrospect, however, this looks a little naive. The considerations involved in this were that if you have success all the problems solve themselves. However, if you have failure it's very nice if the United States is not involved....

Question: To what extent did the CIA operations representatives have to "sell" the operation to the other agencies of government?

Secretary Rusk: You have to draw a distinction between the policy side and the operational side.... On the operational side, we were oversold on the operational aspects.

Question: What do you mean by oversold on the operational aspects?

Secretary Rusk: It was presented in too optimistic terms....

Question: What didn't we do that we should have?

Secretary Rusk: Before the President made his decision, CIA and Defense should have spelled out the entire CIA plan in one presentation. While the President had all the factors in his mind, I think this would have helped.

Secretary Rusk: Furthermore, we overemphasized some of the factors. For example, the question of what to do with this 1,200-man force. This question played too large a role because we certainly should have been able to handle these 1,200 men.

Secretary Rusk: If you are not prepared to go all the way you shouldn't put 1,200 men ashore.

5. President John F. Kennedy Declares American Determination to Defend Berlin, 1961

[O]ur presence in West Berlin, and our access thereto, cannot be ended by any act of the Soviet government. The NATO shield was long ago extended to

"Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis," July 25, 1961, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 533-540.

cover West Berlin—and we have given our word that an attack upon that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all.

For West Berlin—lying exposed 110 miles inside East Germany, surrounded by Soviet troops and close to Soviet supply lines, has many roles. It is more than a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a Communist sea. It is even more than a link with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, an escape hatch for refugees.

West Berlin is all of that. But above all it has now become—as never before—the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation....

We do not want to fight—but we have fought before. And others in earlier times have made the same dangerous mistake of assuming that the West was too selfish and too soft and too divided to resist invasions of freedom in other lands....

So long as the Communists insist that they are preparing to end by themselves unilaterally our rights in West Berlin and our commitments to its people, we must be prepared to defend those rights and those commitments. We will at all times be ready to talk, if talk will help. But we must also be ready to resist with force, if force is used upon us. Either alone would fail. Together, they can serve the cause of freedom and peace.

The new preparations that we shall make to defend the peace are part of the long-term build-up in our strength which has been underway since January. They are based on our needs to meet a world-wide threat, on a basis which stretches far beyond the present Berlin crisis. Our primary purpose is neither propaganda nor provocation—but preparation.

A first need is to hasten progress toward the military goals which the North Atlantic allies have set for themselves. In Europe today nothing less will suffice. We will put even greater resources into fulfilling those goals, and we look to our allies to do the same.

The supplementary defense build-ups that I asked from the Congress in March and May have already started moving us toward these and our other defense goals. They included an increase in the size of the Marine Corps, improved readiness of our reserves, expansion of our air and sea lift, and stepped-up procurement of needed weapons, ammunition, and other items. To insure a continuing invulnerable capacity to deter or destroy any aggressor, they provided for the strengthening of our missile power and for putting 50% of our B-52 and B-47 bombers on a ground alert which would send them on their way with 15 minutes' warning.

These measures must be speeded up, and still others must now be taken. We must have sea and air lift capable of moving our forces quickly and in large numbers to any part of the world.

But even more importantly, we need the capability of placing in any critical area at the appropriate time a force which, combined with those of our allies, is large enough to make clear our determination and our ability to defend our rights at all costs—and to meet all levels of aggressor pressure with whatever

levels of force are required. We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action....

We have another sober responsibility. To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do and where they should go if bombs begin to fall, would be a failure of responsibility. In May, I pledged a new start on Civil Defense. Last week, I assigned, on the recommendation of the Civil Defense Director, basic responsibility for this program to the Secretary of Defense, to make certain it is administered and coordinated with our continental defense efforts at the highest civilian level. Tomorrow, I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives: to identify and mark space in existing structures—public and private—that could be used for fall-out shelters in case of attack; to stock those shelters with food, water, first-aid kits and other minimum essentials for survival; to increase their capacity; to improve our air-raid warning and fall-out detection systems, including a new household warning system which is now under development; and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed.

In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved—if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families—and to our country. In contrast to our friends in Europe, the need for this kind of protection is new to our shores. But the time to start is now. In the coming months, I hope to let every citizen know what steps he can take without delay to protect his family in case of attack. I know that you will want to do no less....

The world is not deceived by the Communist attempt to label Berlin as a hot-bed of war. There is peace in Berlin today. The source of world trouble and tension is Moscow, not Berlin. And if war begins, it will have begun in Moscow and not Berlin.

For the choice of peace or war is largely theirs, not ours. It is the Soviets who have stirred up this crisis. It is they who are trying to force a change. It is they who have opposed free elections. It is they who have rejected an all-German peace treaty, and the rulings of international law. And as Americans know from our history on our own old frontier, gun battles are caused by outlaws, and not by officers of the peace.

6. U.S. Leaders Debate Options during the Missile Crisis, 1962

October 16, 1962, Morning

[Secretary of State Dean] Rusk: ... Mr. President, this is, of course, a serious development. It's one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could carry this far. They seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own [...] Now, um, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events

that will eliminate this base. I don't think we [can] sit still. The question becomes whether we do it by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in, or even the Cubans themselves, take some action on this. The thing that I'm, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It's so involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places, that any action that we take will greatly increase the risks of direct action involving our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world. So I think we have to think very hard about two major courses of action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we think that there is the overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved in doing that. I don't think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that what we're doing is eliminating this particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we're simply doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Or we're going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by actually eliminating the island.

The other would be, if we have a few days—from the military point of view, if we have the whole time—then I would think that there would be another course of action, a combination of things that we might wish to consider. First that we stimulate the OAS [Organization of American States] procedure immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact has been violated....

I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro, perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through his representative at the U.N. I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador would be the best, the better channel to get to Castro privately and tell him that this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is being victimized here, and that the Soviets are preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.

You saw the *Times* story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, "We'll trade Cuba for Berlin." This ought to be brought to Castro's attention. It ought to be said to Castro that this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable. The time has now come when he must take the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, prevent this missile base from becoming operational....

But I think that, by and large, there are these two broad alternatives: one, the quick strike; the other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is [an] utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that Mr. Khrushchev may not himself really understand that or believe that at this point. I think we'll be facing a situation that could well lead to general war ...

[Secretary of Defense Robert S.] McNamara: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I would like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them.

But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept

as foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational. I'm not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational.

Because, if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they're launched there is almost certain to be chaos in part of the east coast or the area in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba.

Secondly, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites plus the airfields plus the aircraft—which may not be on the airfields but hidden by that time—plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now, this is a fairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites; and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans, at least in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands, say two or three thousand. It seems to me these two propositions should underlie our discussion.

Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out and what may be some of the consequences? We could carry out an air strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an air strike within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the chiefs would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days, but we are prepared for that quickly. The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial day, if necessary. Presumably there would be some political discussions taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during. In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for an air invasion, both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after the start of the air strike that would be possible if the political environment made it desirable or necessary at that time. Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some degree of mobilization. I would think of the mobilization coming not before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following, say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase, and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency....

Rusk: About why the Soviets are doing this, Mr. McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don't really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.

[President] Kennedy: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?

[General Maxwell] Taylor [chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]: We have Jupiter missiles ...

[National Security Adviser McGeorge] Bundy: Yeah. We have how many?
McNamara: About fifteen, I believe it is....

Rusk: ... Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it's important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles, and he's doing that to sort of balance that political, psychological plank. I think also that Berlin is very much involved in this. For the first time, I'm beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We've talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to keep our eye on that element. But they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In other words like the Suez- Hungary combination. If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else. But I must say I don't really see the rationality of the Soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country....

Kennedy: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?

[Vice President Lyndon B.] Johnson: ... I think that we're committed at any time that we feel that there's a build up that in any way endangers to take whatever action we must take to assure our security. ... I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of the Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine, but I don't think, I don't rely on 'em much for any strength in anything like this. And, the fact that we're talking about our other allies, I take the position that Mr. Bundy says, we ought to be living all these years... you get your blood pressure up. But the fact is the country's blood pressure is up and they are fearful, and they're insecure, and we're getting divided....

Kennedy: ... What you're really talking about are two or three different operations. One is the strike just on this, these three bases. One, the second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anything else connected with missiles. Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires really the third and which is a larger step. And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the degree of consultation....

[Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy] RFK: Mr. President.

Kennedy: Yes. RFK: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I would say that you're dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second, the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their missiles. You're covering most of Cuba. You're going to kill an awful lot of people, and we're going to take an awful lot of heat on it ...

And then you know, the heat, you're going to announce the reason that you're doing it is because they're sending in these kind of missiles. Well, I would think it's almost incumbent upon the Russians, then, to say, Well, we're going to send them in again, and if you do it again, we're going to do, we're going to do the same thing to Turkey, or We're [sic] going to do the same thing to Iran....

Kennedy: I think we ought to, what we ought to do is, is, uh, after this meeting this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these

various proposals. In the meanwhile, we'll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is needed from the flights, and, in addition, we will.... I don't think we got much time on these missiles. They may be.... So it may be that we just have to, we can't wait two weeks while we're getting ready to, to roll. Maybe just have to just take them out, and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be where we end up. I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to.... Because that's what we're going to do anyway. We're certainly going to do number one; we're going to take out these missiles. The questions will be whether, which, what I would describe as number two, which would be a general air strike. That we're not ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the, is the general invasion. At least we're going to do number one, so it seems to me that we don't have to wait very long. We, we ought to be making those preparations....

October 16, 1962, Evening

McNamara: Mr. President, could I outline three courses ... of action we have considered and speak very briefly on each one? The first is what I would call the political course of action, in which we follow some of the possibilities that Secretary Rusk mentioned this morning by approaching Castro, by approaching Khrushchev, by discussing with our allies. An overt and open approach politically to the problem.... This seemed to me likely to lead to no satisfactory result, and it almost stops subsequent military action. Because the danger of starting military action after they acquire a nuclear capability is so great I believe we would decide against it, particularly if that nuclear capability included aircraft as well as missiles, as it well might at that point.

A second course of action we haven't discussed but lies in between the military course we began discussing a moment ago and the political course of action is a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance; a statement that we would immediately impose an a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba in the future; and an indication that with our open-surveillance reconnaissance, which we would plan to maintain indefinitely for the future, we would be prepared to immediately attack the Soviet Union in the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country ...

But the third course of action is any one of these variants of military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles. The Chiefs are strongly opposed to so limited an air attack. But even so limited an air attack is a very extensive air attack. It's not twenty sorties or fifty sorties or a hundred sorties, but probably several hundred sorties. We haven't worked out the details. It's very difficult to do so when we lack certain intelligence that we hope to have tomorrow or the next day. But it's a substantial air attack. And to move from that into the more extensive air attacks against the MIGs, against the airfields, against the potential nuclear storage sites, against the radar installations, against the SAM sites means, as Max suggested, possibly seven hundred to a thousand sorties per day for five days. This is the very, very rough plan that the Chiefs have outlined, and it is their judgment that that is the type of air attack that

should be carried out. To move beyond that into an invasion following the air attack means the application of tens of thousands, between ninety and over a hundred and fifty thousand men to the invasion forces. It seems to me almost certain that any one of these forms of direct military action will lead to a Soviet military response of some type some place in the world. It may well be worth the price. Perhaps we should pay that. But I think we should recognize that possibility, and, moreover, we must recognize it in a variety of ways....

Rusk: I would not think that they would use a nuclear weapon unless they're prepared to [join?] a nuclear war, I don't think. I just don't see that possibility.

[Unidentified Speaker]: I would agree.

Bundy: I agree.

Rusk: That would mean that, we could be just utterly wrong, but, we've never really believed that Khrushchev would take on a general nuclear war over Cuba....

Kennedy: We certainly have been wrong about what he's trying to do in Cuba. There isn't any doubt about that ... many of us thought that he was going to put MRBMs on Cuba....

Bundy: But, the question that I would like to ask is, quite aside from what we've said—and we're very hardlocked onto it, I know—What is the strategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs in Cuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance?

McNamara: Mac, I asked the Chiefs that this afternoon, in effect. And they said, substantially. My own personal view is, not at all....

Kennedy: Right. Well, now, what is it, in other, the next twenty-four hours, what is it we need to do in order, if we're going to do, well, let's first say, one and two by Saturday or Sunday? You're doing everything that is ...

McNamara: Mr. President, we need to do two things, it seems to me. First, we need to develop a specific strike plan limited to the missiles and the nuclear storage sites, which we have not done. This would be a part of the broader plan ... but I think we ought to estimate the minimum number of sorties. Since you've indicated some interest in that possibility, we ought to provide you that option. We haven't done this.

Kennedy: Okay.

McNamara: But that's an easy job to do. The second thing we ought to do, it seems to me as a government, is to consider the consequences. I don't believe we have considered the consequences of any of these actions satisfactorily, and because we haven't considered the consequences, I'm not sure we're taking all the action we ought to take now to minimize those. I don't know quite what kind of a world we live in after we've struck Cuba, and we've started it.... Now after we've launched fifty to a hundred sorties, what kind of a world do we live in? How do we stop at that point? I don't know the answer to this. I think tonight.... We ought to work on the consequences of any one of these courses of actions, consequences which I don't believe are entirely clear ... to any of us....

Kennedy: If it doesn't increase very much their strategic strength, why is it, can any Russian expert tell us why they.... After all, Khrushchev demonstrated a sense of caution [thousands?] ... Berlin, he's been cautious, I mean, he hasn't been, uh ...

[Undersecretary of State George W.] Ball: Several possibilities, Mr. President. One of them is that he has given us word now that he's coming over in November to the UN. He may be proceeding on the assumption, and this lack of a sense of apparent urgency would seem to support this, that this isn't going to be discovered at the moment and that when he comes over this is something he can do, a ploy. That here is Cuba armed against the United States, or possibly use it to try to trade something in Berlin, saying he'll disarm Cuba if, uh, if we'll, uh, yield some of our interests in Berlin and some arrangement for it. I mean, that this is a, it's a trading ploy....

Kennedy: Why does he put these in there though?...what is the advantage of that? It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in Turkey. Now that'd be goddam dangerous, I would think.

Bundy: Well, we did, Mr. President.

[Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs] U.A. Johnson?: We did it. We...

Kennedy: Yeah, but that was five years ago.

U.A. Johnson: ... did it in England; that's why we were short...We gave England two when we were short of ICBMs.

Kennedy: Yeah, but that's, uh ... that was during a different period then.

U.A. Johnson: But doesn't he realize he has a deficiency of ICBMs, needs a PR capacity perhaps, in view of.... He's got lots of MRBMs and this is a way to balance it out a bit?...

RFK: Let me say, of course ... one other thing is whether we should also think of whether there is some other way we can get involved in this through Guantanamo Bay, or something, or whether there's some ship that, you know, sink the Maine again or something....

Kennedy: Well, it's a goddamn mystery to me... I don't know enough about the Soviet Union, but if anybody can tell me any other time since the Berlin blockade where the Russians have given us so clear provocation, I don't know when it's been, because they've been awfully cautious really. The Russians, I never.... Now, maybe our mistake was in not saying some time before this summer that if they do this we're going to act.

7. U.S. and Soviet Leaders Find a Formula to End the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come see him. We talked alone.

The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began, continues to quickly worsen. We have just received a report that an unarmed American plane was shot down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight over Cuba. The military is demanding that the President arm such planes and respond to fire with fire. The USA government will have to do this.

I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him, what right American planes had to fly over Cuba at all, crudely violating its sovereignty and accepted international norms? How would the USA have reacted if foreign planes appeared over its territory?

"We have a resolution of the Organization of American states that gives us the right to such overflights," R. Kennedy quickly replied.

I told him that the Soviet Union, like all peace-loving countries, resolutely rejects such a "right" or, to be more exact, this kind of true lawlessness, when people who don't like the social-political situation in a country try to impose their will on it—a small state where the people themselves established and maintained [their system]. "The OAS resolution is a direct violation of the UN Charter," I added, "and you, as the Attorney General of the USA, the highest American legal entity, should certainly know that."

R. Kennedy said that he realized that we had different approaches to these problems and it was not likely that we could convince each other. But now the matter is not in these differences, since time is of the essence. "I want," R. Kennedy stressed, "to lay out the current alarming situation the way the president sees it. He wants N.S. Khrushchev to know this. This is the thrust of the situation now."

"Because of the plane that was shot down, there is now strong pressure on the president to give an order to respond with fire if fired upon when American reconnaissance planes are flying over Cuba. The USA can't stop these flights, because this is the only way we can quickly get information about the state of construction of the missile bases in Cuba, which we believe pose a very serious threat to our national security. But if we start to fire in response—a chain reaction will quickly start that will be very hard to stop. The same thing in regard to the essence of the issue of the missile bases in Cuba. The USA government is determined to get rid of those bases—up to, in the extreme case, of bombing them, since, I repeat, they pose a great threat to the security of the USA. But in response to the bombing of these bases, in the course of which Soviet specialists might suffer, the Soviet government will undoubtedly respond with the same against us, somewhere in Europe. A real war will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will die. We want to avoid that any way we can, I'm sure that the government of the USSR has the same wish. However, taking time to find a way out [of the situation] is very risky (here R. Kennedy mentioned as if in passing that there are many unreasonable heads among the generals, and not only among the generals, who are 'itching for a fight'). The situation might get out of control, with irreversible consequences."

... "The most important thing for us," R. Kennedy stressed, "is to get as soon as possible the agreement of the Soviet government to halt further work on the construction of the missile bases in Cuba and take measures under international control that would make it impossible to use these weapons. In exchange the government of the USA is ready, in addition to repealing all measures on the 'quarantine,' to give the assurances that there will not be any invasion of Cuba and that other countries of the Western Hemisphere are ready to give the same assurances—the US government is certain of this."

"And what about Turkey?" I asked R. Kennedy.

"If that is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I mentioned earlier, then the president doesn't see any unsurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue," replied R. Kennedy. "The greatest difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the deployment of missile bases in Turkey was done by a special decision of the NATO Council. To announce now a unilateral decision by the president of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey—this would damage the entire structure of NATO and the US position as the leader of NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows very well, there are many arguments. In short, if such a decision were announced now it would seriously tear apart NATO."

"However, President Kennedy is ready to come to agree on that question with N.S. Khrushchev, too. I think that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey," R. Kennedy said, "we need 4–5 months. This is the minimal amount of time necessary for the US government to do this, taking into account the procedures that exist within the NATO framework. On the whole Turkey issue," R. Kennedy added, "if Premier N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I've said, we can continue to exchange opinions between him and the president, using him, R. Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. However, the president can't say anything public in this regard about Turkey," R. Kennedy said again. R. Kennedy then warned that his comments about Turkey are extremely confidential; besides him and his brother, only 2–3 people know about it in Washington.

"That's all that he asked me to pass on to N.S. Khrushchev," R. Kennedy said in conclusion. "The president also asked N.S. Khrushchev to give him an answer (through the Soviet ambassador and R. Kennedy) if possible within the next day (Sunday) on these thoughts in order to have a business-like, clear answer in principle. [He asked him] not to get into a wordy discussion, which might drag things out. The current serious situation, unfortunately, is such that there is very little time to resolve this whole issue. Unfortunately, events are developing too quickly. The request for a reply tomorrow," stressed R. Kennedy, "is just that—a request, and not an ultimatum. The president hopes that the head of the Soviet government will understand him correctly."

...In the course of the conversation, R. Kennedy noted that he knew about the conversation that television commentator Scali had yesterday with an Embassy adviser on possible ways to regulate the Cuban conflict [one-and-a-half lines whited out].

I should say that during our meeting R. Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I've never seen him like this before. True, about twice he tried to return to the topic of "deception" (that he talked about so persistently during our previous meeting), but he did so in passing and without any edge to it. He didn't even try to get into fights on various subjects, as he usually does, and only persistently returned to one topic: time is of the essence and we shouldn't miss the chance.

After meeting with me he immediately went to see the president, with whom, as R. Kennedy said, he spends almost all his time now.

 ESSAYS

Journalists, historians, and other commentators have passed judgment on the performance of U.S. leaders during the Berlin and Cuba crises ever since those events dominated headlines in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Over time, the declassification of source material has enabled authors to refine their views, but the range of interpretations has narrowed only a little. The following essays reflect two major currents of thought. In the first selection, historian George C. Herring of the University of Kentucky offers a mostly critical view of American leaders, especially President Kennedy, for embracing hawkish, ideologically charged policies and running grave risks of war. In the second essay, Princeton University historian Julian E. Zelizer takes a more sympathetic view of American decision-makers. Zelizer suggests that the president, dedicated to peace despite rhetoric that sometimes suggested otherwise, resisted strong political pressures to adopt belligerent policies and skillfully managed to avoid a devastating war.

Ideology and Ambition

GEORGE C. HERRING

The world of the late 1950s was increasingly complex and infinitely more dangerous [than it had been a few years earlier]. Conflict between the Soviet Union and China, although still not out in the open, intensified at the end of the decade, complicating ties between the two Communist powers and their relations with the United States. The relentless advance of technology raised growing fears of a nuclear war no one might win. Eisenhower and Khrushchev saw the need to ease Cold War tensions, but their cautious moves in that direction confused as much as they clarified relations between the superpowers. The Cold War had gained momentum of its own. The two leaders' initial steps toward what would later be called detente ran afoul of hard-line critics in each nation, institutional and economic imperatives, and conflicts in other parts of the world....

Nothing fed public anxieties and the political turmoil of the late 1950s more than the rising threat of nuclear war and concerns, often politically inspired, that the United States was lagging behind the USSR in technology. Nuclear weapons had been the centerpiece of the administration's New Look defense strategy, and Dulles often boasted that massive retaliation had won major Cold War victories. But in the second term, the reliance on nuclear weapons drew fire from different directions. Critics questioned the wisdom of a grand strategy based on such weapons when the other side also possessed them. Europeans correctly feared they might bear the brunt of a Soviet response in the event of a nuclear exchange and could not but question U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons.

The impact on Japanese fishermen of radioactive fallout from a U.S. nuclear explosion in the Pacific highlighted growing popular fears about the dangers....

The New Look also provoked opposition from the other end of the political spectrum. Army officers and a growing body of civilian defense intellectuals increasingly warned that the reliance on nuclear weapons narrowed the nation's options to launching nuclear war or doing nothing. Especially as the Cold War shifted to the Third World, critics of massive retaliation called for building up conventional forces and developing capabilities for dealing with insurgencies. With total war threatening nuclear annihilation, political scientist Robert Osgood insisted that limited war was the only rational alternative. Democratic senators Stuart Symington of Missouri, John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, and Henry Jackson of Washington, arguing on the basis of badly flawed intelligence, warned that while relying on nuclear weapons the administration had allowed the United States to fall behind the Soviet Union in its means of delivering them. Charges of a "bomber gap" surfaced as early as 1954, accompanied by demands that the United States undertake a massive building program to outstrip the Soviets in nuclear weapons and develop invulnerable delivery systems.

More than anything else, the *Sputnik* "crisis" shaped the American mood of the late 1950s. On October 4, 1957, with maximum fanfare and propaganda, the Soviet Union put into orbit with a huge R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile the world's first artificial satellite, a monumental scientific accomplishment. A month later, it orbited a much larger instrument carrying a live dog. The launch of *Sputnik I* and *Sputnik II* shook the United States to its core. The superiority of U.S. science was assumed to be the bedrock of the nation's security. What the *New York Daily News* called "Khrushchev's comet" appeared to undermine the basic principles of massive retaliation and the New Look—and add substance to Soviet rocket-rattling. Much like Pearl Harbor, it created a sense of profound vulnerability, raising fears that turned to near panic. *Sputnik* even provoked questions among Americans and across the world whether the Soviet system might be superior to that of the United States, a huge problem in the ongoing global competition for hearts and minds. The explosion of an American rocket on its launch pad just weeks later ("Kaputnik," "Stayputnik," Americans nervously called it) added humiliation—and fear. The report of a blue-ribbon panel headed by H. Rowland Gaither Jr., presented to Eisenhower in November and leaked in part to the public, reinforced popular anxiety by painting a frightening picture of the inadequacy of the nation's defenses and calling for a Manhattan Project-like program for missile development and even the construction of fallout shelters. A call to arms much like NSC-68, the Gaither Report, according to the *Washington Post*, portrayed a "United States in the gravest danger in its history." The *Sputnik* panic evoked calls from intellectuals for a refocus from the self-absorption in the era's consumer culture to a higher national purpose....

[In 1958] Khrushchev triggered yet another crisis over that perennial Cold War flash point West Berlin. For the Soviet leadership, in the premier's colorful imagery, Berlin was a "bone in the throat," a "malignant tumor" that required "some surgery." It provided an escape hatch for thousands of skilled workers who fled to the West, damaging the East German economy and embarrassing

the USSR in a contest where symbols had become increasingly important. Khrushchev also perceived that Berlin was among his adversaries' most vulnerable positions—"the testicles of the West," he called it. "Every time I give them a yank, they holler." Now more secure in the Kremlin hierarchy, the Soviet leader interpreted as a victory U.S. refusal in July 1958 to send troops to Iraq to uphold the pro-Western government, further bolstering his self-confidence and confirming his view that threats and pressure were the only language the West understood. Exhibiting both his "peasant logic" and his reckless, sometimes bizarre, diplomatic style—he compared it to playing chess in the dark—in November 1958 he squeezed hard by demanding that West Berlin be made a free city (a city governed autonomously under international agreement). If the Western allies did not comply within six months, he would conclude a separate peace with East Germany, terminating the World War II four-power arrangements and leaving the question of access to West Berlin in the hands of his East German ally. Khrushchev's confused and risky diplomacy was designed to scare the West into serious negotiations and wangle an invitation to visit the United States for a summit meeting. But his move was poorly thought out and characteristically impulsive. If it failed, he casually remarked to his son, "Then, we'll try something else."

Eisenhower agreed that Berlin was a "can of worms." He also was eager to settle the volatile German question. But he could not appear to give in to Soviet threats. He rebuffed hawkish proposals from his military advisers but stood firm on Berlin. He ordered a quiet military buildup while calmly reassuring the nation. Khrushchev's ultimatum expired May 27, 1959 ... without any comment from Moscow. The crisis eased momentarily, but Berlin would remain the most explosive spot in world politics for the next few years....

The Cold War played an important part in the 1960 presidential campaign.... Khrushchev's stormy autumn visit to the United States, complete with a fiery speech before the United Nations and the bizarre spectacle of the Soviet premier removing his shoe and pounding it furiously on the podium—amusing, had it not seemed so ominous—kept the Cold War threat very much alive for Americans. Following themes his party had exploited since *Sputnik*, Democratic candidate John Kennedy repeatedly criticized the Republicans for permitting the nation to fall behind militarily and suffer a huge loss of prestige in the world. He called for "new men to cope with new problems and new opportunities."... The Massachusetts senator blasted the Eisenhower administration for failing to prevent the rise of Castro. JFK won the election by a razor-thin margin, gaining a majority of neither the popular vote nor the states....

Kennedy was only forty-three years old when he assumed the presidency, and his accession marked the coming of age of the World War II generation. The son of a wealthy Boston Irish financier and former ambassador to England, the new president, a war hero himself, was strikingly handsome, bright, witty, charming, and ambitious. He attained no better than a lackluster record in the Senate and was looked upon—with good reason—as a playboy. Indeed, as president, he recklessly carried on dalliances with secretaries, movie stars, and even a Mafia moll. As a senator, he did acquire some foreign policy expertise, taking a

special interest in decolonization. He consciously styled his presidency after his illustrious Democratic predecessors Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. At home he committed himself to an extension of FDR's New Deal, the New Frontier, he called it. Like many of his generation, he was certain that foreign policy was the most exciting and urgent challenge a president faced. "I mean who gives a shit if the minimum wage is \$1.15 or \$1.25," he confided to kindred spirit (at least on that issue) Richard Nixon.

In foreign policy, JFK sought to recapture the blend of idealism and pragmatism that had stamped FDR's leadership in World War II. He gathered about him a young, energetic corps of advisers from the top echelons of academia and business, self-confident, activist men—"action intellectuals," they were called—who shared his determination to "get the country moving again." The youthful and acerbic Harvard College dean and Henry Stimson protégé McGeorge Bundy was named national security adviser; World War II systems analysis "whiz kid" and Ford Motor Company boss Robert McNamara, secretary of defense. The president's younger brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, became his alter ego and closest adviser, even on foreign policy. In the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, they would be labeled—with more than a touch of irony—the "best and the brightest."...

The New Frontiersmen accepted without question the basic assumptions of the containment policy. They perceived the tensions between Moscow and Beijing, but they still viewed Communism as monolithic and a mortal threat to the United States. They also believed, as Kennedy put it, that they must "move forward to meet Communism, rather than waiting for it to come to us and then reacting to it." Coming of age during World War II, they feared another global conflagration. They were also exhilarated by the prospect of leading the nation through perilous times to the ultimate victory. They shared a Wilsonian view that destiny had singled out their nation and themselves to defend the democratic ideal. Reflecting the mood of the time, they believed they could do anything—hence the expansive rhetoric of Kennedy's inaugural address and his firm commitment to land an American on the moon. They also recognized the domestic political importance of foreign policy success. During the campaign, JFK had repeatedly charged the Republicans with indecisiveness and promised to regain the upper hand in the Cold War. Elected by a precariously narrow margin, he kept a wary eye on his domestic flank, ever sensitive to opposition charges of appeasement.

Like Eisenhower, Kennedy altered existing Cold War policies mainly in terms of the means to be employed. Although he quickly discovered that the missile gap actually favored the United States, JFK ordered an immediate and massive buildup of nuclear weapons, missile-firing submarines, and long-range missiles to establish clear superiority over the USSR. He also recognized that the frightful consequences of nuclear war limited the utility of nuclear weapons. Persuaded by Gen. Maxwell Taylor's book *The Uncertain Trumpet* that Eisenhower's reliance on nuclear weapons had left the United States muscle-bound in many Cold War situations, Kennedy expanded and modernized the nation's conventional forces to permit a "flexible response" to various kinds of

threats. Certain that the emerging nations provided the principal battleground for Cold War competition, the administration sought ways to combat guerrilla warfare—"an international disease" the United States must learn to "destroy." The president pushed the military to study counterinsurgency methods and create elite units to employ them. He took particular pride in the green beret worn by the army's Special Forces. He also felt that America must strike at the source of the disease. He pushed for economic and technical assistance programs to eliminate the conditions in which Communism flourished and channel revolutionary forces along democratic paths.

Throughout the campaign, Kennedy had ominously warned of the perils the nation faced, but he himself appears to have been unprepared for the magnitude of the problems. Khrushchev's threat to resolve the status of divided Berlin on his own terms held out the possibility of superpower confrontation. In January 1961, the Soviet premier delivered a seemingly militant speech pledging support for wars of national liberation. In fact, the statement defied Kremlin hard-liners and the Chinese by renouncing nuclear and conventional war. It may even have been intended to reassure the West. To the untutored ears of a new administration, it appeared a virtual declaration of war, and stepped-up Soviet aid to Castro's Cuba and insurgents in the Congo and Laos seemed to confirm the danger. Such was the siege mentality that gripped the White House in early 1961 that the president on one occasion greeted his advisers by grimly asking, "What's gone against us today?"

Cuba was the most vexing problem, and Kennedy early made a fateful decision. He had inherited CIA plans for a covert operation to overthrow Castro. Deferring to the presumed experts in the CIA and the military, the latter of whom had deep but unstated reservations about the workability of the plan, he did not closely scrutinize it. He and his advisers were not disposed to critique something that had been endorsed by one of the great military heroes of the century. The administration had dismantled an NSC organization that might have provided some institutional safeguards against harebrained plots. Rusk did not voice his grave doubts, and Kennedy rebuffed those advisers who expressed skepticism. Despite misgivings himself, he approved the plan in hopes of gaining a major victory in his first months and because not to do so would leave him vulnerable to Republican attacks. To conceal the U.S. role, he refused to provide air support.

Appropriately code-named Bumpy Road, the operation produced what has been aptly called the "perfect failure." Top CIA officials blamed JFK for the debacle for refusing to authorize air support, but the agency's own internal assessment, kept under tight wraps until 1998, told of a plan fatally flawed in conception and execution. The CIA assumed, without any evidence, and incorrectly as it turned out, that a landing of Cuban exiles would trigger an internal insurgency that could topple Castro. Some CIA officials and the Joint Chiefs suppressed their reservations in the expectation that Kennedy, if things went badly, would do what was necessary to succeed, something he had no intention of doing. The plan quickly grew beyond the CIA's capacity to manage it, expanding from a small landing of guerrillas to a full-scale invasion force whose

blown cover made plausible deniability an illusion. The exiles were poorly trained, disorganized, and divided among themselves. The air strikes that were to take out Castro's air force did not do so and tipped off the impending invasion. The site was shifted to the Bay of Pigs, an especially inhospitable spot for an amphibious landing. Without air support and asked to execute a withdrawal, the most difficult of military operations, the ragtag exile forces were sitting ducks for Castro's aircraft and well-prepared defenders. After three days of fighting, 140 were killed, 1,189 captured. The only answer to their final, tragic message—"We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please send help"—came in the form of rescue teams who managed to pick up twenty-six survivors....

A stormy summit with Khrushchev at Vienna added to Kennedy's problems. Over the long term, the June discussions may have helped the two men understand each other, but the short-term results were disastrous. The president was in severe pain from various ailments and heavily medicated. Although he spent hours preparing, he was psychologically unready for the encounter. Ignoring the advice of experts, he engaged in fruitless ideological spats with Khrushchev. In substantive discussions, they agreed only on the need for peace in Laos, where neither had significant interests—or influence. They differed on terms for a nuclear test ban. Their discussions on the most pressing and dangerous issue, Berlin, were chilling. Certain that his younger and inexperienced adversary could be bullied, Khrushchev made clear that the status quo on Berlin was unacceptable. Kennedy insisted that the United States would not surrender its rights. Khrushchev renewed the six-month ultimatum and reiterated his threat of a separate peace. If the United States wanted war, he concluded, "let it begin now." "It will be a cold winter," a solemn president retorted.

Kennedy came home severely shaken—Khrushchev "just beat hell out of me," he confided to a friend. Aides testified that for the next few months he was "imprisoned by Berlin." ... In a major speech on July 25, he hinted at a willingness to negotiate. But he also made clear U.S. determination to defend Western rights in Berlin and proposed a major military buildup. Stopping short of a declaration of national emergency, he announced another big jump in defense spending and an increase in draft calls, a reserve call-up, and extended enlistments to expand the armed forces. Most alarming, he pushed for a federal program to assist in the building of fallout shelters.

Kennedy's speech ratcheted up an already dangerous crisis by several notches. Khrushchev denounced it as a "preliminary declaration of war" and warned an American visitor with ties to the president that "we will meet war with war." To underscore the seriousness of the crisis, he decided to resume nuclear testing. His threats did nothing to resolve the immediate problem in East Berlin, where during July alone more than twenty-six thousand East Germans fled to the West. Picking up on discreet signals from Washington that the United States would not interfere in *East* Berlin, the Soviet Union and East Germany decided to stop the "hemorrhaging" by building a wall to seal off East Germany from West Berlin. Construction began without warning on Sunday, August 13, 1961, starting with barbed wire and then adding concrete blocks once it was clear the West would do nothing.

Ironically, what became one of the most conspicuous, ugly, and despised symbols of the Cold War was at first greeted by some Americans with a sense of relief. To be sure, some hotheads urged knocking the wall down before it was finished despite the obvious risk of war. In fact, few were willing to risk war and some actually accepted the wall as a way to ease tensions. Kremlinologists advised Kennedy that it was Khrushchev's way of defusing an increasingly explosive situation. Thus while dispatching Vice President Lyndon Johnson and former occupation commander Gen. Lucius Clay to West Berlin and sending troops through East Germany into the city to reaffirm the U.S. commitment, the administration acquiesced. "A wall is a hell of a lot better than a war," Kennedy privately mused.

Although it brought the superpowers back from the brink, the wall did not resolve the fundamental issues. Following the summer crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev initiated personal, backchannel communications—what presidential advisers dubbed a "Pen Pal Correspondence." Lower-level discussions on Berlin and other front-burner issues took place intermittently through the fall and into the winter of 1961–62. Khrushchev dropped his deadline; JFK made conciliatory public statements. As so often with the Cold War, however, hostility coexisted uneasily with conciliation. The Soviets conducted at least thirty atmospheric nuclear tests in the fall of 1961; the United States resumed underground testing. On one occasion in mid-October, U.S. and Soviet tanks faced off ominously at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin. Soviet aircraft periodically harassed American planes in German air corridors. At times, Americans got the impression that Moscow had put Berlin on the shelf; on other occasions, it appeared still a top priority. In fact, it converged with Cuba in October 1962 to assume a central role in the most menacing of Cold War crises....

Khrushchev's reckless attempt to place offensive missiles in Cuba brought the United States and the USSR to the brink of war and the world to the edge of nuclear conflagration. It can never be known precisely what moved the Soviet premier to initiate such a dangerous undertaking... Cuba *had* become very important to the Soviet leadership, and the threat of a U.S. invasion must have seemed to Moscow very real. Still, it remains difficult to believe that Khrushchev would have assumed such risk exclusively for the sake of a small ally in the enemy's sphere of influence. By placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles in Cuba, he could strike targets across the eastern and southern United States, and he certainly hoped to make up on the cheap the huge U.S. lead in long-range missiles. He may have hoped to use the Cuban missiles to force a favorable settlement on Berlin. His gambler's instinct likely tempted him to act, along with the lingering belief that Kennedy could be bullied. He wanted to show the United States how it felt to be surrounded by enemy missiles, to throw "a hedgehog at Uncle Sam's pants," as he put it. Thus in May 1962, he persuaded an understandably wary Castro to accept sixty medium- and intermediate-range missiles and a panoply of military equipment to support them. The missiles were carefully concealed on the decks of transport ships. The forty-two thousand troops sent to guard them—armed with tactical nuclear weapons—sweated out the long summer cruise below deck to avoid surveillance. In what proved a colossal miscalculation, Khrushchev persuaded himself that the

weapons could be made operational before the United States detected them, forcing Kennedy to acquiesce.

He was wrong on both counts. CIA analysts using information gleaned from the defector Col. Oleg Penkovsky and aerial photographs accurately identified the mysterious objects as medium- and intermediate-range missiles. McNamara may have been right in arguing that these weapons did not significantly alter the overall strategic balance. From Kennedy's standpoint this was irrelevant. Stunned by Khrushchev's bold ploy and boxed in by his own public statements that offensive weapons in Cuba were unacceptable, he feared that to do nothing in the face of this most blatant Soviet challenge would be political and diplomatic suicide. To fully assess his options, he formed an Executive Committee (ExComm) of top advisers that met regularly during the crisis. He never seriously considered negotiations to secure removal of the weapons. The Soviets had secretly placed them in Cuba and lied about what they were doing. To negotiate under such circumstances would be seen as weak. He also suspected that Moscow would drag out negotiations until the missiles were operational. The ornithological designations "hawk" and "dove" came into parlance during ExComm deliberations. Hawks such as the Joint Chiefs and Acheson pressed for air strikes against the missile sites followed by an invasion to make certain the weapons—and Castro—were removed. Doves questioned whether air strikes would destroy the sites, worried about the morality of a surprise attack against a small nation, rejected an invasion as too risky, and feared Soviet retaliation against Berlin. They urged a blockade of Cuba, to be called a quarantine, combined with pressures on Moscow to remove the missiles. Kennedy opted for this more cautious but still risky course. On Monday, October 22, he announced the quarantine and demanded removal of the missiles.

His speech opened a week of harrowing moves and countermoves in this diplomatic chess game, played for the highest stakes. The United States went to the second highest state of defense readiness (DefCon 2) for the first time in the Cold War. The Strategic Air Command went to its highest alert, launching 550 B-52 bombers armed with nuclear warheads. Soviet technicians frantically worked on the missile sites, and by October 24 the medium-range weapons were near operational. United States warships took up station with standard operating procedures calling for firing a warning shot and, if that failed, disabling the rudder of the approaching ship. Soviet vessels with orders to return fire if fired upon moved ominously toward the quarantine line. Submarines from both sides silently plied the waters of the Caribbean. Harried officials worked under unimaginable pressures and went days without sleep; their nerves grew taut, their thought processes blurred. Attempting to micromanage the crisis to prevent a deadly mistake, even the famously detached Kennedy several times lost his cool. The first break occurred on October 24 when Soviet ships reversed course to avoid the quarantine. "We're eyeball to eyeball," the normally taciturn Rusk exclaimed, "and I think the other fella just blinked."

Not quite. Only after yet another frightful scare was a crude settlement arranged. Apparently convinced on the basis of flawed intelligence that war was imminent, Khrushchev on October 25 dispatched to Washington a personal and highly emotional message warning of the "calamity" of war and offering to

remove the missiles in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. The next day, his fears eased, he sent another message that left U.S. officials shaking their heads in dismay. More measured in tone, it upped the ante by also demanding removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. These weapons were obsolete, but getting rid of them raised numerous complications. The anxiety level soared when a U-2 aircraft was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy's military advisers demanded retaliation. Preparations were being completed for an air strike to be followed by an invasion of Cuba. Unknown to the Americans, Castro was pushing Moscow to launch a first strike against the United States. On October 27, "Black Saturday," the administration shrewdly decided to ignore the second letter and accept the more favorable terms of the first. In the meantime, Robert Kennedy privately assured the Soviet ambassador that the Turkish missiles would be removed. Painfully aware of his military inferiority, Khrushchev, after hours of agonizing suspense, accepted the U.S. proposals.

The missile crisis was the defining moment of the Kennedy presidency, and many observers have given him high marks. He was firm but restrained in responding to this most critical challenge, it is argued. He sought advice from different quarters. He left Khrushchev room for retreat. He did not gloat in the apparent U.S. victory. The October confrontation is also the most studied of Cold War crises, and as more has been learned, the praise for Kennedy has been tempered. To be sure, Khrushchev bears primary responsibility for the confrontation. He deluded himself into thinking that he could get away with an incredibly rash move. But Kennedy's obsession with Cuba and the hostile actions carried out in *Mongoose* provided the occasion and rationale for Khrushchev's actions, a connection totally lost on U.S. officials at the time. Even while he rejected the more risky alternatives, Kennedy's initial response pushed the two nations to the verge of war. He did hold the hawks at bay and displayed skill in crisis management. But he would have been the first to admit that luck and chance helped determine the outcome. The United States came within hours of an invasion that could have had horrific consequences. The number of Soviet troops in Cuba far exceeded U.S. estimates, and they were armed with tactical nuclear weapons. An invasion could have triggered nuclear war. "In the end," political scientist William Taubman concludes, Khrushchev and Kennedy "found the courage to pull back, leaving the other room to retreat ... but not before the world came closer than it ever has to nuclear conflagration."

Domestic Pressures for Toughness

JULIAN E. ZELIZER

From the start of [Kennedy's] administration the Republican Right worked hard to undercut JFK's appeal on national security. The John Birch Society, founded

in 1958 by California-based businessman Robert Welch, included 100,000 members, mostly in the Sunbelt. Anticommunism was the glue that held the society together, though opposition to civil rights was important for its southern members. Conservative radio hosts railed against the administration's failures to stand up to the Soviets. Conservatives enjoyed a vibrant period of book publishing with companies like Regnery, founded in 1947 by conservatives in Chicago. Some of the early movement books included William F. Buckley Jr.'s *God and Man at Yale* (1951), Whittaker Chambers's *Witness* (1952), and Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind* (1953). As the sociologist Daniel Bell observed, it was in the early 1960s that "the 'radical right' emerged into prominence on the American political scene."

The failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba offered conservatives their best opportunity to attack the administration. The covert plan had been hatched in 1960, when the CIA started to train a group of Cuban exiles to invade their homeland; the involvement of U.S. forces would be kept top secret. Candidate Nixon had to keep the plan a secret during the campaign, even as Kennedy criticized him for not doing enough about Castro....

U.S. military leaders were bullish about being able to trigger a revolution in Cuba through the invasion, whereas State Department officials and many of Kennedy's top advisors, as well as the president himself, were concerned not just about whether an invasion would work but also about the political repercussions in Latin America. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr., special assistant to the president, wrote, an invasion "would fix a malevolent image of the new Administration in the minds of millions."

It was a bad idea from the start. The first strike took place less than three months into the new administration, on April 15, 1961, as U.S. forces attacked Cuba with American airplanes that had been disguised to appear as Cuban aircraft stolen by Cuban exiles. The CIA's goal was to destroy as much Cuban airpower as possible to set up the best conditions for a ground invasion. But the CIA failed to destroy Castro's air force. Kennedy called off a planned second air strike, fearing that U.S. planes would be hit and Cuba would be able to prove to the world—and Latin American neighbors—that the "imperialist" United States had been behind the invasion rather than disgruntled Cuban exiles. Castro gained some extra time to regroup.

On April 17, a CIA-sponsored invasion by Cuban exiles began, but it was poorly executed and resulted in 140 of them killed and 1,189 captured. The invasion did not trigger a revolution, as the CIA had hoped, just a huge embarrassment for the United States. The State Department initially denied that there was any connection between the exiles and the United States, but the plan was revealed to the public through the press within a few days....

Kentucky Senator Thurston Morton, the Republican National Committee chairman, said that the invasion had been "disastrous" and that the Kennedy White House was a "prisoner of its own pre-election propaganda." Morton asked what Democrats would say if Nixon had "landed us in this predicament." On June 11, New York Representative William Miller, who had replaced Morton as chairman of the Republican National Committee,

accused Kennedy of having rescinded a plan by Eisenhower that would have provided the exiles with air cover during the invasion.

The fiasco led Kennedy to doubt the judgment and intelligence data of the Defense Department and the CIA. It discouraged him from authorizing military operations in Laos toward the end of April, where communists had taken control. Policy makers had perceived Laos as strategically the most important of the three countries in Southeast Asia that had been under French control (Vietnam and Cambodia were the other two). The Pathet Lao, the communist nationalist force in Laos, had defeated the French after World War II and continued to fight against the government established in 1954, which was sympathetic to Western interests and received assistance from Eisenhower. When Kennedy took office, Eisenhower warned him that military force would be needed to stop a takeover by the Pathet Lao. Kennedy rejected the advice, and most Republicans and Democrats, including General Douglas MacArthur, agreed that it was not worth the fight.

But as a result of Laos and Cuba, Kennedy was losing some of the hawkish luster he had developed in the Senate and the 1960 presidential campaign. "He was like a young prizefighter," observed James Reston, "toying gracefully with his opponent, jabbing at will and casually waving to the crowd, when suddenly he was clipped on the chin.... The magic of the first two months has vanished."...

On August 13, the Soviets constructed a wall separating East and West Berlin. Although U.S. and Soviet soldiers faced off against one another throughout August, Kennedy resisted military pressure to use force and allowed the wall to be constructed. "A wall is a hell of a lot better than a war," he said in private. In return, after extensive negotiations, Khrushchev agreed in November that he would not seek a treaty with East Germany. Although a wall was now in place, Kennedy had persuaded the Soviets to back down from seeking to end Western control over West Berlin.

The press hailed the resolution as a great triumph for Kennedy. He had defused the crisis and protected Western interests, even though the wall had been erected. Theodore Sorensen, the president's special counsel and chief speechwriter, boasted that if Republicans accused Democrats of appeasing communism, "we point to our defense buildup and our Berlin stand (and introduce them to those Republicans who are complaining about the Reservists being called up and the budget not being balanced)." Several polls indicated that Republicans would not be able to make use of the anticommunism issue since the public was pleased with how Kennedy had handled Berlin....

Looking toward the 1962 midterm elections, Kennedy's pollsters started to feel that foreign policy was the "sleeping issue" that could "work decisively for Democrats.... Kennedy has gone a long way toward eliminating the traditional GOP cry that the Democrats are on the one hand the party of appeasement and on the other, the party of war."

The greatest national security challenge to Democrats politically, however, remained Cuba. The fall of Cuba to communism had been an embarrassment to Republicans in 1959, their China, but by 1962 the island nation was of political concern to both parties. The Bay of Pigs had eliminated any advantage Kennedy enjoyed on the issue. As Castro acted defiantly toward American power,

Democrats and Republicans both needed to demonstrate that they would stand firm against this nearby threat.

In the same polls that indicated Kennedy's surging popularity, questions about Cuba almost always elicited negative responses about the president. The failure to eliminate Castro and allegations about the presence of the Soviets on the island symbolized to conservatives Kennedy's inability to follow through on his hawkish promises....

Like Harry Truman in 1950, Kennedy was desperate to increase the number of northern liberals within the Democratic congressional majority to diminish the power of the conservative coalition, which had stifled most of his domestic initiatives from the New Frontier such as medical care for the aged and a tax cut for the middle class. In 1962, Congress approved only 44.3 percent of Kennedy's legislative requests, with many bills never leaving committee.

On August 5, a U-2 reconnaissance flight discovered evidence of Soviet military equipment, including antiaircraft missiles, in Cuba. Kennedy acknowledged to reporters that there was proof of large quantities of equipment coming into Cuba from the Soviet Union, as well as an increased number of technicians. But, he said, there were no signs of troop movements. Kennedy assured reporters that the administration was examining the significance of the evidence....

Throughout August, Republican Senators Kenneth Keating (New York) and Homer Capehart (Indiana) had been attacking Kennedy for ignoring what they saw as the growing crisis in Cuba. Although all of the information from the informants and the CIA remained classified, these two Republicans placed the issue in the news.

Keating, who had been elected to the Senate in 1958, was relying on anti-communism to preserve his support among national Republicans for a possible run for the presidency. He needed to remain liberal on domestic policy, however, to maintain his electoral strength in New York. Keating called on the president to insist that NATO members stop allowing their ships to deliver Soviet cargoes to Cuba. He called on the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), which had excluded Cuba in January 1962, to take action against Castro. Keating, who was not up for re-election until 1964, ridiculed the president's distinction between offensive and defensive weapons: "Who is to say whether a weapon is offensive or defensive? It depends on the direction in which it is aimed." Keating refused to share his sources, which made it impossible to confirm or disprove his allegations. Some later studies would claim that Clare Boothe Luce, a former congresswoman, an anticommunist conservative, and the wife of *Time* editor Henry Luce, had been giving him the information, though this has not been confirmed.

Capehart was a different breed of Republican than Keating. A die-hard conservative, he had been an ardent opponent of Roosevelt and Truman's domestic policies, and although he had opposed the Marshall Plan and the creation of the United Nations, over the years he had moderated his stance. Still, he had been one of the Kennedy administration's toughest critics following the Bay of Pigs. In the upcoming senatorial election, Capehart hoped to beat his far younger challenger, Birch Bayh, by, according to House Minority Leader Charles Halleck, placing "all of his eggs in the Cuban basket." Speaking in his home state of

Indiana, Capehart asked, "How long will the President examine the situation ... until the hundreds of Russian troops grow into hundreds of thousands?"

Concerned about his Republican opponents inside and outside the administration, the president told Marshall Carter, acting director of the CIA while McCone was away, that he did not want any of the U-2 information leaked to the media because it would turn into political fodder for the GOP and exacerbate tensions with Khrushchev. Because he did not think the photographs revealed any kind of serious offensive threat, he didn't see any need to share the data with the public. He refused to believe that the Soviets would take a chance by sending their nuclear weapons so far away....

Yet the administration understood that it was facing a serious political challenge. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Manning warned NSC Director McGeorge Bundy that "in the public mind missiles are missiles" and that "the presence of anything that can be termed missile installations on Cuban soil is certain to have heavy psychological impact on the American public, and on public opinion in the hemisphere and elsewhere." Agreeing with the analysis, Bundy wrote the president, "Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics of the Administration's 'softness' on Cuba.... The expectation is that any missiles will have a substantial political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great alarm, even in the absence of proof that nuclear warheads were arriving with them."

Kennedy understood he had to calm these political storms. Even though the administration did not have a plan of action, the president told Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Bundy that he would invite "the leadership down here, the Republican, key gasbags and others," to update them on some of the information that he had about the SAMs. By doing so, he hoped to undermine Republican claims that the president was withholding information.

On September 4, the president met with a bipartisan group of congressmen. Marshall Carter, Curtis LeMay (chief of staff of the air force), and Kennedy assured the legislators that, based on the information they had, the weapons in Cuba were not offensive. Senator Richard Russell responded that the Cubans could turn "every bit of this stuff" into offensive use. Iowa Republican Senator Bourke Hickenlooper said he was concerned about "the argument that we're a paper tiger and the fomenting groups in Latin America say, 'See, look what's happening 100 miles from the United States. They do nothing about it ... we have nothing to fear, we can spit in their face, we can do this, that, and the other thing.'"...

The political pressure to take action became so intense that on October 1 the administration contemplated a blockade of Cuba. McCone, since returning to Washington from his honeymoon on September 26, had been pressuring the president to renew U-2 surveillance flights. Near the end of September, reports had surfaced of a possible medium-range ballistic missile site in Pinar del Río Province. On October 7, Dirksen said that Kennedy had a "sorry record" on Cuba: "There is a mess in Cuba, a mess of our own making that began with the New Frontier." Dirksen charged that the Soviets had completed eight missile bases in Cuba, with sixteen more being built.

The president authorized a new round of U-2 reconnaissance missions over Cuba on October 9 and took these issues on the campaign trail. In early

October, he traveled to Indiana to campaign for Birch Bayh against Homer Capehart. He warned that "these self-appointed generals and admirals who want to send somebody else's sons to war, and who consistently voted against the instruments of peace, ought to be kept home by the voters and be replaced by somebody like Birch Bayh, who has some understanding of what the twentieth century is all about." Kennedy asked how someone like Capehart with a "19th century" voting record in the Senate could possibly benefit the state. He said that Capehart's "rash" words strengthened "our adversaries."

Republicans responded with equal vigor. On October 10, Keating announced that he had "fully confirmed" information that the "construction has begun on at least six launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles." Keating said, "My own sources on the Cuban situation, which have been 100 percent reliable, have substantiated this report completely.... Six launching sites are under construction—pads which will have the power to hurl rockets into the American heartland and as far as the Panama Canal Zone." By this time, the senator had delivered sixteen speeches that included complaints about the administration withholding information about the Soviet intervention in Cuba. The October 10th speech constituted the most direct challenge to Kennedy's statement that there were no missiles of concern in Cuba. Keating asked the administration to respond. The State Department denied the accusation.

Keating's speech disturbed Kennedy, more than any of the others that the senator had made, given that it contained a level of specificity that had been absent from previous statements. Keating's words, according to one senior CIA officer, "hit like a bombshell at the White House [and] infuriated President Kennedy." The administration scrambled to find the source of the information. McCone personally met with Keating, asking him to "lay his cards on the table." Keating refused. The meeting disintegrated into an ugly verbal fight. A second meeting was scheduled, but Keating did not even show up.

On the day that Keating delivered his speech, McCone had shown Kennedy photographs of Soviet ships carrying crates toward Cuba that his advisors believed might contain offensive weapon material. According to McCone, "The President requested that such information be withheld at least until after the elections as if the information got into the press, a new and more violent Cuban issue would be interjected into the campaign and this would seriously affect his independence of action." During a speech in Boston on October 15, Eisenhower attacked the "dreary foreign record of the past 21 months," which the press interpreted as signaling a formal decision by the Republican Party hierarchy to open this issue up in the campaign.

Then the flood gates broke. On the morning of October 16, the CIA showed the president the first "hard evidence" in the form of aerial photographs of offensive missile sites in Cuba. According to presidential advisor Kenneth O'Donnell, Kennedy approached him in the morning and asked if he still thought all the "fuss" about Cuba was politically unimportant. "Absolutely," O'Donnell said as he assured Kennedy that "voters won't give a damn about Cuba." Kennedy then showed him the photos. After inspecting them with a magnifying glass, O'Donnell said that he couldn't believe his eyes. "You'd better believe it,"

Kennedy replied, "we've just elected Capehart in Indiana and Ken Keating will probably be the next President of the United States." The president told his brother Robert, who was not only his attorney general but his closest advisor, "The campaign is over.... This blows it—we've lost anyway. They were right about Cuba." Most administration officials who saw the pictures knew that they only had a few days before the information became public. After all, as Rusk said, "Keating has already, in effect, announced it on the floor of the Senate."

The final U-2 photographs were delivered to the president at the same time as Republicans announced that they were going to focus the final weeks of the campaign on foreign policy. RNC chairman William Miller issued a statement on October 16—endorsed by Senator Goldwater and California Representative Robert Wilson—that "we are distressed to note that Administration spokesmen in their campaign speeches have studiously avoided forthright discussion of foreign policy. If we were asked to state the issue in one word, that word would be Cuba—symbol of the tragic irresolution of the Administration." By October 18, Cuba had emerged as the top campaign issue in a poll of congressmen and media editors. Out of 344 editors, 301 selected Cuba as the top issue; 155 out of 208 members of Congress who responded made the same choice.

While the last set of photographs still remained top secret, the president faced tremendous pressure from his own circle of advisors to authorize a military strike or invasion. LeMay said that unless the United States responded militarily, the Soviets would read Kennedy's decision as a signal that they could do what they wanted without fear. Eisenhower told McCone that Soviet bases in Cuba were intolerable, and he supported an all-out military action. During one meeting of ExCom, the top-secret committee of senior policy makers who advised the president throughout these pivotal weeks, a Republican advocate of an air strike, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, slipped Sorensen a note: "Ted—Have you considered the very real possibility that if we allow Cuba to complete installation and operational readiness of missile bases, the next House of Representatives is likely to have a Republican majority? That would completely paralyze our ability to react sensibly and coherently to further Soviet advances."

But Kennedy resisted the pressure to respond with military force. Throughout the ExCom meetings, as LeMay chided the president and spoke to him in a demeaning fashion, Kennedy rejected his push to use military force. Like President Truman with General MacArthur in 1951, Kennedy stood up to the pressure from the military. Polls suggested that the president was on the right track. Although Goldwater told a reporter that if the president left it up to voters, "We'd be in Cuba tomorrow," in fact the Gallup poll revealed that sixty-three percent of those polled did not agree with sending armed forces to Cuba.

As he deliberated over whether to impose a blockade or authorize a military strike, the president continued to think about the political repercussions of the missiles. In the context of the past month, this crisis threatened to undermine all of the momentum that Democrats had regained on national security with the missile gap debate, potentially triggering a revival of Republican power. After one meeting about the missiles, Kennedy spoke with RFK and Sorensen on the Truman balcony of the White House. He said that the crisis would harm

Democrats because some voters would say that the GOP had been correct all along and that Kennedy was wrong. "Well," Sorensen recalled the president saying, jokingly, "I guess Homer Capehart is the Winston Churchill of our generation." Kennedy feared that if he pursued too aggressive a stand, however, he would open Democrats to the old charges that Republicans had used against Woodrow Wilson in 1918 and Wendell Willkie had used against FDR in 1940, and other Republicans had echoed thereafter, that they were the "war party."

Notwithstanding his private fears, after October 16 Kennedy resisted the temptation to make a political issue of the crisis. The fact that news of the crisis had not yet been made public to voters or members of Congress afforded him some breathing room to deliberate over what to do without the full-blown pressure of politics. The minutes of the ExCom meetings reveal few discussions of political considerations as Kennedy and his staff deliberated over the options. Even while the president remained on the campaign trail (until October 20, after which he canceled all of his political events), he did not talk about Cuba.

Kennedy decided to announce a quarantine (which was not as strong a measure as a blockade and which Nixon had suggested a few days earlier), with the warning that there would be tougher action if the Soviets violated it. The quarantine only applied to offensive weapon equipment. The president did not propose any stringent enforcement measures. In other words, he wanted to maintain as much flexibility as possible to avoid an attack. To placate the two active Republicans on ExCom, McCone and Dillon, he rejected proposals to combine the quarantine with suggestions for negotiations over a number of issues including, most prominently, removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

Anticipating Republican attacks once the photographs became public, Kennedy instructed McCone to update Eisenhower about them and his decision to impose a quarantine. Following the meeting, on October 21, Eisenhower delivered a speech in which he stated that any foreign policy crisis should not be part of the election. The next day, Kennedy personally called Eisenhower to explain why he had decided on a quarantine and to say that he anticipated the situation would get worse. The president said he would move troops from San Diego to Florida in case the "invasion business" was needed. He said that if the OAS agreed to U.S. actions, that would be good, but if it didn't, the United States would proceed unilaterally. Eisenhower responded that the military option was the only "clean cut" way to resolve the threat. He disagreed with Kennedy that the Politburo would bring Berlin into the situation and doubted it would allow missiles to be fired in retaliation for a U.S. invasion.

In the afternoon of October 22, the president briefed congressional Democrats and one Republican, Senator Dirksen, at the White House to provide them with a full report and to tell them that he was leaning toward a quarantine rather than military strike. Since Congress was not in session, Kennedy used Air Force One to transport senators and representatives. He did not invite Keating or Capehart.

During the meeting, Senator Russell, Lyndon Johnson's mentor and close ally, told the president, "I think that our responsibilities demand stronger steps than that in view of this buildup here.... We're either a first-class power or we're not." Russell predicted that the quarantine would give the Soviets an

opportunity to make more “incendiary” comments, which would ultimately lead to a broader war. Senator Fulbright thought the president should not make any announcements until he was prepared to invade, calling the proposed quarantine the “worst of the alternatives” since it would force the United States to directly confront the Soviet Union rather than the Cubans....

That day, 8,000 conservatives rallied in Madison Square Garden in support of military action against Cuba. The audience included luminaries like William Buckley and Frank Meyer. When one speaker said that by doing nothing Kennedy had been a “silent partner in tyranny,” the crowd booed the president and cheered when speakers called for invading Cuba, yelling, “Fight! Fight!”...

Republicans promised to leave the crisis out of their campaigns. Keating said, “If the price the Republicans must pay for his action is the loss of some seats or some votes, I think it’s a pretty small price.” Eisenhower agreed: “So far as Cuba and the Soviet Union are concerned, in the weeks ahead we cannot be partisans.” According to Arthur Krock of the *New York Times*, “The issue which the Republicans sought to make paramount in the 1962 Congressional campaign was that President Kennedy had failed to ‘do something’ about the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet missile base. Hence this issue is now ‘dead’ ... the President killed it Monday night by ‘doing something,’ indeed by an act, which by its nature assured the unified support of the American people.” Yet such promises of bipartisanship were not universal. Conservative groups staged a protest outside the White House, carrying signs that read “Appeasement Is for Cowards” and “Damn the Missiles, Full Speed Ahead.” Missouri Republican Thomas Curtis, a member of the House Ways and Means Committee, described the confrontation as “phony and contrived for election purposes.”

More common were Republicans who agreed to support the president but nonetheless questioned the timing of his announcement and speculated why Kennedy was only now doing what Republicans had been demanding for several months. The leaders of the Republican congressional committees said that the president’s actions in Cuba had a “distinctly political ring” given that they were occurring two weeks before the midterms. Goldwater said, “I hope there was no political motivation in the Presidents decision. But I can’t get away from the idea that he didn’t act until after he got out in the country campaigning and found that what I and a lot of others have been saying about Cuba was true.”

Meanwhile, according to John Finney of the *New York Times*, Washington was buzzing with speculation about how the United States had missed this intelligence and why Senator Keating seemed to have more information than the administration. “The questions,” he told readers, “are being heard at diplomatic receptions, at Washington cocktail parties and on homebound buses filled with government officials.”

Both JFK and RFK acknowledged privately that they were vulnerable to these attacks and questions. At a meeting of ExCom on the morning of October 23, the attorney general said, “What we are doing now is, in fact, closing the barn door after the horse is gone.” While the Department of State insisted Keating had been wrong about the specific types of missiles that the Soviets had been moving into Cuba, the president and his brother worried about how the events would look to the public....

Following some of the tensest days in American history, on October 28, the administration reached a deal with the Soviets. Ignoring the second letter, Kennedy promised Khrushchev that the United States would publicly agree not to invade Cuba and privately promise to remove its missiles from Turkey *after* the midterm elections. The Soviets assured the administration that they would not reveal the second part of the deal, realizing the problems it would cause with NATO as well as Republicans in Congress.

In exchange, the Soviets dismantled their missile sites. The president had excluded four members of ExCom—Republicans Douglas Dillon and John McCone as well as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor and Vice President Lyndon Johnson—from the final discussions over this deal. He was concerned that Dillon and McCone might leak information of the deal to fellow Republicans, who would subvert its success. Taylor was steadfast in his opposition to a missile deal, while the president's general distrust of LBJ, which had caused him to exclude him from deliberations on many other decisions, resulted in his absence at this final stage.

What was the state of the two parties now vis-à-vis national security? Tom Wicker of the *New York Times* summed up the situation: "Since 1952, when the frustration of the Korean War stalemate gave the Republicans the opening for attacking on this line, they have persistently pictured themselves as the party that knew best how to deal with Communists. Now having gone as near the brink of war as the Republican Administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower ever did, with dramatic results, Mr. Kennedy and his party should have gone a long way toward scotching this recurrent issue against them."

It did not take long for partisan forces to reassert themselves. After the crisis ended, Eisenhower boasted that Republicans deserved credit for having pushed the president to stand up to the Cubans. Conservatives formed the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, which criticized the president's decision to abandon that doctrine by promising not to invade Cuba. On November 1, Senator Goldwater and Representative Wilson told reporters that the president should answer eight questions about Cuba, including whether the no-invasion guarantee meant that the United States had accepted the permanence of communism in Cuba and whether it would abandon Cuban refugees seeking to overthrow Castro. RNC chairman Miller called for an investigation into the failure of "intelligence agencies to advise the President more promptly of the medium-range missile buildup in Cuba." On a Sunday morning talk show, Keating said that he was baffled why the administration had denied his charges in September and early October when, he charged, they knew the information to be true.

But the attacks did not work in the short term. "Republicans may argue that the blockade was too little and too late," said the editors at the *Wall Street Journal*, "but they can no longer contend that Mr. Kennedy did nothing or is not succeeding so far."

The midterm elections were a success for Kennedy and liberals in the Democratic Party. Democrats expanded their Senate majority by two and only lost four seats in the House. It was the first midterm contest since 1934 in which the party in power was able to maintain and even expand its numerical strength.

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Equality, Freedom, and Power: The Civil Rights Revolution

The African American struggle for equality, freedom, and power is a defining event in postwar America. The struggle played out not only in the courts and in the halls of Congress, but also in the workplace, in schools and churches, on college campuses, in the streets, in households, and at lunchroom counters. No part of American life escaped its influence. Moreover, it was a struggle not just of prominent charismatic leaders, but of ordinary men and women who possessed the courage and dignity to demand change. The oppressions they fought to overcome and the changes they demanded raise questions—many of them unresolved—that go to the heart of the American experience. How can a country that endorsed the principle of equality tolerate second-class citizenship for African Americans and other racialized groups? What do Americans mean when they profess to believe in the principles of equality and freedom? What is the relationship between these two ideals? Do Americans believe in equality of condition or in equality of opportunity?

The African American struggle for equality also raises a number of complex questions for the historian. When, for example, did the Civil Rights Movement begin? Did it start with the landmark 1954 *Brown vs. Board of Education* decision, as many early historians argued? Or did it start considerably earlier with countless acts of everyday resistance initiated by ordinary people? What is the relationship between the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power movement that followed it? For many years, historians argued that the Black Power movement rejected many aspects of the earlier movement. But more recently scholars have stressed the continuities between civil rights and black power, pointing out the ways in which issues such as self-defense and community building shaped both of them. Historians are still grappling with these questions.

Since 1945, the many laws, court decisions, and public policies that had sustained racial segregation since the late nineteenth century were swept aside, transforming the nation's racial relations in a single generation. Yet the history of those earlier days, their legacy, remains deeply embedded in the nation's social structure. While some middle-class African Americans have profited from the new economic and social opportunities created by

the Civil Rights Movement, the plight of many poor African Americans has actually worsened. Meanwhile, growing white opposition to affirmative action and other minority programs threatened to further slow the pace of change. In the early twenty-first century, the dream invoked by Martin Luther King Jr. remains only partially fulfilled.

DOCUMENTS

World War II marked a watershed in the African American struggle for equality. Many African Americans served in the armed forces, albeit in segregated units; others found work in defense plants. Wartime rhetoric about freedom and democracy raised expectations that racial progress on the home front was possible, and many African Americans displayed a new determination to secure rights that had long been denied them. But the return of African American soldiers was greeted by violence in parts of the South, as suggested by a *New York Times* report in July 1946 (Document 1). Despite the ongoing threat of white violence, African Americans continued to agitate for their rights, culminating in the Supreme Court's 1954 historic decision in the matter of *Brown v. Board of Education*, Topeka, Kansas (Document 2). The Brown ruling, which held that racially segregated schools were inherently unequal, had an enormous symbolic impact, addressing as it did the deep-seated conflict between the egalitarian rhetoric of America's founding and its long history of slavery and segregation. However, the history of Brown itself was complicated. To be sure, the decision helped fuel an already growing Civil Rights Movement. But the Court temporized in enforcing the ruling, as did President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who privately voiced his disagreement with the decision.

The history of the Civil Rights Movement was shaped not only or even primarily by court decisions, however. Above all, it was shaped by the local actions of thousands of courageous men and women who directly challenged the Jim Crow system of segregation and discrimination by relying on tactics such as boycotts and sit-ins. In Document 3, Jo Ann Robinson recalls her participation in the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, exploring both its economic impact on the city and its psychological effects on its participants. Only twenty-six years old when he helped lead the Montgomery Boycott, Martin Luther King Jr. quickly became the movement's most charismatic leader, drawing strength from and inspiring protests throughout the nation. His "I Have a Dream" address before the Lincoln Memorial during the March on Washington in August 1963, which you can read and listen to online, was couched in the spiritual vernacular of the African American church and the equal rights language of the Declaration of Independence. In Document 4, Ann Moody describes a 1963 sit-in in Jackson, Mississippi, remembering the white violence that she and her fellow activists confronted. The years after 1963 were marked by continuing local struggles throughout much of the South, many of them met by violent resistance. They were also marked by a series of major new laws and court decisions, including the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, which prohibited discrimination in

voting, education, and the use of public facilities, and empowered the federal government to act more decisively in ending segregation and other discriminatory practices.

While these acts sought to formally redress the systems of political disenfranchisement and segregation that had been endemic to the Jim Crow South, racial discrimination also remained deeply entrenched in the urban North, where large numbers of African Americans encountered discrimination in housing and employment, high rates of poverty, inadequate access to health care, and police brutality. By the mid-1960s, a new generation of activists was fighting back against these conditions, calling for an end to police violence in their neighborhoods, championing the right to black self-defense, and seeking to provide basic services to people within their own communities. In 1964, only eight months after Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his "I Have a Dream" Speech, Malcolm X gave a speech in Cleveland, Ohio, in which he urged African Americans to embrace the political, social, and economic philosophy of black nationalism, which emphasized self-help and the autonomy of the black community over the ideal of integration into the dominant white society (Document 5). The Black Panther Party, founded in Oakland, California, in 1966, endorsed similar principles, calling in its founding platform statement for the power "to determine the destiny of our Black community" (Document 6). The emergence of Black Power in the mid-1960s reflected the enduring legacy of many decades of prior activism, while simultaneously anticipating how much racial exclusion and violence would shape deindustrialized cities in the second half of the twentieth century.

* "jail together, stand up for Freedom together."

1. The New York Times Reports a Murder in Georgia, 1946

Monroe, Ga., July 26—Two young Negroes, one a veteran just returned from the war, and their wives were lined up last night near a secluded road and shot dead by an unmasked band of twenty white men.

The ghastly details of the multiple lynching were told today by Loy Harrison, a well-to-do white farmer who had just hired the Negroes to work on his farm. Harrison was bringing the Negroes to his farm when his car was waylaid by the mob eight miles from Monroe. Questioning of one of the Negroes by the mob indicated, Harrison said, that he was suspected of having stabbed his former employer, a white man. The Negroes, Roger Malcolm and George Dorsey, both 27, were removed from the car and led down a side road.

The women, who were sisters and who had just recently married Malcolm and Dorsey, began to scream. Then a mob member said that one of the women had recognized him.

"Get those damned women, too," the mob leader shouted.

Several of the men then came back and dragged the shrieking women from the automobile. A few moments later Mr. Harrison heard the shots—many of them and the mob dispersed.

The grotesquely sprawled bodies were found in a clump of bushes beside a little-used side road, the upper parts of the bodies scarcely recognizable from the mass of bullet holes.

Dorsey's mother, Monia Williams, said that her son had just been discharged after five years in the Army and that she had received his discharge button in the mail just this week.

The lynching was the first in the nation in nearly a year and was the first multiple lynching since two 14-year-old Negro boys were hanged by a Mississippi mob in October 1942. For Georgia it was the first lynching of more than one person since 1918 when ten Negroes were lynched in Brooks County.

2. The Supreme Court Rules on *Brown v. Board of Education*, 1954

... In each of the cases, minors of the negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this court in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate....

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws....

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when *Plessy v. Ferguson* was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping

him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.

... To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone....

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment....

3. Jo Ann Robinson Remembers the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955

... Early Monday the first buses went out for the regular morning’s pickup. Usually at this time people pushed on or scrambled for seats. But today no passengers awaited the buses’ arrival. It was reported that at the very beginning a few riders were spotted on several of the buses. There were in fact a few blacks who had threatened to ignore requests to stay off buses that day. These had been well-indoctrinated into believing that white people were superior, and that blacks had “their place” and should stay in it. But fate seemed to play into the hands of the boycotters. When these faint-hearted few saw the two motorcycle police escorts accompanying the buses, they became really frightened that they might be arrested if they rode the bus. So they took a cab for a dime instead. (The cabs were provided by black citizens cooperating with the group.) Soon, on most of the public carriers, there was “nary a colored soul to pay a single fare.” Instead, hundreds of people were walking or boarding taxis or private cars.

There were no black late-risers on this particular morning, for those who lived on bus lines telephoned those who did not, to say that the boycott was effective, that black passengers were not riding, and that very few whites were riding. In those early morning hours the voice of the liberty-seeking colonists of 1776, the Minutemen of Lexington, seemed to make itself heard in the hearts of Montgomery Negroes, joyously exclaiming, “O, what a glorious morning this is!”

All day long empty buses passed, trailed by white-capped city cops. Very few white passengers rode on that Monday. Of course, 75 to 80 percent of bus riders normally were black. But many of the 20 to 25 percent white riders respected the one-day boycott of black citizens and stayed off the bus, too, to support it. Many whites hauled their maids, cooks, and nurses that day. One bus driver confessed that during a six-hour run he took in only \$6.30.

Downtown merchants counted the day's receipts and came up short, too, especially compared to the preceding Christmas shopping days. Negroes, who as a group had a reputation for spending their earnings without much thought of saving for tomorrow, just "were not in town" to spend money and in any case had no way to carry purchases home. But, then, boycotters were in no mood to go shopping. Christmas was not on their minds. One woman had walked to town to shop for Christmas. She said that while she was in one large department store, the realization came upon her that she was the only black customer in the store, and she hurried out. She stopped in another store and found a similar condition. Deciding that there were no black people in town, she left and went home without purchasing anything....

That day was rough on the bus drivers. They complained to the police department that they were being "persecuted and molested" in various places by colored children who ridiculed them and stuck out their tongues at them as they passed by.

In response to the complaints, officials asked Negro school principals to "stop the children from gathering on corners and poking out their tongues at the embarrassed motormen." Teachers dutifully instructed the children to go about their business and not bother the bus drivers. The children obeyed, but, when tiny tots saw no one looking, especially their teachers, they stuck out their tongues at the "yellow monsters," then looked angelically ahead of them as if they had not done a thing!

In windows, doorways, and yards, people peered at the huge, empty yellow motor vehicles. The empty buses, each with its pair of white-capped motorcycle policemen trailing behind, evoked countless memories of bitter past experiences. Suddenly, all the emotions that had been held in for so long were released in heartless taunts, laughter, and hand-waving.

"You wanted your buses, now you got 'em!"

"It's dey buses, let dem keep 'em!"

"Who will you kick now?"

No obscenity was employed. But though the taunts were mild, harmless, they did the persecuted, oppressed people worlds of good.

The *Advertiser* later (January 10, 1956) quoted a report that one seventy-two-year-old man who had ridden the bus for thirty or forty years sat on his front porch and laughed heartily every time a bus drove by. A woman reported gleefully that the buses were driving by her house "as naked as can be."

Yet another woman "who had walked halfway across town" was given a ride by a minister who asked if she was tired. She replied, "Well, my body

may be a bit tired, but for many years now my soul has been tired. Now my soul is resting. So I don't mind if my body is tired, because my soul is free." All during the first day of the boycott, black drivers during off-hours gave walking boycotters rides. Preachers, lawyers, doctors, businessmen, and ordinary folks picked up people walking; it was said that Ph.D.'s and no d's got together and knew each other as brothers, all members of one race, sticking together for one common cause. A close bond of fellowship and friendship was created. Thus, the race became united. Each person bore his part of the burden. The car owners drove Cadillacs or jalopies, whatever the case was; the bus riders walked if they were not picked up. And the boycotters loved it! They stopped talking so much and so loud on the job and kept many things to themselves. Petty jealousies disappeared, and they manifested a new trust for leadership. In "sticking with the race," they astounded themselves, as well as the white population, which did not know what had "come over the darkies!"

One white woman fired her maid because the "sullen girl" refused to divulge any information concerning the boycott. Many white women disguised their voices to "sound like voices of black people" and telephoned different ministers to find out where the "pick-up station was," and "if there was any new information that they should know." When the ministers would direct them to a certain church for all the information they would need, the callers would ask "where the churches were and how to get there." Then the ministers would know who the callers were and hang up.

Before Monday was half gone, Negroes had made history. Never before had they united in such a manner. There was open respect and admiration in the eyes of many whites who had looked on before, dubious and amused. Even clerks in dime stores, all white, were more cordial. They were heard to add, after a purchase by a black customer, "Y'all come back to see us," which was a very unusual occurrence. The black customers held their heads higher. They felt reborn, important for the first time. A greater degree of race pride was exhibited. Many were themselves surprised at the response of the masses, and could not explain, if they had wanted to, what had changed them overnight into fearless, courageous, proud people, standing together for human dignity, civil rights, and, yes, self-respect! There was a stick-togetherness that drew them like a magnet. They showed a genuine fondness for one another. They were really free—free inside! They felt it! Acted it! Manifested it in their entire beings! They took great pride in being black....

4. Anne Moody Describes a Sit-in in Jackson, Mississippi, May 28, 1963

... At exactly 11 A.M., Pearlana, Memphis, and I entered Woolworth's from the rear entrance. We separated as soon as we stepped into the store, and made small purchases from various counters. Pearlana had given Memphis her watch. He was to let us know when it was 11:14. At 11:14 we were to join him near the lunch counter and at exactly 11:15 we were to take seats at it.

Seconds before 11:15 we were occupying three seats at the previously segregated Woolworth's lunch counter. In the beginning the waitresses seemed to ignore us, as if they really didn't know what was going on. Our waitress walked past us a couple of times before she noticed we had started to write our own orders down and realized we wanted service. She asked us what we wanted. We began to read to her from our order slips. She told us that we would be served at the back counter, which was for Negroes.

"We would like to be served here," I said.

The waitress started to repeat what she had said, then stopped in the middle of the sentence. She turned the lights out behind the counter, and she and the other waitresses almost ran to the back of the store, deserting all their white customers. I guess they thought that violence would start immediately after the whites at the counter realized what was going on. There were five or six other people at the counter. A couple of them just got up and walked away. A girl sitting next to me finished her banana split before leaving. A middle-aged white woman who had not yet been served rose from her seat and came over to us. "I'd like to stay here with you," she said, "but my husband is waiting."

The newsmen came in just as she was leaving. They must have discovered what was going on shortly after some of the people began to leave the store. One of the newsmen ran behind the woman who spoke to us and asked her to identify herself. She refused to give her name, but said she was a native of Vicksburg and a former resident of California. When asked why she had said what she had said to us, she replied, "I am in sympathy with the Negro movement." By this time a crowd of cameramen and reporters had gathered around us taking pictures and asking questions, such as Where were we from? Why did we sit-in? What organization sponsored it? Were we students? From what school? How were we classified?

I told them that we were all students at Tougaloo College, that we were represented by no particular organization, and that we planned to stay there even after the store closed. "All we want is service," was my reply to one of them. After they had finished probing for about twenty minutes, they were almost ready to leave.

At noon, students from a nearby white high school started pouring in to Woolworth's. When they first saw us they were sort of surprised. They didn't know how to react. A few started to heckle and the newsmen became interested again. Then the white students started chanting all kinds of anti-Negro slogans. We were called a little bit of everything. The rest of the seats except the three we were occupying had been roped off to prevent others from sitting down. A couple of the boys took one end of the rope and made it into a hangman's noose. Several attempts were made to put it around our necks. The crowds grew as more students and adults came in for lunch.

We kept our eyes straight forward and did not look at the crowd except for occasional glances to see what was going on. All of a sudden I saw a face I remembered—the drunkard from the bus station sit-in. My eyes lingered on him just long enough for us to recognize each other. Today he was drunk too, so I don't think he remembered where he had seen me before. He took out a

knife, opened it, put it in his pocket, and then began to pace the floor. At this point, I told Memphis and Pearlena what was going on. Memphis suggested that we pray. We bowed our heads, and all hell broke loose. A man rushed forward, threw Memphis from his seat, and slapped my face. Then another man who worked in the store threw me against an adjoining counter.

Down on my knees on the floor, I saw Memphis lying near the lunch counter with blood running out of the corners of his mouth. As he tried to protect his face, the man who'd thrown him down kept kicking him against the head. If he had worn hard-soled shoes instead of sneakers, the first kick probably would have killed Memphis. Finally a man dressed in plain clothes identified himself as a police officer and arrested Memphis and his attacker.

Pearlena had been thrown to the floor. She and I got back on our stools after Memphis was arrested. There were some white Tougaloo teachers in the crowd. They asked Pearlena and me if we wanted to leave. They said that things were getting too rough. We didn't know what to do. While we were trying to make up our minds, we were joined by Joan Trumpauer. Now there were three of us and we were integrated. The crowd began to chant, "Communists, Communists, Communists." Some old man in the crowd ordered the students to take us off the stools.

"Which one should I get first?" a big husky boy said.

"That white nigger," the old man said.

The boy lifted Joan from the counter by her waist and carried her out of the store. Simultaneously, I was snatched from my stool by two high school students. I was dragged about thirty feet toward the door by my hair when someone made them turn me loose. As I was getting up off the floor, I saw Joan coming back inside. We started back to the center of the counter to join Pearlena. Lois Chaffee, a white Tougaloo faculty member, was now sitting next to her. So Joan and I just climbed across the rope at the front end of the counter and sat down. There were now four of us, two whites and two Negroes, all women. The mob started smearing us with ketchup, mustard, sugar, pies, and everything on the counter. Soon Joan and I were joined by John Salter, but the moment he sat down he was hit on the jaw with what appeared to be brass knuckles. Blood gushed from his face and someone threw salt into the open wound. Ed King, Tougaloo's chaplain, rushed to him.

At the other end of the counter, Lois and Pearlena were joined by George Raymond, a CORE field worker and a student from Jackson State College. Then a Negro high school boy sat down next to me. The mob took spray paint from the counter and sprayed it on the new demonstrators. The high school student had on a white shirt; the word "nigger" was written on his back with red spray paint.

We sat there for three hours taking a beating when the manager decided to close the store because the mob had begun to go wild with stuff from other counters. He begged and begged everyone to leave. But even after fifteen minutes of begging, no one budged. They would not leave until we did. Then Dr. Beittel, the president of Tougaloo College, came running in. He said he had just heard what was happening.

About ninety policemen were standing outside the store; they had been watching the whole thing through the windows, but had not come in to stop the mob or do anything. President Beittel went outside and asked Captain Ray to come and escort us out. The captain refused, stating the manager had to invite him in before he could enter the premises, so Dr. Beittel himself brought us out. He had told the police that they had better protect us after we were outside the store. When we got outside, the policemen formed a single line that blocked the mob from us. However, they were allowed to throw at us everything they had collected. Within ten minutes, we were picked up by Reverend King in his station wagon and taken to the NAACP headquarters on Lynch Street.

After the sit-in, all I could think of was how sick Mississippi whites were. They believed so much in the segregated Southern way of life, they would kill to preserve it. I sat there in the NAACP office and thought of how many times they had killed when this way of life was threatened. I knew that the killing had just begun. "Many more will die before it is over with," I thought. Before the sit-in, I had always hated the whites in Mississippi. Now I knew it was impossible for me to hate sickness. The whites had a disease, an incurable disease in its final stage. What were our chances against such a disease? I thought of the students, the young Negroes who had just begun to protest, as young interns. When these young interns got older, I thought, they would be the best doctors in the world for social problems...

5. Malcolm X Explores the Philosophy of Black Nationalism, 1964

... I'm not a politician, not even a student of politics; in fact, I'm not a student of much of anything. I'm not a Democrat, I'm not a Republican, and I don't even consider myself an American. If you and I were Americans, there'd be no problem. Those Hunkies that just got off the boat, they're already Americans; Polacks are already Americans; the Italian refugees are already Americans. Everything that came out of Europe, every blue-eyed thing, is already an American. And as long as you and I have been over here, we aren't Americans yet.

Well, I am one who doesn't believe in deluding myself. I'm not going to sit at your table and watch you eat, with nothing on my plate, and call myself a diner. Sitting at the table doesn't make you a diner, unless you eat some of what's on that plate. Being here in America doesn't make you an American. Being born here in America doesn't make you an American. Why, if birth made you American, you wouldn't need any legislation, you wouldn't need any amendments to the Constitution, you wouldn't be faced with civil-rights filibustering in Washington, D.C., right now. They don't have to pass civil-rights legislation to make a Polack an American.

No, I'm not an American. I'm one of the 22 million black people who are the victims of Americanism. One of the 22 million black people who are the victims of democracy, nothing but disguised hypocrisy. So, I'm not standing

here speaking to you as an American, or a patriot, or a flag-saluter, or a flag-waver—no, not I. I'm speaking as a victim of this American system. And I see America through the eyes of the victim. I don't see any American dream; I see an American nightmare....

... Our mothers and fathers invested sweat and blood. Three hundred and ten years we worked in this country without a dime in return—I mean without a *dime* in return. You let the white man walk around here talking about how rich this country is, but you never stop to think how it got rich so quick. It got rich because you made it rich.

You take the people who are in this audience right now. They're poor, we're all poor as individuals. Our weekly salary individually amounts to hardly anything. But if you take the salary of everyone in here collectively it'll fill up a whole lot of baskets. It's a lot of wealth. If you can collect the wages of just these people right here for a year, you'll be rich—richer than rich. When you look at it like that, think how rich Uncle Sam had to become, not with this handful, but millions of black people. Your and my mother and father, who didn't work an eight-hour shift, but worked from "can't see" in the morning until "can't see" at night, and worked for nothing, making the white man rich, making Uncle Sam rich.

This is our investment. This is our contribution—our blood. Not only did we give of our free labor, we gave of our blood. Every time he had a call to arms, we were the first ones in uniform. We died on every battlefield the white man had. We have made a greater sacrifice than anybody who's standing up in America today. We have made a greater contribution and have collected less. Civil rights, for those of us whose philosophy is black nationalism, means: "Give it to us now. Don't wait for next year. Give it to us yesterday, and that's not fast enough." ...

The political philosophy of black nationalism means that the black man should control the politics and the politicians in his own community; no more. The black man in the black community has to be re-educated into the science of politics so he will know what politics is supposed to bring him in return. Don't be throwing out any ballots. A ballot is like a bullet. You don't throw your ballots until you see a target, and if that target is not within your reach, keep your ballot in your pocket. The political philosophy of black nationalism is being taught in the Christian church. It's being taught in the NAACP. It's being taught in CORE meetings. It's being taught in SNCC [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] meetings. It's being taught in Muslim meetings. It's being taught where nothing but atheists and agnostics come together. It's being taught everywhere. Black people are fed up with the dillydallying, pussyfooting, compromising approach that we've been using toward getting our freedom. We want freedom *now*, but we're not going to get it saying "We Shall Overcome." We've got to fight until we overcome.

The economic philosophy of black nationalism is pure and simple. It only means that we should control the economy of our community. Why should white people be running all the stores in our community? Why should white people be running the banks of our community? Why should the economy of our community be in the hands of the white man? Why? If a black man can't move his store into a white community, you tell me why a white man should move his store into a black community. The philosophy of black nationalism involves a re-education program

in the black community in regards to economics. Our people have to be made to see that any time you take your dollar out of your community and spend it in a community where you don't live, the community where you live will get poorer and poorer, and the community where you spend your money will get richer and richer. Then you wonder why where you live is always a ghetto or a slum area. And where you and I are concerned, not only do we lose it when we spend it out of the community, but the white man has got all our stores in the community tied up; so that though we spend it in the community, at sundown the man who runs the store takes it over across town somewhere. He's got us in a vise....

The social philosophy of black nationalism only means that we have to get together and remove the evils, the vices, alcoholism, drug addiction, and other evils that are destroying the moral fiber of our community. We ourselves have to lift the level of our community, the standard of our community to a higher level, make our own society beautiful so that we will be satisfied in our own social circles and won't be running around here trying to knock our way into a social circle where we're not wanted.

So I say, in spreading a gospel such as black nationalism, it is not designed to make the black man re-evaluate the white man—you know him already—but to make the black man re-evaluate himself. Don't change the white man's mind—you can't change his mind, and that whole thing about appealing to the moral conscience of America—America's conscience is bankrupt. She lost all conscience a long time ago. Uncle Sam has no conscience. They don't know what morals are. They don't try and eliminate an evil because it's evil, or because it's illegal, or because it's immoral; they eliminate it only when it threatens their existence. So you're wasting your time appealing to the moral conscience of a bankrupt man like Uncle Sam. If he had a conscience, he'd straighten this thing out with no more pressure being put upon him. So it is not necessary to change the white man's mind. We have to change our own mind. You can't change his mind about us. We've got to change our own minds about each other. We have to see each other with new eyes. We have to see each other as brothers and sisters. We have to come together with warmth so we can develop unity and harmony that's necessary to get this problem solved ourselves....

6. The Black Panther Party Explains Its Goals and Beliefs, 1966

What We Want

What We Believe

1. *We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.*

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. *We want full employment for our people.*

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. *We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black Community.*

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment as currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over twenty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. *We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.*

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. *We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.*

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. *We want all black men to be exempt from military service.*

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. *We want an immediate end to **police brutality** and **murder** of black people.*

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self defense.

8. *We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.*

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. *We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.*

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group.

A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. *We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.*

When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariable the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

✦ ESSAYS

The essays that follow challenge the classic textbook history of the Civil Rights Movement, which focuses on the years 1954–1968, on the South, on the role of charismatic leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr., on national organizations such as the NAACP, and on the struggle in the courts and halls of Congress. But as the essays by Charles M. Payne and Thomas J. Sugrue argue, the Civil Rights Movement was both larger and more complicated than this simple model might suggest. Payne's essay, based in part on his award-winning book *I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle* (1995), places the Civil Rights Movement within a long tradition of black resistance and protest, emphasizing the important roles played by local communities and less widely heralded grassroots leaders. In the second essay, drawn from his prize-winning study of race and inequality in postwar Detroit, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis* (1996), Sugrue shifts the focus to deeply rooted struggles over jobs, schools, and housing in the industrial North, a focus that helps explain the limits of conventional civil rights politics and the growing anger and frustration of many African Americans, as well as the white backlash on which George Wallace and Richard Nixon would base their political strategies.

The View from the Trenches

CHARLES M. PAYNE

Brown was more than a legal battle. It was one element in a decades-long struggle for equity in education, a struggle that required Blacks in local communities across the South to expose themselves to physical violence and economic repression. In 1947 the Blacks of Clarendon County, South Carolina, for example, decided to ask the school superintendent for a bus for their children. In a pattern that would be repeated many times—Blacks ask for small adjustments in the system, the authorities refuse, Blacks then make more radical demands—the superintendent refused, and the Black community decided to launch a fight for the complete equalization of schools. The leaders of the Clarendon County movement expected trouble; you could not attack white supremacy in South Carolina and not expect trouble. They had not, however, fully considered the number of weapons the system could bring to bear. The man they chose to lead them was a Methodist minister, J. A. Delaine, and he caught nearly the full weight of the repression. In his history of *Brown*, Richard Kluger says of Delaine:

Before it was over, they fired him from the little schoolhouse at which he had taught devotedly for ten years. And they fired his wife and two of his sisters and a niece. And they threatened him with bodily harm.

And they sued him on trumped up charges and convicted him in a kangaroo court and left with a judgement that denied him credit from any bank. And they burned his house to the ground while the fire department stood around watching the flames consume the night. And they stoned the church at which he pastored. And fired shotguns at him out of the dark. But he was not Job, and so he fired back and called the police, who did not come and kept not coming. Then he fled, driving north at eighty-five miles an hour over country roads, until he was across the state line. Soon after, they burned his church to the ground and charged him, for having shot back that night, with felonious assault with a deadly weapon, and so he became an official fugitive from justice.

Similar stories were being repeated across the South between the mid-1940s and the late 1950s. In the wake of World War II, Black activists were more aggressive, to which the white South responded with a wave of repression. Not all of those who got caught by it were men. Like Delaine, Septima Clark lost her career because of her social activism. Born around the turn of the century, the daughter of a cook and a washerwoman, Clark became a schoolteacher in the area around Charleston, South Carolina. After World War I, she became involved in a fight to get Black teachers and principals hired in Charleston. Following years brought other battles—to equalize pay between white and Black teachers, to get more funding for Black schools and a longer school year. By the mid-1950s, she was deeply involved in the state branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) when the state declared the organization subversive and forbade any state or city employee to be a member. Clark refused to deny her membership and was immediately fired.

Fortunately, the year before, she had begun attending classes at the Highlander Folk School in Tennessee. Started during the Depression, Highlander was among the most unique institutions in the South. One of its founders was Myles Horton, who had grown up in a family of poor white Tennessee sharecroppers. He saw Highlander as a school for the poor of Appalachia, a school where the curriculum was essentially about activism, a place where coal miners, steel workers, mill workers, and others could come to learn how to organize. From its inception, it was also a place concerned with attacking white supremacy, a place where civil rights workers could find training and support. Few significant southern civil rights activists in the 1940s and 1950s did not have some contact with Highlander. It was at Highlander that “We Shall Overcome” was introduced to the movement. No matter what people came there for, Highlander insisted—in contradiction to Tennessee law and southern custom—on interracial living, a philosophy that initially discomfited Black visitors just as much as white ones. Visitor after visitor testified that the experience of egalitarian living in an interracial situation had greater impact on them than the courses and workshops.

Already an experienced activist when she first came to Highlander, Clark found the school a supportive, stimulating environment. She started bringing

friends to workshops there and then running workshops herself. When she was fired, Highlander made her its director of education, a position from which she was able to refine Highlander's distinctive style of work. Highlander was founded on a philosophy of struggle that was an alternative to the legal gradualism of the NAACP, on the one hand, or to Dr. Martin Luther King's charisma, on the other. Rather, Highlander espoused a form of participatory democracy. Its statement of purpose, drafted by Clark, speaks of "broadening the scope of democracy to include everyone and deepening the concept to include every relationship." In practical terms, that meant that Highlander wanted to identify and groom leadership at the local level, not just provide it from the outside.

Nothing better illustrates the Highlander style than the Citizenship Schools that Clark developed. She had only been on staff a few months when one of her old students came to her for help. He had just lost an election for school board on Johns Island, one of the Sea Islands opposite Charleston. Blacks made up a large majority of the population, but only a few were able to navigate through the various obstacles the state used to prevent Blacks from voting. This situation was all the more complicated because most Black adults could neither read nor write. Clark, whose first teaching job had been on Johns, developed a program for teaching adults to read and write and then to register, which entailed being able to interpret a section of the state constitution to the satisfaction of the local registrar.

The first class, the existence of which was carefully hidden from whites on the island, had fourteen students, eleven of whom were able to register. From those modest beginnings, the Citizenship Schools grew into one of the most important civil rights initiatives of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Nearly ten thousand people would be trained as teachers and as many as two hundred schools would be in operation at one time "in people's kitchens, in beauty parlors and under trees in the summertime." Across the South, Citizenship Schools and teachers provided much of the on-ground leadership for other civil rights organizations.

This was very much in keeping with how Septima Clark saw the schools. Voting was not, for her, so much an end in itself as it was an organizing device. "The basic purpose of the Citizenship Schools," she wrote, "is discovering local community leaders.... It is my belief that creative leadership is present in any community and only awaits discovery and development." For some in the movement, finding and grooming leadership, transforming individuals, was as important as winning legislative victories, perhaps more so in the long run. Political victories are transitory; the powers that be can grant them today and withdraw them tomorrow unless the movement has created people who are always capable of fighting for themselves. Ella Baker certainly thought so. For her, the movement could not be something in which a few big leaders were going to lead the singing masses to freedom. People, she thought, had to learn to lead themselves.

My basic sense of it has always been to get people to understand that in the long run they themselves are the only protection they have against

violence or injustice.... People have to be made to understand that they cannot look for salvation anywhere but to themselves.

If one thinks of the movement that way, powerful oratory and big demonstrations may not be important, may even be counterproductive, unless they contribute to the goal of developing a broad leadership base. She was no fan of centralized, charismatic leadership precisely because of its antidemocratic tendencies.

I have always felt it was a handicap for oppressed people to depend so largely on a leader, because unfortunately in our culture, the charismatic leader usually becomes a leader because he has found a spot in the public limelight. It usually means that the media made him, and the media may undo him.

What we need, she argued, is people “who are interested not in being leaders as much as in developing leadership in others.” If you can give them the light, people can find their own way. That meant you could not just lead people to change. They had to be a part of the work themselves. She would have agreed emphatically with what James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) said about the need

to involve the people themselves, individually, personally, in the struggle for their own freedom. Not simply because it was clear that no one else was going to confer liberty upon them, but because in the very act of working for the impersonal cause of racial freedom, a man experiences, almost like grace, a large measure of private freedom. Or call it a new comprehension of his own identity, an intuition of the expanding boundaries of his self, which, if not the same thing as freedom, is its radical source.

Baker came into the 1960s with more than three decades of activist experience. A product of rural North Carolina, by the Depression she was in Harlem teaching Black history and organizing domestic workers, economic cooperatives, and adult education programs. In one job application, she noted that she had maintained at least a speaking acquaintance with the leaders of “the articulate mass and semi-mass movements” in the area. The application was for a position with the NAACP, the most important civil rights organization of the period. From 1941, she was an assistant field secretary, which meant spending half the year traveling through the South, organizing new branches and advising established ones. That eventually led to a position as national director of branches, a position she held during the organization’s most dynamic period of growth.

She brought her distinctive philosophy to the position, which meant she had her misgivings about the organization for which she was working. The NAACP, she thought, was overly committed to a legal strategy that left most of its membership—four hundred thousand by 1944—little meaningful role in the development of policy and program. Like many of the leaders with whom she had worked in the Deep South, she was increasingly impatient with the

organization's conservatism. The leadership was putting too much energy into worrying about how much recognition they were getting from important white people, a concern that helped prevent the organization from taking a confrontational stance even when that would have made tactical sense. The program was overly middle-class, not strong enough on the kinds of economic issues that meant most to working-class Black people. Perhaps above all, she found the organization too centralized; too many decisions were being made in New York. The annual conventions were carefully staged exercises in pseudodemocracy. The national staff was really calling the shots.

She wanted to use her position as director of branches to open the organization up somewhat. She tried to have more decisions made in the branches rather than in New York, and she was able to establish a training program for local leaders. By 1946, she decided that democratizing the NAACP was beyond even her considerable talents, and she resigned, working for a variety of causes over the next decade.

When the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was founded in 1957, it actually represented an alliance across generations of activists. The face that the public saw was that of the Reverend King, but in fact he was twenty-eight years old and politically inexperienced. A cadre of older activists formed around him to give him support, including Bayard Rustin, a longtime labor, peace, and civil rights activist, and Stanley Levison, a Jewish lawyer with much experience in left and radical causes. They were able to talk Ella Baker into going south once more where she eventually became the SCLC's first full-time executive director. She was the ideal choice for a fledgling organization in that she had such extensive networks among southern activists. On the other hand, she was an outspoken woman in an organization that did not expect or appreciate that attitude from women; she was suspicious of charismatic leadership in an organization that was built on it, was impatient with ministerial conservatism, and did not personally believe in the nonviolence the organization was espousing. Her years at SCLC were tense, but when the sit-ins erupted in 1960, she was in a position to help channel that energy into an organization that became a model for American activists of all types.

During the 1940s, when Baker was bemoaning the conservatism of the NAACP, one of the most significant alternatives to it was provided by A. Philip Randolph. Formerly the editor of an important African-American socialist magazine, in 1925 he organized the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the most important Black union of its day. The presidency of the union gave him a pulpit from which he gave eloquent voice to the concerns of Black workers for four decades. As befits a man with union roots, he was not much given to the moral suasion and legal gradualism in which the NAACP specialized. His style was to threaten, to embarrass, to put the masses into the street. When it became clear that World War II defense industries were excluding Blacks, Randolph, to the dismay of more timid Black leadership, threatened to march a hundred thousand protesting Negroes on Washington unless President Franklin D. Roosevelt did something. He was criticized for keeping the March on Washington Movement all-Black, but he was adamant about that. "You take ten thousand dollars from a

white man," he said, "you've got his ten thousand dollars but he's got your movement." His thinking also echoed Ella Baker's in how it balanced concern for immediate tactical objectives with concern for larger questions about how the race was developing. In order for a people to develop, they had to fight for their own causes, not have friends do their fighting for them. Sympathetic whites could best help through their own organizations (a position the Black Panthers would revive a quarter-century later).

After the war, Randolph played a role in President Harry Truman's decision to desegregate the armed forces. In 1948, amid cries of treason, Randolph promised that if the services were not desegregated, he would lead a campaign of massive civil disobedience modeled after Gandhi's approach, and he pledged to "openly counsel, aid and abet youth, both white and Negro, to quarantine any jimcrow conscription system." Randolph pushed Truman so that in one meeting the president virtually threw him out of his office. Much established Black leadership, including the NAACP, thought Randolph had gone too far, but 70 percent of young Black men polled in Harlem agreed with Randolph.

In terms of brass, at least, Birmingham's Fred Shuttlesworth was a worthy match for Randolph. In its attempt to harass the NAACP, Alabama went South Carolina one better. South Carolina merely decided that public employees could not be members of the NAACP; in 1956, Alabama declared the organization illegal. NAACP members immediately reconstituted themselves as the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR), which proceeded to give white Alabama even more trouble than had the NAACP. While the NAACP restricted itself mostly to filing lawsuits, the ACMHR, with Shuttlesworth as president, was willing to engage in boycotts, pickets, and demonstrations. When the Supreme Court decided, in December 1956, that bus segregation in Montgomery was unconstitutional, the ACMHR decided to protest Birmingham's segregated buses. Black people had nicknamed Birmingham "Bombingham" and for very good reason. The night before the protest was to begin, the Shuttlesworth home was bombed, injuring a visiting deacon and two of the Shuttlesworth children, though Shuttlesworth himself was untouched. "I wasn't saved to run," he announced.

That kind of hard-headed determination frightened more traditional Black leaders, but it also inspired some people. Shuttlesworth got death threats constantly, the police harassed him in every way they could, including wiretaps, and both the police and the Ku Klux Klan (in Birmingham, it was hard to tell the two apart) harassed his followers. In 1957, in the wake of the Little Rock Crisis, Shuttlesworth was leading four Black youngsters, including two of his own children, to register at the white high school when he was attacked by a mob and beaten with brass knuckles and bicycle chains. His wife was stabbed. The following spring, there was another attempt to bomb his church. Nonetheless, for the rest of the decade, Shuttlesworth and his followers attacked white supremacy in Birmingham—pushing the city to hire Black police officers, open parks and libraries to Negroes, desegregate its schools, and allow Blacks to vote.

That Shuttlesworth survived the 1950s is a small miracle. Others were less fortunate. Harry T. Moore of Mims, Florida, was a schoolteacher, often

described as a shy man. Nonetheless, he was staunch enough in his politics. The work that he was known for and that had propelled him to the presidency of the state NAACP was his persistent agitation for the equalization of the educational resources given to Black and white youngsters. In 1951, he campaigned for the prosecution of a sheriff who had shot two Negro youths, killing one. Shortly after he and his wife had retired on Christmas Eve that year, a bomb destroyed their bedroom. He died immediately and his wife a few days later.

In the prewar years, southern Blacks typically laid low after a racial killing. It was a sign of changing times that Blacks from across the state packed his funeral, paying homage to a man who was for them the kind of symbol of persistence and integrity that Medgar Evers would become for Blacks in Mississippi. The Black press saw another sign of change in the fact that the murder was one of a wave of bombings across the South in the early 1950s. The fact that the most dangerous defenders of racism were hiding behind bombs in the night rather than rallying lynch mobs in the open suggested that killers saw a need to be more cautious. It was a measure of progress, however grim.

When Americans speak of the "civil rights movement," they are unlikely to be thinking of Harry T. Moore or A. Philip Randolph, Septima Clark, Ella Baker, J. A. Delaine, ... or Fred Shuttlesworth. They and the struggles they represent are not a part of American history as it is normally taught, with its streamlined, homogenized version of the movement. Saying that most Americans have been raised on a whitewashed version of movement history is more than a bad pun.

What difference does it make if we leave people like this out? At the very least, it means that we lose touch with the complexity of the historical process. All kinds of people are important to this history—Appalachian whites, Black professionals from quite privileged backgrounds, quasi socialists, radical democrats, church-based activists, advocates of self-defense for Black people, advocates of racial separatism, people as concerned with human development as with legislative victories, people who saw education, the need for self-affirmation, access to jobs, and access to the political system as intertwined. It is not a history that can be comprehended in terms of a couple of dominant figures or any one form of politics, and it is not at all clear that it can be well understood in terms of "civil rights." ...

By way of example of illustrating a less sophisticated top-down approach, we can look at how the Montgomery bus boycott, perhaps our most familiar origin myth about the movement, is normally presented. What we are usually told is that a tired woman refused to give up her seat on the bus and an eloquent, nonviolent prophet rose up to lead the grateful masses, and the Supreme Court eventually saw the justness of their cause. That rendering hides more than it reveals.

For one thing, the traditional story obscures the fact that the people who made the boycott happen had long activist backgrounds, including the venerable E. D. Nixon, a pullman porter with a sixth-grade education, in his mid-fifties at the time of the boycott and probably the most influential Black man in town, at least in the eyes of the Black masses. Nixon had organized the state branch of the

Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters in 1928. He attributed much of what he had learned about organizing to A. Philip Randolph, the founder of the Brotherhood. In the 1930s Nixon, along with Myles Horton at Highlander, tried to organize Alabama farm laborers, and he organized a committee to make sure that Alabama Blacks got their fair share of benefits from federal programs. In 1940, he helped organize the Montgomery Voters League; in 1944, he led a march of 750 people on the registrar's office; from 1939 to 1951, he headed the Montgomery NAACP; and from 1951 to 1953, the state conference.

The portrait of Rosa Parks as some simple woman who accidentally got caught up in great historical events is a complete distortion. She had spent her adult life looking for a way to make a difference. In 1943, she joined the NAACP under Nixon, became its secretary, and worked in voter registration campaigns; she first registered herself in 1945. She also ran the local NAACP Youth Council and served as secretary to the state NAACP Conference of Branches. She had attended one of Ella Baker's Leadership Training Conferences in the 1940s and had spent a week at the Highlander Folk School in 1955. From the 1940s on, she had refused on several occasions to comply with bus segregation laws, frequently enough that some bus drivers recognized her on sight and simply refused to stop for her. King's comment about her—"She was tracked down by the *Zeitgeist*—the spirit of the times"—is precisely wrong. She, like Nixon, had spent much of her adult life actively seeking levers of change, not waiting until the times were right.

Jo Ann Robinson was an English professor at nearby Alabama State College and president of the Women's Political Caucus, a group of three hundred educated Black women who had been concerned with voter registration and segregated public facilities since 1946. They had been agitating the city commission about segregated buses since the early 1950s and in May 1954 had sent a letter to the mayor threatening a boycott if improvements were not made. Between the spring of 1955 and the time of the Parks arrest in December, Nixon and the caucus had considered three bus incidents as potential test cases but decided against them on various tactical grounds. The Parks incident gave them the case they wanted.

Nixon and Robinson's group were largely responsible for the initial mobilization of Black Montgomery. Parks was arrested on a Thursday; Nixon started organizing the first meeting of Negro leadership on Friday; by Monday they had organized a boycott that was nearly completely effective among a community of over forty thousand people. That they could mobilize the Black community so thoroughly, so quickly, is a reflection of how well people such as Nixon and Robinson knew their community, knowledge acquired through long years of working in it. When Nixon called the first nineteen ministers, he had to have been making some calculations about which individuals had to be involved to carry the whole of Black Montgomery with them. That knowledge was the product of three decades of meetings, demonstrations, barbershop arguments, and beauty parlor conversations.

What does the background information, even in this sketchy form, add to our understanding of the movement? Potentially, it broadens our conception of

leadership, ranging from a woman with a college education to a man whose real education came from union organizing. It leaves an impression of women as thinking, determined activists. It restores a sense of human agency, suggesting, as one scholar put it, "that reflective and purposeful people matter." Montgomery happened because many people worked to make it happen. When we take the high drama of moments such as the boycott out of the longer historical context, we implicitly undervalue the more mundane activities, the sheer persistence that helped make the dramatic breakthroughs possible.

Knowing even a little of the larger story also suggests something about how we might think about King's leadership. In some top-down treatments, of course, King comes to be almost equated with the movement.... In fact, what we see in Montgomery was that King was the inheritor of momentum that other people established, a pattern that was to be repeated often over the next several years. Other people constructed the stage, but once he stepped into the role of movement spokesperson, his charisma, broad appeal, and personal growth allowed him to project the message of the movement in ways that virtually no one could have predicted in 1956....

... [A] case can be made that the way in which Martin Luther King is remembered—or disremembered, if you will—contributes to a dumbing down of the discussion. The King of popular memory is the King of August 1963, calling the peaceful throng to the ideal of brotherhood. That memory hardly does justice to the mature King. In the final years of his life, he articulated a more challenging vision of the American future and a more pessimistic assessment of America's capacity for achieving it. Thus, in those years, he was constantly at odds with the press, the White House, and much of the liberal establishment.

There was no way he could have avoided getting caught up in the Black power turmoil. The term derived much of its impact from the fact that it made white people uneasy, to understate the matter. King went to great lengths to explain it in less threatening ways, but he also refused to disavow the young people, many of whom he had worked with for years, who kept shoving the term in the nation's face. Other leaders of older civil rights organizations felt they had to distance themselves from the new radicalism, at least in part because they were worried about the loss of white support. King refused to join the general condemnation. He came to feel that some whites were exploiting the Black power controversy, using it as an excuse not to think about correcting social injustice. This was a part of King's growing disenchantment with liberal America. Too many who styled themselves liberal were only concerned with the problem when they could think of it as a southern problem, not as something in their own backyards. Too many could react supportively when racist violence was being directed against Negroes but were not much concerned with racial inequality as an evil in and of itself, could not see that poverty itself was violence, that the ghetto represented institutionalized violence against its inhabitants.

In his last years, King showed considerable capacity for sticking with what he saw as the principled position even when it was clearly costing him support. He was publically opposed to the Vietnam War when most of the country still

supported it. With few exceptions, his advisers encouraged him to downplay his opposition. King did just the opposite; his criticism grew more caustic. On April 4, 1967, a year before his death, he gave a speech at Riverside Church in New York that did not equivocate.

We must stop now. I speak as a child of God and brother to the suffering poor of Vietnam. I speak for those whose land is being laid waste, whose homes are being destroyed, whose culture is being subverted. I speak for the poor of America who are paying the double price of smashed hopes at home and death and corruption in Vietnam. I speak as a citizen of the world.... The great initiative in this war has been ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours.

The national press spent the next week castigating him. The *New York Times* warned that “to divert the energies of the civil rights movement to the Vietnam issue is both wasteful and self-defeating.” The *Washington Post* concluded that he “has diminished his usefulness to his cause, to his country and to his people.” The *Chicago Tribune* warned Negroes that if they wanted to continue to make progress, “they had better get responsible leadership and repudiate the Kings and the Carmichaels.” These remarks pretty well reflect the tone of national press coverage of King in his last year.

His criticism of the Vietnam adventure caused a further deterioration of his relationship with the White House. His relationship with the FBI was already about as bad as it could get. The bureau—which had labeled the “I Have a Dream” speech “demagogic”—had long been engaged in a campaign to destroy King, taking every opportunity to feed rumors and negative information about him to opinion leaders here and abroad, even trying at one point to trick him into committing suicide. J. Edgar Hoover publicly called King “the most notorious liar in America” and privately called him “the burrhead.”

King’s growing radicalism meant increasing skepticism about whether the nation’s conscience could be reached on economic matters, that he put increasing emphasis on racism as a national problem, not a regional one, and as a problem closely tied to economic exploitation. It meant that he increasingly described problems of inequality in structural terms, not in terms of individual prejudice.

If we look honestly at the realities of our national life, it is clear that we are not marching forward: we are groping and stumbling; we are divided and confused. Our moral values and our spiritual confidence sink, even as our material wealth ascends. In these trying circumstances, the black revolution is much more than a struggle for the rights of Negroes. It is forcing America to face all its interrelated flaws of racism, poverty, militarism and materialism. It is exposing evils that are deeply rooted in the whole structure of our society. It reveals systemic rather than superficial flaws and suggests that radical reconstruction of society itself is the real issue to be faced.

... The way we “remember” King ... is, of course, only illustrative of the way we remember the larger movement. We tend to construct our memories in ways

that make us feel good but that also obscure much of what the movement was trying to say. In 1998, for example, David Halberstram, who covered the movement as a journalist, wrote an admiring essay about the courage and the impact of the early sit-in participants:

Consider what they did. When they had started out, they were virtually alone. Only the Supreme Court ... seemed sympathetic.... Yet only five years later both parties in the Congress were competing to pass legislation trying to outlaw voting injustices; the Justice Department had become their activist partner; the FBI, however reluctantly, had come aboard; and the President of the United States, Lyndon Johnson, was their principal convert.... What they had accomplished in that brief time span still strikes me as a shining example of democracy at work.

There are arguable interpretations here, to be mild about it, but that's not the most important issue. The problem is that the thinking here is a perspective, just one possible perspective on the movement but one that few Americans are likely to recognize as such. From another perspective, we could emphasize another set of "facts" in summation of the movement—the many innocent lives, lives of some of the least privileged of Americans, that had to be sacrificed to make the Justice Department "activist"; the way federal agencies "came aboard" partly to control the movement; the way in which Black radicalism made civil rights legislation seem like a cheap way out; the fact that many of the young people who gave the movement so much of its dynamism think that what they experienced was not some shining example of democracy but the betrayal of it. The more one appreciates the price of a small number of people paid to liberate us from our past, the less miraculous the whole thing seems. Depending on how it is framed, even stressing the courage and idealism of the young people can be a dangerous game. The youngsters developed a series of powerful questions about how this society generates and sustains inequality. We praise their courage while ignoring their questions. In that context, "Our civil rights activists sure were brave" may serve the same ideological function for this generation that "Our nigras are happy" served for another, a way of denying the need for discussion of underlying problems.

Both the movement's achievements and its shortcomings can be taken out of context. If some seem prone to romanticizing the accomplishments of the movement, others, including some Black youth, seem to think the movement accomplished little or nothing, that racism is unchanged from what it used to be. In part, this thinking may reflect how little contemporary youngsters understand just what racism used to be. In part, it may be that some of them are proceeding from a Hollywoodesque version of historical change, where all problems have to be resolved by the last scene. Thinking about history in that way stands in sharp contrast to the way many movement veterans thought about it. They understood their lives as chapters in an ongoing struggle. Ella Baker, who had organized Black history programs in the 1920s and was organizing against South African apartheid in the 1970s, was asked once how she had kept at it so long. She answered in terms that reflected one enduring vision of the movement:

But if people begin to place their values in terms of how high they get in the political world, or how much worldly goods they accumulate, or what kind of cars they have, or how much they have in the bank, that's where I begin to lose respect. To me, I'm part of the human family. What the human family will accomplish, I can't control. But it isn't impossible that what those who came along with me went through might stimulate others to continue to fight for a society that does not have those kinds of problems. Somewhere down the line the numbers increase, the tribe increases. So how do you keep on? I can't help it. I don't claim to have any corner on an answer, but I believe the struggle is eternal. Somebody else carries on.

The Continuing Racial Crisis

THOMAS J. SUGRUE

In late July 1967, one of the most brutal riots in American history swept through Detroit. On July 23, 1967, in the middle of a summer heat wave, the police decided to bust a "blind pig," an illegal after-hours saloon on Twelfth Street in the center of one of Detroit's largest black neighborhoods. Arrests for illegal drinking were common in Detroit, but usually the police dispersed the crowd and arrested a handful of owners and patrons, taking the names of the remainder. On the steamy July night, they decided to arrest all eighty-five people present and detained them—hot, drunk, and angry—outside the saloon until reinforcements could arrive.

By four in the morning, an hour after the bust, nearly two hundred people, attracted by the commotion behind the blind pig, had gathered to watch the proceedings. As the arrestees shouted allegations of police brutality, tempers rose. The crowd began to jeer and to throw bottles, beer cans, and rocks at the police. William Scott II, a son of one of the bar's owners, threw a bottle at a police officer and shouted "Get your god damn sticks and bottles and start hurtin' baby." By 8:00 A.M., a crowd of over three thousand had gathered on Twelfth Street. The riot raged out of control until it was suppressed by a combined force of nearly seventeen thousand law enforcement officers, National Guardsmen, and federal troops. After five days of violence, forty-three people were dead, thirty of them killed by law enforcement personnel. Altogether 7,231 men and women were arrested on riot-related charges. The property damage, still visible in vacant lots and abandoned buildings in Detroit, was extensive. Rioters looted and burned 2,509 buildings. \$36 million in insured property was lost and undoubtedly millions more were lost by those without insurance, not to mention wages, income, and government costs.

Detroit was twice torn by cataclysmic violence in a period of less than twenty-five years. The extent of social and economic changes in the postwar

period, however, made the context of Detroit's long hot summer of 1967 profoundly different from the violent summer of 1943. The vast majority of participants in the 1967 Detroit uprising were black (with the exception of armed officials who were overwhelmingly white); 1943 had involved black and white participants in roughly equal proportions. The changed racial demography of 1967 was hardly surprising, for over a third of Detroit residents were black in 1967, and few whites lived anywhere near the riot's epicenters on Linwood and Twelfth Street on the West Side and on Mack and Kercheval on the East Side. The riot of 1943 came at a time of increasing black and white competition for jobs and housing; by 1967, discrimination and deindustrialization had ensured that blacks had lost the competition. White resistance and white flight left a bitter legacy that galvanized black protest in the 1960s. Detroit's attempts to take advantage of the largesse of the Great Society offered too little, too late for Detroit's poor, but raised expectations nonetheless. Growing resentment, fueled by increasing militancy in the black community, especially among youth, who had suffered the brunt of economic displacement, fueled the fires of 1967.

For those who cared to listen, there were rumblings of discontent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The problems of limited housing, racial animosity, and reduced economic opportunity for a segment of the black population in Detroit had led to embitterment. When sociologist John Leggett and his colleagues interviewed black Detroiters in 1957 and 1958, they found that many were seething with anger about their living and working conditions. When Leggett asked unemployed blacks to predict what would happen if there were another Great Depression, their answers were grimly prophetic. "There'd be widespread riots," answered one. "The young people won't take it," stated another. "They will steal. A lot of them steal now because they aren't working." A third also raised the issue of a youthful rebellion. "The younger generation won't take it; a lot of bad things would happen." "Oh Hot!" remarked another. "Everybody would get a ball bat and start swinging." Black youths, as Leggett's respondents knew, were increasingly alienated. They were most severely affected by the city's shrinking job market. Young people coming of age in Detroit in the mid- and late 1950s and 1960s faced a very different economic world from that of the previous generation. A black male in Detroit in 1945 or 1950 could realistically expect factory employment, even if his opportunities were seriously limited by discrimination. Blacks continued to suffer levels of unemployment disproportionate to those of Detroit residents in general, although labor force participation rates fluctuated with economic cycles. Still, even in the most flush of times, somewhere close to 10 percent of Detroit's black population was unemployed. Over the next three decades, with the exception of a cyclical boom in automobile employment in the mid- and late 1960s, few could rely on steady employment.

A survey of over three hundred young people in one of Detroit's most depressed inner-city neighborhoods in the early 1960s revealed the extent to which limited opportunities in Detroit's job market had narrowed the horizon of Detroit's young African Americans. Not a single respondent mentioned a career in "the broad middle range of occupations such as skilled trades, office,

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clerical, or technical occupations." The report noted that "replacing the whole middle range of occupations" in the "perceptual worlds" of the youth were a "whole range of deviant occupations—prostitution, numbers, malicing, corn whiskey, theft, etc." A growing number of young people turned to criminal activity, for "Under conditions where a gap in legitimate opportunity exists in the world, such deviant occupations grow up to fill the void. The motif is one of survival; it is not based on thrill seeking. What we call deviant occupations are in fact perceived to be common and in fact legitimate within the context of the culture in which these youths live." The situation changed little in the mid-1960s, even though the overall economy of Detroit improved. At the time of the 1967 riot, somewhere between 25 and 30 percent of young blacks (between ages eighteen and twenty-four) were out of work.

The combination of persistent discrimination in hiring, technological change, decentralized manufacturing, and urban economic decline had dramatic effects on the employment prospects of blacks in metropolitan Detroit. What was even more striking was the steady increase of adults who were wholly unattached to the urban labor market. Nearly one in five of all Detroit adults did not work at all or worked in the informal economy in 1950. The number grew steadily in the 1960s. The economic transformation of the city launched a process of deproletarianization, as growing numbers of African Americans, especially young men, joined the ranks of those who gave up on work. By 1980, nearly half of the adult male population had only tenuous connections to the city's formal labor market. The deproletarianization of the city's black population had far-reaching consequences: it shaped a pattern of poverty in the postwar city that was disturbingly new. Whereas in the past, most poor people had had some connection to the mainstream labor market, in the latter part of the twentieth century, the urban poor found themselves on the economic margins.

The deproletarianization of a growing number of Detroit's black workers was exacerbated by the persistent racial divide between blacks and whites in the metropolitan area. Detroit's blacks lacked the geographic mobility—common to other groups in other periods of American history—to adapt to the changing labor market. A visitor to Detroit in the 1960s would have found that despite the tremendous growth of Detroit's black population, the pattern of segregation in the metropolitan area remained intact. Throughout the postwar period whole neighborhoods lost their white populations as hundreds of thousands of white Detroiters fled to the burgeoning ring of suburbs that surrounded the city. Detroit's black population was mobile, but its movement was contained within sharply defined racial barriers.

Plant relocations, especially to rural areas and the South, severely limited the economic opportunities of Detroit's blacks. Detroit's waning industrial economy had less and less to offer them. But few black Detroiters in the 1960s had the option of following the exodus of employment; residential segregation and lack of resources kept most trapped in the city. In addition, the alternatives were hardly more appealing. Few considered moving to other major Rust Belt cities, whose economies, like Detroit's, were rapidly declining. And fewer had any desire to move to the small, overwhelmingly white Midwestern towns that

attracted much of the nonmetropolitan industrialization of the postwar era. Small numbers headed west, and beginning in the 1970s, some began to return to the South. But opportunities in Detroit were, for many, still better than in Alabama's Black Belt, the Mississippi Delta, or the coal mines of West Virginia. Many remembered the promise of the 1940s and early 1950s and clung to the reasonable expectations that Detroit's economy would pick up again. Hope about the city's future was one option available to the unemployed and jobless. But more and more black Detroiters responded with anger to the city's economic and racial crisis.

Beginning in the late 1950s, African American civil rights activists in the city, after a period of retrenchment, engaged in a renewed militancy. As part of the nationwide civil rights movement, black Detroiters founded new, insurgent organizations like the Trade Union Leadership Council and began to refashion the agenda of established groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In the early and mid-1960s, organized African American resistance to discrimination in work and housing accelerated. In 1963, nearly 250,000 blacks and whites, led by the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., marched through Detroit. Inspired by the successes of the civil rights movement in the South, African American activists in Detroit led boycotts against local stores and businesses that discriminated against blacks. And interracial liberals took the struggle for open housing in a new direction, turning their sights on Detroit's middle- and upper-class suburbs, including Birmingham and Livonia, and lobbying hard for state and federal legislation that would prohibit discriminatory real estate practices. In all these ways, 1960s-era Detroit witnessed the emergence of a revitalized civil rights movement.

But many civil rights activists grew impatient with the glacial pace of change in Detroit. Black power organizations burgeoned in Detroit in the 1960s, offering an alternative to the mainstream civil rights activism of the postwar years. Detroit was home to the Reverend Albert Cleage, founder of the nationalist Shrine of the Black Madonna and an early and outspoken advocate of black power. At the same time, a younger generation of African Americans, who watched entry-level jobs vanish and who chafed at ongoing discrimination in Detroit's factories, grew more militant on the shop floor, eschewing the consensus politics and integrationism of the UAW [United Auto Workers] for a new "revolutionary unionism." The black-led Revolutionary Union Movement (RUM) established footholds in Dodge and Chrysler plants, where whole departments remained devoid of African Americans, and where blacks remained underrepresented in local union offices.

The 1960s was a paradoxical time in Detroit. From the perspective of national politics, it seemed hopeful. The federal government enacted the most sweeping civil rights legislation since Reconstruction. At the same time, Detroit benefited tremendously from the expansion of federal urban spending during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In local politics, the balance of power also began to shift to the left, as Detroit's rapidly growing black populations gained electoral power. City politics remained stiffly polarized by the issues of race and housing, but as more blacks voted and were elected to office, they (and a small

but vocal segment of white liberals) broke the stranglehold of the white neighborhood associations on local politics. Mayor Albert Cobo's successor, Louis Miriani, ... recognized the power of blacks as a swing vote and tried, unsuccessfully, to accommodate both white neighborhood groups and blacks. His successor, Jerome Cavanagh, a little-known insurgent, won an upset victory in 1961 over Miriani. Cavanagh's election was almost accidental: he was supported by an unlikely alliance of African Americans and white neighborhood groups, both alienated (for different reasons) by Miriani's equivocal, middle-of-the-road position on race and housing.

Under Cavanagh, who astutely lobbied government officials for assistance, War on Poverty dollars flooded into Detroit. Detroit was second only to New York in the amount of federal dollars that it received in the 1960s. But officials channeled government assistance down familiar routes and established programs that did not fundamentally deviate from the limited agenda that social welfare, labor, and civil rights groups had set in the 1950s. By and large, War on Poverty programs embodied the conventional wisdom of mainstream economists and social welfare advocates, and focused on behavioral modification as the solution to poverty. The most far-reaching antipoverty programs targeted jobless youth. In 1962, Cavanagh established the Mayor's Committee on Community Action for Detroit Youth, and in 1963, the Michigan Employment Security Commissions established a special Detroit Metropolitan Youth Center. Both directed their energies largely toward black youth "deprived because of social, economic, cultural, or ... personal conditions." Government, it was argued, should play a role in the transformation of youth culture. The problem with such initiatives, as Thomas F. Jackson has argued in his seminal article on antipoverty policy in the 1960s, was that they "failed to eliminate income poverty or reduce income inequality [or] to increase the aggregate supply of jobs in urban and other labor markets." The education, job training, and youth programs that were at the heart of the War on Poverty in Detroit were built on the same premises and suffered many of the same limitations as the previous generation of ad hoc programs. None responded adequately to deindustrialization and discrimination.

Simultaneous with the organized protest of civil rights groups were spontaneous outbursts of violent resistance on the streets of Detroit. A growing segment of the black population, especially young people who had little attachment to civil rights and reform organizations, began to vent their discontent at shopkeepers and police officers, the only two groups of whites who regularly appeared in largely black neighborhoods. Protests surrounding the shooting of a black youth by an East Side shopkeeper in 1964, a "mini-riot" on the Lower East Side in 1966, and the massive 1967 riot were the symptoms of growing discontent among Detroit's black poor in the 1960s. Detroit's rioters were disproportionately young black men, the group most affected by racial and economic dislocations, and the most impatient with the slow pace of civil rights reforms.

Further complicating the situation in the postwar era were hardening white racial prejudices. Whites grew increasingly bitter at the failure of their efforts to contain the city's expanding black population. The city was racked with housing

protests throughout the mid-1960s, as mobile blacks continued to transgress the city's precarious racial boundaries. White neighborhood groups grew even more militant in their opposition to civil rights and open housing. In 1965, fresh off the Homeowners' Rights Ordinance campaign, white civic association advocate Thomas Poindexter revived the effort to abolish the Detroit Commission on Community Relations. The same year, twenty-five crosses burned throughout Detroit, including some in the Courville area, Lower West Side, and Wyoming Corridor, whose residents were involved in a last-ditch effort to stem racial transition. White Detroit groups pressured local politicians to oppose civil rights legislation. Their votes played a crucial role in the defeat of Michigan's Democratic governor, G. Mennen Williams, in 1966, and in the defeat of local referenda to raise taxes to pay for Detroit's increasingly African American public schools.

Most importantly, working- and lower middle-class whites continued to rally around racially conservative candidates. In 1968 and 1972, Detroit whites provided an impressive base of support for Alabama segregationist George C. Wallace as he forayed northward. The politician whose most famous declaration was "segregation now, segregation forever" found a receptive audience in one of the supposed bastions of liberal northern urban voters. Wallace's outspoken opposition to open housing, school integration, and the expansion of civil rights in the workplace resonated deeply with alienated white Detroiters. Wallace voters, to a far greater extent than supporters of other candidates, denounced racial integration and believed that the civil rights movement was moving too fast. Cheering crowds of thousands greeted Wallace when he appeared at Cobo Hall, the riverfront convention center. Like Wallace supporters elsewhere in the North, stalwart Democratic voters roared in applause when their candidate derided civil rights, "forced housing," welfare spending, urban crime, and big government. Wallace also tapped into the economic vulnerability of his blue-collar supporters. Pollsters found that Wallace voters were more pessimistic about the economy than the electorate at large. A UAW local in Flint, Michigan, endorsed Wallace, and Ford workers at the company's shrinking River Rouge plant supported him in a straw poll. Wallace's troubled campaign faltered in Detroit in 1968. But emboldened by the depth of grassroots support that he found in the Rust Belt, Wallace returned stronger than ever in 1972. He won the 1972 Michigan Democratic primary, sweeping every predominantly white ward in Detroit. Wallace found some of his most fervent support on Detroit's Northwest and Northeast sides, the final remaining bastions of homeowners' association activity in a city that was now over 45 percent African American. Following the lead of Wallace, Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew repudiated their party's moderate position on civil rights, wooed disaffected urban and southern white Democrats, and swept predominantly white precincts in Detroit in 1968 and 1972.

Racial cleavages also persisted in local politics. Whites provided the crucial margin of support to conservative Polish American mayoral candidate Roman Gibbs in 1969, who edged out his African American opponent Richard Austin. They rallied in support of Detroit's overwhelmingly white police force, including its paramilitary STRESS (Stop Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets) squad that was

regularly accused of brutality toward black suspects. Anti-integration sentiment came to a head when white Detroiters rebelled against the *Milliken v. Bradley* court decision that called for interdistrict busing to eliminate metropolitan-wide educational segregation. The combination of the riot and growing black political power gave urgency to white resistance, but opposition to school integration and support of white conservative candidates for public office was the logical extension of the white racial politics that had divided Detroit in the 1940s and 1950s.

As the invisible boundaries within Detroit frayed, whites continued to flee from the city.... Fleeing whites brought the politics of local defensiveness with them to the suburbs, and found protection behind the visible and governmentally defended municipal boundaries of suburbia. By 1980, metropolitan Detroit had eighty-six municipalities, forty-five townships, and eighty-nine school districts. It was far more difficult for African Americans to cross suburban lines than it was for them to move into white urban neighborhoods. But when a few intrepid blacks tried to move into communities like Redford, Wayne, and Warren, they faced attacks and hostility like those that had plagued them in the city. Window breakings, arson, and threats largely prevented blacks from joining the ranks of working-class suburbanites. Whites also fiercely battled the Department of Housing and Urban Development's attempt to mandate the construction of integrated low-income housing in all-white suburbs.

More importantly, the grassroots racial politics that had dominated Detroit since the 1940s took deep root in suburbia. As the auto industry continued to reduce its Detroit labor force and shut down Detroit-area plants in the 1970s and 1980s, blue-collar suburbanites turned their anger against government-sponsored programs for African Americans, particularly affirmative action. Macomb County, the refuge for so many white East Side residents who fled black movement into their neighborhoods, became a bellwether for the troubled Democratic party in the 1970s and 1980s. Like whites still living in the city of Detroit, Macomb residents overwhelmingly supported Wallace in 1972. And in the 1980s, Macomb County became a bastion of "Reagan Democrats," angry antiliberal white voters who repudiated the party of Franklin D. Roosevelt for the Republican Party. Macomb was combed by pollsters and pundits alike who sought to explain why its Catholic, blue-collar workers had abandoned the New Deal for the New Rights.

The virulence of the white backlash of the 1970s and 1980s seems to lend support to the thesis of many recent commentators that the Democratic party made a grievous political error in the 1960s by ignoring the needs of white, working-class and middle-class voters in favor of the demands of the civil rights movement, black militants, the counterculture, and the "undeserving" poor. "The close identification of the Democratic party with the cause of racial justice," argues Allen Matusow, "did it special injury." Jonathan Rieder contends that the 1960s rebellion of the "silent majority" was in part a response to "certain structural limitations of liberal reform," especially "black demands" that "ran up against the limits of liberalism." Wallace's meteoric rise seems to sustain Thomas and Mary Edsall's argument that the Alabama independent "captured the central political dilemma of racial liberalism and the Democratic party: the inability of

Democrats to provide a political home for those whites who felt they were paying—unwillingly—the largest ‘costs’ in the struggle to achieve an integrated society.”

The Edsalls, Rieder, and Matusow, although they correctly emphasize the importance of white discontent as a national political force, err in their overemphasis on the role of the Great Society and the sixties rebellions in the rise of the “silent majority.” To view the defection of whites from Democratic ranks simply as a reaction to the War on Poverty, civil rights, and black power movements ignores racial cleavages that shaped local politics in the north well before the tumult of the 1960s. Urban antiliberalism had deep roots in a simmering politics of race and neighborhood defensiveness that divided northern cities well before George Wallace began his first speaking tours in the Snowbelt, well before Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act, well before the long, hot summers of Watts, Harlem, Chicago, Newark, and Detroit, and well before affirmative action and busing began to dominate the civil rights agenda. From the 1940s through the 1960s, Detroit whites fashioned a language of discontent directed against public officials, blacks, and liberal reformers who supported public housing and open housing. The rhetoric of George Wallace, Richard Nixon, Spiro Agnew, and Ronald Reagan was familiar to the whites who supported candidates such as Edward Jeffries, Albert Cobo, and Thomas Poindexter. The “silent majority” did not emerge *de novo* from the alleged failures of liberalism in the 1960s; it was not the unique product of the white rejection of the Great Society. Instead it was the culmination of more than two decades of simmering white discontent and extensive antiliberal political organization.

The most enduring legacy of the postwar racial struggles in Detroit has been the growing marginalization of the city in local, state, and national politics. Elected officials in Lansing and Washington, beholden to a vocal, well-organized, and defensive white suburban constituency, have reduced funding for urban education, antipoverty, and development programs. At the same time, Detroit—like its counterparts around the country—grapples with a declining tax base and increasingly expensive social, economic, and infrastructural problems.



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The Great Society and the Politics of Liberal Reform

The Great Society, as President Lyndon B. Johnson and others called the flood of domestic reform legislation enacted between 1964 and 1968, was the high-water mark of modern American liberalism. Greatly expanding the social welfare safety net created by the New Deal of the 1930s, the Great Society also moved into new areas relatively untouched by the New Deal, most notably civil rights for African Americans.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the federal government assumed new responsibilities toward the unemployed, the elderly, and the poor. The Social Security Act of 1935, with its provisions for unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, and support for dependent children, laid the foundation for the modern welfare state. Many Americans came to expect that in times of economic trouble, the federal government would step in to help. As early as 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted that protection of "the family and home," creation of "opportunity for all people," and help for "those overtaken by disaster" were birthrights of all Americans, and in 1944 he elaborated an "economic bill of rights" that promised food, housing, jobs, and education. However, conservative opposition blocked fulfillment of most of these promises during Roosevelt's presidency and later Democratic administrations.

All of this changed in the mid-1960s, when Johnson, with the aid of an expanding economy and large Democratic majorities in Congress, won passage of a broad array of new laws on health, housing, education, workplace safety, civil rights, consumer protection, poverty, and the environment. Rooted in the Democrats' belief that governmental authority could be used to achieve bold progress for less-privileged citizens, new federal programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, the Office of Economic Opportunity, Head Start, and the Job Corps promised to make the nation's extraordinary postwar prosperity accessible to all Americans.

Yet liberal policies drew criticism even in the heyday of the Great Society. Critics charged that the establishment of a larger, more intrusive federal bureaucracy undermined basic American freedoms. Many also complained that welfare sapped the willingness of recipients to work and unfairly diverted resources from hard-working Americans. Critics also frequently complained that Great Society programs achieved meager results, contending, for

example, that housing projects concentrated in poor and often crime-ridden areas destroyed urban neighborhoods while enriching politically connected contractors. Meanwhile, new regulations often seemed to wrap businesses and homeowners in crippling red tape. During the 1970s and 1980s, Ronald Reagan and other conservatives tapped into discontent with Great Society liberalism. While many Great Society programs remained after Reagan became president in 1981, liberal dominance of the public policy agenda was clearly over.

◆ DOCUMENTS

The Great Society sprang from a widespread sense in the early 1960s that America, despite spectacular economic growth since the World War II, faced major social and economic problems that kept some Americans from taking part in the general prosperity. Two landmark books published in 1962 played crucial roles in encouraging Americans to recognize these problems. In *The Other America*, excerpted in Document 1, political scientist Michael Harrington called attention to persistent poverty in many parts of the country. In *Silent Spring* (Document 2), marine biologist Rachel Carson raised awareness of environmental degradation by focusing attention on the damaging effects of pesticides.

Although President John F. Kennedy campaigned on promises of liberal reform in 1960, it was not until the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson that Washington began to make bold progress. The landslide in favor of the Democratic Party in the 1964 election gave liberals a commanding position in Congress, and Johnson focused his considerable political skills on winning passage of a package of initiatives designed to reduce poverty, extend equal rights to African Americans, provide health care for the elderly, protect consumers, and expand educational opportunities. One of his most sweeping assertions of his goals for the Great Society came in a graduation speech at the University of Michigan on May 22, 1964 (Document 3). On August 20 of that year, Congress passed one of the most ambitious pieces of Great Society legislation, the Economic Opportunity Act, excerpted in Document 4. The law established the federal Office of Economic Opportunity and initiated numerous programs to wage Johnson's "war on poverty."

Conservatives, led by 1964 Republican presidential candidate Barry M. Goldwater, attacked Johnson's initiatives as an unwarranted expansion of federal power. In a campaign speech on behalf of Goldwater on October 27, 1964, conservative icon Ronald Reagan, who would be elected governor of California two years later, warned of the dangers posed by expanded governmental power (Document 5). In the short term, such criticism made little difference. An expanding economy, together with the 1964 landslide victory over Goldwater and the Republicans, enabled Johnson to translate many more of his promises into law. The Eighty-Ninth Congress (1965–1967) unquestionably marked the high tide of American liberalism.

Even as the reach and ambition of the Great Society grew, however, it encountered increasingly significant obstacles. One problem was the sheer complexity of the new bureaucracies established under the Great Society. In Document 6, an

interview conducted in 1970, Job Corps Director Otis Singletary recalled both the hopes and frustrations that surrounded his agency as it sought to put poor young Americans to work.

A more serious problem for the Great Society was the Vietnam War, which sapped resources and public attention from Johnson's domestic agenda. As Herbert Block of the *Washington Post* suggested in a cartoon published August 1, 1967 (Document 7), Johnson hoped that he could fight a war and continue building the Great Society. In fact, controversies surrounding the war, combined with a steadily mounting conservative backlash against liberal programs, stalled the momentum of Johnson's domestic agenda and led him to abandon his quest for reelection. In November 1968, Democratic Vice President Hubert Humphrey took only 42.6 percent of the popular vote, whereas Republican Richard Nixon won 43.2 percent and third-party candidate George Wallace garnered 12.9 percent. The following year, one of Nixon's aides, Kevin Phillips, presciently hailed the election as signaling an "emerging Republican majority" rooted in broad opposition to Johnson's handling of the Vietnam War as well as hostility to civil rights and other Great Society initiatives (Document 8).

1. Author Michael Harrington Calls Attention to Poverty, 1962

There is a familiar America. It is celebrated in speeches and advertised on television and in the magazines. It has the highest mass standard of living the world has ever known.

In the 1950's this America worried about itself, yet even its anxieties were products of abundance. The title of a brilliant book was widely misinterpreted, and the familiar America began to call itself "the affluent society." There was introspection about Madison Avenue and tail fins; there was discussion of the emotional suffering taking place in the suburbs. In all this, there was an implicit assumption that the basic grinding economic problems had been solved in the United States. In this theory the nation's problems were no longer a matter of basic human needs, of food, shelter, and clothing. Now they were seen as qualitative, a question of learning to live decently amid luxury.

While this discussion was carried on, there existed another America. In it dwelt somewhere between 40,000,000 and 50,000,000 citizens of this land. They were poor. They still are....

The millions who are poor in the United States tend to become increasingly invisible. Here is a great mass of people, yet it takes an effort of the intellect and will even to see them.

I discovered this personally in a curious way. After I wrote my first article on poverty in America, I had all the statistics down on paper. I had proved to my

satisfaction that there were around 50,000,000 poor in this country. Yet, I realized I did not believe my own figures. The poor existed in the Government reports; they were percentages and numbers in long, close columns, but they were not part of my experience. I could prove that the other America existed, but I had never been there.

My response was not accidental. It was typical of what is happening to an entire society, and it reflects profound social changes in this nation. The other America, the America of poverty, is hidden today in a way that it never was before. Its millions are socially invisible to the rest of us....

There are perennial reasons that make the other America an invisible land.

Poverty is often off the beaten track. It always has been. The ordinary tourist never left the main highway, and today he rides interstate turnpikes. He does not go into the valleys of Pennsylvania where the towns look like movie sets of Wales in the thirties. He does not see the company houses in rows, the rutted roads (the poor always have bad roads whether they live in the city, in towns, or on farms), and everything is black and dirty. And even if he were to pass through such a place by accident, the tourist would not meet the unemployed men in the bar or the women coming home from a runaway sweatshop.

Then, too, beauty and myths are perennial masks of poverty. The traveler comes to the Appalachians in the lovely season. He sees the hills, the streams, the foliage—but not the poor. Or perhaps he looks at a run-down mountain house and, remembering Rousseau rather than seeing with his eyes, decides that “those people” are truly fortunate to be living the way they are and that they are lucky to be exempt from the strains and tensions of the middle class. The only problem is that “those people,” the quaint inhabitants of those hills, are undereducated, underprivileged, lack medical care, and are in the process of being forced from the land into a life in the cities, where they are misfits.

These are normal and obvious causes of the invisibility of the poor. They operated a generation ago; they will be functioning a generation hence. It is more important to understand that the very development of American society is creating a new kind of blindness about poverty. The poor are increasingly slipping out of the very experience and consciousness of the nation.

If the middle class never did like ugliness and poverty, it was at least aware of them. “Across the tracks” was not a very long way to go. There were forays into the slums at Christmas time; there were charitable organizations that brought contact with the poor. Occasionally, almost everyone passed through the Negro ghetto or the blocks of tenements, if only to get downtown to work or to entertainment.

Now the American city has been transformed. The poor still inhabit the miserable housing in the central area, but they are increasingly isolated from contact with, or sight of, anybody else. Middle-class women coming in from Suburbia on a rare trip may catch the merest glimpse of the other America on the way to an evening at the theater, but their children are segregated in suburban schools. The business or professional man may drive along the fringes of

slums in a car or bus, but it is not an important experience to him. The failures, the unskilled, the disabled, the aged, and the minorities are right there, across the tracks, where they have always been. But hardly anyone else is.

In short, the very development of the American city has removed poverty from the living, emotional experience of millions upon millions of middle-class Americans. Living out in the suburbs, it is easy to assume that ours is, indeed, an affluent society....

There are mighty historical and economic forces that keep the poor down; and there are human beings who help out in this grim business, many of them unwittingly. There are sociological and political reasons why poverty is not seen; and there are misconceptions and prejudices that literally blind the eyes. The latter must be understood if anyone is to make the necessary act of intellect and will so that the poor can be noticed.

Here is the most familiar version of social blindness: "The poor are that way because they are afraid of work. And anyway they all have big cars. If they were like me (or my father or my grandfather), they could pay their own way. But they prefer to live on the dole and cheat the taxpayers."

This theory, usually thought of as a virtuous and moral statement, is one of the means of making it impossible for the poor ever to pay their way. There are, one must assume, citizens of the other America who choose impoverishment out of fear of work (though, writing it down, I really do not believe it). But the real explanation of why the poor are where they are is that they made the mistake of being born to the wrong parents, in the wrong section of the country, in the wrong industry, or in the wrong racial or ethnic group. Once that mistake has been made, they could have been paragons of will and morality, but most of them would never even have had a chance to get out of the other America.

There are two important ways of saying this: The poor are caught in a vicious circle; or, The poor live in a culture of poverty.

In a sense, one might define the contemporary poor in the United States as those who, for reasons beyond their control, cannot help themselves. All the most decisive factors making for opportunity and advance are against them. They are born going downward, and most of them stay down. They are victims whose lives are endlessly blown round and round the other America.

Here is one of the most familiar forms of the vicious circle of poverty. The poor get sick more than anyone else in the society. That is because they live in slums, jammed together under unhygienic conditions; they have inadequate diets, and cannot get decent medical care. When they become sick, they are sick longer than any other group in the society. Because they are sick more often and longer than anyone else, they lose wages and work, and find it difficult to hold a steady job. And because of this, they cannot pay for good housing, for a nutritious diet, for doctors. At any given point in the circle, particularly when there is a major illness, their prospect is to move to an even lower level and to begin the cycle, round and round, toward even more suffering....

2. Activist Rachel Carson Warns of Environmental Dangers, 1962

There was once a town in the heart of America where all life seemed to live in harmony with its surroundings. The town lay in the midst of a checkerboard of prosperous farms, with fields of grain and hillsides of orchards where, in spring, white clouds of bloom drifted above the green fields. In autumn, oak and maple and birch set up a blaze of color that flamed and flickered across a backdrop of pines. Then foxes barked in the hills and deer silently crossed the fields, half hidden in the mists of the fall mornings.

Along the roads, laurel, viburnum and alder, great ferns and wildflowers delighted the traveler's eye through much of the year. Even in winter the roadsides were places of beauty, where countless birds came to feed on the berries and on the seed heads of the dried weeds rising above the snow. The countryside was, in fact, famous for the abundance and variety of its bird life, and when the flood of migrants was pouring through in spring and fall people traveled from great distances to observe them. Others came to fish the streams, which flowed clear and cold out of the hills and contained shady pools where trout lay. So it had been from the days many years ago when the first settlers raised their houses, sank their wells, and built their barns.

Then a strange blight crept over the area and everything began to change. Some evil spell had settled on the community: mysterious maladies swept the flocks of chickens; the cattle and sheep sickened and died. Everywhere was a shadow of death. The farmers spoke of much illness among their families. In the town the doctors had become more and more puzzled by new kinds of sickness appearing among their patients. There had been several sudden and unexplained deaths, not only among adults but even among children, who would be stricken suddenly while at play and die within a few hours.

There was a strange stillness. The birds, for example—where had they gone? Many people spoke of them, puzzled and disturbed. The feeding stations in the backyards were deserted. The few birds seen anywhere were moribund; they trembled violently and could not fly. It was a spring without voices. On the mornings that had once throbbed with the dawn chorus of robins, catbirds, doves, jays, wrens, and scores of other bird voices there was now no sound; only silence lay over the fields and woods and marsh.

On the farms the hens brooded, but no chicks hatched. The farmers complained that they were unable to raise any pigs—the litters were small and the young survived only a few days. The apple trees were coming into bloom but no bees droned among the blossoms, so there was no pollination and there would be no fruit.

The roadsides, once so attractive, were now lined with browned and withered vegetation as though swept by fire. These, too, were silent, deserted by all living things. Even the streams were now lifeless. Anglers no longer visited them, for all the fish had died.

In the gutters under the eaves and between the shingles of the roofs, a white granular powder still showed a few patches; some weeks before it had fallen like snow upon the roofs and the lawns, the fields and streams.

No witchcraft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of new life in this stricken world. The people had done it themselves.

This town does not actually exist, but it might easily have a thousand counterparts in America or elsewhere in the world. I know of no community that has experienced all the misfortunes I describe. Yet every one of these disasters has actually happened somewhere, and many real communities have already suffered a substantial number of them. A grim specter has crept upon us almost unnoticed, and this imagined tragedy may easily become a stark reality we all shall know....

The history of life on earth has been a history of interaction between living things and their surroundings. To a large extent, the physical form and the habits of the earth's vegetation and its animal life have been molded by the environment. Considering the whole span of earthly time, the opposite effect, in which life actually modifies its surroundings, has been relatively slight. Only within the moment of time represented by the present century has one species—man—acquired significant power to alter the nature of his world.

During the past quarter century this power has not only increased to one of disturbing magnitude but it has changed in character. The most alarming of all man's assaults upon the environment is the contamination of air, earth, rivers, and sea with dangerous and even lethal materials. This pollution is for the most part irrecoverable; the chain of evil it initiates not only in the world that must support life but in living tissues is for the most part irreversible. In this now universal contamination of the environment, chemicals are the sinister and little-recognized partners of radiation in changing the very nature of the world—the very nature of its life. Strontium 90, released through nuclear explosions into the air, comes to earth in rain or drifts down as fallout, lodges in soil, enters into the grass or corn or wheat grown there, and in time takes up its abode in the bones of a human being, there to remain until his death. Similarly, chemicals sprayed on croplands or forests or gardens lie long in soil, entering into living organisms, passing from one to another in a chain of poisoning and death. Or they pass mysteriously by underground streams until they emerge and, through the alchemy of air and sunlight, combine into new forms that kill vegetation, sicken cattle, and work unknown harm on those who drink from once pure wells. As Albert Schweitzer has said, "Man can hardly even recognize the devils of his own creation."

It took hundreds of millions of years to produce the life that now inhabits the earth—eons of time in which that developing and evolving and diversifying life reached a state of adjustment and balance with its surroundings. The environment, rigorously shaping and directing the life it supported, contained elements that were hostile as well as supporting. Certain rocks gave out dangerous radiation; even within the light of the sun, from which all life draws its energy, there were short-wave radiations with power to injure. Given time—time not in years but in millennia—life adjusts, and a balance has been reached. For time is the essential ingredient; but in the modern world there is no time.

The rapidity of change and the speed with which new situations are created follow the impetuous and heedless pace of man rather than the deliberate pace of

nature. Radiation is no longer merely the background radiation of rocks, the bombardment of cosmic rays, the ultraviolet of the sun that have existed before there was any life on earth; radiation is now the unnatural creation of man's tampering with the atom. The chemicals to which life is asked to make its adjustment are no longer merely the calcium and silica and copper and all the rest of the minerals washed out of the rocks and carried in rivers to the sea; they are the synthetic creations of man's inventive mind, brewed in his laboratories, and having no counterparts in nature.

To adjust to these chemicals would require time on the scale that is nature's; it would require not merely the years of a man's life but the life of generations. And even this, were it by some miracle possible, would be futile, for the new chemicals come from our laboratories in an endless stream; almost five hundred annually find their way into actual use in the United States alone. The figure is staggering and its implications are not easily grasped—500 new chemicals to which the bodies of men and animals are required somehow to adapt each year, chemicals totally outside the limits of biologic experience.

Among them are many that are used in man's war against nature. Since the mid-1940's over 200 basic chemicals have been created for use in killing insects, weeds, rodents, and other organisms described in the modern vernacular as "pests"; and they are sold under several thousand different brand names.

These sprays, dusts, and aerosols are now applied almost universally to farms, gardens, forests, and homes—nonselective chemicals that have the power to kill every insect, the "good" and the "bad," to still the song of birds and the leaping of fish in the streams, to coat the leaves with a deadly film, and to linger on in soil—all this though the intended target may be only a few weeds or insects. Can anyone believe it is possible to lay down such a barrage of poisons on the surface of the earth without making it unfit for all life? They should not be called "insecticides," but "biocides."...

Along with the possibility of the extinction of mankind by nuclear war, the central problem of our age has therefore become the contamination of man's total environment with such substances of incredible potential for harm—substances that accumulate in the tissues of plants and animals and even penetrate the germ cells to shatter or alter the very material of heredity upon which the shape of the future depends.

Some would-be architects of our future look toward a time when it will be possible to alter the human germ plasm by design. But we may easily be doing so now by inadvertence, for many chemicals, like radiation, bring about gene mutations. It is ironic to think that man might determine his own future by something so seemingly trivial as the choice of an insect spray.

All this has been risked—for what? Future historians may well be amazed by our distorted sense of proportion. How could intelligent beings seek to control a few unwanted species by a method that contaminated the entire environment and brought the threat of disease and death even to their own kind? Yet this is precisely what we have done. We have done it, moreover, for reasons that collapse the moment we examine them....

All this is not to say there is no insect problem and no need of control. I am saying, rather, that control must be geared to realities, not to mythical situations, and that the methods employed must be such that they do not destroy us along with the insects....

3. President Lyndon B. Johnson Announces His Program for a "Great Society," 1964

... For a century we labored to settle and to subdue a continent. For half a century we called upon unbounded invention and untiring industry to create an order of plenty for all of our people.

The challenge of the next half century is whether we have the wisdom to use that wealth to enrich and elevate our national life, and to advance the quality of our American civilization.

Your imagination, your initiative, and your indignation will determine whether we build a society where progress is the servant of our needs, or a society where old values and new visions are buried under unbridled growth. For in your time we have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society.

The Great Society rests on abundance and liberty for all. It demands an end to poverty and racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time. But that is just the beginning.

The Great Society is a place where every child can find knowledge to enrich his mind and to enlarge his talents. It is a place where Leisure is a welcome chance to build and reflect, not a feared cause of boredom and restlessness. It is a place where the city of man serves not only the needs of the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community.

It is a place where man can renew contact with nature. It is a place which honors creation for its own sake and for what it adds to the understanding of the race. It is a place where men are more concerned with the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods.

But most of all, the Great Society is not a safe harbor, a resting place, a final objective, a finished work. It is a challenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward a destiny where the meaning of our lives matches the marvelous products of our labor.

So I want to talk to you today about three places where we begin to build the Great Society—in our cities, in our countryside, and in our classrooms.

Many of you will live to see the day, perhaps 50 years from now, when there will be 400 million Americans—four-fifths of them in urban areas. In the remainder of this century urban population will double, city land will double, and we will have to build homes, highways, and facilities equal to all those built since this country was first settled. So in the next 40 years we must rebuild the entire urban United States.

Aristotle said: "Men come together in cities in order to live, but they remain together in order to live the good life." It is harder and harder to live the good life in American cities today.

The catalog of ills is long: there is the decay of the centers and the despoiling of the suburbs. There is not enough housing for our people or transportation for our traffic. Open land is vanishing and old landmarks are violated.

Worst of all expansion is eroding the precious and time honored values of community with neighbors and communion with nature. The loss of these values breeds loneliness and boredom and indifference.

Our societies will never be great until our cities are great. Today the frontier of imagination and innovation is inside those cities and not beyond their borders....

A second place where we begin to build the Great Society is in our countryside. We have always prided ourselves on being not only America the strong and America the free, but America the beautiful. Today that beauty is in danger. The water we drink, the food we eat, the very air that we breathe, are threatened with pollution. Our parks are overcrowded, our seashores overburdened. Green fields and dense forests are disappearing.

A few years ago we were greatly concerned about the "Ugly American." Today we must act to prevent an ugly America.

For once the battle is lost, once our natural splendor is destroyed, it can never be recaptured. And once man can no longer walk with beauty or wonder at nature his spirit will wither and his sustenance be wasted.

A third place to build the Great Society is in the classrooms of America. There your children's lives will be shaped. Our society will not be great until every young mind is set free to scan the farthest reaches of thought and imagination. We are still far from that goal.

Today, 8 million adult Americans, more than the entire population of Michigan, have not finished 5 years of school. Nearly 20 million have not finished 8 years of school. Nearly 54 million—more than one-quarter of all America—have not even finished high school.

Each year more than 100,000 high school graduates, with proved ability, do not enter college because they cannot afford it. And if we cannot educate today's youth, what will we do in 1970 when elementary school enrollment will be 5 million greater than 1960? And high school enrollment will rise by 5 million. College enrollment will increase by more than 3 million.

In many places, classrooms are overcrowded and curricula are outdated. Most of our qualified teachers are underpaid, and many of our paid teachers are unqualified. So we must give every child a place to sit and a teacher to learn from. Poverty must not be a bar to learning, and learning must offer an escape from poverty.

But more classrooms and more teachers are not enough. We must seek an educational system which grows in excellence as it grows in size. This means better training for our teachers. It means preparing youth to enjoy their hours of leisure as well as their hours of labor. It means exploring new techniques of teaching, to find new ways to stimulate the love of learning and the capacity for creation.

These are three of the central issues of the Great Society. While our Government has many programs directed at those issues, I do not pretend that we have the full answer to those problems.

But I do promise this: We are going to assemble the best thought and the broadest knowledge from all over the world to find those answers for America. I intend to establish working groups to prepare a series of White House conferences and meetings—on the cities, on natural beauty, on the quality of education, and on other emerging challenges. And from these meetings and from this inspiration and from these studies we will begin to set our course toward the Great Society.

The solution to these problems does not rest on a massive program in Washington, nor can it rely solely on the strained resources of local authority. They require us to create new concepts of cooperation, a creative federalism, between the National Capital and the leaders of local communities.

Woodrow Wilson once wrote: "Every man sent out from his university should be a man of his Nation as well as a man of his time."

Within your lifetime powerful forces, already loosed, will take us toward a way of life beyond the realm of our experience, almost beyond the bounds of our imagination.

For better or for worse, your generation has been appointed by history to deal with those problems and to lead America toward a new age. You have the chance never before afforded to any people in any age. You can help build a society where the demands of morality, and the needs of the spirit, can be realized in the life of the Nation.

So, will you join in the battle to give every citizen the full equality which God enjoins and the law requires, whatever his belief, or race, or the color of his skin?

Will you join in the battle to give every citizen an escape from the crushing weight of poverty?

Will you join in the battle to make it possible for all nations to live in enduring peace—as neighbors and not as mortal enemies?

Will you join in the battle to build the Great Society, to prove that our material progress is only the foundation on which we will build a richer life of mind and spirit?

There are those timid souls who say this battle cannot be won; that we are condemned to a soulless wealth. I do not agree. We have the power to shape the civilization that we want. But we need your will, your labor, your hearts, if we are to build that kind of society....

4. Landmark Legislation Targets Poverty, 1964

Although the economic well-being and prosperity of the United States have progressed to a level surpassing any achieved in world history, and although these benefits are widely shared throughout the Nation, poverty continues to be the lot of a substantial number of our people. The United States can achieve its full

Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Public Law 88-452, August 20, 1964, United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 78, 88th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 508-534. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=GPO&browsePath=United+States+Statutes+at+Large+%28Digitized%29%2F1964&isCollapsed=false&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&yord=799>.

economic and social potential as a nation only if every individual has the opportunity to contribute to the full extent of his capabilities and to participate in the workings of our society. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity. It is the purpose of this Act to strengthen, supplement, and coordinate efforts in furtherance of that policy.

Title I—Youth Programs

Part A—Job Corps...

... The purpose of this part is to prepare for the responsibilities of citizenship and to increase the employability of young men and young women aged sixteen through twenty-one by providing them in rural and urban residential centers with education, vocational training, useful work experience, including work directed toward the conservation of natural resources, and other appropriate activities....

... In order to carry out the purposes of this part, there is hereby established within the Office of Economic Opportunity ... a Job Corps.

... The Director of the Office ... is authorized to ... enter into agreements with any Federal, State, or local agency or private organization for the establishment and operation, in rural and urban areas, of conservation camps and training centers and for the provision of such facilities and services as in his judgment are needed to carry out the purposes of this part, including but not limited to agreements with agencies charged with the responsibility of conserving, developing, and managing the public natural resources of the Nation and of developing, managing, and protecting public recreational areas, whereby the enrollees of the Corps may be utilized by such agencies in carrying out, under the immediate supervision of such agencies, programs planned and designed by such agencies to fulfill such responsibility, and including agreements for a botanical survey program involving surveys and maps of existing vegetation and investigations of the plants, soils, and environments of natural and disturbed plant communities....

... Within the Job Corps there is authorized a Youth Conservation Corps in which at any one time no less than 40 per centum of the enrollees under this part shall be assigned to camps where their work activity is directed primarily toward conserving, developing, and managing the public natural resources of the Nation, and developing, managing, and protecting public recreational areas. Such work activity shall be performed under the direction of members of agencies charged with the responsibility of conserving, developing, and managing the public natural resources and of developing, managing, and protecting public recreational areas.

Part B—Work-Training Programs...

... The purpose of this part is to provide useful work experience opportunities for unemployed young men and young women, through participation in State

and community work-training programs, so that their employability may be increased or their education resumed or continued and so that public agencies and private nonprofit organizations (other than political parties) will be enabled to carry out programs which will permit or contribute to an undertaking or service in the public interest that would not otherwise be provided, or will contribute to the conservation and development of natural resources and recreational areas....

... The Director is authorized to enter into agreements providing for the payment by him of part or all of the cost of a State or local program submitted hereunder if he determines, in accordance with such regulations as he may prescribe, that—

- (1) enrollees in the program will be employed either (A) on publicly owned and operated facilities or projects, or (B) on local projects sponsored by private nonprofit organizations (other than political parties), other than projects involving the construction, operation, or maintenance of so much of any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship;
- (2) the program will increase the employability of the enrollees by providing work experience and training in occupational skills or pursuits in classifications in which the Director finds there is a reasonable expectation of employment, or will enable student enrollees to resume or to maintain school attendance;
- (3) the program will permit or contribute to an undertaking or service in the public interest that would not otherwise be provided, or will contribute to the conservation, development, or management of the natural resources of the State or community or to the development, management, or protection of State or community recreational areas....

Part C—Work-Study Programs...

... The purpose of this part is to stimulate and promote the part-time employment of students in institutions of higher education who are from low-income families and are in need of the earnings from such employment to pursue courses of study at such institutions....

Title II—Urban and Rural Community Action Programs

Part A—General Community Action Programs...

... The purpose of this part is to provide stimulation and incentive for urban and rural communities to mobilize their resources to combat poverty through community action programs....

... The term “community action program” means a program—

- (1) which mobilizes and utilizes resources, public or private, of any urban or rural, or combined urban and rural, geographical area (referred to in this part as a "community"), including but not limited to a State, metropolitan area, county, city, town, multicity unit, or multicounty unit in an attack on poverty;
- (2) which provides services, assistance, and other activities of sufficient scope and size to give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty or a cause or causes of poverty through developing employment opportunities, improving human performance, motivation, and productivity, or bettering the conditions under which people live, learn, and work;
- (3) which is developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served; and
- (4) which is conducted, administered, or coordinated by a public or private nonprofit agency (other than a political party), or a combination thereof....

Part B—Adult Basic Education Programs ...

... It is the purpose of this part to initiate programs of instruction for individuals who have attained age eighteen and whose inability to read and write the English language constitutes a substantial impairment of their ability to get or retain employment commensurate with their real ability, so as to help eliminate such inability and raise the level of education of such individuals with a view to making them less likely to become dependent on others, improving their ability to benefit from occupational training and otherwise increasing their opportunities for more productive and profitable employment, and making them better able to meet their adult responsibilities....

Part C—Voluntary Assistance Program for Needy Children ...

The purpose of this part is to allow individual Americans to participate in a personal way in the war on poverty, by voluntarily assisting in the support of one or more needy children, in a program coordinated with city or county social welfare agencies....

... In order to carry out the purposes of this part, the Director is authorized to establish a section within the Office of Economic Opportunity to act as an information and coordination center to encourage voluntary assistance for deserving and needy children. Such section shall collect the names of persons who voluntarily desire to assist financially such children and shall secure from city or county social welfare agencies such information concerning deserving and needy children as the Director shall deem appropriate.

... It is the intent of the Congress that the section established pursuant to this part shall act solely as an information and coordination center and that

nothing in this part shall be construed as interfering with the jurisdiction of State and local welfare agencies with respect to programs for needy children.

Title III—Special Programs to Combat Poverty in Rural Areas ...

It is the purpose of this title to meet some of the special problems of rural poverty and thereby to raise and maintain the income and living standards of low-income rural families and migrant agricultural employees and their families....

... The Director is authorized to make loans having a maximum maturity of 15 years and in amounts not exceeding \$2,500 in the aggregate to any low income rural family where, in the judgment of the Director, such loans have a reasonable possibility of effecting a permanent increase in the income of such families by assisting or permitting them to—

(A) acquire or improve real estate or reduce encumbrances or erect improvements thereon,

(B) operate or improve the operation of farms not larger than family sized, including but not limited to the purchase of feed, seed, fertilizer, livestock, poultry, and equipment, or

(C) participate in cooperative associations: and/or to finance nonagricultural enterprises which will enable such families to supplement their income....

... The Director shall develop and implement as soon as practicable a program to assist the States, political subdivisions of States, public and nonprofit agencies, institutions, organizations, farm associations, or individuals in establishing and operating programs of assistance for migrant, and other seasonally employed, agricultural employees and their families which programs shall be limited to housing, sanitation, education, and day care of children. Institutions, organizations, farm associations, or individuals shall be limited to direct loans....

Title IV—Employment and Investment Incentives ...

... It is the purpose of this title to assist in the establishment, preservation, and strengthening of small business concerns and improve the managerial skills employed in such enterprises; and to mobilize for these objectives private as well as public managerial skills and resources....

... The Director is authorized to make, participate (on an immediate basis) in, or guarantee loans, repayable in not more than fifteen years, to any small business concern ..., or to any qualified person seeking to establish such a concern, when he determines that such loans will assist in carrying out the purposes of this title, with particular emphasis on employment of the long-term unemployed....

Title VI—Administration and Coordination ...

... There is hereby established in the Executive Office of the President the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Office shall be headed by a Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. There shall also be in the Office one Deputy Director and three Assistant Directors who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Deputy Director and the Assistant Directors shall perform such functions as the Director may from time to time prescribe....

Volunteers in Service to America

... The Director is authorized to recruit, select, train, and—

- (1) upon request of State or local agencies or private nonprofit organizations, refer volunteers to perform duties in furtherance of programs combating poverty at a State or local level; and
- (2) in cooperation with other Federal, State, or local agencies involved, assign volunteers to work (A) in meeting the health, education, welfare, or related needs of Indians living on reservations, of migratory workers and their families, or of residents of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; (B) in the care and rehabilitation of the mentally ill or mentally retarded under treatment at nonprofit mental health or mental retardation facilities assisted in their construction or operation by Federal funds; and (C) in furtherance of programs or activities authorized or supported under title I or II of this Act....

5. Governor Ronald Reagan Warns of the Dangers of the Welfare State, 1964

It's time we asked ourselves if we still know the freedoms intended for us by the Founding Fathers. James Madison said, "We base all our experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government." This idea that government was beholden to the people, that it had no other source of power except the sovereign people, is still the newest, most unique idea in all the long history of man's relation to man. For almost two centuries we have proved man's capacity for self-government, but today we are told we must choose between a left and right or, as others suggest, a third alternative, a kind of safe middle ground. I suggest to you there is no left or right, only an up or down. Up to the maximum of individual freedom consistent with law and order, or down to the ant heap of totalitarianism; and regardless of their humanitarian purpose those

who would sacrifice freedom for security have, whether they know it or not, chosen this downward path. Plutarch warned, "The real destroyer of the liberties of the people is he who spreads among them bounties, donations, and benefits."

Today there is an increasing number who can't see a fat man standing beside a thin one without automatically coming to the conclusion the fat man got that way by taking advantage of the thin one. So they would seek the answer to all the problems of human need through government. Howard K. Smith of television fame has written, "The profit motive is outmoded. It may be replaced by the incentives of the welfare state." He says, "The distribution of goods must be effected by a planned economy."

Another articulate spokesman for the welfare state defines liberalism as meeting the material needs of the masses through the full power of centralized government. I for one find it disturbing when a representative refers to the free men and women of this country as the masses, but beyond this the full power of centralized government was the very thing the Founding Fathers sought to minimize. They knew you don't control things; you can't control the economy without controlling *people*. So we have come to a time for choosing. Either we accept the responsibility for our own destiny, or we abandon the American Revolution and confess that an intellectual belief in a far-distant capitol can plan our lives for us better than we can plan them ourselves.

Already the hour is late. Government has laid its hand on health, housing, farming, industry, commerce, education, and, to an ever-increasing degree, interferes with the people's right to know. Government tends to grow; government programs take on weight and momentum, as public servants say, always with the best of intentions, "What greater service we could render if only we had a little more money and a little more power." But the truth is that outside of its legitimate function, government does nothing as well or as economically as the private sector of the economy....

Federal welfare spending is today ten times greater than it was in the dark depths of the Depression. Federal, state, and local welfare combined spend 45 billion dollars a year. Now the government has announced that 20 percent, some 9.3 million families, are poverty-stricken on the basis that they have less than a \$3,000 a year income.

If this present welfare spending was prorated equally among these poverty-stricken families, we could give each family more than \$4,500 a year. Actually, direct aid to the poor averages less than \$600 per family. There must be some administrative overhead somewhere. Now, are we to believe that another billion dollar program added to the half a hundred programs and the 45 billion dollars, will, through some magic, end poverty? For three decades we have tried to solve unemployment by government planning, without success. The more the plans fail, the more the planners plan.

The latest is the Area Redevelopment Agency, and in two years less than one-half of one percent of the unemployed could attribute new jobs to this agency, and the cost to the taxpayer for each job found was \$5,000. But beyond the great bureaucratic waste, what are we doing to the people we seek to help?

Recently a judge told me of an incident in his court. A fairly young woman with six children, pregnant with her seventh, came to him for a divorce. Under his questioning it became apparent her husband did not share this desire. Then the whole story came out. Her husband was a laborer earning \$250 a month. By divorcing him she could get an \$80 raise. She was eligible for \$350 a month from the Aid to Dependent Children Program. She had been talked into the divorce by two friends who had already done this very thing. But any time we question the schemes of the do-gooders, we are denounced as being opposed to their humanitarian goal. It seems impossible to legitimately debate their solutions with the assumption that all of us share the desire to help those less fortunate. They tell us we are always against, never for anything. Well, it isn't so much that liberals are ignorant. It's just that they know so much that isn't so.

6. A Great Society Official Remembers Promise and Problems, 1966–1967 (1970)

... When [Office of Economic Opportunity Director Sargent] Shriver offered you the job, did he have a clearly formed notion of what the Job Corps would be? My impression is that he made it up as it went along.

[JOB CORPS DIRECTOR OTIS] SINGLETARY: There was some planning. Some of it was pretty good, and some of it was hopelessly unrealistic. Sarge knew some things he wanted. He had a concept of two kinds of centers. He had a basic concept that I still am kind of in love with. He knew that out there were in fact millions of kids in that sixteen- to twenty-one-year age group who were out of school and out of work and for whom the normal system wasn't working. He saw two ways—one through the conservation center, and the other through the urban job training center—[to make] these people, in a sense, as he liked to put it in that good old way of his, “taxpayers rather than tax eaters.” You'd hear that all the time! ...

Were the Job Corps offices set up, or did all that have to be worked out too?

SINGLETARY: That was the intriguing thing. When you get right down to it, what he was saying was, “Look, here's an idea that's only partially formed, and an empty office practically, and a desk, and \$150 million! Come on up here and create a program!” That is, in a sense, the chance and opportunity of a lifetime, and that is clearly what attracted me, along with—I'll admit this—Shriver himself is a very attractive and persuasive guy, and he helped con me into that....

Where [and how] did you recruit training personnel?

SINGLETARY: We begged, borrowed, and stole. Part of the problem we had was that you couldn't get anybody on the payroll, even though you had the money. The Washington problem of dealing with the Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of the Budget almost was as great, in my opinion, as the problem of trying to create and operate the program. I left there, in my short time, feeling that they made it

doubly difficult for you to get the job done, even after the Congress appropriated the money for you to do it....

We blanketed the country with what we called "opportunity cards," which [was] the Job Corps announcement. You filled it in and sent it in if you thought you were interested, or wanted more information, or wanted to be considered as an applicant. We had them in every post office, in every selection service office, in every employment office. We sent them to all the schools for people they might know to refer them to. In the case of the rural kids, we even got them into the trunks of the cars of every county agent that we could discover in the country and had them taking them out. I will say, that was a clearly successful throwing of the next, because while there was some argument about whether or not there was a demand or need for this program, what we got were hundreds of thousands of those cards sent back to us immediately.

What did you do about those boys who were too ignorant to know what their concerns were?

We had a lot of that. Many of those who went to the conservation centers were like that. They didn't really know what they were interested in. They went out there to try it out. And a lot of the first kids we got were really dumped on us by properly motivated, but very, very unreliable welfare workers in the city. They were just getting rid of their problems....

First of all, we really had to create a program that would not just take a kid who was in poverty, but take a kid who was in poverty and who had a domestic situation of a kind that made it important to put him into the residential situation. We had to have a program that would really do something for that kid in terms of moving him from one plateau to the next in terms of his earning capability and his ability, in a sense, to cope with this century in that way. We ultimately had to find a way to do this at a cost that could be made acceptable to the taxpayer in the country—and to do it in a milieu in which there was a considerable degree of hostility to the program and which tended, particularly in the news media, to inflate the incidents that occurred....

SINGLETARY: Given the youth revolt and the youth movement and all the rest of it as we know it today, the Job Corps was really the first place this hit. If you bear in mind that we were bringing together the most difficult age group in the country: that age group—out of school, out of work—they're tough kids, mostly. We were bringing them into the residential situation. We really had our hands full. It was such a hot publicity item that a fistfight appeared to be a riot. And if it involved a black boy, it was a race riot, as the papers got hold of it! But anybody who would not have anticipated that we were going to have a hell of a lot of disciplinary problems with that age group in the residential situation, particularly as isolated as many of these were, simply missed the point. We did have those problems from the very beginning.

There was a special set of problems with the women's center, the kind of people it attracted around it—males in particular hovering around. Anytime you pull together in a residential situation that number of girls, it's going to be sort of like a dormitory. There's going to be a lot of traffic in and out. And the public pretty generally put a bad light on that. But the need was certainly no less for the women....

Hell's bells, if the dropout rate was thirty-five percent or so—which is pretty high if you compare it to some things—you've got to remember that it's not high compared to the freshman class that enters college this year, if you consider their graduating year. That's going to be about fifty percent, as I recall: about half of them are going to get degrees.

But far more important than that is the simple fact that you started with 100 percent dropout, and that for two-thirds of those kids, the program was to some degree working! As you saw the youngsters, and as you were made aware, as I was—having lived so many of my recent years on the campus, where in spite of all the talk these days about repression and all the rest of it, they're the freest and most privileged kids in the world. That first bunch of Job Corpsmen very nearly broke my heart, the first kids that came into the program. And I'll never forget watching them come off that bus down there [in Catoctin, Maryland].

But the dropout rate, I think, is easily defensible. They talked about the cost of the program a great deal. You know the old cliché about, "You could send a boy to Harvard for what you could send him to the Job Corps." Except you couldn't send this boy to Harvard! I once said to a committee up there: "Fine. You can fill that stadium up there with Job Corps boys, and I will take out of this program the full payment for as many of them to go to Harvard as you can get Harvard to accept." That pointed up the ridiculous fact of trying to argue Harvard.

But if you look at it another way, if you looked at the number of American dollars that had been spent on that boy who enrolled as a freshman in Harvard that year, in the first eighteen years of his life, as compared to what had happened to the kids we were dealing with, that's where you saw the real difference....

Otis Singletary discussed President Johnson's relationship with the Job Corps.

SINGLETARY: I believe that Lyndon Johnson's own career as an [National Youth Administration] administrator and so forth did in fact give him a special feeling for this youth program. There was never a time when I was there that I did not think that he was properly interested.

The other thing is that I am satisfied that, until this day, his vision was a correct vision of the need to do something about that aspect of this population for whom little is being done and yet who [are] potentially in mind a very explosive element in the population.

[Johnson] also saw [the Job Corps] as an investment, not just in camp sites and more jobs, but also an investment in what he liked to call the human potential; that along with those things, some benefits come into the nation at large and some benefits come into the man through increased earning power, and to the government. [There was] also that thing he used to talk about, the quality of life. A lot of people think that a politician is always a phony when he starts in on that. In plain fact, he can have those feelings as well as the next man. And having seen him—we were at Gary together, and I've forgotten where else; I saw him a number of times, both in and out of the White House when I was there—[I] never had any reason to doubt his interest in or sincerity in that program. I was always impressed by that, although I found him to be a very difficult man to work for....

7. The Vietnam War Conflicts with the Great Society, 1967

"There's Money Enough To Support Both Of You —
Now, Doesn't That Make You Feel Better?"



---from The Herblock Gallery (Simon & Schuster, 1968)

8. Conservative Strategist Kevin Phillips Hails an "Emerging Republican Majority," 1969

The long-range meaning of the political upheaval of 1968 rests on the Republican opportunity to fashion a majority among the 57 per cent of the American electorate which voted to eject the Democratic Party from national power. To begin with, more than half of this protesting 57 per cent were firm Republicans from areas—Southern California to Long Island's Suffolk County—or sociocultural backgrounds with a growing GOP bias. Some voted for George Wallace, but most backed Richard Nixon, providing the bulk of his Election Day support. Only a small minority of 1968 Nixon backers—perhaps several million liberal Republicans and independents from Maine and Oregon to Fifth Avenue—cast what may be their last Republican presidential ballots because of the partisan re-alignment taking place. The third major anti-Democratic voting stream of 1968—and the most decisive—was that of the fifteen million or so conservative Democrats who shunned Hubert Humphrey to divide about evenly between Richard Nixon and George Wallace. Such elements stretched from the "Okie" Great Central Valley of California to the mountain towns of Idaho, Florida's space centers, rural South Carolina, Bavarian Minnesota, the Irish sidewalks of New York and the Levittowns of Megalopolis....

Although most of George Wallace's votes came from Democrats rather than Republicans, they were conservatives—Southerners, Borderers, German and Irish Catholics—who had been trending Republican prior to 1968.... [T]he Wallace vote followed the cultural geography of obsolescent conservative (often Southern) Democratic tradition. There was no reliable Wallace backing among blue-collar workers and poor whites as a class; industrial centers in the Yankee sphere of influence from Duluth to Scranton, Fall River and Biddeford shunned the Alabama ex-governor with a mere 2 per cent to 3 per cent of the vote. Areas of eroding Democratic tradition were the great breeding grounds of Wallace voters.

In the South, Wallace drew principally on conservative Democrats quitting the party they had long succored and controlled. Generally speaking, Wallace's Southern strength was greatest in the Democratic Party's historic (pre-1964) lowland strongholds, while the Alabaman's worst Southern percentages came in the Republican highlands. White voters throughout most sections of the Deep South went two-to-one for Wallace. In the more Republican Outer South, only one white voter out of three supported the third-party candidate. In the South as a whole, 85 to 90 per cent of the white electorate cast Nixon or Wallace votes against the re-aligning national Democratic Party in 1968, an unprecedented magnitude of disaffection which indicates the availability of the Wallace vote to the future GOP.

Four of the five Wallace states had gone Republican in 1964, and although the Alabaman greatly enlarged the scope of Southern revolt by

attracting most of the (poor white or Outer South Black Belt) Southerners who had hitherto resisted Republican or States Rights candidacies, much of his tide had already been flowing for Goldwater [in 1964]. Nor does the Nixon Administration have to bid much ideologically for this electorate. Despite his success in enlarging the scope of white Southern revolt, George Wallace failed to reach far enough or strongly enough beyond the Deep South to give his American Independent Party the national base required for a viable future. Republican Nixon won most of the Outer South, establishing the GOP as the ascending party of the local white majority. Having achieved statewide success only in the Deep South, and facing competition from a Southern Republicanism mindful of its opportunity, the Wallace movement cannot maintain an adequate political base and is bound to serve, like past American third parties, as a way station for groups abandoning one party for another. Some Wallace voters were longtime Republicans, but the great majority were conservative Democrats who have been moving—and should continue to do so—towards the GOP....

In addition to Western or Southern Democrats of conservative or populist bent, Wallace also scored well among Catholics, but only in certain areas. From Maine to Michigan, across most of the belt of Yankee-settled territory where local cleavage, though changing, still pits Protestant Republicans against urban Catholic Democrats, the Catholic trend away from the Democrats was slight. However, in the greater New York area, as well as Gary and Cleveland, where minority group (Negro and/or Jewish) power has taken control of local Democratic machinery, Catholic backing of Wallace was considerable. Here,... Catholics are leaving the Democratic Party....

Although the appeal of a successful Nixon Administration and the lack of a Wallace candidacy would greatly swell the 1972 Republican vote in the South, West, Border and the Catholic North, the 1972 GOP may well simultaneously lose a lesser number of 1968 supporters among groups reacting against the party's emerging Southern, Western and New York Irish majority.... Yankees, Megalopolitan silk-stockings voters and Scandinavians from Maine across the Great Lakes to the Pacific all showed a distinct Democratic trend in the years between 1960 and 1968. Such disaffection will doubtlessly continue, but its principal impact has already been felt. Richard Nixon won only 38 per cent of the total 1968 presidential vote on Manhattan's rich East Side; he took only 44 per cent of the ballots in Scarsdale, the city's richest suburb; New England's Yankee counties and towns produced Nixon majorities down 10 per cent to 15 per cent from 1960 levels; fashionable San Francisco shifted toward the Democrats; and Scandinavian Minnesota and Washington state backed Humphrey, as did the Scandinavian northwest of Wisconsin....

The upcoming cycle of American politics is likely to match a dominant Republican Party based in the Heartland, South and California against a minority Democratic Party based in the Northeast and the Pacific Northwest (and encompassing Southern as well as Northern Negroes). With such support behind it, the GOP can easily afford to lose the states of Massachusetts, New York and

Michigan—and is likely to do so except in landslide years. Together with the District of Columbia, the top ten Humphrey states—Hawaii, Washington, Minnesota, Michigan, West Virginia, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Maine—should prove to be the core of national Democratic strength.... [T]he new battlegrounds of quadrennial presidential politics are likely to be California, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

Unluckily for the Democrats, their major impetus is centered in stagnant Northern industrial states—and within those states, in old decaying cities, in a Yankee countryside that has fewer people than in 1900, and in the most expensive suburbs. Beyond this, in the South and West, the Democrats dominate only two expanding voting blocs—Latins and Negroes. From space-center Florida across the booming Texas plains to the Los Angeles—San Diego suburban corridor, the nation's fastest-growing areas are strongly Republican and conservative. Even in the Northeast, the few rapidly growing suburbs are conservative-trending areas.... Because of this demographic pattern, the South and West are gaining electoral votes and national political power at the expense of the Northeast....

The emerging Republican majority spoke clearly in 1968 for a shift away from the sociological jurisprudence, moral permissiveness, experimental residential, welfare and educational programming and massive federal spending by which the Liberal (mostly Democratic) Establishment sought to propagate liberal institutions and ideology—and all the while reap growing economic benefits. The dominion of this impetus is inherent in the list of Republican-trending groups and potentially Republican Wallace electorates of 1968: Southerners, Borderers, Germans, Scotch-Irish, Pennsylvania Dutch, Irish, Italians, Eastern Europeans and other urban Catholics, middle-class suburbanites, Sun Belt residents, Rocky Mountain and Pacific Interior populists. Democrats among these groups were principally alienated from their party by its social programs and increasing identification with the Northeastern Establishment and ghetto alike....

Because the Republicans are little dependent on the Liberal Establishment or urban Negroes—the two groups most intimately, though dissimilarly, concerned with present urban and welfare policies—they have the political freedom to disregard the multitude of vested interests which have throttled national urban policy. The GOP is particularly lucky not to be weighted down with commitment to the political blocs, power brokers and poverty concessionaires of the decaying central cities of the North, now that national growth is shifting to suburbia, the South and the West. The American future lies in a revitalized countryside, a demographically ascendant Sun Belt and suburbia, and new towns—perhaps mountainside linear cities astride monorails 200 miles from Phoenix, Memphis or Atlanta. National policy will have to direct itself towards this future and its constituencies; and perhaps an administration so oriented can also deal realistically with the central cities where Great Society political largesse has so demonstrably failed....

One of the greatest political myths of the decade—a product of liberal self-interest—is that the Republican Party cannot attain national dominance without

mobilizing liberal support in the big cities, appealing to “liberal” youth, empathizing with “liberal” urbanization, gaining substantial Negro support and courting the affluent young professional classes of “suburbia.” The actual demographic and political facts convey a very different message....

[T]he big city political era is over in the United States.... With Negroes moving into the cities, whites have moved out. Moreover, white urban populations are getting increasingly conservative....

While urbanization is changing the face of America, and the GOP must take political note of this fact, it presents the opposite of a problem. A generation ago, the coming of age of the working-class central cities condemned the Republican Party to minority status, but the new “urbanization”—suburbanization is often a better description—is a middle-class impetus shaping the same ignominy for the Democrats. All across the nation, the fastest-growing urban areas are steadily increasing their *Republican* pluralities, while the old central cities—seat of the New Deal era—are casting steadily fewer votes for Democratic liberalism. No major American city is losing population so rapidly as arch-Democratic and establishmentarian Boston, while the fastest-growing urban area in the nation is Southern California’s staunchly conservative Orange County, and the fastest-growing cities are conservative strongholds like Phoenix, Dallas, Houston, Anaheim, San Diego and Fort Lauderdale.

Substantial Negro support is not necessary to national Republican victory in light of the 1968 election returns. Obviously, the GOP can build a winning coalition without Negro votes. Indeed, Negro-Democratic mutual identification was a major source of Democratic loss—and Republican or American Independent Party profit—in many sections of the nation.

◆ ESSAYS

Early analyses of the Great Society tended to focus on the origins of the liberal outlook that dominated the nation in the early 1960s and on the question of whether liberal reform had thwarted more radical possibilities. More recently, scholars have taken the measure of the Great Society from the vantage point of a time when the liberal approach to domestic policy no longer commands the field as it once did. The following essays view the Great Society as a momentous but fleeting moment in American history. In the first essay, historian James T. Patterson examines the remarkable convergence of circumstances that enabled President Johnson to achieve his legislative breakthroughs and speculates on some of the reasons why the Great Society sputtered later in the decade. Historians Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin pick up on the latter theme in the second essay. Whereas Patterson emphasizes weaknesses of Johnson’s leadership, Isserman and Kazin focus on broader societal trends, including hostility to the Vietnam War, backlash against liberal programs, and growing anxiety about lawlessness.

The Heyday of Liberal Reform

JAMES T. PATTERSON

As Johnson departed from his inaugural ball in January 1965, he warned his aides, "Don't stay up late. There's work to be done. We're on our way to the Great Society."

Both the phrase "Great Society" and the planning for it dated to May 1964, when Johnson addressed the graduating class of the University of Michigan. "We have the opportunity," he proclaimed, "to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society." That was "where the city of man serves not only the needs of the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community.... It is a place where men are more concerned with the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods."

Some of Johnson's efforts at that time, notably the war on poverty, were already being readied to advance the Great Society. Starting in that summer, he also established the first of what ultimately became 135 "task forces" to study a wide range of social problems. After the election Johnson drove ahead with all of his legendary energy, for he was certain that his mandate would not last on Capitol Hill. "You've got to give it all you can, that first year," he told an aide. "Doesn't matter what kind of a majority you come in with. You've got just one year when they treat you right, and before they start worrying about themselves."

In pushing for congressional action Johnson amassed very great authority in his own hands. Immediately following the election he cut back drastically on the size of the Democratic National Committee, even removing long-distance phone lines from its offices. He ordered aides and Cabinet heads to say nothing to the media about strategies—all releases would come from the White House. His quest for personal control sought among other things to plug leaks and to curb the unruly federal bureaucracy. It accelerated a long-range postwar trend toward the weakening of party organizations in America and the centering of decision-making in the White House. It also reflected an increasingly imperious and dissimulative manner that distressed his friends and outraged others. Journalists began writing in the spring of 1965 about a "credibility gap" emanating from the Oval Office.

In 1965, however, Johnson's imperiousness did not damage his effectiveness as a leader of domestic policy. Never had a chief executive seemed so much in control of things. Johnson sent sixty-five separate messages to Capitol Hill between January and August and never let up. Much of what he requested aimed to go beyond the bread-and-butter liberalism of the New Deal in order to create a Great Society that would be *qualitatively* better and that would guarantee "rights" and government entitlements. And Congress did his bidding, enacting the most significant domestic legislation since FDR's first term and accelerating the rights-consciousness of the people. The GOP Congressional Committee grumbled that it was the "Three-B Congress—bullied, badgered,

and brainwashed." The journalist James Reston marveled that LBJ was "getting everything through the Congress but the abolition of the Republican party, and he hasn't tried that yet."

Comments such as these reflected a tendency of political observers to personalize the policy-making process. According to such analyses, legislation gets enacted—or foreign policy gets implemented—when and if a President rises above mediocrity to make his mark on the nation. As an explanation of Johnson's successful domestic leadership in 1965 this is useful up to a point. In that historic session LBJ demonstrated many of the traits that make for effective congressional action: advance preparation, thoughtful timing, amazing attention to detail, an unbending sense of purpose, and The Treatment. Behind all of these was his vision, inspiring to liberals, of a Great Society that would establish larger opportunities and entitlements for the disadvantaged.

Other, broader advantages, however, greatly facilitated his strong leadership. Chief among them, as he well recognized, was the nature of Congress in 1965. Here the disastrously impolitic campaign of Goldwater in 1964 had significant consequences. Not only was the new Congress more Democratic than at any time since 1938; it also had sixty-five freshmen, most of them young liberals who arrived in Washington ready and willing to follow their party leaders. These, majority leader Mike Mansfield of Montana in the Senate and Speaker John McCormack of Massachusetts and majority leader Carl Albert of Oklahoma in the House, were mostly loyal to LBJ. The loose but normally formidable coalition of conservatives that had dominated Capitol Hill since the late 1930s was so weak in 1965 that any reasonably competent liberal President would have done well.

Pressure groups, always central to the congressional process, further aided the President. Labor unions were becoming increasingly divided on issues of race and foreign policy and were not always reliable allies of the administration, but they remained the strongest single lobby for some of LBJ's liberal measures. The well-organized National Education Association (NEA) worked hard for federal aid to schools. In addition, liberal "public interest groups" began to come into their own in 1965. Many of the activists who led these groups had been inspired in the Kennedy years. They were young, energetic, politically independent, suspicious of what they called "politics as usual" and of the "tired old bureaucracy" of Washington. They did not always lobby in the savviest fashion. But by 1965 they were publicizing a range of programs, including measures to clean up the environment, improve the delivery of health care, reform the schools, and crack down on what they considered the excesses of big business. They wanted to go beyond the bread-and-butter liberalism of the 1930s to improve the quality of life. Their more aggressive involvement in national affairs broadened the nature of pressure group politics in the United States.

Decisions of the Supreme Court in the early 1960s gave yet another push to rights-consciousness by 1965. Starting in 1962 the Court delivered a series of landmark decisions that delighted many Americans on the left and infuriated most on the right. In that year it issued the first of a number of rulings that

forced states to redraw the lines of rurally weighted voting districts—at both the state and congressional levels—so as to give urban and suburban voters a representation appropriate to their growth in numbers. By 1965 states were scrambling to do so, thereby (reformers hoped) reducing the power of rural conservatives in legislatures and in Congress. In *Engel v. Vitale*, also decided in 1962, the Court held that it was unconstitutional—a violation of the separation of church and state—for public schools in New York to require children to recite a non-denominational State Board of Regents prayer. A year later it ruled against the practice of daily readings of the Bible in the public schools.

These were but a few of many decisions that sought to enhance civil liberties in the early 1960s. In *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963) and *Escobedo v. Illinois* (1964) the Court expanded the constitutional rights of alleged criminals. In *Jacobellis v. Ohio* (1964) it complicated the enforcement of laws against pornography; henceforth, the Court said, prosecutors must prove that such material was “utterly without redeeming social importance.” In the midst of the 1965 congressional session the Court ruled, 7 to 2, that an 1879 Connecticut statute prohibiting not only the sale but also the use (by married as well as unmarried people) of contraceptive devices violated a constitutional right of people to privacy....

Liberals ... were greatly inspired by the Court. At last, they said, the judges were construing the law so as to extend the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to all kinds of Americans, even blacks, non-believers, Jews, and criminals. What a change in constitutional approaches to civil rights and civil liberties since the days of McCarthyism a decade earlier! The Court, moreover, did not bend under criticism; it hewed to its liberal path in the next few years. Advocates of a Great Society rejoiced that liberal programs of the 1960s, unlike those in the 1930s, were safe from judicial assault. Liberals controlled all three branches of American government.

The decisions of the Warren Court reflected and accelerated one of the major trends of the era: the rise of rights-consciousness. This, given special urgency already by the moral power of the civil rights movement, began to seem all-conquering by 1965. It was bolstered by the ever more infectious optimism of liberal social scientists who were certain that the economy, booming in the mid-1960s, could afford to sustain major policy initiatives. Liberal policy-makers, equally optimistic, were sure that the State could engineer political solutions to social and economic problems. Polls suggested that the American people had unprecedented faith in politicians and in the State. The convergence of these ideas and assumptions promoted an increasingly powerful—and ultimately near-irresistible—drive for the expansion of individual rights in the United States. The drive came from the bottom up—from ordinary people demanding justice—and from the top down. A Rights Revolution was at hand.

Among the many liberal acts of the 1965 Congress were some that in other less active sessions would have attracted considerable attention. These included a host of measures signifying the onset of a burgeoning environmental movement: clean air legislation, establishment of parks and national wilderness areas, a law

to control the spread of billboard advertising on interstate highways. Congress also approved a Higher Education Act featuring guaranteed government loans for students, and it substantially expanded existing work-study programs. These widened opportunities for students, especially those from low-income families. Liberals created the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities, thereby substantially engaging the federal government in the promotion of cultural life for the first time since the New Deal. Congress considered laws to improve mine safety and consumer protection. It further increased funding for the war on poverty, although at the modest level of approximately \$1.5 billion for the coming fiscal year.

These and other measures, however, seemed relatively inconsequential in 1965 compared to a Big Four that passed by the end of the session: federal aid to elementary and secondary education, Medicare and Medicaid, immigration reform, and a civil rights act to guarantee voting rights. These four laws, important by any standard of twentieth-century reform legislation, had long been on the agendas of liberal groups. They amply displayed the strengths and weaknesses of the Great Society, of Lyndon Johnson as political leader, and of modern American liberalism.

Improving elementary and secondary education ranked high among the goals of liberals in the postwar era. Some of these advocates focused on the need for higher teachers' salaries. Others, especially once the baby boomers reached school age, demanded more resources for school materials and construction. These goals had dominated debate from the 1940s, when conservatives had ignored Truman's proposals, through 1961, when conservatives and Catholics had defeated Kennedy's. Before 1965, a complicated mix of special interests—religious, racial, regional—had joined conservatives to stymie all major efforts for federal aid.

Three changes in this mix facilitated passage of aid in 1965. One involved race. Urban liberals in the past, led by Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., of Harlem, had opposed federal aid bills that would have assisted segregated schools. But the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which called for the denial of federal assistance to such schools, settled that controversy. Liberals, no longer worrying that aid would abet segregation, were more eager than ever to support general school assistance. The second involved the question of aid to parochial schools. Johnson, a Protestant, was not nearly so politically vulnerable among Protestants as Kennedy had been on this issue, and he resolved to satisfy both the National Education Association, representing public schools, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the most active lobby for parochial schools. He did so by devising a bill that would provide federally assisted educational programs directly to parochial schoolchildren rather than to parochial schools. Public schools would be expected to make these programs available to such students by way of expedients like dual enrollment, public television, and sharing of equipment.

Johnson also injected the third and most important new element into the mix: a focus on poverty. Drawing on selective memories of his own life, he emphasized the benefits of education to poor people. "Compensatory

education,” to be extended to children from low-income families, would greatly expand his war on poverty. The bill that he endorsed trumpeted this principle while at the same time offering a formula for distributing aid that was politically attractive. It offered federal money to 90 percent of school districts in the nation and assured NEA lobbyists that local school administrators would enjoy latitude in determining how the money was spent.

Thanks to these changes it was clear that aid to elementary and secondary education would pass. In the House a bill calling for \$1 billion in the coming year was approved, 263 to 153, with all fifty-six freshman non-southern Democrats who voted on the bill recorded in favor. In the Senate, only eighteen voted no. Johnson signed the bill in April at the site of the one-room school-house where he had learned his ABCs many years before. “As a son of a tenant farmer,” he said, exaggerating the deprivation of his past, “I know that education is the only valid passport from poverty.”

Passage of the act dramatically increased the role of the federal government in school financing. The money, indeed, enticed members of Congress, who approved substantial sums for compensatory education in the next few years. Federal expenditures for schools rose by 1968 to approximately \$4.2 billion, more than ten times the amount (\$375 million) spent ten years earlier. The federal share of total educational spending during the same period increased from less than 3 percent to roughly 10 percent. It continued to rise in subsequent years, generating a historic change in the nature of financial support for schools in the United States....

The second of the Big Four reforms of 1965, Medicare and Medicaid, also emanated from a long and complicated series of postwar legislative struggles that had intensified in the late 1950s and early 1960s. From the Roosevelt years on, the pressure of doctors in the American Medical Association, among other lobbies, had held off major changes in the American health care system. In 1965 one-half of all Americans older than 65 had no health insurance. As with the education issue, however, prospects for liberal overhaul escalated as a result of the 1964 election. Certain of chances for reform, LBJ made better medical care for the elderly his top priority and arranged to have Democratic measures introduced in January as House and Senate Bills Number One. Throughout the course of the subsequent legislative process he drove these bills ahead on mostly straight partisan votes. On one key vote in the House, fifty-eight of the sixty-five first-term Democrats voted to defeat a Republican-sponsored alternative to Medicare that might otherwise have passed.

What did pass was a Medicare bill that mandated increases in Social Security taxes (paid by both employers and employees) to subsidize the costs of hospitalization for certain periods of time (in general, 100 days) for most people who were over 65 years of age. This was Plan A. The bill also offered Plan B, a voluntary program of insurance to help elderly people cover X-ray tests, up to 100 home-nurse visits, and certain doctors' and surgical fees. Plan B was to be supported by the government as well as by payments from recipients of care. The plans aided some 19 million Americans at an estimated cost in the first year (starting July 1, 1966) of \$6.5 billion.

Congressman Wilbur Mills of Arkansas, the influential chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, then helped to add a Medicaid program, which few observers had anticipated and which received little sustained attention on the Hill. Like the education act, it reflected the contemporary focus on poverty. It offered federal matching grants to states that provided money to poor people already eligible for categorical welfare programs—the blind, the disabled, the needy aged not covered by Social Security, and families with dependent children (AFDC)—and to a small number of other “medically indigent” Americans who were not in these categories. Medicaid, like AFDC, was a government “entitlement”: it guaranteed recipients assistance (assuming state spending) without need of annual congressional approval of appropriations. All these reforms passed with ease on partisan votes. Hailing the results, Johnson went to Independence, Missouri, to sign Medicare in the presence of Harry Truman. “No longer will older Americans be denied the healing miracle of modern medicine,” he said with characteristic flourish. “No longer will illness crush and destroy the savings that they have so carefully put away over a lifetime so that they might enjoy dignity in their later years.”

Medicare and Medicaid considerably changed the nature of health care in the United States. Growing rapidly in the next few years, they reached one-fifth of the population by 1976. Medicare helped a number of elderly people to receive health services that might otherwise have driven them into poverty. Medicaid enabled many eligible poor people to go to doctors for the first time in their lives. By 1968 it was estimated that low-income Americans consulted physicians more often than did higher-income people (5.6 visits per year as opposed to 4.9 visits). Changes such as these gladdened the hearts of reformers and helped to sustain liberal support for the programs in later years....

Reform of the nation’s immigration policies, the third of the Big Four in 1965, ranked lower among the priorities of Johnson and his advisers at the start of the legislative session. But congressional Democrats, led by Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, chose to seize upon the uniquely liberal mood to challenge existing immigration laws. These, dating from the 1920s, still employed “national origins” quotas that discriminated against southern and eastern Europeans and that sharply limited the numbers of Asians who could come to America.

By the close of the session they had succeeded, and Johnson traveled yet again, this time to the Statue of Liberty, to sign a bill that reflected the more rights-conscious spirit of the era. The legislation of 1965 did away with the old discriminatory quota system and established priorities that were expected to increase the flow of people from southern and eastern Europe—those, at least, who were not locked behind the iron curtain. It stipulated that a total of 290,000 immigrants per year (roughly the numbers then coming) could be admitted to the United States as of 1968. For the first time in United States history the law set limits on the numbers of immigrants who might be admitted from countries in the Western Hemisphere. These were to be 120,000 per year, with the rest—170,000—to come from Europe and (it was expected) in much smaller numbers from Africa and Asia. A maximum of 20,000 people

might come from any single nation, except from those in the Western Hemisphere, where no such national limits were applied.

At the time of its passage the new immigration law, while hailed for its repeal of the old quotas, did not seem likely to create major changes in the demography of the United States. Over time, however, it did; framers of the law failed to foresee the consequences of what they had done. This was mainly because the law also permitted the admission beyond numerical limits of close relatives of United States citizens, both native-born and naturalized. Over the next decade an average of some 100,000 were admitted each year in addition to the 290,000 authorized by the statute. Equally unexpected, the sources of immigration began to change dramatically after the late 1960s. Contrary to the expectations of Celler and others, the flow of immigrants from Europe declined after 1968. But the numbers from Latin America and Asia began to swell. By 1976 more than half of legal immigrants to the United States came from seven nations: Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, Cuba, Taiwan, India, and the Dominican Republic....

The fourth and most significant liberal accomplishment of the 1965 congressional session involved the still most divisive issue of the age: race relations. This now focused on voting rights for blacks, which the civil rights acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 had failed to guarantee. In many Deep South counties, 90 percent or more of blacks were not registered to vote. Johnson recognized the problem and called for action in his State of the Union message in January....

The 1965 Voting Rights Act greatly extended federal power in the United States. A frankly regional measure, it took aim at Deep South states by stipulating that the Justice Department could intervene to suspend discriminatory registration tests in counties where 50 percent or fewer of the county's voting-age population had been able to register. If that failed to work, the department could send in federal registrars to take over the job. The law covered state and local as well as federal elections and protected not only the right to register but also the right to vote. Two days after the bill became law, federal registrars turned up in Selma as well as in eight other counties in three southern states. Within a year the strong arm of the federal government had helped to increase the registration of eligible Negroes in the six southern states wholly covered by the law from 30 to 46 percent....

American liberals understandably hailed the accomplishments of Johnson and the congressional session of 1965. "It is the Congress of accomplished hopes," Speaker McCormack said. "It is the Congress of realized dreams." No other President cared so much as Johnson did about domestic policies or about civil rights, and none since FDR in the 1930s had come close to securing so many laws, many of them long awaited by reformers. It was a high tide of American liberalism in the postwar era.

By mid-1965, however, there were signs that the tide was about to ebb. Nothing exposed this more clearly than a riot that broke out in Watts, a predominantly black area of Los Angeles, only five days after signing of the voting rights act on August 6. Although Watts seemed to be a less squalid area than many black urban neighborhoods, it contained severe socio-economic problems: three-quarters of the

adult black males living there were unemployed. The riot started following an altercation between police and a black man who resisted arrest for drunken driving. Such fracas were nothing new in the history of relations between police and minorities of color (including Mexican-Americans). But urban blacks, like blacks in the South, had grown proud and angry. Charging police brutality, they rallied to the man's side. What followed was five days of rioting, sniping, looting, and burning, mostly against white-owned stores and buildings. The disturbance, ending only after 13,900 National Guardsmen came in to restore order, killed thirty-four people and injured more than 1,000, the vast majority of them blacks. Damage to property was estimated at more than \$35 million. Some 4,000 people were arrested. Although conservatives claimed that only a handful of "riffraff" had caused the trouble, it was obvious that the uprising commanded wide support in Watts. Some 30,000 people had participated in the rioting, and 60,000 more had stood by in support. Their hopes and expectations whetted, they had lashed out at the white world. When King walked the streets preaching non-violence, they ignored him. Clearly, the civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965 were not softening the social and economic grievances of the black masses. Maybe no liberal legislation could.

Although the Watts riot of 1965 was an extreme response, it appears in retrospect as an ominous omen of the future. One domestic crisis after another in the next few years, including even bloodier racial confrontations in the cities, shattered the optimism of social engineers and threw liberals back on the defensive. By late 1965 Johnson himself seemed close to despair. "What do they want?" he asked of his critics. "I'm giving them boom times and more good legislation than anybody else did, and what do they do—attack and sneer. Could FDR do better? Could anybody do better? What do they want?" From this perspective, the first twenty months of the Johnson years stand as a shining but relatively brief era in the postwar history of American liberalism.

The rather sudden ebbing of liberal hopes caused many scholars—and contemporaries—to blame Johnson. They have a point. LBJ, unable to contain his ego, indeed wanted to outdo FDR—and every other President in history. He measured accomplishment in largely quantitative terms: the more big programs passed, the better. Some of these programs, such as OEO, were hurried into law without much research to sustain them and without much forethought about potentially divisive political consequences. Other programs, such as aid to education, relied overoptimistically on injections of federal spending to cope with complicated social problems that, like poverty, needed more thoughtful study than they received. Getting things done quickly was not the same as getting them done well.

Many of the subsequent problems with Great Society programs stemmed from three common characteristics. One was the tendency of Johnson and his advisers to rely on highly partisan majorities. When the programs encountered difficulties down the road, Republicans and others felt free to say, "I told you so," and to denounce them at will. The civil rights acts stood as exceptions to this tendency. Thanks to the moral power of the civil rights movement—and to the overreaction of racists in the Deep South—these aroused bipartisan

congressional support in the North in 1964 and 1965. Northerners of both parties, having targeted the South as the Enemy, had a stake in what they had accomplished. (After all, the acts did not much affect the North.) The goals were clear and just, the enforcement strong, the laws of lasting significance.

Second, Johnson had little stomach for taking on well-entrenched political interests. In part because he was fearful of conservatives, including corporate interests, he refused to consider creation of large-scale public employment programs, such as the WPA, that might have provided work and raised the income of the poor. Labor unions, too, feared such programs—because they threatened to endanger the jobs of the working poor. Respectful of lobbyists for the National Education Association, Johnson permitted local school administrators overwide leeway in their spending of federal money. Aware of the power of the American Medical Association, he approved health care legislation that (among other things) benefited hospitals, physicians, and insurance companies. He refused to raise taxes to pay for any of these programs.

The Great Society programs were for these reasons quintessentially liberal, not radical. Except in the area of race relations—a major exception—they made no serious effort to challenge the power of established groups, including large corporations. In no way did they seriously confront socio-economic inequality or seek to redistribute wealth. The essence of Great Society liberalism was that government had the tools and the resources to help people help themselves. It sought to advance equality of opportunity, not to establish greater equality of social condition.

Oversell was a third characteristic of Johnson and the Great Society. As LBJ jetted about the country to publicize and to sign the landmark acts of his administration, he (and others) offered soaring descriptions of what he had done. The OEO could end poverty in ten years. Aid to education would provide the “only valid passport from poverty.” Medicare would advance the “healing miracle of modern medicine.” Voting rights were the “most powerful instrument ever devised by men for breaking down injustice.” Some of these programs indeed helped people, and many others—immigration reform, governmental support of the arts and the humanities, environmental legislation—reflected noble intentions. But the Great Society did not do nearly as much to improve the economic standing of people as did the extraordinary growth of the economy. When this stopped—in the 1970s—the flaws in LBJ’s programs seemed glaring. Hyperbole about the Great Society aroused unrealistic popular expectations about government that later came to haunt American liberalism.

These were indeed problems with the presidential leadership of Lyndon Johnson and more broadly with the liberal political philosophy that he embraced. Still, it is a little unfair to harp on them. Johnson, who had an acute sense of what was possible in American politics, was correct in maintaining that he had to move quickly in 1965 if he hoped to advance the liberal agenda. After all, conservatives and interest groups had blocked it for a generation. And getting things done naturally entailed reliance on his heavily Democratic majorities. Outside of civil rights, ... the GOP was neither necessary for legislative majorities in 1965 nor in much of a mood to help.

The Limits of the Great Society

MAURICE ISSERMAN AND MICHAEL KAZIN

... In an issue of the *Village Voice* published late in 1966, cartoonist Jules Feiffer offered a wry analysis of the state of domestic politics in his weekly cartoon. "Big Daddy," a young girl in western dress asks a stricken-looking, cowboy-garbed Lyndon Johnson in the cartoon's first panel, "That look on your face—yer hidin' something'." "Sit down, child," Johnson replies gravely. "Yew gonna have t'be brave.... Great Society has had an accident, child." She begs reassurance that it's only a "li'l bitty accident," but Johnson tells her not to get her hopes up. Then, in the final panel, the child looks up at Johnson with suddenly dawning suspicion: "This accident o' Great Society's, Big Daddy. Has it already happened—or are yew about t'have it happen?" "Naow," Johnson responds slyly, "We don't want t'grow up too fast, child."

By this time *Village Voice* readers, like many of Johnson's former supporters, had come to regard the president as a habitual liar. The man who, seemingly, had no enemies at the start of 1965, had fallen below a 50 percent approval rating by the spring of 1966. The term "credibility gap" was by now in wide circulation to describe Johnson's penchant for deceiving the public. Feiffer probably did Johnson an injustice in suggesting willing complicity on his part in the demise of the bright hopes of the early Great Society. In retirement, Johnson would speak with obvious anguish of the fate of his social programs, about the ill luck and difficult political choices that hampered them while he was in office, and about their cruel dismembering at the hands of his Republican successor. "[N]ow Nixon has come along and everything I've worked for is ruined," he complained to interviewer Doris Kearns in 1971. "There's a story in the paper every day about him slashing another one of my Great Society programs. I can just see him waking up in the morning, making that victory sign of his and deciding which program to kill."

LBJ's self-exculpating account of the death of the Great Society cannot, however, be taken as the whole truth. The bold vision of social transformation that he had announced with such enthusiasm during the presidential campaign of 1964 would wither long before Richard Nixon was in the position to wield an executioner's ax. In the course of 1966, with overwhelming Democratic majorities still in control of both houses of Congress, Johnson could persuade Congress to pass only a single significant Great Society proposal, the Model Cities Act providing federal funding for the redesign and reconstruction of America's inner cities. And even that measure passed with greatly reduced majorities compared to those enjoyed by previous Great Society legislation. Johnson's real goal in 1966 was to hold down spending on existing Great Society programs rather than passing new measures. As domestic policy adviser Joseph Califano would recall, "Johnson's extravagant rhetoric announcing new programs belied the modest funds he requested to begin them." Political reversals in the 1966 midterm elections reinforced Johnson's caution.

Lyndon Johnson could read election returns as well as any man who had ever sat in the Oval Office. Although he continued to propose new social programs in the years remaining in his presidency, they were in scale and ambition nothing like those he had put forward in 1964–1965. There was no more talk of unconditional war against poverty; now it was simply a “poverty program.” By 1968, when he delivered his final State of the Union address, Johnson used the term “Great Society” in only a single passing reference.

Johnson bore significant, though not exclusive, responsibility for blighting the promise of liberal reform in the 1960s. His responsibility lay first and foremost in the fact that after 1965 his first priority as president no longer concerned the Great Society or domestic policy in general, but winning the war in Vietnam. The war not only diverted Johnson’s attention from domestic policy, but also drained billions of dollars in federal funding, some portion of which might otherwise have gone to the Great Society. The war also undermined Johnson’s authority, divided Democrats into feuding camps, and emboldened his conservative opponents. But even without the war, the Great Society would likely have come to grief in the later 1960s, as it ran afoul of other conflicts breaking out between Americans over issues such as racial justice, crime, personal morality, and economic security.

By January 1966, when President Johnson delivered his third State of the Union address, there was no question that the United States was deeply involved in a war that was not destined to end any time soon. The president vowed in his address that the country would prove “strong enough to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Society at home.” But as the war in Vietnam escalated, so did its costs, in dollars as well as in lives. The \$5 billion the United States spent in Vietnam in 1965 doubled the following year; by 1968 direct costs of running the war (excluding veterans benefits and related expenses) increased to \$33 billion....

Johnson was being hit from both the Right and the Left on the issue of spending in Vietnam. The Right demanded that Johnson cut domestic spending as the price for increased taxes (a dispute that delayed the actual passage of the income tax surcharge for nearly a year). “We are trying to get this message across,” declared Wilbur Mills, the conservative chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, in which the surtax bill was bottled up. “We want a pause in this headlong rush toward ever bigger government.” The Left, on the other hand—at least that portion of the Left that still thought it shared any common political ground with Johnson—intended to hold the president to his pledge to provide guns *and* butter to the American people. Bobby Kennedy, now ensconced in Congress as a senator from New York State, and still officially a supporter of the war, challenged Johnson in the spring of 1966 when the administration proposed a lower than expected funding request for aid to disadvantaged schools. The “200 million dollars that is being cut [from the original request],” Kennedy declared, “is what it costs to send the B-52s over Vietnam for perhaps a week.” ...

The war that President Johnson had proposed fighting against poverty was intended as only one part of the much more ambitious project of building the Great Society. But in historical memory the former has all but subsumed the latter; few people today remember how much of the Great Society, from

Medicare to highway beautification to endowments for the humanities and arts, was designed primarily to benefit the middle class. Similarly, the costs of the war on poverty have been greatly exaggerated. Even at their height, Johnson's poverty programs never represented the "unconditional war" that he declared in his first State of the Union address. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who as assistant secretary of labor in charge of the Office of Policy Planning and Research in 1964 had been present at the launching of the war on poverty, would later declare that it had been "oversold and underfinanced to the point that its failure was almost a matter of design." The Office of Economic Opportunity, the agency overseeing the poverty program, received only 1.5 percent of the federal budget for all its programs in the years from 1965 to 1970. Had the money spent on poverty programs simply been parceled out in cash grants to every American whose income fell below the poverty line in those years, each poor person would have received a grand total of about \$70 a year.

The war on poverty had scarcely gotten off the ground when it ran into sustained political opposition. Conservative Republicans viewed the whole thing as an expensive government boondoggle. Many Democrats, particularly those in city government, came to oppose its provisions for "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in directing poverty programs, particularly through the community action agencies. Sargent Shriver had initially expected those agencies to function in ways similar to a board of education, formally independent of local government as school boards generally were, but certainly not in an adversarial position. Instead, many of the agencies launched voter registration drives to oust incumbent politicians or sponsored marches on city halls to demand improved services for poor neighborhoods.

The backlash from urban Democratic leaders was immediate and intense. Two Democratic mayors, Sam Yorty of Los Angeles and John Shelley of San Francisco, offered a resolution to the 1965 meeting of the U.S. Conference of Mayors condemning the war on poverty for "fostering class struggle" in American cities. (Yorty had been a long-time conservative gadfly within the Democratic Party. Shelley, on the other hand, was a former trade unionist who had headed up the San Francisco Labor Council before becoming mayor—his disaffection had ominous implications for the future of urban Democratic politics.) When Congress passed the Model Cities Act in 1966, it directed that the program be administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development rather than the now-suspect OEO, and the provisions for "maximum feasible participation" of the poor were eliminated. Unlike the programs established in 1964–1965, Model Cities would be a program controlled by big city mayors, not by people in poor neighborhoods and ghettos.

By 1966 even the poor were complaining about the war on poverty, a war that had been launched on their behalf, but not at their behest. One of the defining characteristics of the "culture of poverty" that Michael Harrington had described in *The Other America* was a sense of fatalism, at odds with any kind of sustained political involvement. But the war on poverty created a sense of rising expectations among the poor that the antipoverty programs could do little to assuage. In April 1966, at a Washington, D.C. conference of the Citizen's

Crusade Against Poverty (a private advocacy group set up at the behest of the United Auto Workers union to lobby on behalf of the poverty program), Sargent Shriver was booed and jostled by a dissident group of community activists when he attempted to address the group. Shriver was driven from the stage by chants of "You're lying!" and "Stop listening to him!" Afterward UAW official Jack Conway despaired that the poor "have turned on the people who wanted to help them."

For all its limited scope, and for all the controversy it created, the war on poverty was not without its successes. The number of people in the United States whose annual income fell beneath the poverty line declined from 32 million (or 17 percent of the population) in 1965 to 23 million (or 11 percent of the population in 1973). To be sure, poverty had been declining in the 1950s even before there was a war on poverty, and the general prosperity and low unemployment rates of the mid-to-late 1960s certainly accounted for some of the decline. But save for the period of the Second World War, which brought the Great Depression to a sudden end, there was no other period in American history when poverty rates declined as rapidly as they did during the years of Johnson's presidency and its immediate aftermath.

Nonetheless, by the later 1960s, Americans who disagreed on just about everything else were united in judging the war on poverty an abject failure. Government programs had clearly failed to eliminate poverty as either an economic category or as a "culture." If anything, the remaining urban poor (whose numbers began to increase again during the economic hard times of the later 1970s) seemed even more permanently mired in their condition than they had been before the federal government interested itself in their plight.

The conservative argument that the very programs liberals had foisted upon the country in the 1960s kept the poor bound to a "cycle of dependency" would become conventional wisdom within a very few years. While the number of poor people declined in the later 1960s, the number of AFDC recipients mounted at an even more precipitous rate. In 1960 fewer than three-quarters of a million families were receiving aid through AFDC at a cost to the federal and state governments of under a billion dollars; by 1972 there were 3 million families receiving AFDC, at an annual cost of \$6 billion. The swelling welfare rolls were accompanied by rising rates of illegitimacy, teenage pregnancies, single-parent families, violent crime, substance abuse, and a host of other ills that came to be laid at the feet of the liberal social engineers of the Great Society.

In a curious way, the problem with the war on poverty was not that it failed, but that it succeeded—perhaps too well for its own political survival. The intent of the war, after all, was to lessen the distance between the "other America" and the mainstream. One of the characteristic elements of American national identity is the belief that citizenship, and personal security and dignity, are grounded in "rights." The war on poverty, through its rhetoric, and through the legal services it provided poor communities, reinforced the idea that the poor as well as the affluent should enjoy these rights. And one of the expressions of

this new sensibility was the belief that those who received government aid in the form of welfare payments did so not as a matter of charity, but of right.

Since the start of the twentieth century, the term "welfare" had changed in American political discourse from a term with positive associations of health and well-being to one implying malingering incapacity and the waste of taxpayers' hard-earned money. At best, welfare tended to be viewed as a kind of gift that the better-off, through the government, offered to the less fortunate and deserving poor. Those who received it were expected to be appropriately grateful and as unobtrusive as possible....

The hostility to welfare recipients was part of larger shift of sentiment against the poor in the later 1960s. The piety with which poverty had been spoken of in the early days of the Johnson administration gave way by the mid-1960s to a more astringent rhetoric. The vision of the poor as latter-day Daniel Boones perched up high on some West Virginia mountainside disappeared from the media and popular consciousness, to be replaced by the more durable and menacing image of a black urban underclass....

The war on poverty was founded on the assumption that the United States had entered upon an era of permanent abundance. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 declared its goal to be the elimination of the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty. But even in the go-go years of the 1960s economy "plenty" was unevenly distributed in the United States, in ways that left a majority of American families vulnerable to any downturn. Workers' real wages and median family income increased dramatically in the postwar era, but income share remained virtually unchanged (the top fifth of the population received 43 percent of income in 1947, 41.2 percent in 1968). The median family income for 1968, which stood at \$8632, was still about a thousand dollars less than what the Bureau of Labor Statistics defined as "modest but adequate" income for an urban family of four. That meant that many working-class families had to scramble to stay ahead, either by going into debt or by fielding additional breadwinners, usually by means of sending wives into the workforce. (In 1960, 37.8 percent of women were in labor force; by 1970 that number had increased to 43.4 percent—a rising and irreversible trend that would jump to over 50 percent before the end of the next decade.) Rising wages also began to erode as inflation picked up later in the decade and as taxpayers found themselves bumped upward into higher tax brackets.

White working-class taxpayers and small property owners, already fearful about blacks moving into their neighborhoods, resented the war on poverty as a payoff to rioters, "welfare queens," and "poverty pimps." In a nation long obsessed with the automobile, it was only fitting that the earliest and pithiest statements of new political trends were to be found attached to rear fenders: when "I Fight Poverty, I Work" bumper stickers began appearing in the mid-1960s, it was clear that the nation's brief honeymoon of concern and goodwill with the poor was coming to an end.

The prospects for liberal reform were worsened by declining white support for the civil rights struggle. In 1964, 68 percent of northern whites supported the Johnson's administration's civil rights initiatives. That was before Watts and the

riots that followed. Throughout the country, there were 11 major riots (defined as civil disturbances lasting two days or more) in the summer of 1966, and 32 minor riots; the following summer, the number jumped to 25 major and 30 minor riots, including the bloodiest outburst of the decade in Detroit, where 43 people died in the rioting in July 1967.

By 1966, 52 percent of northern whites believed the government was pushing too fast for integration. As long as “civil rights” had been seen as a regional problem, a battle fought between white and black citizens of distant states like Alabama and Mississippi, white ethnic voters in northern cities were prone to support or at least tolerate the liberal politicians who voted for legislation banning racial discrimination. But when confrontations broke out in northern cities between whites and blacks over issues of immediate local concern—housing, jobs, schools, political clout—and when nonviolent demonstrations gave way to or were accompanied by black rioting the equation changed....

By the mid-1960s, the rhetoric and imagery of the civil rights movement was being appropriated by whites for their own purposes. As one Michigan woman wrote to her congressman, “These white people [in Chicago] wish to be left alone and should be allowed to live with their own kind of people, or is the white not supposed to have any freedom?” Open housing proved to be an issue very different from the question of whether blacks should vote or be able to eat in any restaurant they could afford to patronize. Residents of places like Marquette Park had saved for years to buy their own homes in a secure, comfortable neighborhood. For them, black migration spelled a sharp increase in crime and social tensions; the value of their property and the quality of their children’s educations, they feared, would decline rapidly.

The conflict in Chicago in the summer of 1966, and similar ones in other northern locales, revealed large numbers of whites now ready to stand up in the name of their own rights and grievances, in ways that did not bode well either for the civil rights movement or for any other part of the liberal reform agenda. Liberal politicians were held accountable for rising racial animosity, and a host of related evils. A resident of Marquette Park complained to Senator Paul Douglas, a longtime champion of such liberal causes as antipoverty programs and civil rights: “We work hard, pay our taxes, improve ourselves, only to find the more we improve ourselves and our property the more we are taxed and told what we can and cannot do with it.” Property, taxes, self-improvement, and self-rule—this was economic and cultural terrain perfectly suited for nurturing a new conservative political coalition. Senator Douglas would find that out in a hurry as he went down to defeat in November 1966 in his bid for reelection to what would have been his fourth term in office.

As Americans were becoming more mistrustful of liberal leaders, many also wished that traditional sources of authority could be restored to the role they had played (or were imagined to have played) in earlier days, as enforcers of a common morality and social harmony. “We are becoming cannibalized,” a working-class Italian American from Brooklyn complained. “We didn’t sass the policeman when he told us to move. Now in school they call teachers ‘motherfucker.’”

Cultural backlash intersected with the racial backlash and also with class resentments. Although many of the youthful denizens of places like Haight-Ashbury were in reality runaways or “throwaways” from poor and working-class families, the image of the counterculture became synonymous in the minds of many Americans with the privileged existence enjoyed by well-off students at the nation’s best-known colleges and universities....

It was bad enough that the privileged young ignored traditional authority and morality; worse, they actually celebrated the resulting chaos: “We are outlaws!,” the *Berkeley Barb*, a leading underground newspaper exulted: “We defy law and order with our bricks bottles garbage long hair filth obscenity drugs games guns bikes fire fun & fucking—the future of our struggle is the future of crime in the streets.”

There was a certain amount of deliberately provocative hyperbole in such editorial broadsides, and in rock anthems like Jefferson Airplane’s “Volunteers” (“We are all outlaws in the eyes of Amerika!”). But for urban Americans, both black and white, crime was no joking matter in the 1960s. After having declined steadily since the Second World War, rates of serious crime, including murder, rape, robbery, and auto theft shot up dramatically in the mid-1960s.

There were many explanations put forward for this disastrous trend. Liberals favored explanations emphasizing environmental “root causes”—unemployment, poor schools, and the like. Conservatives, on the other hand, blamed permissive child-rearing practices, lax law enforcement, and criminal-coddling courts. Criminologists pointed to additional factors that were beyond the control of public policy, either liberal or conservative. Young people in their teens and early twenties are always the group most likely to find themselves in trouble with the law. The fact that the growth in crime in the 1960s began when the first wave of baby boomers turned 16 certainly accounted for some, if not all, of the increase.

Calls to “support your local police” (a popular bumper sticker slogan), often came with a poorly disguised racial subtext. William Parker, the outspoken chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, told a local reporter in 1965 that within five years “45 percent of the metropolitan area of Los Angeles will be Negro. If you want any protection for your home and family, you’re going to have to get in and support a strong police department. If you don’t do that, come 1970, God help you!”

Conservative politicians quickly recognized the political importance of the crime statistics. “[We] have heard of and seen many wars in the time of the present administration,” Barry Goldwater declared in a campaign speech in mid-September 1964 in St. Petersburg, Florida. “But have we yet heard of the only needed war—the war against crime?” Johnson responded a month later in a campaign speech in Dayton, Ohio, avowing that his war on poverty “is a war against crime and a war against disorder.” The following March, in a message to Congress, Johnson declared a “war on crime,” while still maintaining that the long-run solution to crime was jobs, education, and hope.

But the liberal emphasis on combating the “root causes” of crime, instead of just locking up criminals, was easily parodied by conservatives. “How long are

Conflict
Argument
simultaneous

we going to abdicate law and order ...” House minority leader Gerald Ford asked rhetorically in 1966, “in favor of a soft social theory that the man who heaves a brick through your window or tosses a firebomb into your car is simply the misunderstood and underprivileged product of a broken home?”

For millions of white Americans of middling income, “law and order” became both a cry of outrage at the political, cultural, and social upheavals of the 1960s, and the crux of the solution to them. The phrase conveyed the sense that the hard-won upward mobility of the postwar era was a fragile achievement, prey to the taunts of Ivy League radicals and ghetto rioters alike. The demand for “law and order” asserted the common grievances of ordinary people against the perversely misplaced sympathies of liberal politicians and intellectuals, a group who had come to seem contemptuous of the way normal Americans lived their lives.

In the course of the 1960s, the imagery of class conflict in America was turned on its head. Liberals—who had been thought of as defenders of the interests of the working classes in the 1930s, and who in the early 1960s embraced the cause of the most downtrodden of Americans, southern blacks and the poor—by the mid-1960s were viewed by many as an arrogant elite of “limousine liberals.” And conservatives—those “economic royalists” denounced by FDR in the 1930s as the aristocratic defenders of privilege and power—were emerging in the 1960s as the new populists, speaking for the common man and woman. A liberal government that seemed more interested in protecting esoteric and expansive notions of “rights” for marginal groups than in protecting the lives and property of the vast majority was rapidly losing legitimacy. With the nation’s financial resources engaged in the war in Vietnam, and its emotional resources engaged in the war on crime, there was precious little of either left over for a war on poverty. And if, as it seemed by 1966–1967, that the real political choice the United States faced was between constructing a Great Society or maintaining an orderly one, it is not surprising that so many would choose the latter over the former.

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The New Radicalism of the 1960s

As the 1950s drew to a close, the chill of the McCarthy years faded, and even Eisenhower's towering popularity waned. Amid growing prosperity, expanding educational opportunities, and a growing population of young people as a consequence of the postwar "baby boom," many Americans had the time, inclination, and generational distance from the travails of the 1930s and 1940s to examine their society more closely. What they founded produced unease, and a new critical spirit quickened throughout much of the nation. The burgeoning civil rights struggle focused attention on spectacular racial injustices in many parts of the country. Many women increasingly sensed a lack of fulfillment as they enacted traditional gender roles. Meanwhile, dramatically rising living standards for many Americans underscored the fact that millions of fellow citizens remained trapped in poverty. Fears of nuclear war and later hostility to the war in Vietnam led Americans to question how their government made decisions. Perhaps most important of all, many Americans sensed that their nation, in its quest for material abundance, had lost touch with older principles and nobler aspirations.

It was this spirit of unease to which John F. Kennedy appealed in his promise to "get America moving again" along a "new frontier." But Kennedy embodied a moderate liberalism not very different from the moderate conservatism that had marked the Eisenhower years. The new radicalism that blossomed during the 1960s entailed a much deeper reappraisal of American society and a much greater willingness to challenge—even overturn—the existing political, economic, and cultural order. Indeed, radicals broke sharply with liberals as the 1960s progressed, criticizing liberals as mere reformers who refused to address America's problems at their roots.

Radicalism took many different forms. Some critics of mainstream society took an earnest, academic approach, detailing their points of view in weighty studies and manifestos. Others took a more exuberant and confrontational approach, embracing a counterculture typified by long hair, sexual liberation, drug use, and philosophical creativity that flew in the face of social conventions. At root, though, the radicals shared a sense that their society had gone badly off course and required renovation at its core. This attitude antagonized many Americans, who were more comfortable with the status quo, and alarmed governmental authorities, who used legal and illegal means to monitor radical groups. Hostility to the radicals, along with the backlash against liberal social programs explored in Chapter 5, helped fuel the conservative revival in subsequent years.



DOCUMENTS

One of the most powerful voices of radicalism in the 1950s was that of C. Wright Mills, a sociologist and prolific author who criticized what he saw as the empty self-satisfaction of American society, especially its intellectual elite. In Document 1, a letter published in the journal *New Left Review*, Mills tears into American liberalism and calls for a more “utopian” kind of political movement. Mills’s writings inspired student activist Tom Hayden and other leaders of Students for a Democratic Society to write the Port Huron Statement, excerpted as Document 2. The most influential statement of New Left views during the 1960s, the statement called for a new radicalism that would shun Marxist clichés of the 1930s and embrace instead “participatory democracy” and a reconstruction of American society that would replace “power rooted in possession, privilege, or circumstance [with] power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason, and creativity.”

Despite the radicalism of its views, SDS dedicated itself to the more or less traditional politics of organization and struggle and projected an image of earnestness and dedication. That style contrasted sharply with another expression of 1960s radicalism embodied by Timothy Leary, a psychologist who advocated drug use and urged young Americans to “turn on,” “tune in,” and “drop out.” In Document 3, an excerpt from a 1967 essay titled “Start Your Own Religion,” Leary urges readers to reject all social conventions and strive for a more authentic, satisfying existence.

The later 1960s saw increasing numbers of young Americans not just joining the countercultural movement but also engaging in more direct forms of confrontation with established authorities, especially on university campuses. One of the most spectacular campus uprisings occurred at Colombia University in New York in the spring of 1968, when student radicals occupied several university buildings. In Document 4, an excerpt from a pamphlet titled “Why We Strike,” leaders laid out their demands, which included an end to university involvement in military research, cancellation of plans to build a new gym that critics regarded as an affront to local minority communities, and greater student involvement in university decision making.

Most Americans, of course, were not students, were not young, and were not radical. Although some sympathized with the goals of student protesters, many others angrily opposed their methods and goals. Government officials sometimes used their powers to monitor and subvert radical organizations. The FBI launched an illegal, secret campaign under the auspices of its Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) to disrupt the New Left. A congressional investigation completed in 1976 exposed those methods and sharply criticized the FBI for its behavior between 1968 and 1971 (Document 5). Meanwhile, American leaders lambasted radicals as unrepresentative and irresponsible minorities. In Document 6, a speech delivered on October 30, 1969, Vice President Spiro Agnew called on other Americans to assert themselves and restore respect for law and order.

By the early 1970s, the political radicalism that had characterized the 1960s had subsided, much of the decade's cultural radicalism had been absorbed and converted into cultural commodities, and a faltering economy had dampened the heady optimism of the previous decade. In Document 7, pollster Daniel Yankelovich captures the chastened new spirit in a survey that mapped the changing attitudes and values of the 1970s.

1. C. Wright Mills Calls for a New Left, 1960

... It is no exaggeration to say that since the end of World War II in Britain and the United States smug conservatives, tired liberals and disillusioned radicals have carried on a weary discourse in which issues are blurred and potential debate muted; the sickness of complacency has prevailed, the bi-partisan banality flourished. There is no need ... to explain again why all this has come about among "people in general" in the NATO countries; but it may be worthwhile to examine one style of cultural work that is in effect an intellectual celebration of apathy.

Many intellectual fashions, of course, do just that; they stand in the way of a release of the imagination—about the cold war, the Soviet bloc, the politics of peace, about any new beginnings at home and abroad. But the fashion I have in mind is the weariness of many NATO intellectuals with what they call "ideology", and their proclamation of "the end of ideology".... Does it amount to anything?

Underneath this style of observation and comment there is the assumption that in the West there are no more real issues or even problems of great seriousness. The mixed economy plus the welfare state plus prosperity—that is the formula. US capitalism will continue to be workable; the welfare state will continue along the road to ever greater justice. In the meantime, things everywhere are very complex, let us not be careless, there are great risks ...

This posture—one of "false consciousness" if there ever was one—stands in the way, I think, of considering with any chances of success what may be happening in the world.

First and above all, it does rest upon a simple provincialism. If the phrase "the end of ideology" has any meaning at all, it pertains to self-selected circles of intellectuals in the richer countries. It is in fact merely their own self-image. The total population of these countries is a fraction of mankind; the period during which such a posture has been assumed is very short indeed. To speak in such terms of much of Latin-America, Africa, Asia, the Soviet bloc is merely ludicrous. Anyone who stands in front of audiences—intellectual or mass—in any of these places and talks in such terms will merely be shrugged off (if the audience is polite) or laughed at out loud (if the audience is more candid and knowledgeable). The end-of-ideology is a slogan of complacency, circulating among the prematurely middle-aged, centered in the present, and in the rich Western societies. In the final analysis, it also rests upon a disbelief in the shaping

by men of their own futures—as history and as biography. It is a consensus of a few provincials about their own immediate and provincial position....

All this is just the sort of thing that I at least have always objected to, and do object to, in the “socialist realism” of the Soviet Union.

There too, criticism of milieux are of course permitted—but they are not to be connected with criticism of the structure itself: one may not question “the system”. There are no “antagonistic contradictions”....

There too, pessimism is permitted—but only episodically and only within the context of the big optimism: the tendency is to confuse any systematic or structural criticism with pessimism itself. So they admit criticisms, first of this and then of that: but engulf them all by the long-run historical optimism about the system as a whole and the goals proclaimed by its leaders.

I neither want nor need to overstress the parallel, yet in a recent series of interviews in the Soviet Union concerning socialist realism I was very much struck by it. In Uzbekistan and Georgia as well as in Russia, I kept writing notes to myself, at the end of recorded interviews: “This man talks in a style just like Arthur Schlesinger Jr.” “Surely this fellow’s the counterpart of Daniel Bell, except not so—what shall I say?—so gossipy; and certainly neither so petty nor so vulgar as the more envious status-climbers. Perhaps this is because here they are not thrown into such a competitive status-panic about the ancient and obfuscating British models of prestige”....

But the most immediately important thing about the “end of ideology” is that it *is* merely a fashion, and fashions change. Already this one is on its way out....

We who have been consistently radical in the moral terms of our work throughout the postwar period are often amused nowadays that various writers—sensing another shift in fashion—begin to call upon intellectuals to work once more in ways that are politically explicit. But we shouldn’t be merely amused—we ought to try to make their shift more than a fashion change.

The end-of-ideology is on the way out because it stands for the refusal to work out an explicit political philosophy. And alert men everywhere today do feel the need of such a philosophy. What we should do is to continue directly to confront this need. In doing so, it may be useful to keep in mind that to have a working political philosophy means to have a philosophy that enables you to work....

So far as political and human *ideals* are concerned, the end-of-ideology stands for a denial of their relevance—except as abstract ikons. Merely to hold such ideals seriously is in this view “utopian”....

We are frequently accused of being “utopian”—in our criticisms and in our proposals; and along with this, of basing our hopes for a New Left *politics* “merely on reason”, or more concretely, upon the intelligentsia in its broadest sense.

There is truth in these charges. But must we not ask: what now is really meant by Utopian? And: Is not our utopianism a major source of our strength? “Utopian” nowadays I think refers to any criticism or proposal that transcends the up-close milieux of a scatter of individuals: the milieux which men and women can understand directly and which they can reasonably hope directly to change. In this exact sense, our theoretical work is indeed utopian—in my own case, at least,

deliberately so. What needs to be understood, and what needs to be changed, is not merely first this and then that detail of some institution or policy. If there is to be a politics of a New Left, what needs to be analysed is the *structure* of institutions, the *foundation* of policies. In this sense, both in its criticisms and in its proposals, our work is necessarily structural—and so, *for us*, just now—utopian....

Isn't all this, isn't it something of what we are trying to mean by the phrase, "The New Left?" Let the old men ask sourly, "Out of Apathy—into what?" The Age of Complacency is ending. Let the old women complain wisely about "the end of ideology." We are beginning to move again....

2. Students for a Democratic Society Calls for a Profound Reappraisal of American Society, 1962

We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.

When we were kids the United States was the wealthiest and strongest country in the world: the only one with the atom bomb, the least scarred by modern war, an initiator of the United Nations that we thought would distribute Western influence throughout the world. Freedom and equality for each individual, government of, by, and for the people—these American values we found good, principles by which we could live as men. Many of us began maturing in complacency.

As we grew, however, our comfort was penetrated by events too troubling to dismiss. First, the permeating and victimizing fact of human degradation, symbolized by the Southern struggle against racial bigotry, compelled most of us from silence to activism. Second, the enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence of the Bomb, brought awareness that we ourselves, and our friends, and millions of abstract "others" we knew more directly because of our common peril, might die at any time. We might deliberately ignore, or avoid, or fail to feel all other human problems, but not these two, for these were too immediate and crushing in their impact, too challenging in the demand that we as individuals take the responsibility for encounter and resolution.

While these and other problems either directly oppressed us or rankled our consciences and became our own subjective concerns, we began to see complicated and disturbing paradoxes in our surrounding America. The declaration "all men are created equal ..." rang hollow before the facts of Negro life in the South and the big cities of the North. The proclaimed peaceful intentions of the United States contradicted its economic and military investments in the Cold War status quo.

We witnessed, and continue to witness, other paradoxes. With nuclear energy whole cities can easily be powered, yet the dominant nation-states seem more likely to unleash destruction greater than that incurred in all wars of human history. Although our own technology is destroying old and creating new forms of social organization, men still tolerate meaningless work and idleness. While

two-thirds of mankind suffers undernourishment, our own upper classes revel amidst superfluous abundance. Although world population is expected to double in forty years, the nations still tolerate anarchy as a major principle of international conduct and uncontrolled exploitation governs the sapping of the earth's physical resources. Although mankind desperately needs revolutionary leadership, America rests in national stalemate, its goals ambiguous and tradition-bound instead of informed and clear, its democratic system apathetic and manipulated rather than "of, by, and for the people."

Not only did tarnish appear on our image of American virtue, not only did disillusion occur when the hypocrisy of American ideals was discovered, but we began to sense that what we had originally seen as the American Golden Age was actually the decline of an era. The worldwide outbreak of revolution against colonialism and imperialism, the entrenchment of totalitarian states, the menace of war, overpopulation, international disorder, supertechnology—these trends were testing the tenacity of our own commitment to democracy and freedom and our abilities to visualize their application to a world in upheaval.

Our work is guided by the sense that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living. But we are a minority—the vast majority of our people regard the temporary equilibriums of our society and world as eternally functional parts. In this is perhaps the outstanding paradox: we ourselves are imbued with urgency, yet the message of our society is that there is no viable alternative to the present. Beneath the reassuring tones of the politicians, beneath the common opinion that America will "muddle through," beneath the stagnation of those who have closed their minds to the future, is the pervading feeling that there simply are no alternatives, that our times have witnessed the exhaustion not only of Utopias, but of any new departures as well. Feeling the press of complexity upon the emptiness of life, people are fearful of the thought that at any moment things might thrust out of control. They fear change itself, since change might smash whatever invisible framework seems to hold back chaos for them now. For most Americans, all crusades are suspect, threatening. The fact that each individual sees apathy in his fellows perpetuates the common reluctance to organize for change. The dominant institutions are complex enough to blunt the minds of their potential critics, and entrenched enough to swiftly dissipate or entirely repel the energies of protest and reform, thus limiting human expectancies. Then, too, we are a materially improved society, and by our improvements we seem to have weakened the case for further change.

Some would have us believe that Americans feel contentment amidst prosperity—but might it not better be called a glaze above deeply felt anxieties about their role in the new world? And if these anxieties produce a developed indifference to human affairs, do they not as well produce a yearning to believe there *is* an alternative to the present, that something *can* be done to change circumstances in the school, the workplaces, the bureaucracies, the government? It is to this latter yearning, at once the spark and engine of change, that we direct our present appeal. The search for truly democratic alternatives to the present, and a commitment to social experimentation with them, is a worthy and fulfilling human enterprise, one which moves us and, we hope, others today. On such a

basis do we offer this document of our convictions and analysis: as an effort in understanding and changing the conditions of humanity in the late twentieth century, an effort rooted in the ancient, still unfulfilled conception of man attaining determining influence over his circumstances of life....

Making values explicit—an initial task in establishing alternatives—is an activity that has been devalued and corrupted. The conventional moral terms of the age, the politician moralities—"free world," "people's democracies"—reflect realities poorly, if at all, and seem to function more as ruling myths than as descriptive principles. But neither has our experience in the universities brought us moral enlightenment. Our professors and administrators sacrifice controversy to public relations; their curriculums change more slowly than the living events of the world; their skills and silence are purchased by investors in the arms race; passion is called unscholastic. The questions we might want raised—what is really important? can we live in a different and better way? if we wanted to change society, how would we do it?—are not thought to be questions of a "fruitful, empirical nature," and thus are brushed aside....

Men have unrealized potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity. It is this potential that we regard as crucial and to which we appeal, not to the human potentiality for violence, unreason, and submission to authority. The goal of man and society should be human independence: a concern not with image or popularity but with finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic; a quality of mind not compulsively driven by a sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly adopts status values, nor one which represses all threats to its habits, but one which has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences, one which easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly faces problems which are troubling and unresolved; one with an intuitive awareness of possibilities, an active sense of curiosity, an ability and willingness to learn.

This kind of independence does not mean egoistic individualism—the object is not to have one's way so much as it is to have a way that is one's own. Nor do we deify man—we merely have faith in his potential.

Human relationships should involve fraternity and honesty. Human interdependence is contemporary fact; human brotherhood must be willed however, as a condition of future survival and as the most appropriate form of social relations. Personal links between man and man are needed, especially to go beyond the partial and fragmentary bonds of function that bind men only as worker to worker, employer to employee, teacher to student, American to Russian.

Loneliness, estrangement, isolation describe the vast distance between man and man today. These dominant tendencies cannot be overcome by better personnel management, nor by improved gadgets, but only when a love of man overcomes the idolatrous worship of things by man.

As the individualism we affirm is not egoism, the selflessness we affirm is not self-elimination. On the contrary, we believe in generosity of a kind that imprints one's unique individual qualities in the relation to other men, and to all human activity. Further, to dislike isolation is not to favor the abolition of privacy; the latter differs from isolation in that it occurs or is abolished according

to individual will. Finally, we would replace power and personal uniqueness rooted in possession, privilege, or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason, and creativity.

As a *social system* we seek the establishment of a democracy of individual participation, governed by two central aims: that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men and provide the media for their common participation.

In a participatory democracy, the political life would be based in several root principles:

- that decision-making of basic social consequence be carried on by public groupings;
- that politics be seen positively, as the art of collectively creating an acceptable pattern of social relations;
- that politics has the function of bringing people out of isolation and into community, thus being a necessary, though not sufficient, means of finding meaning in personal life;
- that the political order should serve to clarify problems in a way instrumental to their solution; it should provide outlets for the expression of personal grievance and aspiration; opposing views should be organized so as to illuminate choices and facilitate the attainment of goals; channels should be commonly available to relate men to knowledge and to power so that private problems—from bad recreation facilities to personal alienation—are formulated as general issues.

The economic sphere would have as its basis the principles:

- that work should involve incentives worthier than money or survival. It should be educative, not stultifying; creative, not mechanical; self-directed, not manipulated, encouraging independence, a respect for others, a sense of dignity, and a willingness to accept social responsibility, since it is this experience that has crucial influence on habits, perceptions, and individual ethics;
- that the economic experience is so personally decisive that the individual must share in its full determination;
- that the economy itself is of such social importance that its major resources and means of production should be open to democratic participation and subject to democratic social regulation....

3. Timothy Leary Celebrates Drug Use, 1967

Into this Garden of Eden each human being is born perfect. We were all born divine mutants, the DNA code's best answer to joyful survival on this planet. An

exquisite package for adaptation based on 2 billion years of consumer research (RNA) and product design (DNA).

But each baby, although born perfect, immediately finds himself in an imperfect, artificial, disharmonious social system which systematically robs him of his divinity.

And the social systems—where did they come from?

Individual societies begin in harmonious adaptation to the environment and, like individuals, quickly get trapped into nonadaptive, artificial, repetitive sequences.

When the individual's behavior and consciousness get hooked to a routine sequence of external actions, he is a dead robot, and ... it is time for him to die and be reborn. Time to "drop out," "turn on," and "tune in." This period of robotization is called the Kali Yuga, the Age of Strife and Empire, the peak of so-called civilization, the Johnson Administration, etc. This relentless law of death, life, change is the rhythm of the galaxies and the seasons, the rhythm of the seed. It never stops....

Drop Out—detach yourself from the external social drama which is as dehydrated and ersatz as TV.

Turn On—find a sacrament which returns you to the temple of God, your own body. Go out of your mind. Get high.

Tune In—be reborn. Drop back in to express it. Start a new sequence of behavior that reflects your vision....

Any action that is not a conscious expression of the drop-out-turn-on-tune-in-drop-out rhythm is the dead posturing of robot actors on the fake-prop TV studio stage set that is called American reality.

Actions which are conscious expressions of the turn-on; tune-in, drop-out rhythm are religious.

The wise person devotes his life exclusively to the religious search—for therein is found the only ecstasy, the only meaning.

Anything else is a competitive quarrel over (or Hollywood-love sharing of) television studio props....

When you turn on, remember: you are not a naughty boy getting high for kicks.

You are a spiritual voyager furthering the most ancient, noble quest of man. When you turn on, you shed the fake-prop TV studio and costume and join the holy dance of the visionaries. You leave LBJ and Bob Hope; you join Lao-tse, Christ, Blake. Never underestimate the sacred meaning of the turn-on.

To turn on, you need a sacrament. A sacrament is a visible external thing which turns the key to the inner doors. A sacrament must bring about bodily changes. A sacrament flips you out of the TV-studio game and harnesses you to the 2-billion-year-old flow inside.

A sacrament which works is dangerous to the establishment which runs the fake-prop TV studio—and to that part of your mind which is hooked to the studio game.

Each TV-prop society produces exactly that body-changing sacrament which will flip out the mind of the society.

Today the sacrament is LSD. New sacraments are coming along.

Sacraments wear out. They become part of the social TV-studio game. Treasure LSD while it still works. In fifteen years it will be tame, socialized, and routine....

Drop out means exactly that: drop out.

Most of the activity of most Americans goes into robot performances on the TV-studio stage. Fake. Unnatural. Automatic.

Drop out means detach yourself from every TV drama which is not in the rhythm of the turn-on, tune-in, drop-out cycle.

Quit school. Quit your job. Don't vote. Avoid all politics. Do not waste conscious thinking on TV-studio games. Political choices are meaningless.

To postpone the drop-out is to cop out.

Dismiss your fantasies of infiltrating the social stage-set game. Any control you have over television props is their control over you.

Dismiss the Judaic-Christian-Marxist-puritan-literary-existentialist suggestion that the drop-out is escape and that the conformist cop-out is reality....

The drop-out, turn-on, tune-in rhythm is most naturally done in small groups of family members, lovers, and seed friends.

For both psychedelic and legal reasons, you must form your own cult.

The directors of the TV studio do not want you to live a religious life. They will apply every pressure (including prison) to keep you in their game.

Your own mind, which has been corrupted and neurologically damaged by years of education in fake-prop TV-studio games, will also keep you trapped in the game.

A group liberation cult is required.

You must form that most ancient and sacred of human structures—the clan. A clan or cult is a small group of human beings organized around a religious goal.

Remember, you are basically a primate. You are designed by the 2-billion-year blueprint to live in a small band.

You cannot accept the political or spiritual leadership of anyone you cannot touch, con-spire (breathe) with, worship with, get high with.

Your clan must be centered on a shrine and a totem spiritual energy source. To the clan you dedicate your highest loyalty, and to you the clan offers its complete protection.

But the clan must be centered on religious goals. Religion means being tuned in to the natural rhythm. Religion is the turn-on, tune-in, drop-out process.

Because you and your clan brothers are turned on, you will radiate energy. You will attract attention—hostility from the TV establishment, enthusiastic interest from rootless TV actors who wish to join your clan. Everyone basically wants to turn on, tune in, and drop out....

Do you wish to use marijuana and LSD to get beyond the TV scenario? To enhance creativity? As catalysts to deepen wisdom?

If so, you will be helped by making explicit the religious nature of your psychedelic activities. To give meaning to your own script, to clarify your relationships with others, and to cope with the present legal setup, you will do well to start your own religion....

First, decide with whom you will make the voyage of discovery. If you have a family, certainly you will include them. If you have close friends, you will certainly want to include them. The question, with whom do I league for spiritual discovery? is a fascinating exercise....

In defining the goal of your religion, you need not use conventional religious language. You don't have to make your spiritual journey sound "religious." Religion cannot be pompous and high-flown. Religion is consciousness expansion, centered in the body and defined exactly the way it sounds best to you. Don't be intimidated by Caesar's Hollywood fake versions of religiosity. If life has a meaning for you beyond the TV-studio game, you are religious. Spell it out....

Some spiritual people are not compatible with the monogamous union and prefer a freer sexual regime, the group marriage. Good! Many tribes and clans throughout the planet have flourished in complete and holy promiscuity. But be explicit. Painful confusions occur if sexual orientations and sexual taboos (cellular and physical, not psychological or cultural) are disregarded in forming clans.

Select clan members who share or complement your style, your way of tuning in, your temperament, your sexual orientation.

The aim of clan living is to subordinate the ego game to the family game—the clan game....

4. Columbia University Students Explain Their Protest, 1968

... The strike at Columbia began on Tuesday, April 23, when after repeated rebuffs from the Administration, over 800 students marched off campus and smashed a major section of the twelve foot high fence surrounding the proposed gym site in Morningside Park. When the students returned to campus they occupied Hamilton Hall and elected a steering committee. In the next few days, a total of five buildings were seized. Representatives from each new building and from the central office were added to the Strike Steering Committee. Thus the students began to institute the democratic procedures they were seeking for their university and their society.

A single theme dominates the Columbia strikers' six demands: the struggle for self-determination. We demand that construction of the gym cease so that the community, not the Columbia Administration, can decide what is done

with their land. We demand that Columbia sever all ties with the Institute for Defense Analyses, which develops [*sic*] counterinsurgency projects for both foreign and domestic use, so that Columbia's resources are not used to develop the techniques that prevent oppressed people at home and abroad from gaining control over their own lives....

In their demand for amnesty the striking students maintain their belief in self-determination. They had protested that the laws by which they were being judged were put forth by an illegitimate authority responsible only to an outside interest group, the Trustees....

Perhaps the most prophetic of the demands was the call for a permanent student-faculty commission, democratically chosen, which would hear and pass binding judgments on all future disciplinary actions. For obvious reasons, this demand was either ignored or distorted by the enemies of self-determination, i.e., the bourgeois media ... the Administration, etc. Their aim is privilege, not democracy. While the striking students shouted "Let the people decide", Kirk and his cohorts called for "committees to study" or "investigations to ascertain." When this empty rhetoric failed to dissuade the striking students and their allies, Kirk and company made the choice that no one will ever forgive: he called in the cops.

As so many third world countries bear the scars of U.S. imperialism, the dried bloodstains on the grounds of Columbia are the cruel testimony to Columbia's administrative justice. For those who initially doubted the sincerity and rightness of the striking students' cause. Bloody Tuesday was all the additional evidence needed. Today, Columbia students and most faculty are more united than ever before in their demand for a truly just university as the beginning of the construction of a truly democratic society....

The striking students demand that the University conduct all judicial proceedings in open hearings with due process before a bipartite jury of faculty and students with binding power. If speech is to be free, decision-making must be public. Free access to knowledge is a prerequisite for freedom of speech.

Due process must be based on principles of reciprocity. Due process is legitimate only if all members of the University are subject to rules and discipline. Any panel system that would judge only students, leaving the Administration and Trustees immune is inherently unjust. Reciprocity requires that rules of action and procedure be applicable to everyone in the community.

The issue of due process, however, is now secondary to the issue of power. A small group of men, with dominant interests in corporate enterprise, control the resources of Columbia University and have the power to shape the University to their general needs. A formal judicial committee in itself resolves nothing when the real power—the power to allocate funds, to hire and fire, to judge tenure, to select admissions procedures and similar social sanctions—is monopolized by the Trustees. It is to their power that we first addressed our coercive protest. We did not conduct a symbolic demonstration; we entered into a power struggle that only began with the six demands.

The content and form of our struggle stems from the fact that our interests are diametrically opposed to those of the Administration and the Trustees they

serve. Interests and objectives are a product of social and economic associations; all of the Trustees and none of the students are members of the governing class. Individual and collectively they exercise enormous influence within all sectors of our society, particularly financial and industrial corporations. In short, their power rests on and benefits from maintaining the existing order and only so long as this university serves the system will they insure its financial well-being and prestige....

5. FBI Wages a Secret Campaign against the New Left, 1968–1971 (1976)

COINTELPRO is the FBI acronym for a series of covert action programs directed against domestic groups. In these programs, the Bureau went beyond the collection of intelligence to secret action designed to “disrupt” and “neutralize” target groups and individuals. The techniques were adopted wholesale from wartime counterintelligence, and ranged from the trivial (mailing reprints of *Reader's Digest* articles to college administrators) to the degrading (sending anonymous poison-pen letters intended to break up marriages) and the dangerous (encouraging gang warfare and falsely labeling members of a violent group as police informers).

This report is based on a staff study of more than 20,000 pages of Bureau documents, depositions of many of the Bureau agents involved in the programs, and interviews of several COINTELPRO targets. The examples selected for discussion necessarily represent a small percentage of the more than 2,000 approved COINTELPRO actions. Nevertheless, the cases demonstrate the consequences of a Government agency's decision to take the law into its own hands for the “greater good” of the country.

COINTELPRO began in 1956, in part because of frustration with Supreme Court rulings limiting the Government's power to proceed overtly against dissident groups; it ended in 1971 with the threat of public exposure. In the intervening 15 years, the Bureau conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association, on the theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter violence.

Many of the techniques used would be intolerable in a democratic society even if all of the targets had been involved in violent activity, but COINTELPRO went far beyond that. The unexpressed major premise of the programs was that a law enforcement agency has the duty to do whatever is necessary to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political order....

7. New Left. The Internal Security Section had undergone a slow transition from concentrating on the “Old Left”—the CPUSA [Communist party, USA]

and SWP [Socialist Workers party]—to focusing primarily on the activities of the “New Left”—a term which had no precise definition within the Bureau. Some agents defined “New Left” functionally, by connection with protests. Others defined it by philosophy, particularly antiwar philosophy.

On October 28, 1968, the fifth and final COINTELPRO was started against this undefined group. The program was triggered in part by the Columbia campus disturbance. Once again, law enforcement methods had broken down, largely (in the Bureau’s opinion) because college administrators refused to call the police on campus to deal with student demonstrations. The atmosphere at the time was described by the Headquarters agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO:

During that particular time, there was considerable public, Administration—I mean governmental Administration—[and] news media interest in the protest movement to the extent that some groups, I don’t recall any specifics, but some groups were calling for something to be done to blunt or reduce the protest movements that were disrupting campuses. I can’t classify it as exactly an hysteria, but there was considerable interest [and concern]. That was the framework that we were working with. ... It would be my impression that as a result of this hysteria, some governmental leaders were looking to the Bureau.

And, once again, the combination of perceived threat, public outcry, and law enforcement frustration produced a COINTELPRO.

According to the initiating letter, the counterintelligence program’s purpose was to “expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize” the activities of the various New Left organizations, their leadership, and adherents, with particular attention to Key Activists, “the moving forces behind the New Left.” The final paragraph contains an exhortation to a “forward look, enthusiasm, and interest” because of the Bureau’s concern that “the anarchist activities of a few can paralyze institutions of learning, induction centers, cripple traffic, and tie the arms of law enforcement officials all to the detriment of our society.” The internal memorandum recommending the program further sets forth the Bureau’s concerns:

Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and violence caused to a large extent by various individuals generally connected with the New Left. Some of these activists urge revolution in America and call for the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. They continually and falsely allege police brutality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful acts to further their so-called causes.

The document continues:

The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the college campuses.

Based on those factors, the Bureau decided to institute a new COINTELPRO.

8. New Left Directives. The Bureau's concern with "tying the hands of law enforcement officers," and with the perceived weakness of college administrators in refusing to call police onto the campus, led to a May 23, 1968, directive to all participating field offices to gather information on three categories of New Left activities:

(1) false allegations of police brutality, to "counter the wide-spread charges of police brutality that invariably arise following student-police encounters";

(2) immorality, depicting the "scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the characters, activities, habits, and living conditions representative of New Left adherents"; and

(3) action by college administrators, "to show the value of college administrators and school officials taking a firm stand," and pointing out "whether and to what extent faculty members rendered aid and encouragement."

The letter continues, "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored. It cannot be expected that information of this type will be easily obtained, and an imaginative approach by your personnel is imperative to its success."

The order to furnish information on "immorality" was not carried out with sufficient enthusiasm. On October 9, 1968, headquarters sent another letter to all offices, taking them to task for their failure to "remain alert for and to seek specific data depicting the depraved nature and moral looseness of the New Left" and to "use this material in a vigorous and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them." Recipient offices were again instructed to be "particularly alert for this type of data" and told:

As the current school year commences, it can be expected that the New Left with its anti-war and anti-draft entourage will make every effort to confront college authorities, stifle military recruiting, and frustrate the Selective Service System. Each office will be expected, therefore, to afford this program continuous effective attention in order that no opportunity will be missed to destroy this insidious movement.

As to the police brutality and "college administrator" categories, the Bureau's belief that getting tough with students and demonstrators would solve the problem, and that any injuries which resulted were deserved, is reflected in the Bureau's reaction to allegations of police brutality following the Chicago Democratic Convention.

On August 28, 1968, a letter was sent to the Chicago field office instructing it to "obtain all possible evidence that would disprove these charges" [that the Chicago police used undue force] and to "consider measures by which cooperative news media may be used to counteract these allegations." The administrative "note" (for the file) states:

Once again, the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left are taking advantage of the situation in Chicago surrounding the

Democratic National Convention to attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies.... We should be mindful of this situation and develop all possible evidence to expose this activity and to refute these false allegations.

In the same vein, on September 9, 1968, an instruction was sent to all offices which had sent informants to the Chicago convention demonstrations, ordering them to debrief the informants for information "indicating incidents were staged to show police reacted with undue force and any information that authorities were baited by militants into using force." The offices were also to obtain evidence of possible violations of anti-riot laws.

The originating New Left letter had asked all recipient offices to respond with suggestions for counterintelligence action. Those responses were analyzed and a letter sent to all offices on July 6, 1968, setting forth twelve suggestions for counterintelligence action which could be utilized by all offices. Briefly the techniques are:

(1) preparing leaflets designed to discredit student demonstrators, using photographs of New Left leadership at the respective universities. "Naturally, the most obnoxious pictures should be used";

(2) instigating "personal conflicts or animosities" between New Left leaders;

(3) creating the impression that leaders are "informants for the Bureau or other law enforcement agencies";

(4) sending articles from student newspapers or the "underground press" which show the depravity of the New Left to university officials, donors, legislators, and parents. "Articles showing advocacy of the use of narcotics and free sex are ideal";

(5) having members arrested on marijuana charges;

(6) sending anonymous letters about a student's activities to parents, neighbors, and the parents' employers. "This could have the effect of forcing the parents to take action";

(7) sending anonymous letters or leaflets describing the "activities and associations" of New Left faculty members and graduate assistants to university officials, legislators, Boards of Regents, and the press. "These letters should be signed 'A Concerned Alumni,' or 'A Concerned Taxpayer'";

(8) using "cooperative press contacts" to emphasize that the "disruptive elements" constitute a "minority" of the students. "The press should demand an immediate referendum on the issue in question";

(9) exploiting the "hostility" among the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] and other New Left groups toward the SWP, YSA [Young Socialist Alliance], and Progressive Labor Party;

(10) using "friendly news media" and law enforcement officials to disrupt New Left coffeehouses near military bases which are attempting to "influence members of the Armed Forces";

(11) using cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters to "ridicule" the New Left; and

(12) using “misinformation” to “confuse and disrupt” New Left activities, such as by notifying members that events have been cancelled.

As noted earlier, the lack of any Bureau definition of “New Left” resulted in targeting almost every anti-war group, and spread to students demonstrating against anything. One notable example is a proposal targeting a student who carried an “obscene” sign in a demonstration protesting administration censorship of the school newspaper, and another student who sent a letter to that paper defending the demonstration. In another [example, an] article regarding “free love” on a university campus was anonymously mailed to college administrators and state officials since free love allows “an atmosphere to build up on campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left.”

None of the Bureau witnesses deposed believes the New Left COINTELPRO was generally effective, in part because of the imprecise targeting.

6. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew Lashes Out at Radicals, 1969

... It is time for the preponderant majority, the responsible citizens of this country, to assert *their* rights. It is time to stop dignifying the immature actions of arrogant, reckless, inexperienced elements within our society. The reason is compelling. It is simply that their tantrums are insidiously destroying the fabric of American democracy.

By accepting unbridled protest as a way of life, we have tacitly suggested that the great issues of our times are best decided by posturing and shouting matches in the streets. America today is drifting toward Plato’s classic definition of a degenerating democracy—a democracy that permits the voice of the mob to dominate the affairs of government.

Last week I was lambasted for my lack of “mental and moral sensitivity.” I say that any leader who does not perceive where persistent street struggles are going to lead this nation lacks mental acuity. And any leader who does not caution this nation on the danger of this direction lacks moral strength.

I believe in Constitutional dissent. I believe in the people registering their views with their elected representatives, and I commend those people who care enough about their country to involve themselves in its great issues. I believe in legal protest within the Constitutional limits of free speech, including peaceful assembly and the right of petition. But I do not believe that demonstrations, lawful or unlawful, merit my approval or even my silence where the purpose is fundamentally unsound. In the case of the Vietnam Moratorium, the objective announced by the leaders—immediate unilateral withdrawal of all our forces from Vietnam—was not only unsound but idiotic. The tragedy was that thousands who participated wanted only to show a fervent desire for peace, but were used by the political hustlers who ran the event.

Agnew speech, “Impudence in the Streets,” October 30, 1969, in Agnew, *Frankly Speaking: A Collection of Extraordinary Speeches* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs, 1970), pp. 44–51.

It is worth remembering that our country's founding fathers wisely shaped a Constitutional republic, not a pure democracy. The representative government they contemplated and skillfully constructed never intended that elected officials should decide crucial questions by counting the number of bodies cavorting in the streets. They recognized that freedom cannot endure dependent upon referendum every time part of the electorate desires it.

So great is the latitude of our liberty that only a subtle line divides use from abuse. I am convinced that our preoccupation with emotional demonstration, frequently crossing the line to civil disruption and even violence could inexorably lead us across that line forever.

Ironically, it is neither the greedy nor the malicious but the self-righteous who are guilty of history's worst atrocities. Society understands greed and malice and erects barriers of law to defend itself from these vices. But evil cloaked in emotional causes is well disguised and often undiscovered until it is too late.

We have just such a group of self-proclaimed saviours of the American soul at work today. Relentless in their criticism of intolerance in America, they themselves are intolerant of those who differ with their views. In the name of academic freedom, they destroy academic freedom. Denouncing violence, they seize and vandalize buildings of great universities. Fiercely expressing their respect for truth, they disavow the logic and discipline necessary to pursue truth.

They would have us believe that they alone know what is good for America—what is true and right and beautiful. They would have us believe that their reflexive action is superior to our reflective action; that their revealed righteousness is more effective than our reason and experience.

Think about it. Small bands of students are allowed to shut down great universities. Small groups of dissidents are allowed to shout down political candidates. Small cadres of professional protestors are allowed to jeopardize the peace efforts of the President of the United States.

It is time to question the credentials of their leaders. And, if in questioning we disturb a few people, I say it is time for them to be disturbed. If, in challenging, we polarize the American people, I say it is time for a positive polarization....

Now, we have among us a glib, activist element who would tell us our values are lies, and I call them impudent. Because anyone who impugns a legacy of liberty and dignity that reaches back to Moses, is impudent.

I call them snobs for most of them disdain to mingle with the masses who work for a living. They mock the common man's pride in his work, his family and his country. It has also been said that I called them intellectuals. I did not. I said that they characterized themselves as intellectuals. No true intellectual, no truly knowledgeable person, would so despise democratic institutions.

America cannot afford to write off a whole generation for the decadent thinking of a few. America cannot afford to divide over their demagoguery, to be deceived by their duplicity, or to let their license destroy liberty. We can, however, afford to separate them from our society—with no more regret than we should feel over discarding rotten apples from a barrel....

7. A Pollster Reports on "The Big Chill," 1974

LATE 1960s

- The campus rebellion is in full flower.
- New life styles and radical politics appear together: granny glasses, crunchy granola, commune-living, pot smoking, and long hair seem inseparable from radical politics, sit-ins, student strikes, protest marches, draft card burnings.
- A central theme on campus: the search for self-fulfillment *in place of* a conventional career.
- Growing criticism of America as a "sick society."
- The Women's Movement has virtually no impact on youth values and attitudes.
- Violence on campus is condoned and romanticized; there are many acts of violence.
- The value of education is severely questioned.
- A widening "generation gap" appears in values, morals, and outlook, dividing young people (especially college youth) from their parents.
- A sharp split in social and moral values is found within the youth generation, between college students and the noncollege majority. The gap *within* the generation proves to be larger and more severe than the gap *between* the generations.
- A new code of sexual morality, centering on greater acceptance of casual premarital sex, abortions, homosexuality, and extramarital relations is confined to a minority of college students.
- The challenge to the traditional work ethic is confined to the campus.
- Harsh criticisms of major institutions, such as political parties, big business, the military, etc., are almost wholly confined to college students.
- The universities and the military are major targets of criticism.
- The campus is the main locus of youthful discontent; noncollege youth is quiescent.

EARLY 1970s

- The campus rebellion is moribund.
- An almost total divorce takes place between radical politics and new life styles.
- A central theme on campus: how to find self-fulfillment *within* a conventional career.
- Lessening criticism of America as a "sick society."
- Wide and deep penetration of Women's Liberation precepts is underway.
- Violence-free campuses; the use of violence, even to achieve worthwhile objectives, is rejected.
- The value of education is strongly endorsed.
- The younger generation and older mainstream America move closer together in values, morals, and outlook.
- The gap within the generation narrows. Noncollege youth has virtually caught up with college students in adopting the new social and moral norms.
- The new sexual morality spreads both to mainstream college youth and also to mainstream working-class youth.
- The work ethic appears strengthened on campus but is growing weaker among noncollege youth.
- Criticism of some major institutions are tempered on campus but are taken up by the working-class youth.
- Criticism of the universities and the military decrease sharply.
- Campuses are quiescent, but many signs of latent discontent and dissatisfaction appear among working-class youth.

LATE 1960s (<i>continued</i>)	EARLY 1970s (<i>continued</i>)
Much youthful energy and idealism is devoted to concern with minorities.	Concern for minorities lessens.
The political center of gravity of college youth: left/liberal.	No clear-cut political center of gravity: pressures in both directions, left and right.
The New Left is a force on campus: there are growing numbers of radical students.	The New Left is a negligible factor on campus: the number of radical students declines sharply.
Concepts of law and order are anathema to college students.	College students show greater acceptance of law and order requirements.
The student mood is angry, embittered, and bewildered by public hostility.	There are few signs of anger or bitterness and little overt concern with public attitudes toward students.



ESSAYS

Like so much about the 1960s, the origins and nature of the radicalism that flourished during the decade has produced an enormous amount of frequently contentious commentary. For years, many authors concentrated on the merits of the movement. Critics decried its lack of coherent ideology and disciplined organization, while sympathizers lamented its disintegration in the late 1960s. In more recent times, scholars have gained enough chronological and emotional distance from the decade to offer more balanced judgments. The following two essays address different issues that have drawn a good deal of attention. First, historian Jeremi Suri of the University of Texas at Austin asks why radicalism surged during the 1960s. Although Suri shows that U.S. radicalism was just one prong of an international wave of dissent against established authority, he concentrates his analysis on the American experience. In the second essay, political scientist Hugh Heclo of George Mason University examines the legacy of the New Left, viewing the 1960s in the context of a late twentieth-century transition from modernity to postmodernity.

The Sources of Radicalism

JEREMI SURI

If politics is a form of controlled conflict, the balance of power shifted decisively to the young in the 1960s. The number of people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine increased dramatically from 1955 to 1975, reflecting the post-World War II baby boom that began in 1945 in Europe and America and in 1949 in China. Students now composed a large and restive segment of the population. Their condemnations of the alleged “false promises” and “hypocrisies”

in contemporary society took aim at the Cold War stalemate. Leaders such as Kennedy, Khrushchev, de Gaulle, and Mao struggled with the obstacles that nuclear weapons, alliances, and bureaucracies posed to policy change. The growing mass of young citizens, however, demanded more radical politics.

The youth culture of the early 1960s gestated in a relatively stable international environment in which young men—especially the most educated—were generally not involved in military conflict. More young women also entered college than ever before. This post–World War II generation of citizens enjoyed lives more secure and comfortable than their parents'. Security and comfort, however, did not preclude discontent and apprehension. The youth culture of the 1960s furthered domestic instability and upheaval.

Extensive student interaction within the framework of crowded, usually urban, educational institutions provided the *infrastructure* for dissent within many societies. The words of prominent iconoclasts—writers as well as musicians and artists—supplied the *language* that allowed men and women to express their anger as they had not before. The American civil rights movement exemplifies how the language of dissent drew on an infrastructure of educated and energetic students. Throughout the United States, Europe, and Asia numerous protest movements emerged from a similar combination of dissident ideas and nascent youth organizations. In many cases student protesters mobilized around a powerful rhetoric of social criticism articulated by intellectual elites. Authors such as Michael Harrington, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Wu Han, and Herbert Marcuse contributed to the language that empowered youth around the world to organize and agitate in diverse ways.

The high tide of student and other domestic protests did not arrive until the end of the 1960s. The first half of the decade, however, set the stage for later social disruptions that in turn transformed Cold War politics. The language of dissent, formulated during the early years of university expansion, provided the critical tools for men and women to challenge state power.

Demographics alone do not trigger social change. Education played a fundamental role in nurturing domestic unrest. During the late 1950s the leaders of the great powers expanded their citizens' access to school and college instruction. These educational reforms fit within a larger series of state modernizing programs aimed at building a technically sophisticated, skilled, and ideologically imbued population.

The United States and the Soviet Union provide the clearest examples of state-directed expansion in education. Fearing the challenges of ever more destructive military conflict, President Dwight Eisenhower and Premier Nikita Khrushchev created lucrative sources for the recruitment and training of national scientific elites. In America, the National Defense Education Act of 1958 offered student fellowships, enabling many working- and middle-class families their first opportunities to send their children to university. In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's push for scientific progress supported research facilities for the children of Russian peasants in Moscow, Leningrad, and new academic centers such as Akademgorodok. Between 1950 and 1965 the number of Soviet scientists rose from 162,500 to 665,000.

Education reform was crucial for various attempts to formulate an activist foreign policy agenda. Looking to the future after the first Sputnik launch in October 1957, prominent observers emphasized the importance to state power of broad-based scientific sophistication. British scholar C. P. Snow famously called for an integration of the “two cultures”—literature and science—in education worldwide; only a more knowledgeable, well-rounded public could manage the increased “rate of change” and the “special danger” of a nuclear world.

More than almost any other figure, James Conant worked to bridge the “two cultures” through international education reform. Conant had unique connections across universities and governments. He had served as the president of Harvard University, a scientific adviser to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and the U.S. ambassador to West Germany. In the late 1950s he argued that only a wider and more rigorous meritocracy of educated talent could cope with emerging foreign policy challenges. Commenting to President Eisenhower on his proposal for a “Commission on National Goals” in 1959, Conant explained that “today prophecies about the international scene are difficult to make even for a short period of years.” “Having traveled around the country,” he continued, he was “disturbed ... by the present complacency and the confusion even among the leading citizens.”

Conant attempted to influence “public school people,” encouraging reforms for improved student achievement in science and other fields. He worked during the early 1960s to make education more accessible and rigorous. In a study of urban and rural inequalities—*Slums and Suburbs*—Conant advocated different forms of instruction for young citizens of various talents. Policymakers could not expect that every child would attain the same high standards. The government should, according to Conant, create a calibrated system that maximized the learning and public contribution of each student. These proposals had a favorable reception in the U.S. Department of Defense, where officials worried about both civilian capabilities and educational achievement among military officers.

National standardized testing, first pioneered by Conant for recruitment at Harvard in the 1930s, would now play an increasingly important role across the United States. These tests replaced a system of educational privilege with one of meritocracy, in which gifted students (according to exam results) found their way to the best educational institutions, and eventually to the most important positions in society. Other students, sorted by the “objective” tests, attained places in education and society appropriate to their talents. In this manner education reform sought to expand the training of all, creating a broad comparative advantage of abilities whereby each citizen performed for the public interest to the maximum of his or her capability....

Conant’s ideas appealed to combined worries about domestic complacency and international stagnation. His endeavors addressed the desire, shared by many politicians, to mobilize talent and forge creative policy alternatives. Because military resources and established state institutions appeared to constrain rather than to empower policy for ideological purposes, leaders turned to their growing young populations as a source for national achievement—what Kennedy called the “new frontier,” and Khrushchev “communist construction.” ...

Demographic trends and education reforms converged to initiate a remarkable international expansion in higher education between 1955 and 1970. The enlargement of modern universities, colleges, and related postsecondary institutions followed the growth in both military resources and administrative functions controlled by states. By the 1960s higher education became a distinct sphere of government-sponsored activity, with its own clearly defined and regulated facilities.

As an integral part of functioning society rather than an isolated elite privilege, institutions of higher education grew to accommodate both the expanding young population and the demands of political leaders. Although the precise structure and curriculum for higher education differed widely in each country, universities brought together a cross-section of the best-trained students, almost all of whom were literate and proficient in basic mathematics. In this context higher education groomed an aristocracy of talent and leadership, in contrast to earlier aristocracies of birth or manner.

The statistics on the expansion of higher education in the 1960s are far from exact; differences in definition and disputes in reporting characterize all the historical data. The growth trends, however, are unmistakable. Just as the number of nuclear warheads and state bureaucracies increased across societies after 1955, so did the population of students in higher education. The expansion of universities, colleges, and other postsecondary schools occurred at a galloping rate in each of the great powers, with the notable exception of mainland China after the early 1960s....

The experience of academic life—where intellectual study and separation from family are integral to student identity—became commonplace among a wide diversity of youths in the 1960s. Compulsory military service had often marked a distinct period in the maturation of young men, between childhood and full adulthood. The expansion in educational access created a freer, more intellectual transition for many citizens from diverse backgrounds, both male and female. Education reform, driven by demographics and state policy, provided the structural foundation for an international youth culture more integrated across gender and more politically aware than its predecessors.

Men and women attending university in the 1960s were not united by class, ethnicity, or national origin. Their commonality lay in their status as students. The influence of government within the expanding institutions of higher education exerted strong pressures on students for conformity with dominant ideologies. The experiences of McCarthyism in the United States, the Anti-Rightist Campaign against domestic critics in China, and the recurring purges in the Soviet Union, though very different in degree, attested to how coercive the forces of domestic order could become for students, intellectuals, and society as a whole.

The instruments of state "hegemony"—whereby the government uses education and other forms of indoctrination to reinforce its authority—operated effectively within the expanding institutions of higher education, but they also generated a series of powerful counterresponses ("counter-hegemonies"). The literacy, international awareness, and group interaction that served the purposes of educational indoctrination also empowered dissent against the aims of the state. Within universities students could produce their own literature (openly in

the West, covertly in communist societies), distribute their materials to a large number of counterparts, organize their own social networks, and, most significant, turn their access to information against the claims of governing authorities.

In the early 1960s individuals in and around various universities used these sources of counterhegemony to transform students into dissidents. Agitators in the eyes of many, these individuals—often writing from outside the student community for young readers—played the role of Antonio Gramsci’s “organic intellectuals.” Emerging from various age cohorts and backgrounds, a set of charismatic figures crafted a language of protest that inspired the growing body of students to resist the aims of state leaders.

The discontents that motivated dissent preceded this period. One writer notes that the “objective conditions” for protest were more acute in many societies before the 1960s. Rebellion, however, required something more than a simple motive. Alexis de Tocqueville noted that “rising expectations” fuel protest during periods when social improvement stalls. Scholars have also emphasized the importance of both organization and language in knitting various protests together for cohesive challenges to authority. A number of influential intellectuals in the late 1950s and early 1960s filled this role. Drawing on the expanded university population, writers in each of the great powers provided the critical vocabulary that encouraged acts of dissent to proliferate.

The breakdown of the Cold War “domestic consensus” began in the early 1960s. Contrary to the conformist aims of state leaders, educational institutions nurtured a language of protest among students years before the Vietnam War and other international crises sparked broader criticisms of authority. Dissident voices communicated through journals, artwork, music, and television played a role somewhat similar to public criticisms shared in Parisian cafés before the French Revolution. They exposed the shortcomings of distinguished political figures and delegitimized what one historian calls the “royal touch” of government.

An analysis of influential dissident texts sheds light on the proliferation of protest movements during the 1960s. Dissident writers contradicted the claims of established leaders and turned the energies of many citizens to alternative courses of action, including covert organization and extralegal protest. Operating under very different degrees of restriction, these dissidents voiced growing frustrations with the political status quo. They expressed hope for something other than a permanent Cold War. The expanded academic community in each of the great powers became a crucial forum for the transmission of these ideas, often in secret, and the organization of what many called “direct action.” Protest movements such as the American civil rights movement had important nonacademic origins, but in the 1960s universities around the world became incubators for revolution.

Most modern revolutions have built on a series of influential texts and networks for social mobilization. The language of dissent in the 1960s produced a corpus of what one historian describes as the “forbidden bestsellers” that preceded prior upheavals. The extensive uprisings around 1968 grew from an international dissident culture, created in diverse ways by writers in each of the great powers. Authors such as Daniel Bell, John Kenneth Galbraith, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Wu Han, and Herbert Marcuse were the Jean-Jacques Rousseaus of

the twentieth century—inspirations for passionate reading, discussion, and public contention....

In 1960 the American sociologist and longtime social-democrat Daniel Bell published one of those books that periodically capture almost everyone's attention. Bell's *End of Ideology* became the focus of countless debates in America and Europe. Prominent scholars and diverse students knew about the book's central contention that the old Cold War ideologies were, in Bell's judgment, "dead." ...

Bell did not believe that conflict would cease to divide antagonistic interests at home and abroad. Despite his recurrent references to the "end" of ideology, he recognized that in the late 1950s the very *nature* of ideology had shifted decisively. The dominant language of social justice and legitimate authority no longer addressed the concerns voiced by articulate critics and a growing cohort of university students.

Bell's central insight was that superpower rivalry did not focus the energies of citizens as it had in prior years. He observed that "the old ideologies have lost their 'truth' and their power to persuade." In a world in which nuclear stalemate and administrative largess made stagnation within society palpable, there was little left to debate in the established language of politics. The promises of freedom offered by Marxist and liberal-capitalist ideologies appeared untenable when the largest states endeavored to restrain, rather than embolden, international pressures for change. Growing policy stagnation along a very moderate middle road between utopian visions made desired social reforms seem ever more distant. "The young intellectual," Bell explained, "is unhappy because the 'middle way' is for the middle-aged, not for him; it is without passion and is deadening."

Many of the geopolitical disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union reached a stable "settlement" by the early 1960s. Bell recognized that domestic activists by no means considered their own aspirations settled. Politics among the great powers had become entrenched in a stagnant center that forced disgruntled voices to ever more critical extremes. This phenomenon proved most evident in the United States, but it surfaced in Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and China as well.

Bell's analysis did not capture the full range of dissent within the great powers. His book did, however, predict that traditional centers of dominance could no longer hold. Government authorities—military and bureaucratic—clearly resisted the application of principle to dangerous problems. Cold War "peace" in the early 1960s ran against the moral rhetoric of "freedom" and "liberation" that had justified the post-World War II conflict in the first place. The failure to realize promised ideals opened a series of formerly taboo questions, especially among young thinkers. The language of dissent in the 1960s labeled existing leaders as illegitimate for failing to meet their own espoused standards of justice.

John Kenneth Galbraith, writing in 1958, had anticipated Daniel Bell's analysis. After 1960 Bell's critique added resonance to the Harvard economist's condemnation of America's hollow affluence. Galbraith's discussion in *The Affluent Society*—later extended by socialist writer Michael Harrington—provided the indispensable

vocabulary for attacks on the underside of state achievements in the 1960s. In America and elsewhere the social failings of political policy received newfound attention thanks to Galbraith's evocative, if not fully satisfactory, polemic.

Galbraith recognized that although American affluence was incontestable during the Eisenhower years, its distribution belied claims to personal freedom. His best-selling book criticized American society for its obsession with wealth and its accompanying neglect of pervasive inequalities. Targeting the "social imbalance" between human needs and lucrative market priorities, Galbraith condemned the "paramount position of production" in America. "It is an index of the prestige of production in our national attitudes," he explained, "that it is identified with the sensible and practical. And no greater compliment can be paid to the forthright intelligence of any businessman than to say that he understands production."

"Conventional wisdom" prioritized the production of material goods above what Galbraith saw as critical human investments in adequate health care, an improved living environment, and other public facilities. "Whether the problem be that of a burgeoning population and of space in which to live with peace and grace, or whether it be the depletion of the materials which nature has stocked in the earth's crust and which have been drawn upon more heavily in this century than in all previous time together, or whether it be that of occupying minds no longer committed to the stockpiling of consumer goods, the basic demand on America will be on its resources of ability, intelligence, and education." "The test," Galbraith proclaimed, "will be less the effectiveness of our material investment than the effectiveness of our investment in men."

Despite its extraordinary wealth, America was in danger of failing this test. Inequalities among individuals and sectors of the economy were not the problem per se. Policy blindness to these inequalities was the central reason for Galbraith's urgency. The rhetoric of economic growth in America devoted little attention to a relatively small but significant cohort of impoverished citizens residing in rural lands like Appalachia and urban slums like Chicago's south side. Residents of these largely "invisible" regions suffered from inadequate education, poor nutrition, restricted economic opportunities, and a generally distempered social outlook. Galbraith did not deny that general economic growth had lifted many poor families, but he exposed the myth of universal mobility. "The most certain thing about modern poverty," Galbraith lamented, "is that it is not efficiently remedied by a general and tolerably well-distributed advance in income." Postwar America had produced great affluence, but many citizens remained stuck in poverty.

Michael Harrington—a prominent Socialist Party activist—employed moving detail to reinforce the more literary claims of *The Affluent Society*. Extending an earlier article on "Our Fifty Million Poor" into a larger investigative exposé, Harrington reported in his landmark 1962 book, *The Other America*, on a wide range of experiences throughout the nation: unemployed coal miners, subsistence farmers, inner-city slum dwellers, segregated African Americans, mentally ill individuals, elderly citizens, and disadvantaged youth. Employing U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics that estimated an annual income of \$3,500 for the subsistence of a family of four, Harrington computed that 50 million Americans—approximately one quarter of the population—lived in poverty.

Harrington's argument proved more damning than a simple measure of relative suffering. He argued that contemporary poverty in America did not reflect the long-dreaded ravages of climate, war, and pestilence. In a world of sophisticated nuclear devices and far-reaching administrative institutions, flawed policy bore the burden of responsibility for continued suffering. Postwar programs for domestic economic growth and foreign competition benefited "those least who need help most." "These are the people who are immune to progress."

Technological advances provided unprecedented farm and factory abundance for the nation. This abundance, however, came at the cost of isolating those least able to operate the new machines. "As the society [becomes] more technological, more skilled," Harrington explained, "those who learn to work the machines, who get the expanding education, move up. Those who miss out at the very start find themselves at a new disadvantage."

Poverty, according to Harrington, had become much more than a cyclical condition, concentrated in "pockets" of the nation. The deprivations of the poor expanded into a pervasive "culture" that suffocated the creative aspirations underlying economic dynamism in America. Employing the image of a "vicious circle," Harrington described the dysfunctional families, communities, and morals that the poor propagated within the very fabric of abundance. "The United States contains," he exclaimed, "an underdeveloped nation, a culture of poverty." ...

Criticisms of private materialism and political stagnation did not, contrary to the prejudices of some historians, arise only on the traditional left of the ideological spectrum. Eisenhower's restrained approach to foreign and domestic policy drew invective from self-proclaimed "new conservatives" such as William F. Buckley Jr. and Senator Barry Goldwater. Their condemnations of contemporary political leaders were as harsh as anything coming from the pens of Galbraith or Harrington. No longer could Eisenhower point to a conservative groundswell for politics aimed at preserving the status quo. The political right joined the left in calls for more policy activism.

"Are we to fight the machine?" William F. Buckley asked. "Can conservatism assimilate it?" Buckley responded with rhetorical relish in *Up from Liberalism*, asserting that "the machine must be accepted, and conservatives must not live by programs that were written as though the machine did not exist, or could be made to go away." Conservatives would devise a new agenda—an alternative to nostalgia for a lost past or exuberance for a brave new world. Buckley demanded a "program that speaks to our time."

In the pages of his weekly journal, the *National Review*, Buckley and his followers called for stronger defense of national ideals and increased community activism. They exposed the restraint of American policy at home and abroad for the materialism it claimed to abhor. The politics of Cold War competition became, for Buckley, an increasingly frustrating hindrance to a desired era of individual religious realization and creative experience. Instead of affirming enduring moral principles vested in the dignity of the individual and the omnipotence of God, Cold War moderation focused exclusively on methods and means without inherent value. Directing particular venom at theories of

development and democratization closely connected with American foreign policy, Buckley exclaimed that “our preoccupation these days ... is not so much with the *kind* of society democracy brings forth in a given political situation, as with democracy itself.” Democracy, he continued, “has no program. It cannot say to its supporters: do thus, and ye shall arrive at the promised land.”

In an era without clear political ambitions, the constitutional procedures labored upon by Madison had become, in a word Buckley borrowed from contemporary college students, “dull.” In place of procedure, restraint, and conformity, Buckley aimed to animate popular discussion with fire and brimstone. While Galbraith and Harrington carried themselves as socially conscious truth-tellers in a world of sham, the *National Review* crowd imagined itself as a populist intelligentsia, occupying the role of God-fearing preachers in a world too fearful to believe. Refusing to endorse either John F. Kennedy or Richard Nixon in the 1960 presidential election, Buckley explained that the new conservatives would gain “leverage on events” by dissenting from both established political parties.

Buckley published *Up from Liberalism* as an explicit retort to *The Affluent Society*. The two texts, however, displayed striking similarities in tone and sentiment. Both writers hurled parallel invectives at the self-satisfied superficiality of American social thought during the Cold War. State power had created material abundance, but not the spiritual realization that made the Cold War, in the image of World War II, a righteous enterprise. The military and administrative strains of the early 1960s only presaged more stagnation in the domestic areas that demanded most concerted effort. Buckley and Galbraith were rabble-rousers. They drew upon neglected social energies in America to kick-start creative and probing thought. Young citizens attracted to the political right and left—heavily influenced by Buckley and Galbraith—set themselves against the dominant international trends toward political restraint.

Barry Goldwater, a U.S. senator from Arizona, emerged in the early 1960s to offer the spreading social criticism on the right a new political home. Goldwater failed to win election to the presidency, but he came to the forefront of American politics through a confluence of his own public maneuverings and the groundswell among critics of Republican policy. The energy Goldwater inspired among young conservatives at the *National Review*, on college campuses, and in selected areas of the country testified to the existence of a veritable, if limited, New Right movement born about the same time as the more famous “New Left.”

Goldwater’s 1960 clarion call, *The Conscience of a Conservative*, set out an audacious agenda for criticism of American stagnation. The Arizona senator condemned the restraining impulses in contemporary politics. He spoke explicitly of “victory” in the Cold War through an unabashed emphasis upon America’s superior capabilities. “Peace,” Goldwater exclaimed, “is a proper goal for American policy—as long as it is understood that peace is not all we seek.” “A tolerable peace ... must follow victory over Communism. We have been fourteen years trying to bury that unpleasant fact. It cannot be buried and any foreign policy that ignores it will lead to our extinction as a nation.”

Goldwater sought to invigorate politics with moral principle. He focused his efforts on creating a more muscular, "offensive" American foreign policy, supported by reawakened patriotism at home. Calls for "victory" against communism provided an organizing mission that Goldwater found lacking in current Western leadership. "If our objective is victory over Communism," Goldwater explained, "we must achieve superiority in all of the weapons—military, as well as political and economic—that may be useful in reaching that goal. Such a program costs money, but so long as the money is spent wisely and efficiently, I would spend it. I am not in favor of 'economizing' on the nation's safety."

According to Goldwater's vision, the United States would be in, but not of, the world. The American government would use overwhelming strength to protect its interests, and otherwise avoid entanglements that stifled creativity and hindered independent action. Goldwater wanted Washington to lead at home and abroad without becoming unnecessarily encumbered in complex arrangements with allies or adversaries. He argued that America's military muscle and its growing prosperity should serve as a beacon of freedom, not a restricting arm of administration. Freedom and prosperity would spread to more Americans, Goldwater promised, after victory over communist threats replaced the Cold War stalemate.

This rhetoric emboldened a wide range of dissident voices within universities and other communities. During the 1960s young men and women participated in chapters of Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) throughout the nation. YAF—founded at Buckley's Connecticut residence in September 1960—pledged itself to the vision of politics articulated most prominently by Goldwater. "In this time of moral and political crisis," the YAF "Statement of First Principles" explained, "it is the responsibility of the youth of America to affirm certain eternal truths ... History shows periods of freedom are rare, and can exist only when free citizens concertedly defend their rights against all enemies." Echoing Goldwater, YAF proclaimed that "the forces of international Communism are, at present, the greatest single threat to [our] liberties ... the United States should stress victory over, rather than co-existence with, this menace." In later years Alabama governor George Wallace—campaigning for the presidency in 1968 and 1972—merged this New Right rhetoric with a broader racial backlash against civil rights reforms. Ronald Reagan also drew on what one scholar calls "grass-roots" conservatism, particularly in southern California, as he attacked the degenerate "big government" politics of mainstream Democrats and Republicans....

The Sixties and the Origins of "Postmodern" America

HUGH HECLLO

Mid-twentieth-century America [was in the grip of modernity]. Modernity refers here to those characteristic ways of living and thinking associated with a

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technologically advanced, commercially-oriented society, a society that has gone through the now familiar processes of industrialization and urbanization. Everyday life becomes "structurally differentiated" into specialized spheres of work and home, production and consumption, education and entertainment, and so on. Densely layered social bonds in self-contained communities with well-fixed traditions are gradually supplanted. They are replaced by transient, functionally separated relationships of isolated individuals in fluid groupings whose anti-traditionalist tolerance tends toward relativism. New impersonal "systems" of rational organization and contract are self-consciously designed to coordinate economic, social, and political activities. And most important for present purposes, modernity brings with it a secularization of public life and thought. This does not mean that people become personally less religious. The secularization in view here refers to the relegation of religion to the distinctly private sphere of personal beliefs and choice, a refuge of psychological peace and communitarian warmth with no widely accepted authority over the utility-oriented public spheres of polity and economy. With the coming of modernity, science and rational calculation gradually expel any transcendent divinity from the natural and social world, what Max Weber famously described as "the disenchantment of the world."

By the 1960s America exhibited all these signs of modernity to an extent that would have seemed incomprehensible to people only sixty or seventy years earlier. Automobile transportation and suburban/urban housing patterns, vast corporate organizations and the full flowering of a mass consumer market, the development of massive educational systems as a separate sphere for youth—these were merely some of the outward signs of the deeper forces of modernity. Sixty years earlier, education (or if one prefers, indoctrination) in the godly order of nature, history, the economy, and society had infused everything from first readers to university curricula. By the Sixties it was secular science that held center stage, not least of all a triumphant behavioralism in the social sciences that had much to say about the relation of processes to outcomes and little at all to say about the moral worth of any particular outcome. By self-report to pollsters and church attendance rates, Americans were still a remarkably religious people in the 1950s. But it was what many theologians themselves called a "secular Christianity" of private belief outside the public arena. Religiosity was a personal matter, one of many self-attributes in a socially fragmented and historically conditioned world that was deconsecrated of sacred or ultimate significance. "Multiculturalism" had not yet been affirmed. But the once robust socio-cultural-political reality of the Protestant establishment was becoming little more than a vaguely surviving mood of morally neutral civility.

By mid-century, the American public arena carried all the modern hallmarks of a rationalized sociopolitical order. It displayed the maturing form of what later leftist critics would call "corporate liberalism" and others would call "Cold War liberalism" or interest-group liberalism.... The once threatening Social Question had been resolved into something like an implicit social contract: a middle-class welfare state of social insurance for (mainly) male breadwinners, government-business cooperation to stabilize employment, and rationalized management of

an ever-expanding consumer market. Chastened by their earlier experiences with the Left and the threat of McCarthyism, liberals were Cold War and social-reform "realists." Public affairs was an arena for tough-minded, analytic problem-solving, appropriately dominated by those with the necessary expertise and presumably tough minds. Policy problems were discrete issues where fact-finding, technical competence, and rational analysis had everything to offer, and ideology was an unproductive distraction. Descendants of a now thoroughly secularized Progressive impulse, mid-century liberals were the elite vanguard of modernity.

This Cold War liberalism was never as consistent and monolithic as its critics would later contend, but it did offer the central organizing principles for a stable political society in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. It embraced the modern system of large-scale, hierarchical organizations in business, labor, education, marketing, mainstream religious denominationalism, and government. It celebrated both the Realpolitik of pragmatic group politics and the use of dispassionate reason for problem-solving. Through public policy-making—a term increasingly in vogue—society could be rationally understood and steered. Ideological debates about the role of government or the meaning of social justice were considered a distracting echo from an early industrializing era misguided by class conflict and emotional bombast. The dominant view assumed a national government that would be actively devoted to (1) assuring a favorable business climate for the commercial culture of mass consumption, (2) projecting overwhelming anticommunist force abroad, and (3) marshaling the expertise to confront particular problems of domestic policy as these arose at home. From time to time the mid-century consensus could be heard mouthing the old sounds of transcendent idealism and providential exceptionalism. But the real voice was that of modernity speaking in the soothing, moderate tones of a consumer democracy.

As the 1950s turned into the 1960s, Cold War liberalism marched onward in its policy-making work. Fiscal policy gradually evolved from what had been generally perceived to be a "moral" issue of balancing the budget to a political-technocratic management tool of economic science. To deal with what were perceived to be pressing national problems, liberal reformers, policy experts, and mainstream interest groups struggled over what was coming to be known as the "national agenda." ...

Slowly, moderately, "nonideologically," a liberal agenda emerged for new national commitments to regional economic development, aid to education, health, insurance for the elderly, environmental protection, and "moderate" civil rights legislation. To help implement this agenda, a stream of tough-minded, Cold War "action intellectuals" followed John Kennedy to Washington in 1960. With Lyndon Johnson the stream became a river of policy experts, task forces, and new ventures in federal domestic policy. While the overweening optimism about the capacity of experts for social engineering would soon fade, the forces of modernity pressed onward in American politics and society. Meanwhile, like a second great tectonic plate surfacing and grating alongside, there came a surge of personal discontent and social self-questioning that would constitute the Great Awakening of the 1960s:...

In particular, youths coming of age in the 1960s were well primed for such distress, quite apart from the remarkable events of assassination, war, and official deceit that would afflict their coming of age in the Sixties. If only because of its sheer size, this generation commanded special attention as it moved from birth toward adulthood. As youths raised in a culture of intense parenting and self-satisfied affluence, their age cohort was possibly the first group of children in history to be treated as a separate, specially privileged part of the population. Many, but by no means all, were conditioned to expect much—and to demand much—when the world did not live up to their expectations. As always, active engagement would be a minority taste. The numbers who became directly and indirectly involved “in the Sixties” were significant, but so too were the numbers of young Americans opposed or indifferent. Something less than a fifth of those under twenty in 1959 appear to have participated in organized protests associated with the social causes of the Sixties, but no doubt many others were affected by a faith-shaking cultural confusion. In the years 1965–68 two to three percent of U.S. students considered themselves “activists,” although 20 percent said they had participated in at least one protest demonstration. Likewise we should recall that in 1968 Richard Nixon beat Hubert Humphrey by a 49 percent to 39 percent margin among those under twenty-five, and in 1972, among eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old voters, George McGovern won by a 53 percent to 47 percent margin.

As youths and other people searched for a transformative understanding of themselves and their society, their searches often congealed to manifest ... as social movements—“organized, non-governmental efforts of large numbers of people to attain significant social and personal change.” More than anything else, it was this movement-referenced yearning for personal and social rebirth, expressed through political action and policy demands, that turned the mere decade of the 1960s into the larger historic moment that would become known as the Sixties....

The archetypal movements of the 1960s defined themselves against, attacked, and rejected not conservatives but the liberal consensus and its institutional structures. First among blacks and white liberals awakening to the civil rights cause, and then in widening circles, [reformers] ... perceived intolerable gaps between the espoused norms and the lived realities of the liberal system. Looking back from the 1990s, former activists who defend and those who regret their actions both agree that it was basically the working arrangements of the entrenched liberal administrative state and society that they were attacking.

For the early civil rights activists, it was the liberal order of “moderate,” go-slow accommodation to state-sanctioned racial segregation in the Democratically controlled South. For the student New Left it was the interlocking liberal hegemony of corporate capitalism, state militarism, and antidemocratic bureaucratic structures of a consumerist society. For the emerging feminist movement the object of resistance was the dominant institutional-cultural paradigm of male privilege and female oppression, including, it turned out, within the New Left movement itself. For environmentalists or consumer advocates, the offending system was an unholy partnership of corporate power-holders pursuing profits with

reckless abandon and captured bureaucracies failing to protect the public interest. The list could be extended for pages. In all manner of awakening activism, new struggles were deemed necessary to free people from isolated, oppressed lives lived under the spell of coercive elites in a bureaucratized, mass society....

Although each of the Sixties movements had its own history, they were also interconnected, sometimes by overlapping memberships, but most especially by activists' mutual inspiration and critical motifs. Therefore as reinforcing forces, the Sixties movements and their activists had a cumulative impact well beyond any particular issue of the moment. The liberal system's gradualist, anti-idealistic acceptance of "things as they are" was rejected in favor of a visionary and fundamental restructuring of society. Essentially there were three interrelated motifs.

1. *Liberation.* The Sixties movements saw themselves as freedom struggles. Rights to personal autonomy had to be reasserted against the oppressions of the inherited order. To be truly free was to be able to find self-fulfillment in one's own way, to grow, find meaning, and express one's true self. The movement, with its resources and arena for direct action, was the instrument for organizing against one's own oppression to achieve personal liberation. The liberation in question ranged from freedom defined against the oppression of racial segregation to freedom from limits on self-realization imposed by gender roles, consumerism, conventional morality—anything restricting the "range of alternatives for identity." From the stately Rosa Parks to counterculture dropouts at Woodstock, New Lights of all sorts awakened to their own power to overcome their oppression.

2. *Egalitarian inclusiveness.* The Sixties movements shared the basal presupposition that all people are to be equally included in society, since all are equal in their right to liberation. Thus despite their avant-garde pretensions, movement activists unknowingly restated the iron bond between liberation and equality captured by John Milton's question three centuries earlier: "... for inferior who is free?" The inherited, hierarchical pecking orders of race, gender, wealth, and political power generally had to be supplanted by a community of equals where none would be marginalized.

Again, different branches of movement culture had their own particular versions of this common theme. For civil rights activists the issue was as plain as the equal inclusion promised but never delivered by the Constitution's Civil War amendments. The National Organization for Women's founding statement held out the promise of "a fully equal partnership of the sexes," and the SDS's well-known Port Huron statement ordained that "human brotherhood must be willed as the more appropriate form of social relations." Likewise, environmentalists and consumer advocates insisted they spoke for all those excluded and left voiceless in the liberal regime of interest-group politics and corporate-bureaucratic deal-making. Not least of all, each movement within itself was seen as embodying the ideal of a fraternal commonwealth (an expectation that led to much discord about those movement leaders becoming "media stars").

3. *Participatory openness.* If conditions of unfreedom are to be overcome for a community of equals, it follows that the closed structures of establishment power must be opened up so that all can share in the decisions affecting their lives.

Activists saw themselves as part of what would be termed later in another context as prodemocracy movements. The liberated are not simply set free as individuals; they are empowered by virtue of being thoroughly embedded in participatory political and economic decision-making processes. In one sense this part of movement culture simply reflected a democratic vision rooted in American experience, a restatement of the Tocquevillian vision of large-spirited individualists who become such by being actively engaged in deliberating and managing their collective affairs.

Something more, however, was at work than good citizenship and participatory democracy. Institutional structures had to be opened and subjected to participatory scrutiny because they could not be trusted. Their spurious and elitist claims to disinterested knowledge and benevolent intentions created the conditions that made liberation necessary in the first place. Whatever the movement in question, activists saw elites of the "organized system" as self-serving establishments that had to be disestablished, something that could happen only through open access to decision-making processes. From university governance to the congressional committee process, from administrative implementation of the law to local zoning for trash dumps—all was to be opened to participatory democracy. And since the authority of even reformed institutions could not be trusted (given the ever-present tendency for oppression by the modern managerial technocracy/racist culture/sexist paradigm and so on), it would have to be activists themselves who used democratized procedures to pursue the just cause in question. Thus for many movement activists the real aim was not participation, which could simply mean cooptation by the process. The real aim was for your side, seen as the people's side, to win.

These, or at least something like them, seem to have been the common motifs of the awakened movement culture of the Sixties. For many of the participants, the movements represented "free spaces" between purely private lives and large-scale institutions. They were public environments of civil society where people voluntarily came together around visions of a new self and a new society. They were identity-breeding spaces in which people could create solidarity and break down the conventional oppositions of public and private, individual and community. Unlike conservatives' view of voluntary "mediating structures" as protectors of the social status quo, activists presented their movements as open, evolving forces for generating fundamental democratic change to "get back our country." ...

The ... movements of the Sixties helped to produce important changes in the policies, processes, and very tone of American politics.... However, it would be difficult to argue that the result of the changes ushered in by the Sixties was any sense of self-confident renewal or regained centeredness in American public life.... There were reforms in abundance, but a generation later, unlike the payoff of earlier upheavals, these seemed to add up to greater public distress and cultural confusion rather than to catharsis and revitalization.

At base the problem was that allegiances to cultural and political traditions were being dissolved with no replacement in sight. While aggressively and often

successfully attacking the inherited moral authority of "the system," [reformers] ... had no coherent alternative to put in its place.... This is not to say, obviously, that the ... reformers were lacking in idealism. Movement culture was awash with moral indignation against the injustices and hypocrisy of the established system.... But with consciences awakened and disturbed, the question remained: What in the modern era could provide authoritative standards for constructive revitalization? What was the source of authority for the Truth claims made by the reformers?

As the 1960s progressed it became clear that any justifying warrant to legitimate reform demands was entirely self-referential.... Activists did not see themselves awakening penitently to a revived version of the nation's religious tradition or the established truths of its culture. They awakened to values and commitments they found personally fulfilling. To be free was to be able to live out one's subjectivity as a growing, self-realizing creator of meaning in one's life. The relevant guiding authority was the self-willed commitment to personal liberation and fulfillment in the world. Correspondingly, the rupture with the past was simply a healthy break with traditions of oppression. The long-standing national narrative of America's providential and benevolent moral mission in the world—a grounding component of earlier awakenings—became widely regarded by activists as little more than a conceit masking the country's failures and hypocrisy.

Herein lay a crucial though generally unacknowledged passage out of pre-modern and modern perspectives into what would increasingly become a post-modern sensibility. The concept of "pretending" in a *premodern* worldview could be invested with positive connotations of making believe—of claiming and behaving "as if" in order that the pretence might serve as an aspiration leading to the real, as yet unseen, thing. To the rationalistic *modern* perspective, pretending was an irrational, misleading escape inherently inferior to objective observation of the concrete, empirical facts. In contrast to both these views, the evolving *postmodern* sensibility attracted its audiences by showing the invariable falseness that underlay pretending. Pretence is only the disguise for the real thing, the system's way of concealing what the movement's critical powers had to continually unmask if liberation were to occur. Unmasking, the revealing of hidden agendas and unworthy motives of the powers that be, became a leitmotiv of movement culture. Perceptive observers sympathetic to the Sixties movements would later recognize that this rejection rather than engagement with normative tradition opened a dangerous gap between activists and the bulk of ordinary Americans' cultural understandings of patriotism and religion.

Many activists of the various movements of the Sixties displayed deep earnestness in the search for personal and social rebirth.... [They] proclaimed fulfillment to be the promise of self-fulfillment, the good to be what one freely chooses for one's own without the hegemonic pressure of institutions.... It was a secular version of what Dietrich Bonhoeffer called "cheap grace," the forgiving grace we bestow on ourselves. With "sin" passé, self-blame was out and system-blame was in. Postmodern sensibility would develop as a fervent search for answers based on the conviction that there are no "real" answers outside the self....

For some in the movements, the personalized, self-referential basis of awakened faith soon made it fairly easy to give up on sociopolitical action and to concentrate on “doing one’s own thing” to get on in life. As one of the founders of the student movement later described some in the New Left:

A generation giddy about easy victories was too easily crushed by defeats, too easily placated by private satisfactions.... The premium the movement placed on the glories and agonies of pure existential will ill-equipped many of us to slog away.

This stands in striking contrast with the early civil rights movement’s traditionalist faith in the transcendent strength available for eventual victory. As the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. put it in his letter from the Birmingham jail: “... The opposition we face will surely fail. We will win our freedom because the sacred heritage of our nation and the eternal will of God are embodied in our echoing demands.”

As the Sixties wore on, some activists counted on the revolutionary intensity and militancy of their convictions to intimidate opponents. Radical breakaway groups formed and re-formed on the student Left, in feminist and environmental circles, and in the black community. Generally these groups soon faded away, either into the mists of counterculture spontaneity and mind-trips or into the bomb smoke of vulgar Marxist anarchism.

In their central thrust, however, the Sixties movements eventually sought to advance their claims by nonrevolutionary confrontations of power with power, organization with counter organization....

For those who chose to stay engaged in their causes, and for others who joined, to be a movement activist increasingly meant to have expert (if uncredentialed) knowledge about particular public issues, to be organizationally sophisticated (not least in foundation fund-raising and horizontal “networking” skills), and to understand the folkways of orchestrating media attention for your policy agenda. But notice too, participation in public deliberation was not simply a question of interest-group inclusion—getting one’s voice heard. It was a strategic matter of constructing, defending, and advancing the “issues” that infused one’s group identity against the designs of adversaries contesting for control of a social field....

In general, the movements were not responses to economic crises or material breakdowns in society. On the contrary, everything about Cold War liberalism was proceeding *too* smoothly to suit thousands of movement activists. The deep-running issue was, to put it rather grandly, one of “meaning”—what people thought they were to make of themselves, individually and as a society. In an era of secular modernity, the raw materials of social life—identities, solidarities, and meanings—could not be considered as givens; they were constructions to be labored over and achieved by people increasingly aware of themselves as the creators and contenders for power involved in these constructive processes. Domains of social life once shielded by tradition and transcendent fixities—from procreation to death and all the production of culture in between—were unmasked and exposed to technocratic agendas of control as well as alternative “democratic” projects to control the newly opened domains. Thus the Sixties

social movements would take on the modern organizational logic of rational resource mobilization, but they would also point toward a postmodern quest for the human design of meaning and identity, which is to say, toward the contexts of a reflexive society self-consciously making itself....

... [The Sixties were] transformative, for better or worse. [The decade] created an unprecedented openness of institutions to critical public view and correction. It established a presumption for an inclusive social union of equals beyond anything ever attempted by a nation-state. It nationalized policy-making on issues touching virtually every aspect of one's daily life. It drove a fundamental pluralism into the very heart of America's narrative understanding of itself. And it soon energized political forces that claimed to speak for the "true America's" religious and cultural traditions.

At the same time, a dangerous dissociation among government, policy politics, and the public was set in motion. Despite the forms of greater democratic openness in the system (in fact often because of them), policy-making in the postmodern era revolves around contending bodies of activists who are largely detached from the bulk of ordinary citizens. This is one thread that runs through our entire policy process broadly understood, from the focus-group consultants' framing of issues and the professional management of election campaigns to the details of the latest court hearing on agency regulations. The gap between policy activists and what have been called those with a commitment to everyday life is an equal-opportunity destroyer of public confidence, applying to the right and left of the political spectrum. It reflects something more than the familiar fact that serious political activity is a minority taste. The dissociation is structured in a post-Sixties policy culture that has institutionalized the distrust of institutions and their normative authority, whether in the public or private sector. The faithful activists of both right and left carry the antinomian banner.

For example, even on such a highly charged matter as the so-called culture wars over the public schools, the vast bulk of Americans are not preoccupied by concerns about multiculturalism and sex education. And traditional Christian parents (i.e., regular churchgoers who consider themselves born-again or biblical literalists) share most of the same concerns and support the same solutions for the public schools as do other Americans. On this and the host of other issues crowding the policy agenda, activists confront each other and do battle over competing claims to rights-victimhood, all sides claiming the moral right (and fund-raising necessity) to demonize their policy opponents. Huge expectations are invested in public-policy solutions to dire domestic problems, both by those who would have government do more and by those who would have it do much less, or nothing. But none of this adds up to a process or public philosophy that could provide ordinary citizens with a sense of coherent meaning to what is happening in their collective affairs. Everyday Americans find their lives entangled in a regime of activist government and activist antigovernment politics that they can little understand, much less sense they are controlling.

By the mid-1990s the Sixties were regnant. The now-adult, divided, radically pluralistic Sixties generation was taking over the reins of power. More than

that, they were leading an inchoate debate on what political vision of the world could have authority over the nation. In effect, the search was on for a higher public moral order in a policy culture denying there could be any such thing. Here was a situation ripe with possibilities for demagoguery and for citizens' mounting disgust with the politics to which they were onlookers. Such are the perils of a basically religious people awakening in modernity.

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From the Feminine Mystique to Women's Liberation: Feminist Politics in the 1960s and 1970s

In the 1960s and 1970s, feminists created one of the most influential social movements in the history of the United States. Over a twenty-year period, feminists generated a revolution in public policy, restructured existing institutions and established new ones, and changed American culture. Feminists compelled people to reflect on gender relations, and, in the process, they expanded the meaning of freedom for everyone. The women who comprised the movement differed along lines of race, class, and sexuality, and they did not always share the same strategies. Some sought to insure that women gained equality within preexisting institutions—such as the workplace and schools, while others sought to politicize issues—such as reproduction and sexual violence—that had been excluded from the realm of public debate. But these diverse goals were what made feminism such a powerful force in the 1960s and 1970s. By the early 1980s, the movement had radically altered the politics, culture, and society of the United States.

The feminist movement originated in certain changes that took place in the United States after World War II: the growing presence of married women and mothers in the paid labor force (despite a domestic ideology that denied this presence); the related shift away from an earlier family wage economy, defined by a male breadwinner's ability to support a stay-at-home wife and children, to a dual-earner economy in which both men and women would need to enter the labor market in order to survive; a growing openness surrounding women's sexuality within science, law, and popular culture; and the rise of the civil rights movement and the New Left, both of which prompted many women to reflect on the ways that sexism had shaped their lives. As women entered both American workplaces and the public sphere in unprecedented numbers, they continued to encounter policies that marginalized them economically, politically, and culturally. It was this contradiction that sparked feminist activism in the 1960s.

Scholars have argued that feminism actually comprised two distinct but overlapping political movements during this period: the Women's Rights Movement and the Women's Liberation Movement. The Women's Rights Movement emerged in the mid-1960s and was focused on the bread and butter issues of pay equity, fair wages, and equal opportunity. Through groups like the National Organization for Women (NOW) (founded in 1966), women's rights activists used legislation and the courts to combat gender discrimination in schools, in workplaces, and in politics. The Women's Liberation Movement emerged somewhat later, and the women who were drawn to it tended to be somewhat younger in age, college educated, white, and middle class. Many had first become political through their activism in the civil rights, New Left, and antiwar movements of the era. Women's liberation activists used writing and consciousness-raising as powerful tools for exploring sexist oppression, and they also relied on highly visible protests to call attention to cultural practices—such as beauty pageants and advertising—that degraded and objectified women. Fighting back in American workplaces, in the halls of Congress, in courtrooms, in the streets, and inside their own homes, hundreds of thousands of women—young and old; African American, Latina, and white; privileged and poor—spearheaded a movement that demanded both equality and freedom and that endures into our own time.



DOCUMENTS

The following documents reflect the diverse tactics and themes that shaped feminist politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Document 1 is an excerpt from the first chapter of Betty Friedan's 1963 book *The Feminine Mystique*. An interpretive analysis of the lives of college-educated, white, middle-class women in the 1950s, the book—which became a feminist classic—suggested that many suburban housewives were discontented, unfulfilled, and frustrated by domestic life. The year after she published *The Feminine Mystique*, Friedan helped to found the National Organization for Women (NOW), whose statement of purpose is reproduced in Document 2. Document 3, a first-person account of one woman's illegal abortion in the years before *Roe v. Wade* (the Supreme Court decision that made abortion a constitutionally guaranteed right), provides historical context for what would become a central feminist demand: women's access to safe and legal abortions. Along with Betty Friedan, Pauli Murray was an early feminist activist who recognized that workplace equality was crucial to women's economic survival. In Document 4, Murray explains why this insight was especially pertinent to African American women, who were confronted with both sexism and racism on the job, a dual burden Murray called "Jane Crow." By the late 1960s, feminist pioneers like Friedan and Murray were joined by radical women's liberation activists, whose writings are exemplified in Documents 5 and 6. Document 5, "Feminists Speak Out Against the Miss America Pageant," was written by young feminists in response to the 1968 Miss America Pageant in Atlantic City, where protesters gathered and charged pageant organizers with promoting sexism, racism, militarism, and consumerism. In "The Woman-Identified Woman," (Document 6), lesbian feminists took the feminist movement to task for failing to

address the issue of lesbianism, insisting that because lesbians were “women-identified women” who refused to define themselves in relation to men, they represented the true face of radical feminist politics. Feminists were not only accused of failing to adequately deal with lesbianism; they were also charged with neglecting to address the unique challenges confronting women of color. In “A Black Feminist Statement” (Document 7), the Combahee River Collective insisted that feminists could not address sexism alone; they had to simultaneously confront patriarchy, capitalism, racism, and heterosexism as parts of a total political-economic system. The Collective also affirmed their solidarity with black men in the struggle against racism, explaining that the ravages of racism prevented them from embracing the separatism adopted by some white feminists. Taken together, the documents reflect the movement’s breadth during these years, as well as the challenges feminists confronted when grappling with issues of difference among women.

1. Betty Friedan Uncovers “The Problem That Has No Name,” 1963

The problem lay buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of American women. It was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the middle of the twentieth century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay beside her husband at night—she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question—“Is this all?”

For over fifteen years there was no word of this yearning in the millions of words written about women, for women, in all the columns, books, and articles by experts telling women their role was to seek fulfillment as wives and mothers. Over and over women heard in voices of tradition and of Freudian sophistication that they could desire no greater destiny than to glory in their own femininity. Experts told them how to catch a man and keep him, how to breastfeed children and handle their toilet training, how to cope with sibling rivalry and adolescent rebellion; how to buy a dishwasher, bake bread, cook gourmet snails, and build a swimming pool with their own hands; how to dress, look, and act more feminine and make marriage more exciting; how to keep their husbands from dying young and their sons from growing into delinquents. They were taught to pity the neurotic, unfeminine, unhappy women who wanted to be poets or physicists or presidents. They learned that truly feminine women do not want careers, higher education, political rights—the independence and the opportunities that the old-fashioned feminists fought for. Some women, in their forties and fifties, still remembered painfully giving up those dreams, but most of the younger women no longer even thought about them. A thousand expert voices applauded their femininity, their adjustment, their new maturity. All they had

to do was devote their lives from earliest girlhood to finding a husband and bearing children.

By the end of the nineteen-fifties, the average marriage age of women in America dropped to 20, and was still dropping, into the teens. Fourteen million girls were engaged by 17. The proportion of women attending college in comparison with men dropped from 47 per cent in 1920 to 35 per cent in 1958. A century earlier, women had fought for higher education; now girls went to college to get a husband. By the mid-fifties, 60 per cent dropped out of college to marry, or because they were afraid too much education would be a marriage bar. Colleges built dormitories for "married students," but the students were almost always the husbands. A new degree was instituted for the wives—"Ph.T." (Putting Husband Through).

Then American girls began getting married in high school. And the women's magazines, deploring the unhappy statistics about these young marriages, urged that courses on marriage, and marriage counselors, be installed in the high schools. Girls started going steady at twelve and thirteen, in junior high. Manufacturers put out brassieres with false bosoms of foam rubber for little girls of ten. And an advertisement for a child's dress, sizes 3-6x, in the *New York Times* in the fall of 1960, said: "She Too Can Join the Man-Trap Set."

By the end of the fifties, the United States birthrate was overtaking India's. The birth-control movement, renamed Planned Parenthood, was asked to find a method whereby women who had been advised that a third or fourth baby would be born dead or defective might have it anyhow. Statisticians were especially astounded at the fantastic increase in the number of babies among college women. Where once they had two children, now they had four, five, six. Women who had once wanted careers were now making careers out of having babies. So rejoiced *Life* magazine in a 1956 paean to the movement of American women back to the home....

Interior decorators were designing kitchens with mosaic murals and original paintings, for kitchens were once again the center of women's lives. Home sewing became a million-dollar industry. Many women no longer left their homes, except to shop, chauffeur their children, or attend a social engagement with their husbands. Girls were growing up in America without ever having jobs outside the home. In the late fifties, a sociological phenomenon was suddenly remarked: a third of American women now worked, but most were no longer young and very few were pursuing careers. They were married women who held part-time jobs, selling or secretarial, to put their husbands through school, their sons through college, or to help pay the mortgage. Or they were widows supporting families. Fewer and fewer women were entering professional work. The shortages in the nursing, social work, and teaching professions caused crises in almost every American city. Concerned over the Soviet Union's lead in the space race, scientists noted that America's greatest source of unused brainpower was women. But girls would not study physics: it was "unfeminine." A girl refused a science fellowship at Johns Hopkins to take a job in a real-estate office. All she wanted, she said, was what every other American girl wanted, to get married, have four children, and live in a nice house in a nice suburb.

The suburban housewife—she was the dream image of the young American women and the envy, it was said, of women all over the world. The American housewife—freed by science and labor-saving appliances from the drudgery, the dangers of childbirth, and the illnesses of her grandmother. She was healthy, beautiful, educated, concerned only about her husband, her children, her home. She had found true feminine fulfillment. As a housewife and mother, she was respected as a full and equal partner to man in his world. She was free to choose automobiles, clothes, appliances, supermarkets; she had everything that women ever dreamed of.

In the fifteen years after World War II, this mystique of feminine fulfillment became the cherished and self-perpetuating core of contemporary American culture. Millions of women lived their lives in the image of those pretty pictures of the American suburban housewife, kissing their husbands goodbye in front of the picture window, depositing their stationwagonsful of children at school, and smiling as they ran the new electric waxer over the spotless kitchen floor. They baked their own bread, sewed their own and their children's clothes, kept their new washing machines and dryers running all day. They changed the sheets on the beds twice a week instead of once, took the rug-hooking class in adult education, and pitied their poor frustrated mothers, who had dreamed of having a career. Their only dream was to be perfect wives and mothers; their highest ambition to have five children and a beautiful house, their only fight to get and keep their husbands. They had no thought for the unfeminine problems of the world outside the home; they wanted the men to make the major decisions. They gloried in their role as women, and wrote proudly on the census blank: "Occupation: housewife."...

If a woman had a problem in the 1950s and 1960s, she knew that something must be wrong with her marriage, or with herself. Other women were satisfied with their lives, she thought. What kind of a woman was she if she did not feel this mysterious fulfillment waxing the kitchen floor? She was so ashamed to admit her dissatisfaction that she never knew how many other women shared it. If she tried to tell her husband, he didn't understand what she was talking about. She did not really understand it herself. For over fifteen years women in America found it harder to talk about this problem than about sex. Even the psychoanalysts had no name for it. When a woman went to a psychiatrist for help, as many women did, she would say, "I'm so ashamed," or "I must be hopelessly neurotic." "I don't know what's wrong with women today," a suburban psychiatrist said uneasily. "I only know something is wrong because most of my patients happen to be women. And their problem isn't sexual." Most women with this problem did not go to see a psychoanalyst, however. "There's nothing wrong really," they kept telling themselves. "There isn't any problem."

But on an April morning in 1959, I heard a mother of four, having coffee with four other mothers in a suburban development fifteen miles from New York, say in a tone of quiet desperation, "the problem." And the others knew, without words, that she was not talking about a problem with her husband, or her children, or her home. Suddenly they realized they all shared the same problem, the problem that has no name. They began, hesitantly, to talk about it.

Later, after they had picked up their children at nursery school and taken them home to nap, two of the women cried, in sheer relief, just to know they were not alone.

2. NOW Issues Its Statement of Purpose, 1966

We, men and women who hereby constitute ourselves as the National Organization for Women, believe that the time has come for a new movement toward true equality for all women in America, and toward a fully equal partnership of the sexes, as part of the world-wide revolution of human rights now taking place within and beyond our national borders.

The purpose of NOW is to take action to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of American society now, exercising all the privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partnership with men.

We believe the time has come to move beyond the abstract argument, discussion, and symposia over the status and special nature of women which has raged in America in recent years; the time has come to confront, with concrete action, the conditions that now prevent women from enjoying the equality of opportunity and freedom of choice which is their right as individual Americans, and as human beings.

NOW is dedicated to the proposition that women first and foremost are human beings, who, like all other people in our society, must have the chance to develop their fullest human potential. We believe that women can achieve such equality only by accepting to the full the challenges and responsibilities they share with all other people in our society, as part of the decision-making mainstream of American political, economic, and social life.

We organize to initiate or support action, nationally or in any part of this nation, by individuals or organizations, to break through the silken curtain of prejudice and discrimination against women in government, industry, the professions, the churches, the political parties, the judiciary, the labor unions, in education, science, medicine, law, religion, and every other field of importance in American society....

There is no civil rights movement to speak for women, as there has been for Negroes and other victims of discrimination. The National Organization for Women must therefore begin to speak.

WE BELIEVE that the power of American law, and the protection guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution to the civil rights of all individuals, must be effectively applied and enforced to isolate and remove patterns of sex discrimination, to ensure equality of opportunity in employment and education, and equality of civil and political rights and responsibilities on behalf of women, as well as for Negroes and other deprived groups.

We realize that women's problems are linked to many broader questions of social justice; their solution will require concerted action by many groups. Therefore, convinced that human rights for all are indivisible, we expect to give active support to the common cause of equal rights for all those who suffer discrimination and deprivation, and we call upon other organizations committed to such goals to support our efforts toward equality for women.

WE DO NOT ACCEPT the token appointment of a few women to high-level positions in government and industry as a substitute for a serious continuing effort to recruit and advance women according to their individual abilities. To this end, we urge American government and industry to mobilize the same resources of ingenuity and command with which they have solved problems of far greater difficulty than those now impeding the progress of women.

WE BELIEVE that this nation has a capacity at least as great as other nations, to innovate new social institutions which will enable women to enjoy true equality of opportunity and responsibility in society, without conflict with their responsibilities as mothers and homemakers. In such innovations, America does not lead the Western world, but lags by decades behind many European countries. We do not accept the traditional assumption that a woman has to choose between marriage and motherhood, on the one hand, and serious participation in industry or the professions on the other. We question the present expectation that all normal women will retire from job or profession for ten or fifteen years, to devote their full time to raising children, only to reenter the job market at a relatively minor level. This in itself is a deterrent to the aspirations of women, to their acceptance into management or professional training courses, and to the very possibility of equality of opportunity or real choice, for all but a few women. Above all, we reject the assumption that these problems are the unique responsibility of each individual woman, rather than a base social dilemma which society must solve. True equality of opportunity and freedom of choice for women requires such practical and possible innovations as a nationwide network of child-care centers, which will make it unnecessary for women to retire completely from society until their children are grown, and national programs to provide retraining for women who have chosen to care for their own children full time.

WE BELIEVE that it is as essential for every girl to be educated to her full potential of human ability as it is for every boy—with the knowledge that such education is the key to effective participation in today's economy and that, for a girl as for a boy, education can only be serious where there is expectation that it will be used in society. We believe that American educators are capable of devising means of imparting such expectations to girl students. Moreover, we consider the decline in the proportion of women receiving higher and professional education to be evidence of discrimination. This discrimination may take the form of quotas against the admission of women to colleges and professional schools; lack of encouragement by parents, counselors, and educators; denial of loans or fellowships; or the traditional or arbitrary procedures in graduate and professional training geared in terms of men, which inadvertently discriminate against

women. We believe that the same serious attention must be given to high school dropouts who are girls as to boys.

WE REJECT the current assumptions that a man must carry the sole burden of supporting himself, his wife, and family, and that a woman is automatically entitled to lifelong support by a man upon her marriage, or that marriage, home, and family are primarily woman's world and responsibility—hers, to dominate, his to support. We believe that a true partnership between the sexes demands a different concept of marriage, an equitable sharing of the responsibilities of home and children and of the economic burdens of their support. We believe that proper recognition should be given to the economic and social value of homemaking and child care. To these ends, we will seek to open a reexamination of laws and mores governing marriage and divorce, for we believe that the current state of “half-equality” between the sexes discriminates against both men and women, and is the cause of much unnecessary hostility between the sexes.

WE BELIEVE that women must now exercise their political rights and responsibilities as American citizens. They must refuse to be segregated on the basis of sex into separate-and-not-equal ladies' auxiliaries in the political parties, and they must demand representation according to their numbers in the regularly constituted party committees—at local, state, and national levels—and in the informal power structure, participating fully in the selection of candidates and political decision-making, and running for office themselves.

IN THE INTERESTS OF THE HUMAN DIGNITY OF WOMEN, we will protest and endeavor to change the false image of women now prevalent in the mass media, and in the texts, ceremonies, laws, and practices of our major social institutions. Such images perpetuate contempt for women by society and by women for themselves. We are similarly opposed to all policies and practices—in church, state, college, factory, or office—which, in the guise of protectiveness, not only deny opportunities but also foster in women self-denigration, dependence, and evasion of responsibility, undermine their confidence in their own abilities, and foster contempt for women.

NOW WILL HOLD ITSELF INDEPENDENT OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY in order to mobilize the political power of all women and men intent on our goals. We will strive to ensure that no party, candidate, President, senator, governor, congressman, or any public official who betrays or ignores the principle of full equality between the sexes is elected or appointed to office. If it is necessary to mobilize the votes of men and women who believe in our cause, in order to win for women the final right to be fully free and equal human beings, we so commit ourselves.

WE BELIEVE THAT women will do most to create a new image of women by *acting* now, and by speaking out in behalf of their own equality, freedom, and human dignity—not in pleas for special privilege, nor in enmity toward men, who are also victims of the current half-equality between the sexes—but in an active, self-respecting partnership with men. By so doing, women will develop confidence in their own ability to determine actively, in partnership with men, the conditions of their life, their choices, their future, and their society.

3. Margaret Cerullo Remembers an Illegal Abortion, 1968

My story is not unusual. Like many women of my generation, women now in their late thirties and forties, my commitment to abortion rights drew its initial passion from my own illegal abortion, 21 years ago....

In 1968 I was 20 years old and I was a student, a junior in college at the University of Pennsylvania.... [A]gainst my will, and much to my dismay, I was pregnant, a fact I discovered the Saturday before my final exams were going to begin. Not only was abortion illegal in 1968, so was birth control. In Philadelphia where I lived (not a backwater) you could only get the pill (the only form of birth control I thought of) if you were married, had your parents' permission, or were 21 years of age. I was too young, I wasn't married, and my parents were practicing Catholics. Women students at Penn had just discovered a doctor in Philadelphia—one doctor—who would accept a letter of permission not only from your parents, but also from your aunt. So, we sat around the dorms granting our "nieces" permission to use birth control. I participated in these letter-writing sessions, knowing that by the time I got the pill it might already be "too late."

I was about nine or ten weeks pregnant by the time I figured out where I could get a pregnancy test, had one, and waited for the results. I really had very little idea how I was going to go about getting an abortion, but I was absolutely clear that I did not want to have a child. Like so many young women who get pregnant, I had not been sexually active for long. I felt I was only beginning to know the possibilities of my body, as I was only beginning to dream the possibilities of my life.

I really cannot remember exactly how I found the phone numbers, but I suppose I got them through the various means of the underground student/political/counter-cultural scene. I began making calls all over the East Coast, very coded telephone calls. "Hello, this is Mary; I'm calling because I just saw John; well, actually, I saw John about nine and a half weeks ago." You coded the relevant information about what you wanted and how serious the situation was. I made three or four of these calls from pay phones in between taking exams, and the person on the other end of each one of them hung up abruptly after I blurted out the critical information. Eventually, I found out there was a major crackdown in process, just a chance regular kind of repressive crackdown on illegal abortionists on the East Coast. The weeks were ticking away and I was starting for the first time to feel nervous. I knew after twelve weeks I would really be in trouble and I had to go home to see my family after exams were over. I was worried about how I would disguise nausea and morning sickness.

Finally, I got the number of the "Clergymen's [*sic*] Council on Problem Pregnancies" and I went to visit a clergyman in the Philadelphia suburbs. The

Council tried to match you with clergymen of your own faith, but there were none of my faith participating. It was explained to me that there was one place they thought it would be possible to have an illegal abortion very quickly, a place called Towson, Maryland, outside of Baltimore. I would have to appear with \$600 in small bills.

It seemed an enormous amount of money then (I was living on \$5 a week spending money) and not simple to find. (I have recently calculated that \$600 in 1968 is equivalent to approximately \$2,100 in 1989 dollars.) The money was what made me decide to tell the guy I had gotten pregnant with. He agreed to dress up in a suit and go to the bank and apply for a loan. He got it and that's how I came up with \$600 in small bills. I was to appear in Towson at 2:00 in the afternoon outside the movie theater and wait until a man carrying a bag of groceries appeared at the theater and follow him. The clergyman with whom I spoke suggested that I think about the experience I was going to have as an act of civil disobedience against an unjust law. To call up righteous anger at a moment of terror was a great help to me....

... I encountered the man carrying a bag of groceries. He gestured and I went off with him to his car. There was another woman already there, another college student. She told me later she got pregnant the first time she slept with her boyfriend. We stopped by the mall and picked up a third woman, then drove for about 45 minutes. The third woman, who was from near Towson, said that we had taken an amazingly circuitous route to arrive at a little cottage in the woods where the grocery bag man lived with his wife. On an end table in the living room was a gold-leaf-framed picture of their son in his military uniform, a formal portrait taken before he left for Vietnam. In his absence, his bedroom had been turned into an "operating room."

The "doctor" eventually came, carrying a black bag (the sign he was a doctor) and wearing a mask that made me think of the Lone Ranger. We tossed coins to determine who would go first and proceeded to have our abortions in turn. Mine was a straightforward procedure, an old-fashioned "D&C" with no complications, and not more pain than I expected or was stoically prepared to endure. One of the other women, however, the other student, bled for a very long time, so instead of turning up back at the movie theater in Towson at 6:00 p.m. as I had been told, we didn't return until about 10:00 p.m. At about 7:00, I was allowed to call my friends in Baltimore to say I would be late, so those waiting in Towson had only about an hour and a half of anxiety that something had gone wrong or, almost unspeakable, that I would not return.

As I rode in the back seat of the car through Maryland countryside on my way to have an illegal abortion that day in May 1968, I came to a shocking realization. For the first time in my life, I understood that I was a woman, not a "human being," but a woman. For the first time, I understood something about what it meant to be a woman in this society—that the lives of women were not of value. And I realized, in an inchoate rage that is with me today as I recall this story, that in this society, *because I had sex, someone thought I deserved to die....*

4. Pauli Murray Argues that "Sex" Be Included in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964

1. The human rights "revolution" transcends the issue of discrimination on basis of race or color. Women's rights are a part of human rights. The history of the Negro rights movement parallels the women's rights movement. It is no accident that the increased interest in the status of women today coincides with increased civil rights activities of Negroes....
2. Employment is the area of keenest competition among groups—Negro-white; male-female. If sex is not included in civil rights bill, there is danger of *increasing* conflict between groups. On the other hand if sex is included, the civil rights bill would be including all the major areas of class discrimination in employment and it would encourage hiring of persons on the basis of individual merit.... Including all major class discriminations would tend to reduce hard feelings among the various classes....
3. Sex discrimination is a serious problem for working women, who constitute one-third of the labor force. Discrimination against women is "a way of life" at the present time, just as discrimination against Negroes is....
4. The Administration has sought highly qualified women for Federal appointive positions. This is an important step in removing discrimination against professional women. Nothing has been done to eliminate discrimination against working women in lower economic level[s] [however], many of whom are heads of families with children to support. Including sex in the civil rights bill would help these women, who suffer most because of sex discrimination.
5. If sex is not included, the civil rights bill would be including only one-half of the Negroes. It would not protect Negro women from discrimination of the basis of sex. It is impossible for a Negro woman to tell whether she is being turned down for a job because she is Negro or because she is a woman. If sex is not included in the civil rights bill an employer could say he is not hiring her because of her sex, even if his real reason is racial discrimination, and hire a less qualified white man instead. Negro women *especially* need protection against discrimination because an even greater percentage of Negro women are heads of families. One out of eight of the working women are Negro women. Negro women are heads of families in more than one-fifth of all nonwhite families.

Pauli Murray, "Arguments made on behalf of including 'sex' in the employment section of the civil rights bill," contained within a letter from Pauli Murray to Marguerite Rowalt. April 14, 1964, Folder 7, Mary O. Eastwood Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College.

5. Feminists Speak Out against the Miss America Pageant, 1968

On September 7th in Atlantic City, the Annual Miss America Pageant will again crown "your ideal." But this year, reality will liberate the contest auction-block in the guise of "genyooine" de-plasticized, breathing women. Women's Liberation Groups, black women, high-school and college women, women's peace groups, women's welfare and social-work groups, women's job-equality groups, pro-birth control and pro-abortion groups—women of every political persuasion—all are invited to join us in a day-long boardwalk-theater event, starting at 1:00 p.m. on the Boardwalk in front of Atlantic City's Convention Hall. We will protest the image of Miss America, an image that oppresses women in every area in which it purports to represent us. There will be: Picket Lines; Guerrilla Theater; Leafleting; Lobbying Visits to the contestants urging our sisters to reject the Pageant Farce and join us; a huge Freedom Trash Can (into which we will throw bras,* girdles, curlers, false eyelashes, wigs, and representative issues of *Cosmopolitan*, *Ladies' Home Journal*, *Family Circle*, etc.—bring any such woman-garbage you have around the house); we will also announce a Boycott of all those commercial products related to the Pageant, and the day will end with a Women's Liberation rally at midnight when Miss America is crowned on live television. Lots of other surprises are being planned (come and add your own!) but we do not plan heavy disruptive tactics and so do not expect a bad police scene. It should be a groovy day on the Boardwalk in the sun with our sisters. In case of arrests, however, we plan to reject all male authority and demand to be busted by policewomen only. (In Atlantic City, women cops are not permitted to make arrests—dig that!)

Male chauvinist-reactionaries on this issue had best stay away, nor are male liberals welcome in the demonstrations. But sympathetic men can donate money as well as cars and drivers.

Male reporters will be refused interviews. We reject patronizing reportage. *Only newswomen will be recognized.*

The Ten Points

We Protest:

1. *The Degrading Mindless-Boob-Girlie Symbol.* The Pageant contestants epitomize the roles we are all forced to play as women. The parade down the runway blares the metaphor of the 4-H Club county fair, where the nervous animals are judged for teeth, fleece, etc., and where the best "specimen" gets the blue ribbon. So are women in our society forced daily to compete for male approval, enslaved by ludicrous "beauty" standards we ourselves are conditioned to take seriously.

From *Sisterhood is Powerful: An Anthology of Writings from the Women's Liberation Movement*, © 1970 by Robin Morgan. By permission of Edite Kroll Literary Agency Inc.

*Bras were never burned. Bra-burning was a whole-cloth invention of the media—Ed.

2. *Racism with Roses*. Since its inception in 1921, the Pageant has not had one Black finalist, and this has not been for a lack of test-case contestants. There has never been a Puerto Rican, Alaskan, Hawaiian, or Mexican-American winner. Nor has there ever been a *true* Miss America—an American Indian.

3. *Miss America as Military Death Mascot*. The highlight of her reign each year is a cheerleader-tour of American troops abroad—last year she went to Vietnam to pep-talk our husbands, fathers, sons and boyfriends into dying and killing with a better spirit. She personifies the “unstained patriotic American womanhood our boys are fighting for.” The Living Bra and the Dead Soldier. We refuse to be used as Mascots for Murder.

4. *The Consumer Con-Game*. Miss America is a walking commercial for the Pageant's sponsors. Wind her up and she plugs your product on promotion tours and TV—all in an “honest, objective” endorsement. What a skill.

5. *Competition Rigged and Unrigged*. We deplore the encouragement of an American myth that oppresses men as well as women: the win-or-you're-worthless competitive disease. The “beauty contest” creates only one winner to be “used” and forty-nine losers who are “useless.”

6. *The Woman as Pop Culture Obsolescent Theme*. Spindle, mutilate, and then discard tomorrow. What is so ignored as last year's Miss America? This only reflects the gospel of our society, according to Saint Male: women must be young, juicy, malleable—hence age discrimination and the cult of youth. And we women are brainwashed into believing this ourselves!

7. *The Unbeatable Madonna-Whore Combination*. Miss America and Playboy's centerfold are sisters over the skin. To win approval, we must be both sexy and wholesome, delicate but able to cope, demure yet titillatingly bitchy. Deviation of any sort brings, we are told, disaster: “You won't get a man!!”

8. *The Irrelevant Crown on the Throne of Mediocrity*. Miss America represents what women are supposed to be: unoffensive, bland, apolitical. If you are tall, short, over or under what weight The Man prescribes you should be, forget it. Personality, articulateness, intelligence, commitment—unwise. Conformity is the key to the crown—and, by extension, to success in our society.

9. *Miss America as Dream Equivalent To—?* In this reputedly democratic society, where every little boy supposedly can grow up to be President, what can every little girl hope to grow to be? Miss America. That's where it's at. Real power to control our own lives is restricted to men, while women get patronizing pseudo-power, an ermine cloak and a bunch of flowers; men are judged by their actions women by their appearance.

10. *Miss America as Big Sister Watching You*. The Pageant exercises Thought Control, attempts to sear the Image onto our minds, to further make women oppressed and men oppressors; to enslave us all the more in high-heeled, low-status roles; to inculcate false values in young girls; to use women as beasts of buying; to seduce us to prostitute ourselves before our own oppression.

NO MORE MISS AMERICA

6. Radicalesbians Explore the Meaning of “The Woman-Identified Woman,” 1970

What is a lesbian? A lesbian is the rage of all women condensed to the point of explosion. She is the woman who, often beginning at an extremely early age, acts in accordance with her inner compulsion to be a more complete and freer human being than her society—perhaps then, but certainly later—cares to allow her. These needs and actions, over a period of years, bring her into painful conflict with people, situations, the accepted ways of thinking, feeling and behaving, until she is in a state of continual war with everything around her, and usually with her self. She may not be fully conscious of the political implications of what for her began as personal necessity, but on some level she has not been able to accept the limitations and oppression laid on her by the most basic role of her society—the female role. The turmoil she experiences tends to induce guilt proportional to the degree to which she feels she is not meeting social expectations, and/or eventually drives her to question and analyze what the rest of her society more or less accepts. She is forced to evolve her own life pattern, often living much of her life alone, learning usually much earlier than her “straight” (heterosexual) sisters about the essential aloneness of life (which the myth of marriage obscures) and about the reality of illusions. To the extent that she cannot expel the heavy socialization that goes with being female, she can never truly find peace with herself. For she is caught somewhere between accepting society’s view of her—in which case she cannot accept herself—and coming to understand what this sexist society has done to her and why it is functional and necessary for it to do so. Those of us who work that through find ourselves on the other side of a tortuous journey through a night that may have been decades long. The perspective gained from that journey, the liberation of self, the inner peace, the real love of self and of all women, is something to be shared with all women—because we are all women.

It should first be understood that lesbianism, like male homosexuality, is a category of behavior possible only in a sexist society characterized by rigid sex roles and dominated by male supremacy. Those sex roles dehumanize women by defining us as a supportive/serving caste in relation to the master caste of men, and emotionally cripple men by demanding that they be alienated from their own bodies and emotions in order to perform their economic/political/military functions effectively. Homosexuality is a by-product of a particular way of setting up roles (or approved patterns of behavior) on the basis of sex; as such it is an inauthentic (not consonant with “reality”) category. In a society in which men do not oppress women, and sexual expression is allowed to follow feelings, the categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality would disappear.

But lesbianism is also different from male homosexuality, and serves a different function in the society. “Dyke” is a different kind of put-down from “faggot”, although both imply you are not playing your socially assigned sex role ... are

not therefore a "real woman" or a "real man." The grudging admiration felt for the tomboy, and the queasiness felt around a sissy boy point to the same thing: the contempt in which women—or those who play a female role—are held. And the investment in keeping women in that contemptuous role is very great. Lesbian is a word, the label, the condition that holds women in line. When a woman hears this word tossed her way, she knows she is stepping out of line. She knows that she has crossed the terrible boundary of her sex role. She recoils, she protests, she reshapes her actions to gain approval. Lesbian is a label invented by the Man to throw at any woman who dares to be his equal, who dares to challenge his prerogatives (including that of all women as part of the exchange medium among men), who dares to assert the primacy of her own needs. To have the label applied to people active in women's liberation is just the most recent instance of a long history; older women will recall that not so long ago, any woman who was successful, independent, not orienting her whole life about a man, would hear this word. For in this sexist society, for a woman to be independent means she can't be a woman—she must be a dyke. That in itself should tell us where women are at. It says as clearly as can be said: women and person are contradictory terms. For a lesbian is not considered a "real woman." And yet, in popular thinking, there is really only one essential difference between a lesbian and other women: that of sexual orientation—which is to say, when you strip off all the packaging, you must finally realize that the essence of being a "woman" is to get fucked by men....

Women in the movement have in most cases gone to great lengths to avoid discussion and confrontation with the issue of lesbianism. It puts people up-tight. They are hostile, evasive, or try to incorporate it into some "broader issue." They would rather not talk about it. If they have to, they try to dismiss it as a "lavender herring." But it is no side issue. It is absolutely essential to the success and fulfillment of the women's liberation movement that this issue be dealt with. As long as the label "dyke" can be used to frighten women into a less militant stand, keep her separate from her sisters, keep her from giving primacy to anything other than men and family—then to that extent she is controlled by the male culture. Until women see in each other the possibility of a primal commitment which includes sexual love, they will be denying themselves the love and value they readily accord to men, thus affirming their second-class status. As long as male acceptability is primary—both to individual women and to the movement as a whole—the term lesbian will be used effectively against women.... [I]t must be understood that what is crucial is that women begin disengaging from male-defined response patterns. In the privacy of our own psyches, we must cut those cords to the core. For irrespective of where our love and sexual energies flow, if we are male-identified in our heads, we cannot realize our autonomy as human beings.

But why is it that women have related to and through men? By virtue of having been brought up in a male society, we have internalized the male culture's definition of ourselves. That definition consigns us to sexual and family functions, and excludes us from defining and shaping the terms of our lives. In exchange for our psychic servicing and for performing society's non-profit-making functions, the man confers on us just one thing: the slave status which makes us legitimate in the eyes of the society in which we live. This is called "femininity"

or “being a real woman” in our cultural lingo. We are authentic, legitimate, real to the extent that we are the property of some man whose name we bear. To be a woman who belongs to no man is to be invisible, pathetic, inauthentic, unreal. He confirms his image of us—of what we have to be in order to be acceptable by him—but not our real selves; he confirms our womanhood—as he defines it, in relation to him—but cannot confirm our personhood, our own selves as absolutes. As long as we are dependent on the male culture for this definition, for this approval, we cannot be free.

The consequence of internalizing this role is an enormous reservoir of self-hate. This is not to say the self-hate is recognized or accepted as such; indeed most women would deny it. It may be experienced as discomfort with her role, as feeling empty, as numbness, as restlessness, as a paralyzing anxiety at the center. Alternatively, it may be expressed in shrill defensiveness of the glory and destiny of her role. But it does exist, often beneath the edge of her consciousness, poisoning her existence, keeping her alienated from herself, her own needs, and rendering her a stranger to other women. They try to escape by identifying with the oppressor, living through him, gaining status and identity from his ego, his power, his accomplishments. And by not identifying with other “empty vessels” like themselves. Women resist relating on all levels to other women who will reflect their own oppression, their own secondary status, their own self-hate. For to confront another woman is finally to confront one’s self—the self we have gone to such lengths to avoid. And in that mirror we know we cannot really respect and love that which we have been made to be.

As the source of self-hate and the lack of real self are rooted in our male-given identity, we must create a new sense of self.... Only women can give to each other a new sense of self. That identity we have to develop with reference to ourselves, and not in relation to men.... Our energies must flow toward our sisters, not backward toward our oppressors. As long as woman’s liberation tries to free women without facing the basic heterosexual structure that binds us in one-to-one relationship with our oppressors, tremendous energies will continue to flow into trying to straighten up each particular relationship with a man, into finding how to get better sex, how to turn his head around-into trying to make the “new man” out of him, in the delusion that this will allow us to be the “new woman.” This obviously splits our energies and commitments, leaving us unable to be committed to the construction of the new patterns which will liberate us....

7. Black Feminists Speak Out, 1977

We are a collective of black feminists ... actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the

logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face....

... [W]e find our origins in the historical reality of Afro-American women's continuous life-and-death struggle for survival and liberation. Black women's extremely negative relationship to the American political system (a system of white male rule) has always been determined by our membership in two oppressed racial and sexual castes.... There have always been black women activists—some known, like Sojourner Truth, Harriet Tubman, Frances E. W. Harper, Ida B. Wells Barnett, and Mary Church Terrell, and thousands upon thousands unknown—who had a shared awareness of how their sexual identity combined with their racial identity to make their whole life situation and the focus of their political struggles unique. Contemporary black feminism is the outgrowth of countless generations of personal sacrifice, militancy, and work by our mothers and sisters.

A black feminist presence has evolved most obviously in connection with the second wave of the American women's movement beginning in the late 1960s. Black, other Third World, and working women have been involved in the feminist movement from its start, but both outside reactionary forces and racism and elitism within the movement itself have served to obscure our participation....

Black feminist politics also have an obvious connection to movements for black liberation, particularly those of the 1960s and 1970s. Many of us were active in those movements (civil rights, black nationalism, the Black Panthers), and all of our lives were greatly affected and changed by their ideology, their goals, and the tactics used to achieve their goals. It was our experience and disillusionment within these liberation movements, as well as experience on the periphery of the white male left, that led to the need to develop a politics that was antiracist, unlike those of white women, and antisexist, unlike those of black and white men.

There is also undeniably a personal genesis for black feminism, that is, the political realization that comes from the seemingly personal experiences of individual black women's lives. Black feminists and many more black women who do not define themselves as feminists have all experienced sexual oppression as a constant factor in our day-to-day existence....

Our development also must be tied to the contemporary economic and political position of black people. The post-World War II generation of black youth was the first to be able to minimally partake of certain educational and employment options, previously closed completely to black people. Although our economic position is still at the very bottom of the American capitalist economy, a handful of us have been able to gain certain tools as a result of tokenism in education and employment which potentially enable us to more effectively fight our oppression....

Above all else, our politics initially sprang from the shared belief that black women are inherently valuable, that our liberation is a necessity not as an adjunct to somebody else's but because of our need as human persons for autonomy. This may seem so obvious as to sound simplistic, but it is apparent that no other ostensibly progressive movement has ever considered our specific oppression a priority or worked seriously for the ending of that oppression. Merely naming the

pejorative stereotypes attributed to black women (e.g., mammy, matriarch, Sapphire, whore, bulldagger), let alone cataloguing the cruel, often murderous, treatment we receive, indicates how little value has been placed upon our lives during four centuries of bondage in the Western hemisphere. We realize that the only people who care enough about us to work consistently for our liberation is us....

... We believe that the most profound and potentially the most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression. In the case of black women this is a particularly repugnant, dangerous, threatening, and therefore revolutionary concept because it is obvious from looking at all the political movements that have preceded us that anyone is more worthy of liberation than ourselves. We reject pedestals, queenhood, and walking ten paces behind. To be recognized as human, levelly human, is enough.

We believe that sexual politics under patriarchy is as pervasive in black women's lives as are the politics of class and race. We also often find it difficult to separate race from class from sex oppression because in our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously. We know that there is such a thing as racial-sexual oppression which is neither solely racial nor solely sexual, e.g., the history of rape of black women by white men as a weapon of political repression.

Although we are feminists and lesbians, we feel solidarity with progressive black men and do not advocate the fractionalization that white women who are separatists demand. Our situation as black people necessitates that we have solidarity around the fact of race.... [W]e struggle together with black men against racism, while we also struggle with black men about sexism.

We realize that the liberation of all oppressed peoples necessitates the destruction of the political-economic systems of capitalism and imperialism as well as patriarchy. We are socialists because we believe the work must be organized for the collective benefit of those who do the work and create the products and not for the profit of the bosses. Material resources must be equally distributed among those who create these resources.... We need to articulate the real class situation of persons who are not merely raceless, sexless workers, but for whom racial and sexual oppression are significant determinants in their working/economic lives....

As we have already stated, we reject the stance of lesbian separatism because it is not a viable political analysis or strategy for us. It leaves out far too much and far too many people, particularly black men, women, and children. We have a great deal of criticism and loathing for what men have been socialized to be in this society: what they support, how they act, and how they oppress. But we do not have the misguided notion that it is their maleness, *per se*—i.e., their biological maleness—that makes them what they are. As black women we find any type of biological determinism a particularly dangerous and reactionary basis upon which to build a politic. We must also question whether lesbian separatism is an adequate and progressive political analysis and strategy, even for those who practice it, since it so completely denies any but the sexual sources of women's oppression, negating the facts of class and race.

During our years together as a black feminist collective we have experienced success and defeat, joy and pain, victory and failure. We have found that it is very difficult to organize around black feminist issues, difficult even to announce in certain contexts that we are black feminists....

The major source of difficulty in our political work is that we are not just trying to fight oppression on one front or even two, but instead to address a whole range of oppressions. We do not have racial, sexual, heterosexual, or class privilege to rely upon, nor do we have even the minimal access to resources and power that groups who possess any one of these types of privilege have.

The psychological toll of being a black woman and the difficulties this presents in reaching political consciousness and doing political work can never be underestimated. There is a very low value placed upon black women's psyches in this society, which is both racist and sexist. As an early group member once said, "We are all damaged people merely by virtue of being black women." We are dispossessed psychologically and on every other level, and yet we feel the necessity to struggle to change our condition and the condition of all black women....

... If black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the destruction of all the systems of oppression....

During our time together we have identified and worked on many issues of particular relevance to black women. The inclusiveness of our politics makes us concerned with any situation that impinges upon the lives of women, Third World, and working people. We are of course particularly committed to working on those struggles in which race, sex, and class are simultaneous factors in oppression. We might, for example, become involved in workplace organizing at a factory that employs Third World women or picket a hospital that is cutting back on already inadequate health care to a Third World community, or set up a rape crisis center in a black neighborhood. Organizing around welfare or daycare concerns might also be a focus. The work to be done and the countless issues that this work represents merely reflect the pervasiveness of our oppression.

Issues and projects that collective members have actually worked on are sterilization abuse, abortion rights, battered women, rape, and health care. We have also done many workshops and educationals on black feminism on college campuses, at women's conferences, and most recently for high school women.

One issue that is of major concern to us and that we have begun to publicly address is racism in the white women's movement. As black feminists we are made constantly and painfully aware of how little effort white women have made to understand and combat their racism, which requires among other things that they have a more than superficial comprehension of race, color, and black history and culture. Eliminating racism in the white women's movement is by definition work for white women to do, but we will continue to speak to and demand accountability on this issue.

In the practice of our politics we do not believe that the end always justifies the means. Many reactionary and destructive acts have been done in the name of achieving "correct" political goals. As feminists we do not want to mess over people in the name of politics. We believe in collective process and a nonhierarchical distribution of power within our own group and in our vision of a revolutionary society. We are committed to a continual examination of our politics as they develop through criticism and self-criticism as an essential aspect of our practice. As black feminists and lesbians we know that we have a very definite revolutionary task to perform and we are ready for the lifetime of work and struggle before us.

✦ ESSAYS

The following essays reflect on the dual movements that comprised feminism in the 1960s and the 1970s: the movement for women's rights and the movement for women's liberation. In "Title VII and the Fight Against Workplace Sex Discrimination," Nancy MacLean traces the ways that early feminist activists like Pauli Murray successfully used the Title VII provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to demand fair treatment for women in the American workplace. In the process, MacLean places African American women like Murray at the center of feminism's history during these years. In the second essay, historian Alice Echols discusses radical feminism—the place of radical feminism within the wider history of 1960s radicalism, the actions and tactics radical feminists deployed, and their critique of the mainstream women's movement represented by organizations such as NOW.

Title VII and the Fight against Workplace Sex Discrimination

NANCY MACLEAN

... Doing away with gender-based protective laws while at the same time promising working women equality with working men, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allowed women to define themselves as full earner-citizens and to build new alliances. Much has been said about the class and race biases of second-wave feminism, yet when the focus of inquiry turns from the youthful women's liberation activists, often students, to the usually older working women who mobilized around issues of employment and focused on changing public policy, the movement looks more diverse and more attentive to bread-and-butter needs.

In fact, the women who most appreciated the potential of Title VII were those who had benefited least from the family wage bargain. Many black women of all classes and wage-earning women of all backgrounds experienced firsthand both the underside of an order that promised family wages to men only and claimed to protect women while treating them as lesser beings, and the limitations of color-blind and gender-neutral formal equality. Because neither of the strategies white feminists had been pursuing met their needs, black women activists had for decades sought instead social policies that recognized mothers' need for well-paid work and for support in their familial obligations. Participation in civil rights struggles also made some acutely sensitive to the dangers of the separate-but-equal tack pursued by labor-affiliated white feminists and more willing to demand an end to exclusion. "I just want equal treatment," said the labor and civil rights activist Dollie Robinson. "Whatever the men get, I want." Moreover, now that the civil rights movement had won broad support for the

idea of opening up all jobs, employment organizing benefited from a built-in momentum that other feminist projects such as reproductive rights lacked.

That momentum, in turn, enabled workplace activists to pose powerful challenges to widely accepted norms and practices that held all women down, among them the division of labor by gender and the sexual objectification of women. As they worked on the job and through activist groups, government agencies, court challenges, and other means to win equal citizenship at work, their organizing changed the way millions thought about women's and men's capacities. They altered American culture's common sense about gender, just as black activists had its notions about race. As they inspired women to redefine their identities, allegiances changed too, and the novel idea spread that the women's movement and the civil rights movement were natural allies. The reforms they won—not only access to new jobs but also pregnancy leave, the outlawing of sexual harassment, and greater support for parenting—led to increased inclusion of women in all areas of public life. Throughout, outsiders and insiders worked together, as grassroots protesters and sympathizers passed the initiative back and forth “like running a relay.” Once again, Title VII did not itself bring change, but it did provide a resource that enabled activists to chip away at the foundations of exclusion in so many areas that they caused the whole structure to stagger.

Among the first to appreciate Title VII's potential to improve women's lives, especially black women's lives, was the attorney Pauli Murray. Identifying herself as member of “the class of unattached, self-supporting women for whom employment opportunities were necessary to survival,” Murray became one of the most influential voices for including women of all groups in Title VII's ban on discrimination. Having crossed many boundaries in her own life, she saw ties that others overlooked. Descended from slaves, slaveholders, and Native Americans, Murray was orphaned at an early age. Raised in the South, she made the North her home in adult life. Influenced deeply as a young adult by the radical left, and a participant in the first sit-ins in the 1940s, she forged at that time a friendship with Eleanor Roosevelt which gained her access to power. A deeply spiritual person—later she became an ordained Episcopal priest—and a poet, she felt herself to be also “a warrior.” Married only briefly and disastrously, she built her world around strong, independent women in the age of the feminine mystique. But what most affected Murray's identity was the combined force of race and gender. A brilliant and accomplished student, she found herself denied admission by the University of North Carolina in 1938 because of her race, and by Harvard Law School in 1944 because of her sex. When she entered Howard Law School, where some of the country's most brilliant legal minds honed the challenges that would lead to *Brown v. Board of Education*, she learned that her male civil rights colleagues thought sex discrimination humorous, even when turned against a co-worker in the cause. It was then, in the 1940s, that Murray coined the phrase “Jane Crow” to capture the injustices to which women were subject. “The rationalizations upon which this sex prejudice rests,” she declared, “are often different from those supporting racial discrimination in label only.” As she would say later, “the two meet in me,” and from that standpoint she widened public understanding of what real freedom meant.

Murray was “overjoyed” when the word “sex” was added to the Civil Rights Act “because, as a Negro woman, I knew that it was difficult to determine whether I was being discriminated against because of race or sex.” She belonged to a network of progressive women who in the 1950s and 1960s began to explore different strategies for achieving fairness for their sex in the absence of a mass movement. In 1963 some succeeded in persuading Congress to pass the Equal Pay Act, the first federal anti-discrimination legislation. Yet their victory showed that formal equality was not enough: since job segregation had kept women in low-paying occupations different from those held by men, the key problem was not unequal pay for the same work but different work for women that was accorded lower market value. When a southern congressman, Howard Smith, proposed an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to bar sex discrimination in Title VII, these women pounced on the opportunity. “Smith insisted he was serious,” writes one observer, “but his comments appear to have been aimed at satirizing the logic behind the civil rights bill, which, in the view of Smith and many conservatives, was attempting to defy human nature.” Representative Martha Griffiths of Michigan used the ribaldry that greeted Smith’s proposal to shame her male peers: “I presume that if there had been any necessity to have pointed out that women were a second-class sex, the laughter would have proved it.” Other female House members, few as they were, rose to support Griffiths with arguments about the prevalence of sex discrimination in employment. Meanwhile, self-defined feminists who had weathered the years since women’s suffrage in the National Women’s Party lobbied in support of women’s inclusion in the bill. The amendment stayed in, by a vote of 168 to 133. And thus it was that the historic Civil Rights Act outlawed discrimination against women, but only in employment.

Behind the scenes, what persuaded the law’s sponsors to keep the sex discrimination provision, notwithstanding Smith’s hostility to the bill’s purpose and their own fear of “diluting” black civil rights, was neither the NWP nor Griffiths but Pauli Murray. She drafted a memorandum that the women’s network distributed to every member of Congress, the attorney general, and other key players, among them the president’s wife, Lady Bird Johnson. “If sex is not included,” she argued, “the civil rights bill would be including only one half of the Negroes.” Her logic convinced in part because she brought people to see how the case being made for opening jobs to African Americans concentrated on men while slighting women’s needs. Advocates were so concerned to shore up black men’s masculinity and familial authority through breadwinning jobs that they utterly neglected the plight of the tens of thousands of black women struggling on their own under the most challenging conditions. Murray used the same data others used on family breakup to make a very different, feminist case. “Negro women *especially* need protection against discrimination,” she pointed out, because they are “heads of families in more than one fifth of all nonwhite families.” For them, there was no such thing as a protective male family wage. Besides, since women of all groups now made up a third of the nation’s labor force, it was time to understand that “women’s rights are a part of human rights.”...

Murray transmitted her commitment to the dignity of “self-supporting” women to a new wave of activists in the mid-sixties. Title VII provided them a

wedge with which to open up the whole gender system to question. It served as the mechanism with which once-private grievances could be turned into classically political issues, the subjects of public debate and policy. Now able to work on problems they never before had tools to fix, feminist activists challenged the very foundation on which gender was constructed.

Yet articulating a vision and including women in legislation were only the beginning; the hardest struggle would be to make the law actually work for women. That would never have happened but for working-class women such as Lorena Weeks, a middle-aged white mother from small-town Georgia. Weeks, who had given nineteen years of "exemplary" service to Southern Bell as a telephone operator, took courage from Title VII and applied for the much better paid position of "switchman" in March 1966 in hopes of a shorter commute, allowing for more time with her children. Because she was a woman, the company denied her request outright and gave the job to a man with less seniority; Weeks then suffered unrelenting harassment. When efforts at conciliation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission failed to persuade the company, Weeks sued. She was not alone. When the EEOC opened in the summer of 1965, observers were stunned at the number of complaints it received from women: they made up more than one fourth of the total. Some 2,432 women in that initial year alone, overwhelmingly wage-earning and often union members, challenged refusals to hire, unequal wages, sex-segregated seniority lists, unequal health and pension coverage, biased recruitment and promotion policies, and more. Like the African American would-be textile and construction workers whose appeals helped shape the EEOC's mission, these women showed why their treatment, so long accepted as "just the way things were," was an injustice that demanded righting. In Weeks's case, Southern Bell claimed allegiance to a state protective law that prevented working "women and minors" from being required to lift more than thirty pounds; Weeks pointed out that her typewriter, which supervisors made her move, weighed more than that. The Court of Appeals ruled in her favor against laws based on "stereotyped characterization" that excluded women from good jobs. Title VII, the judges observed, "rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks"—an autonomy "men have always had."

Weeks's case and others like it exposed a pattern of workplace "sex segregation," a term that did not exist prior to the Civil Rights Act. Emerging as it did from the struggle against Jim Crow, Title VII put the spotlight clearly on job ghettos. Although women unionists had questioned their lower wages and lesser benefits before the mid-1960s, the sexual division of labor had remained sacrosanct: that men and women should hold different jobs required no explanation. Breaking out of what some feminists came to call "the pink-collar ghetto" was unthinkable because hardly anyone recognized the walls that enclosed them. "We never questioned it when they posted female and male jobs," recalled one woman who was active in the labor movement before the 1960s. "We didn't realize it was discrimination."

Thanks to Title VII, activists could better identify how this division of labor restricted human possibility for both women and men, much as the racial division

of labor did for blacks and whites. The issue came up in the very first Title VII case, which concerned airline stewardesses, as they were then called. In arguing against the airlines' case that only women could properly provide service and comfort to passengers, NOW activist Mary Eastwood noted wryly that the airlines were unlikely to hire "the star of the girls' basketball team, even [if] she were a compassionate, sensitive woman and would be great at throwing coats up on the shelf and balancing martinis." Eastwood then proposed a way to settle the issue that would become the essence of the "self-analysis" required of government contractors by affirmative action programs. In each job where such stereotypes operated, she urged, "it should be required that a very objective analysis be made of the specific requirements of the work and the actual ability of the particular individual who seeks the job. If one must be compassionate to be a flight attendant, then an individual female or male who seeks this job should be tested for compassion. For the airlines to assume that any female automatically has this characteristic and all males do not is the very essence of sex prejudice." By asking why only men were thought able to do certain jobs and only women others, Title VII activists opened foundational questions about gender.

Such questions, let alone their answers, were anything but obvious at the time Lorena Weeks and the flight attendants filed their complaints. Herman Edelsberg, the EEOC's executive director, called women's inclusion in Title VII a "fluke" and mocked it as "conceived out of wedlock." His was at first the majority opinion at the new commission, blessed by Vice Chairman Luther Holcomb, a white Baptist evangelist from Dallas, before his appointment to the new agency. These men saw no problem with airlines that hired women for the same jobs as men but gave them a different job title and smaller paychecks, and then fired them when they married or turned thirty-two, because, said Holcomb, "the practice represents the unanimous judgment of an entire industry." The public liked "to be ministered to by women rather than men," airline surveys found, and after all, "Congress did not seek to abolish the differences between the male and female sex." If a business acknowledged those differences by restricting a particular job to one sex, Holcomb could see no "discriminatory purpose" in that. "Common sense" dictated that women could better please passengers and make them "*feel well cared for.*"...

As working women and their activist allies unsettled beliefs about who could do what, they also defied prevailing understandings of employers' prerogatives by using Title VII to fight sexual objectification. Today, nearly all histories of second-wave feminism mention the women's liberation protest at the Atlantic City Miss America pageant of 1969. What they miss is that two years before, other women had *already* challenged such imagery. Working with the flight attendants two months after its founding, NOW demanded that the nation's airlines cease treating the female worker "as a sex object" to be fired when she was no longer judged pleasing to males—when she was no longer nubile, got married, or gained weight. NOW backed up flight attendants' protests at the way the airlines used them to lure male customers in the same way strip clubs might. National Airlines, for example, ran an ad campaign featuring beautiful young women saying, "I'm Debbie, Fly Me," or "I'm Cheryl, Fly Me," and

required female crew members to wear buttons inviting passengers to "fly me." Aided by NOW, some of the workers went on to form Stewardesses for Equal Rights and others the Stewardesses' Anti-Defamation League. (One bumper sticker taunted "National, Your Fly Is Open.") This was just the first of many campaigns against advertising that treated women as mindless sexual instruments. Through its Images of Women Task Force, NOW identified and fought numerous battles against such ads.

Like the slow abrasion of waves on stone, the arguments of female petitioners, the initiative of brokers of inclusion, and the experience of seeing women do as well as or better than men in jobs once off-limits proved "a revelation" to male EEOC staff, including Tom Robles, director of the Albuquerque regional office. "It was like somebody turned on a light in the dark," he admitted. Even Edelsberg saw that light within a few years, and later acknowledged Murray and Sonia Pressman [a woman employed at the EEOC] for "having turned him around." The about-face at the agency was striking, as its staff members both manifested and advanced the national sea change in attitudes about gender justice in these years. Between 1968 and 1971 it issued a series of decisions and new guidelines to promote gender equality and began collaborating with NOW on joint efforts. Pressman boasted of having written the EEOC's first *Annual Digest of Legal Interpretations*, which advised the nation's employers that the only jobs for which sex legitimately created a monopoly were "sperm donor and wet nurse."

Learning of the agitation rousing the EEOC to action, other women began to fight practices that had long bothered them but until then had seemed untouchable. "Their very presence in the streets," one AT&T employee turned activist later said in acknowledging feminists, "enabled us inside." Responding to news of the Civil Rights Act, a factory worker named Alice Peurla recognized, "Here's my chance." Peurla had worked at U.S. Steel's South Works plant in Chicago doing quality testing since 1953, an occupation a few women managed to stay in after the company let most women go at the end of World War II to open jobs to male veterans. Born to Armenian immigrants in St. Louis, Peurla was a radical. Her father, a devoted unionist, had admired the Soviet Union for its aid to Armenians against Turkish aggression; stamped by his example and her own employment experiences since she took her first job at age eight, Peurla became a labor organizer. Though not a feminist, she was an active antiracist; she joined CORE in the 1940s and took part in early sit-ins to open St. Louis lunch counters to black patrons. In the 1950s Peurla found sanctuary for her values and resources for organizing in the ranks of the left. As embattled as it then was, it trained and sustained Peurla and others in an outsider counterpart to the reform network that nurtured Murray and other NOW founders. What kept Peurla at U.S. Steel, however, was not leftist politics but a failed marriage. When her husband became an abusive alcoholic, she left him. In order to raise her infant daughter, she needed higher wages, and the night shift at U.S. Steel paid much better than did female-dominated occupations, even with a third of her pay going for babysitting. From the time her little girl reached school age, Peurla kept trying for a day job at the mill, but to no avail. The jobs were never

posted; they just “all of a sudden” went to men. At the end of 1967, when a man she had trained, who had ten years’ less experience, landed a day job in the main lab, she protested. Her boss admitted, “We don’t want any women on these jobs,” and the union sided with the company. That was when, laying claim to Title VII, Peurla filed suit.

Her experience illustrates both the drawbacks and the potential of legal challenges. On the one hand, her case dragged on for years; it wasn’t until 1974 that Peurla actually got the job she sought. On the other hand, it paved the way for a larger lawsuit a few years later, when thirty female steelworkers in Gary, Indiana, joined with Chicago NOW to form Steel Workers NOW and pressed for broader changes in the industry. At the same time, Pennsylvania NOW members and Baltimore NOW steelworkers filed suit against steel companies after fourteen years of fruitless complaints about the persistent preference shown to males with less seniority. They benefited from a landmark consent decree in 1974 that settled 408 cases pending with the EEOC, following decisive legal victories by the NAACP on behalf of black steelworkers. The decree opened nine leading steel firms to black men and all women as never before, particularly in the skilled crafts from which they had been most particularly excluded....

Like young radical women students, older women workers attempted things they had once thought impossible and talked to one another in ways that changed their sense of themselves and how they deserved to be treated by others. New York NOW, for example, ran “rap sessions” for women to discuss employment problems. The founding conference of Stewardesses for Women’s Rights included a panel on “consciousness-raising,” run by Kathie Sarachild, the women’s liberationist best known for explaining the technique. Without using that rubric, other working-class women engaged in similarly empowering discussions. Whether in formal settings such as the founding conference of the Coalition of Labor Union Women, women’s caucuses, or casual small-group lunchtime conversations, women re-scripted the stories of their own lives.

Expecting better treatment at work, many also changed their relationships at home. One focus was the gender division of household labor, which created a double burden for most working women. Even before Title VII and the women’s movement, said the auto worker Florence Peterson, “I resented” doing all of the housework and child care and “felt it was unfair. But I always thought that’s the way life was.” Fighting for change at work ended that sense of inevitability. “Most of us worked in three spheres, at least,” recalled one AT&T activist, “trying to change our personal lives, our workplaces, and our world.” Some working women activists learned that their growing confidence was “a threat” to the men they had married. Speaking for many, one found herself saying, “I don’t need this”—and leaving. “Everybody likes to be loved,” she observed, but there were limits to how “tolerant” she felt now. Others found partners who welcomed their growth. A key reason why Ruth Bader Ginsburg was first attracted to the man she later married was that “Martin was the only boy I knew who cared that I had a brain.” He also learned to cook well. “A supportive husband who is willing to share duties and responsibilities,” she said, “is a must.” For some, intimate sustenance came from other women. A few NOW activists therefore organized for

"lesbian rights" and campaigned for city ordinances that included "sexual preference" among other categories for protection from discrimination. One Chicago activist argued that gay women would benefit from organizing for "basic economic issues such as adequate jobs and job related benefits, affirmative action, child care." "For no women are jobs, housing, child custody, and child support more crucial," she observed, "than for lesbians who daily face the threat of losing any or all of these" as punishment for their sexual orientation. Justice proved indivisible: settling one problem yielded the resources to name and face others....

... No longer figured as dependents of men, women found that their relationship to the wider polity changed as well. The results were not always good for individual women, or for the most vulnerable women with the least promising prospects. As lifetime employment became the norm for most women, and as feminists won them the right to be considered as individual earners apart from family commitments, popular support for public assistance for mothers remaining outside the paid labor force waned, and the welfare program Aid to Families with Dependent Children became more politically vulnerable than ever. But however uneven the outcome, it was clear that a male-dominated economy had lost the legitimacy it once enjoyed.

All of this revised understandings of gender long embedded in American culture. It also won results that mattered to millions, even those oblivious to the source of the changes. The 1970s saw the first notable decline in sex segregation in the United States in a century. By the time women's push for economic inclusion was in full rig, the more mainstream, family wage argument for affirmative action raised by male civil rights activists was in tatters. In its place was a new vision of universal access to transformed workplaces. When white women—so long the beneficiaries of the family wage and "protection"—demanded to stand on their own two feet and chose African Americans as allies, the culture of exclusion started to give way as never before.

Women's Liberation and Sixties Radicalism

ALICE ECHOLS

On 7 September 1968 the sixties came to the Miss America Pageant when one hundred women's liberationists descended upon Atlantic City to protest the pageant's promotion of physical attractiveness and charm as the primary measures of women's worth. Carrying signs that declared, "Miss America Is a Big Falsie," "Miss America Sells It," and "Up Against the Wall, Miss America," they formed a picket line on the boardwalk, sang anti-Miss America songs in three-part harmony, and performed guerrilla theater. The activists crowned a live sheep Miss America and paraded it on the boardwalk to parody the way the contestants, and by extension, all women, "are appraised and judged like animals at a county fair." They tried to convince women in the crowd that the tyranny of beauty was but one of the many ways that women's bodies were colonized. By

announcing beforehand that they would not speak to male reporters (or to any man for that matter), they challenged the sexual division of labor that consigned women reporters to the “soft” stories and male reporters to the “hard” news stories. Newspaper editors who wanted to cover the protest were thus forced to pull their female reporters from the society pages to do so.

The protesters set up a “Freedom Trash Can” and filled it with various “instruments of torture”—high-heeled shoes, bras, girdles, hair curlers, false eye-lashes, typing books, and representative copies of *Cosmopolitan*, *Playboy*, and *Ladies’ Home Journal*. They had wanted to burn the contents of the Freedom Trash Can but were prevented from doing so by a city ordinance that prohibited bonfires on the boardwalk. However, word had been leaked to the press that the protest would include a symbolic bra-burning, and, as a consequence, reporters were everywhere. Although they burned no bras that day on the boardwalk, the image of the bra-burning, militant feminist remains part of our popular mythology about the women’s liberation movement.

The activists also managed to make their presence felt inside the auditorium during that night’s live broadcast of the pageant. Pageant officials must have known that they were in for a long night when early in the evening one protester sprayed Toni Home Permanent Spray (one of the pageant’s sponsors) at the mayor’s booth. She was charged with disorderly conduct and “emanating a noxious odor,” an irony that women’s liberationists understandably savored. The more spectacular action occurred later that night. As the outgoing Miss America read her farewell speech, four women unfurled a banner that read, “Women’s Liberation,” and all sixteen protesters shouted “Freedom for Women,” and “No More Miss America” before security guards could eject them. The television audience heard the commotion and could see it register on Miss America’s face as she stumbled through the remainder of her speech. But the program’s producer prevented the cameramen from covering the cause of Miss America’s consternation. The TV audience did not remain in the dark for long, because Monday’s newspapers described the protest in some detail. As the first major demonstration of the fledgling women’s liberation movement, it had been designed to make a big splash, and after Monday morning no one could doubt that it had.

In its wit, passion, and irreverence, not to mention its expansive formulation of politics (to include the politics of beauty, no less!), the Miss America protest resembled other sixties demonstrations. Just as women’s liberationists used a sheep to make a statement about conventional femininity, so had the Yippies a week earlier lampooned the political process by nominating a pig, Pegasus, for the presidency at the Democratic National Convention. Although Atlantic City witnessed none of the violence that had occurred in Chicago, the protest generated plenty of hostility among the six hundred or so onlookers who gathered on the boardwalk. Judging from their response, this new thing, “women’s liberation,” was about as popular as the antiwar movement. The protesters were jeered, harassed, and called “commies” and “man-haters.” One man suggested that it “would be a lot more useful” if the protesters threw themselves, and not their bras, girdles, and makeup, into the trash can.

Nothing—not even the verbal abuse they encountered on the boardwalk—could diminish the euphoria women's liberationists felt as they started to mobilize around their own, rather than other people's, oppression. Ann Snitow speaks for many when she recalls that in contrast to her involvement in the larger, male-dominated protest Movement, where she had felt sort of “blank and peripheral,” women's liberation was like “an ecstasy of discussion.” Precisely because it was about one's own life, “there was,” she claims, “nothing distant about it.” Robin Morgan has contended that the Miss America protest “announced our existence to the world.” That is only a slight exaggeration, for as a consequence of the protest, women's liberation achieved the status of a movement both to its participants and to the media; as such, the Miss America demonstration represents an important moment in the history of the sixties.

Although the women's liberation movement only began to take shape toward the end of the decade, it was a paradigmatically sixties movement. It is not just that many early women's liberation activists had prior involvements in other sixties movements, although that was certainly true, as has been ably documented by Sara Evans. And it is not just that, of all the sixties movements, the women's liberation movement alone carried on and extended into the 1970s that decade's political radicalism and rethinking of fundamental social organization. Although that is true as well. Rather, it is also that the larger, male-dominated protest Movement, despite its considerable sexism, provided much of the intellectual foundation and cultural orientation for the women's liberation movement. Indeed, many of the broad themes of the women's liberation movement—especially its concern with revitalizing the democratic process and reformulating “politics” to include the personal—were refined and recast versions of ideas and approaches already present in the New Left and the black freedom movement.

Moreover, like other sixties radicals, women's liberationists were responding at least in part to particular features of the postwar landscape. For instance, both the New Left and the women's liberation movement can be understood as part of a gendered generational revolt against the ultradomesticity of that aberrant decade, the 1950s. The white radicals who participated in these movements were in flight from the nuclear family and the domesticated versions of masculinity and femininity that prevailed in postwar America. Sixties radicals, white and black, were also responding to the hegemonic position of liberalism and its promotion of government expansion both at home and abroad—the welfare/warfare state. Although sixties radicals came to define themselves in opposition to liberalism, their relation to liberalism was nonetheless complicated and ambivalent. They saw in big government not only a way of achieving greater economic and social justice, but also the possibility of an increasingly well-managed society and an ever more remote government.

In this essay I will attempt to evaluate some of the more important features of sixties radicalism by focusing on the specific example of the women's liberation movement. I am motivated by the problematic ways in which “the sixties” has come to be scripted in our culture. If conservative “slash and burn” accounts of the period indict sixties radicals for everything from crime and drug use to single motherhood, they at least heap guilt fairly equally upon antiwar, black

civil rights, and feminist activists alike. By contrast, progressive reconstructions, while considerably more positive in their assessments of the period, tend to present the sixties as if women were almost completely outside the world of radical politics. Although my accounting of the sixties is in some respects critical, I nonetheless believe that there was much in sixties radicalism that was original and hopeful, including its challenge to established authority and expertise, its commitment to refashioning democracy and "politics," and its interrogation of such naturalized categories as gender and race.

Women's discontent with their place in America in the sixties was, of course, produced by a broad range of causes. Crucial in reigniting feminist consciousness in the sixties was the unprecedented number of women (especially married white women) being drawn into the paid labor force, as the service sector of the economy expanded and rising consumer aspirations fueled the desire of many families for a second income. As Alice Kessler-Harris has pointed out, "homes and cars, refrigerators and washing machines, telephones and multiple televisions required higher incomes." So did providing a college education for one's children. These new patterns of consumption were made possible in large part through the emergence of the two-income family as wives increasingly "sought to aid their husbands in the quest for the good life." By 1960, 30.5 percent of all wives worked for wages. Women's growing participation in the labor force also reflected larger structural shifts in the U.S. economy. Sara Evans has argued that the "reestablishment of labor force segregation following World War II ironically reserved for women a large proportion of the new jobs created in the fifties due to the fact that the fastest growing sector of the economy was no longer industry but services." Women's increasing labor force participation was facilitated as well by the growing number of women graduating from college and by the introduction of the birth control pill in 1960.

Despite the fact that women's "place" was increasingly in the paid work force (or perhaps because of it), ideas about women's proper role in American society were quite conventional throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, held there by a resurgent ideology of domesticity—what Betty Friedan coined the "feminine mystique." But, as Jane De Hart-Mathews has observed, "the bad fit was there: the unfairness of unequal pay for the same work, the low value placed on jobs women performed, the double burden of housework and wage work." By the mid-1960s at least some American women felt that the contradiction between the realities of paid work and higher education on the one hand and the still pervasive ideology of domesticity on the other had become irreconcilable.

Without the presence of other oppositional movements, however, the women's liberation movement may not have developed at all as an organized force for social change. It certainly would have developed along vastly different lines. The climate of protest encouraged women, even those not directly involved in the black movement and the New Left, to question conventional gender arrangements. Moreover, many of the women who helped form the women's liberation movement had been involved as well in the male-dominated Movement. If the larger Movement was typically indifferent, or worse, hostile, to women's liberation, it was nonetheless through their experiences in that Movement that

the young and predominantly white and middle-class women who initially formed the women's liberation movement became politicized. The relationship between women's liberation and the larger Movement was at its core paradoxical. If the Movement was a site of sexism it also provided white women a space in which they could develop political skills and self-confidence, a space in which they could violate the injunction against female self-assertion. Most important, it gave them no small part of the intellectual ammunition—the language and the ideas—with which to fight their own oppression.

Sixties radicals struggled to reformulate politics and power. Their struggle confounded many who lived through the sixties as well as those trying to make sense of the period some thirty years later. One of the most striking characteristics of sixties radicals was their ever-expanding opposition to liberalism. Radicals' theoretical disavowal of liberalism developed gradually and in large part in response to liberals' specific defaults—their failure to repudiate the segregationists at the 1964 Democratic National Convention, their lack of vigor in pressing for greater federal intervention in support of civil rights workers, and their readiness (with few exceptions) to support President Lyndon B. Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War. But initially some radicals had argued that the Movement should acknowledge that liberalism was not monolithic but contained two discernible strands—"corporate" and "humanist" liberalism. For instance, in 1965 Carl Oglesby, an early leader of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), contrasted *corporate liberals*, whose identification with the system made them "illiberal liberals," with *humanist liberals*, who he hoped might yet see that "it is this movement with which their own best hopes are most in tune."

By 1967 radicals were no longer making the distinction between humanist and corporate liberals that they once had. This represented an important political shift for early new leftists in particular who once had felt an affinity of sorts with liberalism. Black radicals were the first to decisively reject liberalism, and their move had an enormous impact on white radicals. With the ascendancy of black power many black militants maintained that liberalism was intrinsically paternalistic, and that black liberation required that the struggle be free of white involvement. This was elaborated by white radicals, who soon developed the argument that authentic radicalism involved organizing around one's own oppression rather than becoming involved, as a "liberal" would, in someone else's struggle for freedom. For instance, 1967 Gregory Calvert, another SDS leader, argued that the "student movement has to develop an image of its own revolution ... instead of believing that you're a revolutionary because you're related to Fidel's struggle, Stokely's struggle, always someone else's struggle." Black radicals were also the first to conclude that nothing short of revolution—certainly not Johnson's Great Society programs and a few pieces of civil rights legislation—could undo racism. As leftist journalist Andrew Kopkind remembered it, the rhetoric of revolution proved impossible for white new leftists to resist. "With black revolution raging in America and world revolution directed against America, it was hardly possible for white radicals to think themselves anything less than revolutionaries."...

... [S]ixties radicals did (especially over time) appropriate, expand, and recast Marxist categories in an effort to understand the experiences of oppressed and

marginalized groups. Thus exponents of what was termed “new working-class theory” claimed that people with technical, clerical, and professional jobs should be seen as constituting a new sector of the working class, better educated than the traditional working class, but working class nonetheless. According to this view, students were not members of the privileged middle class, but rather “trainees” for the new working class. And many women’s liberationists (even radical feminists who rejected Marxist theorizing about women’s condition) often tried to use Marxist methodology to understand women’s oppression. For example, Shulamith Firestone argued that just as the elimination of “economic classes” would require the revolt of the proletariat and their seizure of the means of production, so would the elimination of “sexual classes” require women’s revolt and their “seizure of control of reproduction.”

If young radicals often assumed an arrogant stance toward those remnants of the Old Left that survived the 1950s, they were by the late 1960s unambiguously contemptuous of liberals. Women’s liberationists shared new leftists’ and black radicals’ rejection of liberalism, and, as a consequence, they often went to great lengths to distinguish themselves from the liberal feminists of the National Organization for Women (NOW). (In fact, their disillusionment with liberalism was more thorough during the early stages of their movement building than had been the case for either new leftists or civil rights activists because they had lived through the earlier betrayals around the Vietnam War and civil rights. Moreover, male radicals’ frequent denunciations of women’s liberation as “bourgeois” encouraged women’s liberationists to distance themselves from NOW.) NOW had been formed in 1966 to push the federal government to enforce the provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawing sex discrimination—a paradigmatic liberal agenda focused on public access and the prohibition of employment discrimination. To women’s liberation activists, NOW’s integrationist, access-oriented approach ignored the racial and class inequities that were the very foundation of the “mainstream” that NOW was dedicated to integrating. In the introduction to the 1970 bestseller, *Sisterhood Is Powerful*, Robin Morgan declared that “NOW is essentially an organization that wants reform [in the] second-class citizenship of women—and this is where it differs drastically from the rest of the Women’s Liberation Movement.” In *The Dialectic of Sex*, Shulamith Firestone described NOW’s political stance as “untenable even in terms of immediate political gains” and deemed it “more a leftover of the old feminism rather than a model of the new.” Radical feminist Ti-Grace Atkinson went even further, characterizing many in NOW as only wanting “women to have the same opportunity to be oppressors, too.”

Women’s liberationists also took issue with liberal feminists’ formulation of women’s problem as their exclusion from the public sphere. Younger activists argued instead that women’s exclusion from public life was inextricable from their subordination in the family and would persist until this larger issue was addressed. For instance, Firestone claimed that the solution to women’s oppression was not inclusion in the mainstream, but rather the eradication of the biological family, which was the “tape worm of exploitation.”

Of course, younger activists’ alienation from NOW was often more than matched by NOW members’ disaffection from them. Many liberal feminists

were appalled (at least initially) by women's liberationists' politicization of personal life. NOW founder Betty Friedan frequently railed against women's liberationists for waging a "bedroom war" that diverted women from the real struggle of integrating the public sphere.

Women's liberationists believed that they had embarked upon a much more ambitious project—the virtual remaking of the world—and that theirs was the real struggle. Nothing short of radically transforming society was sufficient to deal with what they were discovering: that gender inequality was embedded in everyday life. In 1970 Shulamith Firestone observed that "sex-class is so deep as to be invisible." The pervasiveness of gender inequality and gender's status as a naturalized category demonstrated to women's liberationists the inadequacy of NOW's legislative and judicial remedies and the necessity of thoroughgoing social transformation. Thus, whereas liberal feminists talked of ending sex discrimination, women's liberationists called for nothing less than the destruction of capitalism and patriarchy. As defined by feminists, patriarchy, in contrast to sex discrimination, defied reform. For example, Adrienne Rich contended: "Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familial-social, ideological, political system in which men—by force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition, law and language, customs etiquette, education, and the division of labor, determine what part women shall or shall not play, and in which the female is subsumed under the male."

Women's liberationists typically indicted capitalism as well. Ellen Willis, for instance, maintained that "the American system consists of two interdependent but distinct parts—the capitalist state, and the patriarchal family." Willis argued that capitalism succeeded in exploiting women as cheap labor and consumers "primarily by taking advantage of women's subordinate position in the family and our historical domination by man."

Central to the revisionary project of the women's liberation movement was the desire to render gender meaningless, to explode it as a significant category. In the movement's view, both masculinity and femininity represented not timeless essences, but rather "patriarchal" constructs. (Of course, even as the movement sought to deconstruct gender, it was, paradoxically, as many have noted, trying to mobilize women precisely on the basis of their gender.) This explains in part the significance abortion rights held for women's liberationists, who believed that until abortion was decriminalized, biology would remain women's destiny, thus foreclosing the possibility of women's self-determination.

Indeed, the women's liberation movement made women's bodies the site of political contestation. The "colonized" status of women's bodies became the focus of much movement activism. (The discourse of colonization originated in Third World national liberation movements but, in an act of First World appropriation, was taken up by black radicals who claimed that African Americans constituted an "internal colony" in the United States.) Radical women trying to persuade the larger Movement of the legitimacy of their cause soon followed suit by deploying the discourse to expose women's subordinate position in relation to men. This appropriation represented an important move and one characteristic of radicalism in the *late* 1960s, that is, the borrowing of conceptual frameworks and discourse from other movements to comprehend the situation

of oppressed groups in the United States—with mixed results at best. In fact, women's liberationists challenged not only tyrannical beauty standards, but also violence against women's sexual alienation, the compulsory character of heterosexuality and its organization around male pleasure (inscribed in the privileging of the vaginal over clitoral orgasm), the health hazards associated with the birth control pill, the definition of contraception as women's responsibility, and, of course, women's lack of reproductive control. They also challenged the sexual division of labor in the home, employment discrimination, and the absence of quality child-care facilities. Finally, women's liberationists recognized the power of language to shape culture.

The totalitarianism of their vision would have been difficult to translate into a concrete reform package, even had they been interested in doing so. But electoral politics and the legislative and judicial reforms that engaged the energies of liberal feminists did little to animate most women's liberationists. Like other sixties radicals, they were instead taken with the idea of developing forms that would prefigure the utopian community of the imagined future. Anxious to avoid the "manipulated consent" that they believed characterized American politics, sixties radicals struggled to develop alternatives to hierarchy and centralized decision making. They spoke often of creating "participatory democracy" in an effort to maximize individual participation and equalize power. Their attempts to build a "democracy of individual participation" often confounded outsiders, who found Movement meetings exhausting and tedious affairs. But to those radicals who craved political engagement, "freedom" was, as one radical group enthused, "an endless meeting." According to Gregory Calvert, participatory democracy appealed to the "deep anti-authoritarianism of the new generation in addition to offering them the immediate concretization of the values of openness, honesty, and community in human relationships." Women's liberationists, still smarting from their first-hand discovery that the larger Movement's much-stated commitment to egalitarianism did not apply equally to all, often took extraordinary measures to try to ensure egalitarianism. They employed a variety of measures in an effort to equalize power, including consensus decision making, rotating chairs, and the sharing of both creative and routine movement work.

Fundamental to this "prefigurative politics," as sociologist Wini Breines terms it, was the commitment to develop counterinstitutions that would anticipate the desired society of the future. Staughton Lynd, director of the Mississippi Freedom Schools and a prominent new leftist, likened sixties radicals to the Wobblies (labor radicals of the early twentieth century) in their commitment to building "the new society within the shell of the old." According to two early SDSers, "What we are working for is far more than changes in the structure of society and its institutions or the people who are now making the decisions.... The stress should rather be on wrenching people out of the system both physically and spiritually."

Radicals believed that alternative institutions would not only satisfy needs unmet by the present system, but also, perhaps, by dramatizing the failures of the system, radicalize those not served by it but currently outside the Movement. Tom Hayden proposed that radicals "build our own free institutions—community organizations, newspapers, coffeehouses—at points of strain within the system

where human needs are denied. These institutions become centers of identity, points of contact, building blocks of a new society from which we confront the system more intensely."

Among the earliest and best known of such efforts were the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party and the accompanying Freedom Schools formed during Freedom Summer of 1964. In the aftermath of that summer's Democratic National Convention, Bob Moses [Parris] of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) even suggested that the Movement abandon its efforts to integrate the Democratic party and try instead to establish its own state government in Mississippi. And as early as 1966 SNCC's Atlanta Project called on blacks to "form our own institutions, credit unions, co-ops, political parties." This came to be the preferred strategy as the sixties progressed and disillusionment with traditional politics grew. Rather than working from within the system, new leftists and black radicals instead formed alternative political parties, media, schools, universities, and assemblies of oppressed and unrepresented people.

Women's liberationists elaborated on this idea, creating an amazing panoply of counterinstitutions. In the years before the 1973 Supreme Court decision decriminalizing abortion, feminists established abortion referral services in most cities of any size. Women's liberationists in Chicago even operated an underground abortion clinic, "Jane," where they performed about one hundred abortions each week. By the mid-1970s most big cities had a low-cost feminist health clinic, a rape crisis center, and a feminist bookstore. In Detroit, after "a long struggle to translate feminism into federalese," two women succeeded in convincing the National Credit Union Administration that feminism was a legitimate "field" from which to draw credit union members. Within three years of its founding in 1973, the Detroit credit union could claim assets of almost one million dollars. Feminists in other cities soon followed suit. Women's liberation activists in Washington, D.C., formed Olivia Records, the first women's record company, which by 1978 was supporting a paid staff of fourteen and producing four records a year. By the mid-1970s there existed in most cities of any size a politicized feminist counterculture, or a "women's community."

The popularity of alternative institutions was that at least in part they seemed to hold out the promise of political effectiveness without co-optation. Writing in 1969, Amiri Baraka (formerly LeRoi Jones), a black nationalist and accomplished poet, maintained, "But you must have the cultural revolution.... We cannot fight a war, an actual physical war with the forces of evil just because we are angry. We can begin to build. We must build black institutions ... all based on a value system that is beneficial to black people."...

The move toward building counterinstitutions was part of a larger strategy to develop new societies "within the shell of the old," but this shift sometimes had unintended consequences. While feminist counterinstitutions were originally conceived as part of a culture of resistance, over time they often became more absorbed in sustaining themselves than in confronting male supremacy, especially as their services were duplicated by mainstream businesses. In the early years of the women's liberation movement this alternative feminist culture did provide the sort of "free space" women needed to confront sexism. But as it was further

elaborated in the mid-1970s, it ironically often came to promote insularity instead—becoming, as Adrienne Rich has observed, “a place of emigration, an end in itself,” where patriarchy was evaded rather than confronted. In practice, feminist communities were small, self-contained subcultures that proved hard to penetrate, especially to newcomers unaccustomed to their norm and conventions. The shift in favor of alternative communities may have sometimes impeded efforts at outreach for the women’s liberationists, new leftists, and black radicals who attempted it.

On a related issue, the larger protest Movement’s great pessimism about reform—the tendency to interpret every success a defeat resulting in the Movement’s further recuperation (what Robin Morgan called “futilitarianism”)—may have encouraged a too-global rejection of reform among sixties radicals. For instance, some women’s liberation groups actually opposed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) when NOW revived it. In September 1970 a New York-based group, The Feminists, denounced the ERA and advised feminists against “squandering invaluable time and energy on it.” A delegation of Washington, D.C., women’s liberationists invited to appear before the senate subcommittee considering the ERA, testified: “We are aware that the system will try to appease us with their [*sic*] paper offerings. We will not be appeased. Our demands can only be met by a total transformation of society which you cannot legislate, you cannot co-opt, you cannot *control*.” In *The Dialectic of Sex*, Firestone went so far as to dismiss child-care centers as attempts to “buy women off” because they “ease the immediate pressure without asking why the pressure is on *women*.”

Similarly, many SDS leaders opposed the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP), an abortive attempt to form a national progressive organization oriented around electoral politics and to launch an antiwar presidential ticket headed by Martin Luther King Jr. and Benjamin Spock. Immediately following NCNP’s first and only convention, in 1967, the SDS paper *New Left Notes* published two front-page articles criticizing NCNP organizers. One writer contended that “people who recognize the political process as perverted will not seek change through the institutions that process has created.” The failure of sixties radicals to distinguish between reform and reformism meant that while they defined the issues, they often did little to develop policy initiatives around those issues. Moreover, the preoccupation of women’s liberationists with questions of internal democracy (fueled in part by their desire to succeed where the men had failed) sometimes had the effect of focusing attention away from the larger struggle in an effort to create the perfect movement. As feminist activist Frances Chapman points out, women’s liberation was “like a generator that got things going, cut out and left it to the larger reform engine which made a lot of mistakes.” In eschewing traditional politics rather than entering them skeptically, women’s liberationists, like other sixties radicals, may have lost an opportunity to foster critical debate in the larger arena.

If young radicals eschewed the world of conventional politics they nonetheless had a profound impact upon it, especially by redefining what is understood as “political.” Although the women’s liberation movement popularized the slogan “the personal is political,” the idea that there is a political dimension to

personal life was first embraced by early SDSers who had encountered it in the writings of C. Wright Mills. Rebellng against a social order whose public and private spheres were highly differentiated, new leftists called for a reintegration of the personal with the political. They reconceptualized apparently personal problems—specifically their alienation from a campus cultural milieu characterized by sororities and fraternities, husband and wife hunting, sports, and careerism, and the powerlessness they felt as college students without a voice in campus governance or curriculum—as political problems. Thus SDS's founding Port Huron Statement of 1962 suggested that for an American New Left to succeed, it would have to "give form to ... feelings of helplessness and indifference, so that people may see the political, social, and economic sources of their private troubles and organize to change society." Theirs was a far more expansive formulation of politics than what prevailed in the Old Left, even among the more renegade remnants that had survived into the early sixties. Power was conceptualized as relational and by no means reducible to electoral politics.

By expanding political discourse to include personal relations, new leftists unintentionally paved the way for women's liberationists to develop critiques of the family, marriage, and the construction of sexuality. (Of course, nonfeminist critiques of the family and sexual repressiveness were hardly in short supply in the 1950s and 1960s, as evidenced by *Rebel without a Cause*, *Catcher in the Rye*, and Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd*, to mention but a few.) Women's liberationists developed an understanding of power's capillary-like nature, which in some respects anticipated those being formulated by Michel Foucault and other poststructuralists. Power was conceptualized as occupying multiple sites and as lodging everywhere, even in those private places assumed to be the most removed from or impervious to politics—the home and, more particularly, the bedroom.

The belief of sixties radicals that the personal is political also suggested to them its converse—that the political is personal. Young radicals typically felt it was not enough to sign leaflets or participate in a march if one returned to the safety and comfort of a middle-class existence. Politics was supposed to unsettle life and its routines, even more, to transform life. For radicals the challenge was to discover, underneath all the layers of social conditioning, the "real" self unburdened by social expectations and conventions. Thus, SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael advanced the slogan, "Every Negro is a potential black man." Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt argued that among the "most exciting things to come out of the women's movement so far is a new daring ... to tear down old structures and assumptions and let real thought and feeling flow." Life would not be comfortable, but who wanted comfort in the midst of so much deadening complacency? For a great many radicals, the individual became a site of political activism in the sixties. In the black freedom movement the task was very much to discover the black inside the Negro, and in the women's liberation movement it was to unlearn niceness, to challenge the taboo against female self-assertion.

Sixties radicalism proved compelling to many precisely because it promised to transform life. Politics was not about the subordination of self to some larger political cause; instead, it was the path to self-fulfillment. This ultimately was the power of sixties radicalism. As Stanley Aronowitz notes, sixties radicalism was in large

measure about “infus[ing] life with a secular spiritual and moral content” and “fill[ing] the quotidian with personal meaning and purpose.” But “the personal is political” was one of those ideas whose rhetorical power seemed to sometimes work against or undermine its explication. It could encourage a solipsistic preoccupation with self-transformation. As new leftist Richard Flacks presciently observed in 1965, this kind of politics could lead to “a search for personally satisfying modes of life while abandoning the possibility of helping others to change theirs.” Thus the idea that “politics is how you live your life, not who you vote for,” as Yippie leader Jerry Rubin put it, could and did lead to a subordination of politics to life-style. If the idea led some to confuse personal liberation with political struggle, it led others to embrace an asceticism that sacrificed personal needs and desires to political imperatives. Some women’s liberation activists followed this course, interpreting the idea that the personal is political to mean that one’s personal life should conform to some abstract standard of political correctness. At first this tendency was mitigated by the founders’ insistence that there were no personal solutions, only collective solutions, to women’s oppression. Over time, however, one’s self-presentation, marital status, and sexual preference frequently came to determine one’s standing or ranking in the movement. The most notorious example of this involved the New York radical group, The Feminists, who established a quota to limit the number of married women in the group. Policies such as these prompted Barbara Ehrenreich to question “a feminism which talks about universal sisterhood, but is horrified by women who wear spiked heels or call their friends ‘girls.’” At the same time, what was personally satisfying was sometimes upheld as politically correct. In the end, both the women’s liberation movement and the larger protest Movement suffered, as the idea that the personal is political was often interpreted in such a way as to make questions of life-style absolutely central.

The social movements of the sixties signaled the beginning of what would come to be known as “identity politics,” the idea that politics is rooted in identity. Although some New Left groups by the late 1960s did come to endorse an orthodox Marxism whereby class was privileged, class was not the pivotal category for these new social movements. (Even those New Left groups that reverted to the “labor metaphysic” lacked meaningful working-class participation.) Rather, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, and youth were the salient categories for most sixties activists. In the women’s liberation movement, what was termed “consciousness-raising” was the tool used to develop women’s group identity.

As women’s liberationists started to organize a movement, they confronted American women who identified unambiguously as women, but who typically had little of what Nancy Cott would call “we-ness,” or “some level of identification with ‘the group called women.’” Moreover, both the pervasiveness of gender inequality and the cultural understanding of gender as a natural rather than a social construct made it difficult to cultivate a critical consciousness about gender even among women. To engender this sense of sisterhood or “we-ness,” women’s liberationists developed consciousness-raising, a practice involving “the political reinterpretation of personal life.” According to its principal architects, its purpose was to “awaken the latent consciousness that ... all women have about our oppression.” In talking about their personal experiences, it was argued, women would come to understand that what they had believed

were personal problems were, in fact, "social problems that must become social issues and fought together rather than with personal solutions."

Reportedly, New York women's liberationist Kathie Sarachild was the person who coined the term *consciousness-raising*. However, the technique originated in other social movements. As Sarachild wrote in 1973, those who promoted consciousness-raising "were applying to women and to ourselves as women's liberation organizers the practice a number of us had learned in the civil rights movement in the South in the early 1960s." There they had seen that the sharing of personal problems, grievances, and aspirations—"telling it like it is"—could be a radicalizing experience. Moreover, for some women's liberationists consciousness-raising was a way to avoid the tendency of some members of the movement to try to fit women within existing (and often Marxist) theoretical paradigms. By circumventing the "experts" on women and going to women themselves, they would be able to not only construct a theory of women's oppression but formulate strategy as well. Thus women's liberationists struggled to find the commonalities in women's experiences in order to generate generalizations about women's oppression.

Consciousness-raising was enormously successful in exposing the insidiousness of sexism and in engendering a sense of identity and solidarity among the largely white, middle-class women who participated in "c-r" groups. By the early 1970s even NOW, whose founder Betty Friedan had initially derided consciousness-raising as so much "navel-gazing," began sponsoring c-r groups. But the effort to transcend the particular was both the strength and the weakness of consciousness-raising. If it encouraged women to locate the common denominators in their lives, it inhibited discussion of women's considerable differences. Despite the particularities of white, middle-class women's experiences, theirs became the basis for feminist theorizing about women's oppression. In a more general sense the identity politics informing consciousness-raising tended to privilege experience in certain problematic ways. It was too often assumed that there existed a kind of core experience, initially articulated as "woman's experience." Black and white radicals (the latter in relation to youth) made a similar move as well. When Stokely Carmichael called on blacks to develop an "ideology which speaks to our blackness," he, like other black nationalists, suggested that there was somehow an essential and authentic "blackness."

With the assertion of difference within the women's movement in the 1980s, the notion that women constitute a unitary category has been problematized. As a consequence, women's experiences have become ever more discretely defined, as in "the black female experience," "the Jewish female experience," or "the Chicana lesbian experience." But, as Audre Lorde has argued, there remains a way in which, even with greater and greater specificity, the particular is never fully captured. Instead, despite the pluralization of the subject within feminism, identities are often still imagined as monolithic. Finally, the very premise of identity politics—that identity is the basis of politics—has sometimes shut down possibilities for communication, as identities are seen as necessarily either conferring or foreclosing critical consciousness. Kobena Mercer, a British film critic, has criticized the rhetorical strategies of "authenticity and authentication" that tend to characterize identity politics. He has observed: "if I preface a point by saying something like, 'as a black gay man, I feel marginalized by your discourse,' it

makes a valid point but in such a way that preempts critical dialogue because such a response could be inferred as a criticism not of what I say but of what or who I am. The problem is replicated in the familiar cop-out clause, ‘as a middle-class, white, heterosexual male, what can I say?’”

The problem is that the mere assertion of identity becomes in a very real sense irrefutable. Identity is presented as not only stable and fixed, but as also insurmountable. While identity politics gives the oppressed the moral authority to speak (perhaps a dubious ground from which to speak), it can, ironically, absolve those belonging to dominant groups from having to engage in a critical dialogue. In some sense, then, identity politics can unintentionally reinforce Other-ness. Finally, as the antifeminist backlash and the emergence of the New Right should demonstrate, there is nothing inherently progressive about identity. It can be, and has been, mobilized for reactionary as well as for radical purposes. For example, the participation of so many women in the antiabortion movement reveals just how problematic the reduction of politics to identity can be.

Accounts of sixties radicalism usually cite its role in bringing about the dismantling of Jim Crow and disfranchisement, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, and greater gender equality. However, equally important, if less frequently noted, was its challenge to politics as usual. Sixties radicals succeeded both in reformulating politics, even mainstream politics, to include personal life, and in challenging the notion that elites alone have the wisdom and expertise to control the political process. For a moment, people who by virtue of their color, age, and gender were far from the sites of formal power became politically engaged, became agents of change.

Given the internal contradictions and shortcomings of sixties radicalism, the repressiveness of the federal government in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and changing economic conditions in the United States, it is not surprising that the movements built by radicals in the sixties either no longer exist or do so only in attenuated form. Activists in the women’s liberation movement, however, helped to bring about a fundamental realignment of gender roles in this country through outrageous protests, tough-minded polemics, and an “ecstasy of discussion.” Indeed, those of us who came of age in the days before the resurgence of feminism know that the world today, while hardly a feminist utopia, is nonetheless a far different, and in many respects a far fairer, world than what we confronted in 1967.



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Vietnam and the Crisis of American Power

The Vietnam War is one of the most traumatic events in American history since 1945. It cost the lives of more than fifty-eight thousand Americans and of millions of Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians. It shattered the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, dealt the Democratic Party a crippling defeat, and divided the American people more deeply than at any other time since the Civil War. In many ways, the war's controversies continue to reverberate through American society and politics in the twenty-first century.

The Vietnam War was a product of the Cold War and the projection of the ideas, interests, and strategies associated with that struggle onto a region undergoing profound change as it emerged from decades of colonial rule. The United States and the Soviet Union (and its sometimes ally, sometimes rival, China) sought to shape what sorts of states would emerge from the disintegration of the old colonial system. For the United States, the war in Vietnam was also the logical outcome of America's postwar effort to maintain what Truman adviser Clark M. Clifford had once described as "our conception of a decent world order" or what media magnate Henry Luce had earlier called "an American century."

The U.S. defeat in Vietnam, combined with the political crises and economic uncertainties of the 1970s, led many Americans to wonder if the postwar "American era" had ended. The war seemed to suggest that the United States lacked not only the know-how and material capabilities to dictate events in a distant country but also—and even more troubling—the confidence and moral clarity that qualified it for global leadership. Although some Americans would regain a strong sense of national purpose in the 1980s, others remained convinced that the United States must exercise great caution internationally in the future.

Among the many questions that continue to preoccupy historians and other students of America's war in Vietnam, four have received the lion's share of attention: Why did the United States invest so much in the creation and maintenance of an anticommunist regime in South Vietnam? Why did the United States fail to achieve its objectives? Might different decisions by the United States have brought victory? And finally, what are the lessons of

the Vietnam War for a world no longer dominated by the Cold War but in which the forces of nationalism remain strong?

◆ DOCUMENTS

As World War II drew to a close and Japanese control over Vietnam waned, the Viet Minh, whose forces represented a powerful fusion of communism and nationalism, seized power throughout much of the country. With an eye toward gaining U.S. support (or at least tolerance), Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of a new nation, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), in a speech that began with familiar phrasing (Document 1). The French effort to regain control of Vietnam and the resulting First Indochina War (1946–1954) posed a dilemma for U.S. policymakers: Should the United States accept the victory of a movement that, like the victorious faction in China's long-running civil war, was both communist and nationalist, or should it support the prolongation of French dominance? Although the Truman and Eisenhower administrations debated the question, they decided to support the French with funds and military equipment but not troops. President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed grave concerns about the consequences of a DRV victory at an April 27, 1954, press conference (Document 2), in which he suggested that if Ho Chi Minh's forces took control, other nations in the region would fall like a "row of dominoes."

The French defeat was sealed on July 21, 1954, by the Geneva Accords (Document 3), which temporarily divided Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel, established procedures for the nation's reunification, and sought to insulate it from further outside intervention. Despite these provisions, the United States soon replaced France as the dominant Western power in Vietnam. Its efforts to create and sustain a new anticommunist government in the south, however, drew the United States deeper into conflict with the National Liberation Front (NLF, or "Vietcong"), which was supported by the armies of communist North Vietnam. At the center of the struggle were the many Vietnamese peasants whose poverty and alienation from the U.S.-backed southern government made them easy recruits for the NLF in the early years of the war. In Document 4, a Vietnamese farmer named Nguyen Tan Thanh explains why he joined the Vietcong.

Although U.S. military advisers had been present in Vietnam since the 1950s, American combat troops arrived in large numbers only in 1965, when the Johnson administration determined that South Vietnam would fall to the communists if U.S. troops did not take charge of the fighting. Document 5 is composed of excerpts from two memoranda, one by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara urging escalation and one by Undersecretary of State George W. Ball arguing that the United States should seek a negotiated solution. Johnson, of course, followed the advice of McNamara and other "hawkish" advisers.

The decision to intervene with U.S. combat forces quickly stoked antiwar sentiment in the United States. In Document 6, the president of Students for a Democratic Society, a vocal antiwar organization, examines the origins of American involvement in Vietnam and attempts to place the war in a global context. Antiwar activism grew in strength and visibility as the fighting dragged on with no end in sight. Document 7, the reminiscence of a U.S. soldier who fought in South Vietnam in 1967 and 1968, sheds light on some of the reasons why the war settled into a brutal stalemate. As support for the U.S. policy declined and the national mood became increasingly acrimonious, Johnson declined in 1968 to run for reelection. His successor, Richard Nixon, hoped he could still achieve the basic U.S. goal of securing a stable, noncommunist South Vietnam after he became president in early 1969. His hopes proved misplaced. In Document 8, U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger summarizes the gloomy situation that confronted the United States even as the new administration continued the war. South Vietnam still stood when the last U.S. troops left in 1973, but the country fell to communist armies two years later.

1. The Vietnamese Declare Their Independence, 1945

“We hold truths that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

This immortal statement is extracted from the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. Understood in the broader sense, this means: “All peoples on the earth are born equal; every person has the right to live to be happy and free.”

The Declaration of Human and Civic Rights proclaimed by the French Revolution in 1791 likewise propounds: “Every man is born equal and enjoys free and equal rights.”

These are undeniable truths.

Yet, during and throughout the last eighty years, the French imperialists, abusing the principles of “Freedom, equality and fraternity,” have violated the integrity of our ancestral land and oppressed our countrymen. Their deeds run counter to the ideals of humanity and justice.

In the political field, they have denied us every freedom. They have enforced upon us inhuman laws. They have set up three different political regimes in Northern, Central, and Southern Viet Nam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) in an attempt to disrupt our national, historical, and ethical unity.

They have built more prisons than schools. They have callously ill-treated our fellow-compatriots. They have drowned our revolutions in blood.

They have sought to stifle public opinion and pursued a policy of obscurantism on the largest scale; they have forced upon us alcohol and opium in order to weaken our race.

In the economic field, they have shamelessly exploited our people, driven them into the worst misery, and mercilessly plundered our country.

They have ruthlessly appropriated our rice fields, mines, forests, and raw materials. They have arrogated to themselves the privilege of issuing banknotes, and monopolized all our external commerce. They have imposed hundreds of unjustifiable taxes, and reduced our countrymen, especially the peasants and petty tradesmen, to extreme poverty.

They have prevented the development of native capital enterprises; they have exploited our workers in the most barbarous manner.

In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese fascists, in order to fight the Allies, invaded Indochina and set up new bases of war, the French imperialists surrendered on bended knees and handed over our country to the invaders.

Subsequently, under the joint French and Japanese yoke, our people were literally bled white. The consequences were dire in the extreme. From Quang Tri up to the North, two millions of our countrymen died from starvation during the first months of this year.

On March 9th, 1945, the Japanese disarmed the French troops. Again the French either fled or surrendered unconditionally. Thus, in no way have they proved capable of "protecting" us; on the contrary, within five years they have twice sold our country to the Japanese.

Before March 9th, many a time did the Viet Minh League invite the French to join in the fight against the Japanese. Instead of accepting this offer, the French, on the contrary, let loose a wild reign of terror with rigour worse than ever before against Viet Minh's partisans. They even slaughtered a great number of our "*condamnés politiques*" imprisoned at Yen Bay and Cao Bang.

Despite all that, our countrymen went on maintaining, vis-à-vis the French, a humane and even indulgent attitude. After the events of March 9th, the Viet Minh League helped many French to cross the borders, rescued others from Japanese prisons, and, in general, protected the lives and properties of all the French in their territory.

In fact, since the autumn of 1940, our country ceased to be a French colony and became a Japanese possession.

After the Japanese surrender, our people, as a whole, rose up and proclaimed their sovereignty and founded the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

The truth is that we have wrung back our independence from Japanese hands and not from the French.

The French fled, the Japanese surrendered. Emperor Bao Dai abdicated, our people smashed the yoke which pressed hard upon us for nearly one hundred years, and finally made our Viet Nam an independent country. Our people at the same time overthrew the monarchical regime established tens of centuries ago, and founded the Republic.

For these reasons, we the members of the Provisional Government representing the entire people of Viet Nam, declare that we shall from now on have

no more connections with imperialist France; we consider null and void all the treaties France has signed concerning Viet Nam, and we hereby cancel all the privileges that the French arrogated to themselves on our territory.

The Vietnamese people, animated by the same common resolve, are determined to fight to the death against all attempts at aggression by the French imperialists.

We are convinced that the Allies who have recognized the principles of equality of peoples at the Conferences of Teheran and San Francisco cannot but recognize the independence of Viet Nam.

A people which has so stubbornly opposed the French domination for more than 80 years, a people who, during these last years, so doggedly ranged itself and fought on the Allied side against Fascism, such a people has the right to be free, such a people must be independent.

For these reasons, we, the members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, solemnly declare to the world:

"Viet Nam has the right to be free and independent and, in fact, has become free and independent. The people of Viet Nam decide to mobilise all their spiritual and material forces and to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their right of Liberty and Independence."

2. President Dwight D. Eisenhower Explains the Domino Theory, 1954

Q. Robert Richards, Copley Press Mr. President, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world? I think there has been, across the country, some lack of understanding on just what it means to us.

The President You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.

First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.

Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.

Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

Now, with respect to the first one, two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.

Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.

But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indo-China, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking about millions and millions and millions of people.

Finally, the geographical position achieved thereby does many things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.

It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go—that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.

So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.

3. The Geneva Agreement Divides Vietnam into North and South, 1954

Final declaration, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the Agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present Declaration and in the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos, [and] Viet-nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of

Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel, or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the Agreement relating to Viet-nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present Declaration and in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have

collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-nam are respected.

4. A South Vietnamese Peasant Explains Why He Joined the Vietcong, 1961 (1986)

I joined the VC [Vietcong—formally, the National Liberation Front] when I was thirty-five years old. I was married and had four children. I was leasing farmland—one hectare [about 2.5 acres]—that was very poor in quality, almost sterile. That was why the owner rented it out to us. Despite working hard all year round, we got only about 100 *gia* of rice out of it. Of this amount, 40 *gia* went to the landlord. We borrowed money to buy ducks and geese. We lived a very hard life. But I cultivated the land carefully, and in time it became fertile. When it did, the owner took it back; my livelihood was gone. I had to go back to my parents, to raise ducks for my father.

I was poor. I had lost my land and I didn't have enough money to take care of my children. In 1961 propaganda cadres of the [National Liberation] Front contacted me. These guys had joined the resistance against the French, and after Geneva they had stayed underground in the South. They came to all the poor farmers and made an analysis of the poor and rich classes. They said that the

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rich people had always served the French and had used the authority of the French to oppress the poor. The majority of the people were poor, not because they wasted their money but because they had been exploited by the landlords who had worked with the French. In the past, the ancestors of the poor had broken ground for tillage. Then powerful people had seized their land. Without any other means to live, the poor had become slaves of the landlords. The cadres told us that if the poor people don't stand up [to] the rich people, we would be dominated by them forever. The only way to ensure freedom and a sufficient life was to overthrow them.

When I heard the cadres, I thought that what they said was correct. In my village there were about forty-three hundred people. Of these, maybe ten were landlords. The richest owned five hundred hectares [1,236 acres], and the others had at least twenty hectares [49 acres] apiece. The rest of the people were tenants or honest poor farmers. I knew that the rich oppressed the poor. The poor had nothing to eat, and they also had no freedom. We had to get rid of the regime that allowed a few people to use their money and authority to oppress the others.

So I joined the Liberation Front. I followed the VC to fight for freedom and prosperity for the country. I felt that this was right.

5. President Lyndon Johnson's Advisers Debate Expanding the War, 1965

Robert S. McNamara

[26 June 1965; revised 1 July 1965]

Introduction

Our objective is to create conditions for a favorable settlement by demonstrating to the VC [Viet Cong]/DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam—North Vietnam] that the odds are against their winning. Under present conditions, however, the chances of achieving this objective are small—and the VC are winning now—largely because the ratio of guerrilla to antiguerrilla forces is unfavorable to the government. With this in mind, we must choose among three courses of action with respect to South Vietnam: (1) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that can be arranged; (2) continue at about the present level, with U.S. forces limited to say, 75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks while recognizing that our position will probably grow weaker; or (3) expand substantially the U.S. military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and the North Vietnamese in the North and at the same time launch a vigorous effort on the political side to get negotiations started. An outline of the third of these approaches follows.

Choices

Robert S. McNamara, Memorandum for the President, June 26, 1965; revised July 1, 1965; George W. Ball to the President, memorandum, July 1, 1965; both in National Security File, National Security Council History, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965," Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

I. Expanded Military Moves

The following military moves should be taken together with the political initiatives in Part II below.

A. Inside South Vietnam. Increase U.S./SVN [South Vietnam] military strength in SVN enough to prove to the VC that they cannot win and thus to turn the tide of the war....

B. Against North Vietnam. While avoiding striking population and industrial targets not closely related to the DRV's supply of war material to the VC, we should announce to Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow into and out of North Vietnam....

II. Expanded Political Moves

Together with the above military moves, we should take the following political initiatives in order (a) to open a dialogue with Hanoi, Peking, and the VC looking toward a settlement in Vietnam, (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military involvement and support of North Vietnam until the time when settlement can be achieved, and (c) to cement the support for U.S. policy by the U.S. public, allies, and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. While our approaches may be rebuffed until the tide begins to turn, they nevertheless should be made....

George W. Ball

[1. July 1965]

1. *A Losing War:* The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong [formally, the National Liberation Front]. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms no matter how many hundred thousand white foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy.

No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war—which is at the same time a civil war between Asians—in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN [South Vietnam]) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point:

(a) The sneak attack on the Danang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. *This raid was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants.*

(b) The B-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong *who had obviously been tipped off.*

(c) The search-and-destroy mission of the 173rd Airborne Brigade which spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy *who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment.*

2. *The Question to Decide:* Should we limit our liabilities in South Viet-Nam and try to find a way out with minimal long-term cost?

The alternative—no matter what we may wish it to be—is almost certainly a protracted war involving an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces, mounting U.S. casualties, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.

3. *Need for a Decision Now:* So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the United States and a large part of the population of South Viet-Nam, organized and directed from North Viet-Nam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping [*sic*].

The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct combat they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.

Once we suffer large casualties we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives. *Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after we had paid terrible costs.*

4. *A Compromise Solution:* Should we commit U.S. manpower and prestige to a terrain so unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy—or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so?

5. *Costs of Compromise Solution:* The answer involves a judgment as to the costs to the United States of such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries in the area of South Viet-Nam, the credibility of our commitments, and our prestige around the world. In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial U.S. forces to combat in South Viet-Nam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a long-term catastrophe. I believe we have tended greatly to exaggerate the costs involved in a compromise settlement....

6. A Dissenter Dissects Liberalism, 1965

Seven months ago at the April March on Washington, Paul Potter, then President of Students for a Democratic Society, stood in approximately this spot and said that we must name the system that creates and sustains the war in Vietnam—name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it, and change it.

Speech by Carl Oglesby, "Let Us Shape the Future," November 27, 1965, in Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines, eds., *"Takin' It to the Streets": A Sixties Reader*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 178–183.

Today I will try to name it—to suggest an analysis which, to be quite frank, may disturb some of you—and to suggest what changing it may require of us.

← We are here again to protest a growing war. Since it is a very bad war, we acquire the habit of thinking it must be caused by very bad men. But we only conceal reality, I think, to denounce on such grounds the menacing coalition of industrial and military power, or the brutality of the blitzkrieg we are waging against Vietnam, or the ominous signs around us that heresy may soon no longer be permitted. We must simply observe, and quite plainly say, that this coalition, this blitzkrieg, and this demand for acquiescence are creatures, all of them, of a Government that since 1932 has considered itself to be fundamentally liberal.

The original commitment in Vietnam was made by President Truman, a mainstream liberal. It was seconded by President Eisenhower, a moderate liberal. It was intensified by the late President Kennedy, a flaming liberal. Think of the men who now engineer that war—those who study the maps, give the commands, push the buttons, and tally the dead: Bundy, McNamara, Rusk, Lodge, Goldberg, the President himself. They are not moral monsters. They are all honorable men. They are all liberals.

But so, I'm sure, are many of us who are here today in protest. To understand the war, then, it seems necessary to take a closer look at this American liberalism. Maybe we are in for some surprises. Maybe we have here two quite different liberalisms: one authentically humanist; the other not so human at all.

✱ Not long ago I considered myself a liberal and if someone had asked me what I meant by that, I'd perhaps have quoted Thomas Jefferson or Thomas Paine, who first made plain our nation's unprovisional commitment to human rights. But what do you think would happen if these two heroes could sit down now for a chat with President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy?

They would surely talk of the Vietnam war. Our dead revolutionaries would soon wonder why their country was fighting against what appeared to be a revolution. The living liberals would hotly deny that it is one: there are troops coming in from outside, the rebels get arms from other countries, most of the people are not on their side, and they practice terror against their own. Therefore: not a revolution.

What would our dead revolutionaries answer? They might say: "What fools and bandits, sirs, you make then of us. Outside help? Do you remember Lafayette? Or the three thousand British freighters the French navy sunk for our side? Or the arms and men we got from France and Spain? And what's this about terror? Did you never hear what we did to our own Loyalists? Or about the thousands of rich American Tories who fled for their lives to Canada? And as for popular support, do you not know that we had less than one-third of our people with us? That, in fact, the colony of New York recruited more troops for the British than for the revolution? Should we give it all back?"

Revolutions do not take place in velvet boxes. They never have. It is only the poets who make them lovely. What the National Liberation Front is fighting in Vietnam is a complex and vicious war. This war is also a revolution, as honest a revolution as you can find anywhere in history. And this is a fact which all our intricate official denials will never change.

But it doesn't make any difference to our leaders anyway. Their aim in Vietnam is really much simpler than this implies. It is to safeguard what they take to be American interests around the world against revolution or revolutionary change, which they always call communism—as if that were that. In the case of Vietnam, this interest is, first, the principle that revolution shall not be tolerated anywhere, and second, that South Vietnam shall never sell its rice to China—or even to North Vietnam.

There is simply no such thing now, for us, as a just revolution—never mind that for two-thirds of the world's people the Twentieth Century might as well be the Stone Age; never mind the melting poverty and hopelessness that are the basic facts of life for most modern men; and never mind that for these millions there is now an increasingly perceptible relationship between their sorrow and our contentment.

Can we understand why the Negroes of Watts rebelled? Then why do we need a devil theory to explain the rebellion of the South Vietnamese? Can we understand the oppression in Mississippi, or the anguish that our Northern ghettos makes epidemic? Then why can't we see that our proper human struggle is not with communism or revolutionaries, but with the social desperation that drives good men to violence, both here and abroad?

To be sure, we have been most generous with our aid, and in Western Europe, a mature industrial society, that aid worked. But there are always political and financial strings. And we have never shown ourselves capable of allowing others to make those traumatic institutional changes that are often the prerequisites of progress in colonial societies. For all our official feeling for the millions who are enslaved to what we so self-righteously call the yoke of communist tyranny, we make no real effort at all to crack through the much more vicious right-wing tyrannies that our businessmen traffic with and our nation profits from every day. And for all our cries about the international Red conspiracy to take over the world, we take only pride in the fact of our six thousand military bases on foreign soil....

7. A Soldier Remembers His Ordeal, 1967–1968

I was about to be drafted, so I went into the Navy Reserves. I was a hospital corpsman. At that time so many hospital corpsmen were being killed that they put the reserves on active duty. I went through six months of medical training at Great Lakes and from there I was transferred to Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, where I went through field medical school, the Marines teaching Navy people how to stay alive in a jungle situation, which was very ironic because it was the middle of winter and about fifteen below. We're stomping through the marshes and the ice training for Vietnam. They had little model Vietnamese villages set up and Marines who had been in Vietnam telling us

what booby traps were, how they were made, what to look for and what we would be up against.

If you got orders that said "Fleet Marine Force," that meant you put on the green uniform. Yeah, I joined the Navy to get out of the infantry and ended up in the infantry. I was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, Lima Company, which was about two klicks south of Nui Kim San, the town right below Marble Mountain. It was about another five kilometers from the ocean and three kilometers south of Danang.

We were mainly engaged in squad-sized patrols, five or six men who would go out five or six miles from the battalion staging area. If we were going to patrol outside the area for any length of time, they would usually send the platoon. We ran into old-style Viet Cong—black pajamas, bare feet and M-1 rifles.

We would get ambushed, one or two men hit, and they'd run before we could get in an air strike or choppers. It was fighting on a small scale my first three months that taught me some fundamental things and gave me a chance to learn the ropes. A lot of the corpsmen who went over were immediately engaged in large infantry actions and killed because they didn't have time to learn some basic skills—to be able to tell, for example, the direction the fire was coming from. Frequently it was coming from two or three directions in an ambush. I learned how to find cover in flat sandy areas where you wouldn't think you would be able to find cover. You stayed below the horizon line. Small lumps in the earth can provide more cover than you expected. And I became quite good at crawling....

There was no lack of cover fire and there was usually a fire team with me when I went after a casualty. There were several occasions when I did have to go out alone, which were the most horrifying experiences I've ever had in my life.

There was one ambush where I had to crawl about fifty meters to get to a man and no one else could move because we were pretty well pinned down. He was the point man. The rest of us had to pull back because the fire was so heavy, so the point man was stranded. The fire team laid down a sheet of automatic-weapons fire that was working its way right in front of my nose. They worked me along until I got to the man, and then kept covering me while I tried to treat him. Unfortunately he was pretty well dead by the time I got there. I was scared to death. The enemy was very close because the rounds were coming close. There was a man in a spider trap maybe thirty meters away who kept popping at me. Another Marine managed to get close enough to cover for me and he almost got hit. There were bullets kicking up sand all around me during the entire thing. When I got to the man I had to lay on top of him, grab his clothing and roll him over to the left to get him out of the line of fire. I succeeded in getting him behind a clump of earth, and I calmed down a bit and was able to treat him. He had bled to death internally by this time. This guy's name was George Custer. He was seventeen years old. If your parents signed certain kinds of papers, you could get over there and die at seventeen....

I saw cruelty and brutality that I didn't expect to see from our own people against the villagers. It took me a while in country to realize why it was happening. In this type of fighting it was almost impossible to know who the enemy

was at any one time. Children were suspect, women were suspect. Frequently the ARVN's themselves were on two payrolls. Their army was heavily infiltrated with Viet Cong or people who were politically ambivalent, who could change sides as easily as changing clothes.

When, for example, we would patrol an area of villages for a number of weeks and continue to lose men to booby traps, and the people in the villages who pretended not to know anything about these booby traps walked the same trails that we did day after day without stepping on them, it became obvious that these people were well informed by the VC where the booby traps were.

One must understand that it's very easy to slip into a primitive state of mind, particularly if your life is in danger and you can't trust anyone. It was difficult for me to assimilate both sides of the picture, that maybe some of these villagers really were enemy. In one case I saw a young man, probably eighteen years old, push an old man into his family bunker inside his hootch and throw a grenade in after him. We'd been hit a lot that week and pressure had been building up. It wasn't anything that happened that day. But I remember this guy distinctly because he had a tattoo of a little red devil on his left arm and he had his shirt off when he threw the old man into the bunker and threw the grenade in after him. This is something that I blocked from my memory for twelve years. There are several of these memory blocks that are coming back to me now that I had just put right out of my mind....

The very idea of the search-and-destroy operation is one of enormous logical fallacy. You send a patrol out in order to get it ambushed, in order to mark a target with a smoke rocket from a helicopter so jets can come in and napalm the area. In other words, you have to get ambushed before you can find the enemy. Now, this immediately gives them a chance to inflict damage and then get out of the way. The VC were smart enough to know that it was going to take two or three minutes at fastest to get a Huey out there, so they could kill a couple of people and split before anybody ever got there. We proceeded to mark the target where we thought the fire had come from. Meanwhile the VC were eating their hamburgers in Danang. It happened time after time. An incredible drain....

8. Henry Kissinger Shares His Doubts with President Nixon, 1969

... I have become deeply concerned about our present course on Vietnam. This memorandum is to inform you of the reasons for my concern. It does not discuss alternative courses of action, but is provided for your background consideration. You know my recommendations.

While time acts against both us and our enemy, it runs more quickly against our strategy than against theirs. This pessimistic view is based on my view of Hanoi's strategy and the probable success of the various elements of our own.

Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 10, 1969, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), pp. 370-374.

I. U.S. Strategy

In effect, we are attempting to solve the problem of Vietnam on three highly interrelated fronts: (1) within the U.S., (2) in Vietnam, and (3) through diplomacy. To achieve our basic goals through diplomacy, we must be reasonably successful on *both* of the other two fronts.

a. U.S.

The pressure of public opinion on you to resolve the war quickly will increase—and I believe increase greatly—during the coming months. While polls may show that large numbers of Americans now are satisfied with the Administration's handling of the war, the elements of an evaporation of this support are clearly present. The plans for student demonstrations in October are well known, and while many Americans will oppose the students' activities, they will also be reminded of their own opposition to the continuation of the war. As mentioned below, I do not believe that "Vietnamization" can significantly reduce the pressures for an end to the war, and may, in fact, increase them after a certain point. Particularly significant is the clear opposition of many "moderate" leaders of opinion, particularly in the press and in the East (e.g., *Life Magazine*). The result of the recrudescence of intense public concern must be to polarize public opinion. You will then be somewhat in the same position as was President Johnson, although the substance of your position will be different. You will be caught between the Hawks and the Doves.

The effect of these public pressures on the U.S. Government will be to accentuate the internal divisiveness that has already become apparent to the public and Hanoi. Statements by government officials which attempt to assuage the Hawks or Doves will serve to confuse Hanoi but also to confirm it in its course of waiting us out.

b. Vietnam

Three elements on the Vietnam front must be considered—(1) our efforts to "win the war" through military operations and pacification, (2) "Vietnamization," and (3) the political position of the GVN.

(1) I do not believe that with our current plans we can win the war within two years, although our success or failure in hurting the enemy remains very important.

(2) "Vietnamization" must be considered both with regard to its prospects for allowing us to turn the war over to the Vietnamese, and with regard to its effect on Hanoi and U.S. public opinion. I am not optimistic about the ability of the South Vietnamese armed forces to assume a larger part of the burden than current MACV plans allow. These plans, however, call for a thirty-month period in which to turn the burden of the war over to the GVN. I do not believe we have this much time.

In addition, "Vietnamization" will run into increasingly serious problems as we proceed down its path.

—Withdrawal of U.S. troops will become like salted peanuts to the American public: The more U.S. troops come home, the more will be demanded. This could eventually result, in effect, in demands for unilateral withdrawal—perhaps within a year.

—The more troops are withdrawn, the more Hanoi will be encouraged—they are the last people we will be able to fool about the ability of the South Vietnamese to take over from us. They have the option of attacking GVN forces to embarrass us throughout the process or of waiting until we have largely withdrawn before doing so (probably after a period of higher infiltration).

—Each U.S. soldier that is withdrawn will be relatively more important to the effort in the south, as he will represent a higher percentage of U.S. forces than did his predecessor. (We need not, of course, continue to withdraw combat troops but can emphasize support troops in the next increments withdrawn. Sooner or later, however, we must be getting at the guts of our operations there.)

—It will become harder and harder to maintain the morale of those who remain, not to speak of their mothers....

(3) We face a dilemma with the GVN: The present GVN cannot go much farther towards a political settlement without seriously endangering its own existence; but at the same time, it has not gone far enough to make such a settlement likely.

Thieu's failure to "broaden" his government is disturbing, but not because he failed to include a greater variety of Saigon's Tea House politicians. It is disturbing because these politicians clearly do not believe that Thieu and his government represent much hope for future power, and because the new government does not offer much of a bridge to neutralist figures who could play a role in a future settlement. This is not to mention his general failure to build up political strength in non-Catholic villages. In addition, as U.S. troops are withdrawn, Thieu becomes more dependent on the political support of the South Vietnamese military.

c. Diplomatic Front

There is not therefore enough of a prospect of progress in Vietnam to persuade Hanoi to make real concessions in Paris. Their intransigence is also based on their estimate of growing U.S. domestic opposition to our Vietnam policies. It looks as though they are prepared to try to wait us out.

II. Hanoi's Strategy

There is no doubt that the enemy has been hurt by allied military actions in the South, and is not capable of maintaining the initiative on a sustained basis there. Statistics on enemy-initiated activities, as well as some of Giap's recent statements, indicate a conscious decision by Hanoi to settle down to a strategy of "protracted warfare." This apparently consists of small unit actions with "high point" flurries of activity, and emphasis on inflicting U.S. casualties (particularly through rocket and mortar attacks). This pattern of actions seems clearly to indicate a low-cost strategy aimed at producing a psychological, rather than military, defeat for the U.S.

This view of their strategy is supported by our estimates of enemy infiltration. They *could* infiltrate more men, according to intelligence estimates, despite growing domestic difficulties. The only logical reason for their not having done so is that more men were not needed in the pipeline—at least for a few months—to support a lower-cost strategy of protracted warfare. It seems most unlikely that they are attempting to “signal” to us a desire for a *de facto* mutual withdrawal, although this cannot be discounted. There is no diplomatic sign of this—except in Xuan Thuy’s linkage of points two and three of the PRG program—and I do not believe they trust us enough to “withdraw” a larger percentage of their men than we have of ours, as they would be doing.

Hanoi’s adoption of a strategy designed to wait us out fits both with its doctrine of how to fight a revolutionary war and with its expectations about increasingly significant problems for the U.S.

III. Conclusion

In brief, I do not believe we can make enough evident progress in Vietnam to hold the line within the U.S. (and the U.S. Government), and Hanoi has adopted a strategy which it should be able to maintain for some time—barring some break like Sino-Soviet hostilities. Hence my growing concern.

◆ ESSAYS

Among the most contentious questions related to America’s war in Vietnam are two deceptively simple ones: Why did U.S. leaders believe that defeating communism in a far-away Southeast Asian nation was worth a massive investment of American resources and lives? And were they right to commit the nation to war on the strength of those beliefs? The following essays offer sharply different answers to those questions. In the first essay, political commentator Michael Lind offers a sympathetic analysis of the decisions that led to a major war in Vietnam, arguing that U.S. leaders correctly judged that a communist takeover would undermine America’s broader pursuit of the Cold War. In the second essay, historian Fredrik Logevall of Cornell University views the American commitment to Vietnam as a terrible mistake and examines the flawed reasoning that led U.S. leaders to commit the nation to war.

A Necessary War

MICHAEL LIND

The Vietnam War ... was at one and the same time a civil war and proxy battle in the Cold War. During the Cold War, Indochina mattered—and it mattered to the Soviet Union and China as well as to the United States.

Examining the Vietnam War in its Cold War context does not necessarily justify it. Indeed, some argue that while it was necessary for the United States to wage the Cold War, success in the Cold War did not require the United States to establish or defend a protectorate over most of Indochina. This is the claim that was made by a number of American "realists" at the time of the Vietnam conflict and in the succeeding decades. Realism, or *realpolitik*, is the theory of international relations that emphasizes the primacy and legitimacy of power struggles in world politics. Several of the most prominent American realist thinkers—diplomat George Kennan, journalist Walter Lippmann, and scholar Hans Morgenthau, among others—criticized the Vietnam War in particular, and in some cases the Cold War as a whole, as an unnecessary or disproportionate response to the threats posed by Soviet expansionism and communist Chinese revolutionary radicalism. Within the U.S. government in the 1960s, Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Undersecretary of State George Ball, one of the Democratic party's most influential foreign policy experts, also used the language of realism to criticize what they considered to be an overly ambitious U.S. grand strategy.

The realist critique of the Vietnam War remains very popular today. It permits aging veterans of the sixties left, embarrassed by their former support for Ho Chi Minh's vicious dictatorship and their denunciations of American presidents as war criminals or their avoidance of the draft, to claim that they were right to oppose the war, even if their rationale was mistaken. The realist critique permits former Maoists turned Metternichs to declare that the Vietnam War, even if it was not an immoral atrocity, was a strategic mistake. The realist critique of the Vietnam War also serves the purposes of many contemporary advocates of an assertive U.S. foreign policy: for them to say that the Vietnam War resulted from strategic folly denies a debating point to opponents who claim that a contemporary intervention that they favor threatens to become "another Vietnam." Finally, the fact that some of the policymakers who played a role in the war, like former Secretary of State Robert McNamara, have claimed that it was a mistake from the beginning has appeared to strengthen the realist critique (even though other policymakers, such as former national security adviser Walt Rostow, continue to argue that the war made sense in terms of U.S. strategy).

In light of all this, it is important to recall that there was, and is, a realist case in favor of the Vietnam War, as well as one against it. If some American realists such as Lippmann, Kennan, and Morgenthau doubted the importance of America's commitment to denying Indochina to the communist bloc, others, such as Walt and Eugene Rostow, Samuel P. Huntington, and John P. Roche, were convinced of the significance of that commitment. The fact that the United States was defeated in Vietnam does not necessarily discredit the strategic logic that inspired the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and their Southeast Asian neighbors. The failure of American policy in Indochina may have resulted from inappropriate military tactics, or the characteristics of the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese societies and governments, or the support provided Hanoi by the Soviet Union and China, or the peculiarities of American political culture—or some combinations of all of these factors.

The case that Indochina was worth a limited American war of some kind, particularly in the circumstances of the Cold War in the 1960s, is compelling in light of what we now know about the pattern and result of the Cold War as a whole.

Contemporary critics of the Johnson administration spoke of its “credibility gap” in connection with the Vietnam War. In addition to having exaggerated the progress of the United States and its South Vietnamese allies in the war, Johnson and his aides were accused of a failure to clearly explain the goal of the war to the American public and the world. Typical of this line of criticism is a comment in 1968 by William R. Corson, a former marine colonel in Vietnam, in his critique of the war, *The Betrayal*: “The emergence of the credibility gap came from the ill-fated attempts of Secretary [of State Dean] Rusk to justify the war successively as, first, a defense of Vietnamese freedom, then a defense of our national interest, and finally the defense of the world from the yellow peril.”

Indeed, Johnson and officials of his administration provided several rationales for the escalation of the U.S. effort in Vietnam. Johnson cited “the deepening shadow of China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on, by Peking.” On another occasion he stressed the need to thwart guerrilla warfare as an instrument of communist expansion: “Our strength imposes on us an obligation to assure that this type of aggression does not succeed.” Secretary of State Dean Rusk stressed the potential effects of a defeat of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia on America’s global alliance system, including “our guarantees to Berlin.”: ...

... [T]he notion of the “credibility gap” ignores the possibility that in escalating the Vietnam War the Johnson administration had several purposes, not just one. By successfully defending South Vietnam against subversion from North Vietnam, a client of the Soviet Union and China, the United States could deter the Soviets, reassure its allies, discourage the adoption of the Chinese and Vietnamese model of revolutionary “people’s war” by antiwestern insurgents in developing countries, and encourage the economic development and liberalization of South Vietnam as well as of South Korea and Taiwan, all at the same time.

While the U.S. intervention in Vietnam served a number of complementary purposes, there was a hierarchy among U.S. goals. The administrations of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon may not have made that hierarchy as clear as intellectuals would like. Nevertheless, in hindsight it is possible to identify the place assigned to different goals in the hierarchy of purposes by these three presidents and their aides. The chief purpose of the United States in Vietnam was to demonstrate America’s credibility as a military power and a reliable ally to its enemies and its allies around the world. The danger was that if the United States were perceived to be lacking in military capacity, political resolve, or both, the Soviet Union and/or China and their proxies would act more aggressively, while U.S. allies, including important industrial democracies such as West Germany and Japan, would be inclined to appease the communist great powers. It was in this global geopolitical context that preventing “falling dominoes”—whether in Southeast Asia proper, or in Third World countries far from Vietnam—was important. Least important of all the U.S. purposes in intervening in Vietnam

was promoting liberty, democracy, and prosperity in South Vietnam itself. The defeat of the attempted takeover of South Vietnam by North Vietnam was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the evolution of the authoritarian government of South Vietnam toward liberalism and democracy. But America's political goals in South Vietnam were appropriately incidental and subordinate to America's goals in Southeast Asian power politics, which, in turn, were incidental and subordinate to America's global strategy in the third world war....

One of the myths about the Vietnam War is the claim that the chief rationale for U.S. intervention was the "domino theory." This derived its name from a metaphor used by President Eisenhower to explain U.S. concern about the consequences of communist takeovers in Indochina: "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences." The danger that the "loss" of Indochina would lead to a "loss" of Southeast Asia in its entirety to the American bloc ("the free world") was stressed at different times by U.S. policymakers, usually in rhetoric intended for the general public. "The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence," President Kennedy told the American public in a televised press conference on March 23, 1961. President Johnson, in his characteristically hyperbolic style, claimed that if the communists were not stopped in Vietnam the United States might have to fight them in Waikiki.

But this "regional" version of the domino effect was not the only interpretation of the metaphor. Examining the statements and actions of American statesmen and commentators during the Vietnam era reveals that it is necessary to untangle three conceptions bound up in the idea of the domino effect. At different times the domino effect was used to mean a *regional domino effect*, a *global revolutionary wave effect* or a *global bandwagon effect*. It was feared that the loss of South Vietnam to Hanoi-sponsored communist insurgents would lead to communist takeovers in neighboring countries in Indochina or Southeast Asia, or to copycat communist or antiwestern revolutions in other areas of the developing world, or to bandwagoning with or appeasement of the Soviet Union or communist China by U.S. allies and neutrals unsure of the reliability of U.S. security guarantees. In the worst case, all of three of these domino effects might occur. The fall of South Vietnam and a few neighboring countries might, at one and the same time, inspire imitative revolutions elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and frighten U.S. allies into appeasing Moscow and/or Beijing. Once the issue has been clarified in this way, it becomes obvious that to dismiss the concerns of U.S. policymakers about the prospective loss of Indochina to the communist bloc, it is not enough to prove that their fears of the regional domino effect in Southeast Asia were exaggerated. Even if they were mistaken about the extent of the regional domino effect, they might have been right about the dangers of the other two domino effects—the revolutionary wave effect and the bandwagon effect. As it happened, the fall of only three regional dominoes in Indochina *did* trigger a worldwide revolutionary

wave and an even more dangerous trend of pro-Soviet bandwagoning in world politics.

One of the central claims of opponents of the Vietnam War was the assertion that American policymakers tragically mistook spontaneous nationalist movements in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as evidence of the existence of an international communist conspiracy. "Where communism takes root in Asia," George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis wrote in their influential book *The United States in Vietnam*, "its strength arises, not through subversion directed from China or Russia, but because of locally generated social, economic, and political factors." A look at a map of Asia in 1989 is enough to refute this argument. Every successful communist insurgency in Asia took place in a country bordering on one or more countries under communist rule, beginning with China, where Mao's communists received massive Soviet aid across the Sino-Soviet border. Communist insurgencies were defeated in countries such as the Philippines and Malaya that lacked any borders with a Marxist-Leninist regime. When the Cold War ended, not one communist movement had succeeded in an Asian country without a communist neighbor—not one....

The revolutionary wave effect produced by the fall of Saigon in 1975 was far more significant than the regional domino effect in Southeast Asia proper....

The Marxist-Leninist revolutionary wave associated with the Vietnam War saw "affiliate Marxist-Leninist revolutions" come to power outside of Indochina in the Congo (1964, 1968), Benin (1972), Ethiopia and Guinea-Bissau (1974), Madagascar, Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Angola (1975), Afghanistan (1978), and Grenada and Nicaragua (1979). All of these revolutions were inspired in part by the example of the successful struggle of the Indochinese communists against the United States. Along with Cuban communists who worked to export revolution on behalf of the Soviet bloc in Africa and the Middle East, the Vietnamese communists exported their successful revolution by invading and occupying Laos and Cambodia. If dominoes such as Thailand and Indonesia did not fall, other dominoes far from Southeast Asia, such as Nicaragua and Angola and Ethiopia, did—and they fell to a revolutionary wave emanating, in part, from Indochina.

The communist victory in South Vietnam, then, was followed by a minor regional domino effect and a major global revolutionary wave effect. And yet the most powerful argument for U.S. intervention in Vietnam came from a third variant of the domino theory. What was primarily at stake in Vietnam for the United States was its global reputation as a military superpower and as a reliable ally—its credibility—not the alliance memberships or constitutions of Thailand, Indonesia, and a handful of other nations, nor even the affiliation of Marxist-Leninist regimes in Nicaragua and Ethiopia with Moscow. The primary danger facing the United States was the likelihood that, if the Soviet Union and/or China helped a proxy state annihilate an American protectorate, the Soviet Union and China would be dangerously emboldened, while weak American allies and neutrals around the world would be frightened into appeasing one or the other of the two communist great powers. By stressing the regional domino theory or a possible revolutionary wave effect instead of the defense of America's global credibility, successive U.S. presidential administrations confused the

public, undermined their own case, and provided hostages in the form of weak arguments to critics of U.S. Cold War strategy. This is a tragedy, because the commitment to defend America's client states in Indochina, along with U.S. commitments to South Korea and Taiwan, was justified by the need to demonstrate American credibility both to America's enemies and to American allies and neutrals....

Credibility, in power politics, is a country's reputation for military capability combined with the political resolve to use it in order to promote its goals. The concern of statesmen with the reputation of their states for military ability and resolve is as old as interstate politics....

The natural concern of U.S. leaders with credibility was heightened into something like an obsession by the peculiar dynamics of the Cold War—a world war fought by means of sieges and duels. Unlike World Wars I and II, the third global conflict of the twentieth century took the form of a half-century siege on the European front and duels or proxy wars in a number of other theaters. The forward deployment of U.S. troops in Central Europe, Japan, and South Korea following the Korean War, together with U.S. efforts to maintain conventional and nuclear superiority, made up the siege aspect of the Cold War. In the long run, the superior military-industrial capability of the United States and its affluent allies was bound to wear down the military-industrial base of the Soviet empire, as long as two conditions were met. The first condition for western success in the Cold War was alliance unity; the alliance of the United States, West Germany, Japan, Britain, France, and the other major democracies could not be split by a Soviet diplomatic strategy of divide-and-rule. Meeting this condition required periodic reaffirmations of alliance unity, like the deployment of the Euromissiles by NATO in the early 1980s in response to Soviet intimidation. In addition, the American bloc was required to match and surpass the Soviet imperium in the arms race. Because the goal was to spend the Soviet Union into bankruptcy, not merely to defend the western allies against an implausible threat of invasion, the American bloc could not accumulate a sufficiency of nuclear missiles and other weapons and then quit. The arms race was an auction that had to be continued until one side dropped out.

The military-industrial siege of the Soviet empire took far longer than early Cold War leaders such as Truman and Eisenhower and their advisers had expected. In the 1950s, Eisenhower hoped that U.S. troops might be withdrawn from Europe in the next decade. Instead, the siege lasted almost half a century. While manning the siegeworks in Europe and northeast Asia, the United States also had to demonstrate its determination by threatening war, or, if the threat failed, by waging limited war, with the Soviet Union and/or China and their proxies in regions on the periphery of the main theaters of Cold War competition. Sometimes the United States had to fight where it was challenged by its enemies, not where it would have preferred to fight. Because perceived power is power (except in times of war, when actual power is tested), the danger that a strategic retreat will be misinterpreted as evidence of a loss of will or capability is quite real. To refuse to duel is to lose the duel.

Thus defined, credibility became the central strategic concern of the United States in the Cold War. Henry Kissinger described the American interest in Indochina in terms of U.S. credibility in global power politics: "With respect to Indo-China, we are not equating the intrinsic importance of each part of the world, and we are not saying that every part of the world is strategically as important to the United States as any other part of the world ... [The question of aid to allies in Indochina] is a fundamental question of how we are viewed by all other people." John Foster Dulles made a similar point in calling on the United States to protect the anticommunist remnant of the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan in spring 1950: "If we do not act, it will be everywhere interpreted that we are making another retreat because we dare not risk war."

Who was the intended audience for American displays of credibility? Makers and defenders of U.S. Cold War strategy reasoned that the United States had to deter its enemies and reassure its allies at the same time. In a speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, President Johnson invoked these two reasons for demonstrations of credibility in the context of the war in Indochina. First, he cited the need to reassure America's allies: "Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of America's commitment, the value of America's word." Second, President Johnson sought to discourage America's enemies: "The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia, as we did in Europe, in the words of the Bible: 'Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further.'"...

In the mid-1960s, the sound and ultimately successful Cold War grand strategy of global military containment of the communist bloc required Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to escalate the U.S. involvement in Vietnam rather than withdraw without a major effort. Any president in office at the time probably would have done so. On February 17, 1965, former president Dwight Eisenhower told President Johnson that "the U.S. has put its prestige onto the proposition of keeping SE Asia free.... We cannot let the Indo-Chinese peninsula go. [Eisenhower] hoped it would not be necessary to use the six to eight divisions mentioned, but if it should be necessary then so be it." Similarly, any president in the 1960s probably would have led the United States to war if North Korea had invaded South Korea a second time, or if China had invaded Taiwan. In the circumstances of the Cold War, a president who abandoned any of the three fronts in Asia to the communist bloc without a major struggle would have been guilty of dereliction of his duties as commander-in-chief and leader of the worldwide American alliance system. To argue otherwise is ahistorical. If the United States today, a decade after the demise of the Soviet Union, is prepared to go to war on behalf of South Korea and possibly Taiwan as well, then it makes no sense to argue that it was irrational for the United States to defend its Indochinese protectorate at the height of the Third World War.

Once the Vietnam War is viewed in the context of the Cold War, it looks less like a tragic error than like a battle that could hardly be avoided. The Cold War was fought as a siege in Europe and as a series of duels elsewhere in the world—chiefly, in Korea and Indochina. Both the siege and the duels were necessary. Power in world politics is perceived power, and perceived power is a vector that results from perceived military capability and perceived political will. The U.S. forces stationed in West Germany and Japan demonstrated the capability of the United States to defend its most important allies. U.S. efforts on behalf of minor allies in peripheral regions such as South Korea and South Vietnam and Laos proved that the United States possessed the will to be a reliable ally. Had the United States repeatedly refused to take part in proxy-war duels with the Soviet Union, and with China during its anti-American phase, it seems likely that there would have been a dramatic pro-Soviet realignment in world politics, no matter how many missiles rusted in their silos in the American West and no matter how many U.S. troops remained stationed in West Germany.

Most of the major duels between the American bloc and the communist bloc took place in countries that were peripheral (so that proxy wars between the superpowers would be unlikely to escalate into all-out global war) and symbolic (because they were divided between communist and noncommunist states). Along with China, which was divided between the communist mainland and Nationalist Taiwan, and partitioned Korea, Vietnam was one of a handful of front-line countries. The argument that the United States should have “chosen its battles” more carefully and avoided peripheral regions in which its allies were at a disadvantage posits a false alternative. It would have been foolish for Moscow or Beijing to risk general war by attacking major U.S. allies, or to sponsor military challenges to the U.S. alliance system in places where the United States and its allies had a clear military and political advantage. The United States, then, was fated to forfeit the Cold War, or to fight in difficult conditions in battlefields that its enemies chose.

While the need to preserve a surplus of American credibility required the United States to escalate its involvement in Indochina by going to war, the need to preserve a surplus of American public support for the Cold War in its entirety required the U.S. government to avoid escalating the war in Indochina too much. Presidents Johnson and Nixon defended America's Cold War credibility, at the cost of eroding America's Cold War consensus. The high costs of the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1968 destroyed U.S. public support for an open-ended commitment to the defense of the noncommunist states of Indochina, while the additional costs of the prolonged withdrawal between 1968 and 1973 endangered public support for the Cold War on any front.

In the United States, the domestic result of the Vietnam War was a neo-isolationist consensus in the 1970s. Disaffected moderate supporters of the Cold War teamed up with the permanent antiinterventionist made up of mostly northern progressive isolationists and Marx-influenced leftists. The neoisolationism of the U.S. Congress and the Carter administration in its first years permitted and encouraged the Soviet Union, with the assistance of its Vietnamese and

Cuban auxiliaries, to engage in empire-building in the Third World without fear of American reprisal. The perception of rising Soviet power and American retreat inspired European appeasement of Moscow in the mid-seventies and also inspired bandwagoning with Moscow on the part of Third World states in the UN General Assembly. Only the Second Cold War of 1979–89, orchestrated in the face of significant leftist and neutralist opposition by Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand, and other western democratic leaders, reversed the pro-Soviet trend in world politics and drove the Soviet Union into bankruptcy by raising the costs of its bid for world military primacy. Far from having no affect in world politics, the U.S. defeat in Indochina inaugurated a period in which the relative power, influence, and ambition of the Soviet empire peaked....

An Avoidable Catastrophe

FREDRIK LOGEVALL

For a man who led his country into what is widely seen as a disastrous war, Lyndon Baines Johnson has enjoyed surprisingly gentle treatment from historians. He has had his detractors over the years, to be sure, but most authors have been at once critical of his Vietnam policy and sympathetic to his plight. Johnson made the wrong decision in 1965, they in essence argue, but how can you blame him? After all, with the exception of poor old George Ball, the undersecretary of state, all of the president's senior advisors advocated a military solution in the key months of decision, while in the broader foreign policy bureaucracy, the pressure was all in the direction of escalation. On Capitol Hill and in elite public opinion generally, so it is implied, the mood in the same period was likewise hawkish, or at least unquestioning. An all-powerful "Cold War consensus"—never much analyzed in this literature—reigned supreme in American opinion and dictated that the commitment to South Vietnam had to be maintained, through major military escalation if necessary. In real political terms, therefore, so the argument goes, LBJ had no choice but to expand the war. (To the extent that he had a choice, it was whether or not to move faster and harder militarily, along the lines suggested by a few military analysts.) He was thus not really personally responsible, he cannot fairly be held accountable, for his "nonchoice" to escalate the fighting. No one else in his position would have done differently.

Viewed from the context of the time, moreover, Johnson and his top Vietnam lieutenants understandably believed that the new military measures would work, that the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign and the dispatch of combat troops would compel Hanoi to give up the game. Add to all this the

intransigence of North Vietnam on the subject of negotiations, and it becomes clear that there existed no realistic way of averting the war.

This “inevitability thesis” ... is attractive at first glance, even comforting on some level (if it was all bound to happen, there’s no need to lose sleep over what might have been). Its power results in good measure from the unfortunate tendency of authors to focus much of their attention on the high-level discussions in July 1965—by then, the momentum for large-scale war really was more or less unstoppable—and by their assumption that because public and congressional support for the war effort was high after the so-called Americanization, it must have been high before as well. Some historians have also equated Johnson’s undoubted skepticism and caution regarding Vietnam with dovishness, and concluded that he must have been forced into a war he didn’t want.

The Wider Context

The more one examines these various components of the inevitability thesis, however, the more dubious they become. At no point from his ascension to the White House in November 1963 through the winter of 1965, it turns out, was Lyndon Johnson confined to a certain course of action in Vietnam. He inherited a difficult Vietnam problem from John F. Kennedy, and his choices ranged from bad to worse. But exist the choices did, at least through February and March 1965. Neither domestic nor international considerations compelled him to escalate the war. At home, Johnson confronted not an all-powerful Cold War mindset, fully committed to thwarting communist designs in Southeast Asia, but a pronounced fluidity in non-official thinking about the conflict. The general public, to the extent it paid attention at all, was ambivalent, not wanting to lose in Vietnam but also not wanting to send America’s young men to fight and die there; in early 1965, large majorities voiced support for negotiations and for maintaining the present level of commitment to Saigon. (In such times of uncertainty, one U.S. official would later concede, the natural inclination for people is to follow the government’s lead, whichever way it chooses to go.) In the intelligence community, skepticism about the prospects for any U.S.-led war in Vietnam was widespread. The same was true on Capitol Hill and in the mainstream press, including on the editorial pages of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Wall Street Journal*. Significantly, many of these observers said that the United States had more than fulfilled its obligation to a South Vietnamese government so patently unwilling to do its part in its own defense.

Consider, in particular, the mood in Congress, where the Democrats held large majorities in both houses in early 1965. The near-unanimous passage a few months prior of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution—which gave Johnson wide latitude to wage war in Southeast Asia as he saw fit—should not obscure (though it often does) the essential point: the most respected, most senior Democratic law makers in the country opposed an escalation of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. This group included Armed Services Committee chair and Johnson mentor Richard Russell (Georgia), Majority Leader Mike

Mansfield (Montana), Foreign Relations Committee chair J. William Fulbright (Arkansas), and Vice President-elect and then Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey (Minnesota). All four were widely respected for their foreign policy expertise. They were also politically savvy, arguably no less so than the presumed master of partisan strategizing, Lyndon Johnson. Each of them held well-founded concerns about how opinion leaders in the press and in Congress as well as voters in middle America would react to a long and inconclusive Asian war; each of them doubted the importance of Vietnam to U.S. security. Nor were they the only law makers to hold these views. Exact numbers are hard to come by, but certainly in the Senate a clear majority of Democrats and moderate Republicans were either downright opposed to Americanization or were ambivalent; meanwhile, vocal proponents of taking the war to North Vietnam were strikingly few in number....

Nor were America's allies abroad clamoring for escalation. On the contrary, by the end of 1964, the United States was largely isolated on Vietnam on the world stage. Most friendly governments in Asia and Europe were sympathetic to what Washington sought to achieve in Vietnam—to preserve an independent, noncommunist government in the South—and they shared the U.S. desire to check possible Chinese expansion in the region. Nevertheless, with a few exceptions, these governments resisted what in some cases was strong and persistent American pressure to become actively involved in the defense of South Vietnam. Deeply skeptical that a lasting military victory against the Viet Cong could be achieved—especially in view of the perceived politico-military weakness of the South Vietnamese government and the apathy and war weariness of the southern populace—many allied leaders also possessed doubts that the outcome in Vietnam really mattered to Western security. Some also feared the political implications at home of committing manpower to an overseas struggle whose importance to national security was open to question.

China and the Soviet Union, meanwhile, were supporters of North Vietnam, but both were anxious to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States. All too aware of their military weakness vis-à-vis the Americans, both communist powers made clear to the Hanoi leadership that it could not necessarily count on their material support in the event of a large-scale U.S. intervention. For the Soviets, in particular, major war in Vietnam would be a disaster, risking a conflagration in an inconsequential area of the world and likely halting the momentum toward Soviet-American détente begun in 1963. Kremlin leaders thus hoped for a political solution to the conflict, perhaps by way of a great-power conference, and they cautioned both Hanoi and Washington against escalation. What is more, it now seems quite clear that neither Moscow nor Beijing nor most American allies believed that the United States would suffer a crippling blow to its global prestige if it failed to stand firm in South Vietnam, particularly given the chronic ineptness of the Saigon government.

More than anything, it was this bleak political situation in South Vietnam, and the apparent unwillingness of southern leaders to work to rectify it, that gave Johnson maneuverability on the war. Dedicated and courageous anti-communists willing to fight for the cause certainly existed in the South, but

never in sufficient numbers. Overall, incompetence, corruption, and infighting characterized the political leadership in Saigon, while the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was plagued by a general reluctance among officers to engage the enemy and alarming rates of desertion among soldiers. Among the larger South Vietnamese population, war weariness, induced by two decades of fighting, was widespread. And underneath it all percolated a latent, but potentially powerful, anti-Americanism. For large numbers of independent observers, the implications were clear: absent a much greater commitment to the struggle on the part of both the Saigon leadership and the mass of the population—an unlikely prospect, at best—there would be no hope for any U.S. military intervention, no matter how large. Americans would fail just as the French before them had failed....

A crucial question in historical terms is whether U.S. officials at the time were aware of these attitudes: the deep misgivings among informed observers at home and abroad, the severity of the politico-military problems in South Vietnam, the thinking in Hanoi. The answer can be stated unequivocally: they were. At the start of 1965, they knew full well that backing for the Vietnam commitment among the American people was broad but also shallow and that the support presumed a level of U.S. involvement that stayed more or less the same. They knew that Johnson had won raucous applause on the campaign trail the previous fall when he vowed not to send American boys to fight an Asian war. And they understood that influential voices in American society, including leading newspapers, were urging that the American presence in Vietnam be reduced rather than increased. Policy makers worried about the opposition to escalation among Senate Democrats such as Mansfield, Russell, and Fulbright, and among respected commentators such as Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and the *New York Times* editorial page. In 1965, they worked hard to woo these critics, to convert them to the administration's position, or at least to induce them to be quiet....

In terms of international opinion, policy makers were all too cognizant of the opposition to escalation and the desire for early negotiations on the part of key allied governments, and of the misgivings about the war evident even in Asia itself. In the lead-up to the Americanization of the war in 1965, the administration worked hard to get allied involvement in the military defense of South Vietnam, partly through an effort known as the "More Flags" program. Originally the program, which was launched in May 1964, sought only noncombat-related aid for South Vietnam, but in short order it was expanded to include also fighting troops. The campaign yielded meager results. A handful of countries eventually committed soldiers—though most drove a hard bargain in doing so, which is to say, their forces were mercenaries more than allies—but most, including all of the European allies, declined. By mid-1965, when large-scale war began, Washington's More Flags campaign had become, one might say, a "few flags" problem.

Most important, policy makers in Washington generally had a sound grasp of the situation on the ground in South Vietnam and—to a lesser but significant

degree—of the thinking in Hanoi. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara would later claim, in his memoirs and a subsequent coauthored book, that he and his colleagues were largely ignorant of the dynamics of the struggle in Vietnam, the obstacles to a military solution, and Hanoi's openness to negotiations. "If only we had known" is the mantra in these works. He sells himself short. He was hardly an expert on Vietnam in 1964 and 1965, but neither was he unaware of the chronic problems in the war effort, or the thin nature of domestic and allied support for the war, or the deepening Sino-Soviet split....

Much more than they later admitted, senior U.S. officials understood that they faced long odds in Vietnam, even as they Americanized the war. The hubris so often ascribed to them is seldom seen in the vast internal record, at least with respect to the prospects in the fighting. (The hubris is evident in their presumed right to be in Vietnam and to tell the Vietnamese what kind of society they ought to create.) Lyndon Johnson and his chief lieutenants fully agreed that the military picture was worsening each month, and though they liked to say that bombing North Vietnam would make a major difference to the situation in the South, privately they were doubtful. They were not optimistic that Hanoi would succumb to this form of coercion and cease its support of the insurgency, and they knew that, regardless, success or failure would hinge on developments below the 17th Parallel. Even as they sent the first contingent of U.S. ground troops to the war, the president and his lieutenants understood that it would bring resentment from many southerners, including some of the leaders in Saigon, and generate charges of "colonialism" from elsewhere in Asia and around the world. As for the quality of the government in South Vietnam, policy makers were anything but sanguine: they knew it was less capable and less popular than ever, permeated with dissension, and—in some quarters at least—not altogether unsympathetic to an early end to the war through a deal with the Viet Cong....

On the matter of diplomacy, American officials knew prior to Americanization that Hanoi had not closed the door to early negotiations: They were aware in late 1964 that UN secretary-general U Thant had won assurances from Hanoi earlier in the fall that it would enter bilateral talks with Washington and that Burmese leader Ne Win had agreed to serve as host for the talks. And there were other signs. In early December, for example, Undersecretary of State William P. Bundy told Canadian officials that Hanoi had in recent weeks been putting out hints in various quarters that it was interested in pursuing a negotiated settlement to the war. Robert McNamara, in his coauthored book, *Argument without End*, makes much of Washington's misreading of Premier Pham Van Dong's "Four Points" statement of April 1965; no one in Washington, the book claims, realized that the statement might present an opening for talks. In fact, several officials thought precisely that. National Security advisor McGeorge Bundy, for example, after describing North Vietnam's statement as "quite unacceptable to us," acknowledged to LBJ that Hanoi had referred to the Four Points as "a basis for discussions" and that he, Ray Cline (acting CIA director), and Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson all agreed that there existed "at least a hint of real interest from Hanoi in eventual discussions." In late July 1965,

a State Department intelligence report put it bluntly: "Has Hanoi shown any interest in negotiations? Yes, repeatedly."

In sum, the Americanization of the war in Vietnam in 1965 cannot remotely be considered foreordained, at least not in any structural sense. Severe doubts both at home and abroad about Vietnam's importance to American and Western security; a South Vietnamese ally incapable and apparently unwilling to live up to its end of the bargain; pessimism among senior American policy makers about the prospects in the conflict and about the importance of the outcome; and an adversary seemingly open to negotiations—all of these suggest that Americanization was not overdetermined. One could indeed conclude the opposite, that the action is difficult to explain, perhaps even incomprehensible on some level. Regardless, it seems undeniable that Johnson, fated to be president when the key Vietnam decisions had to be made, could have chosen differently. He could have avoided this war....

This is not to suggest that disengagement was risk free, that it would not have cost Johnson anything politically. Such a course would have brought a domestic political cost, even if disguised through some kind of agreement leading to a coalition government in Saigon and a "decent interval" before any Hanoi takeover. The question is how big a cost. The president would have been branded an "appeaser" by Cold War hawks such as Richard Nixon and journalist Joseph Alsop, but in response he could have called on his own team of heavy hitters to defend the decision. A distinction must be made, moreover, between being called names by your opponents and actually losing significant political power as a result. In view of the constellation of forces in Congress and in the press, especially after Johnson's landslide election victory in 1964, there is little reason to believe that a decision against war would have exacted an exorbitant political price. His margin of victory in the election was so huge, it could have withstood some erosion—if indeed any occurred. It bears remembering, moreover, that Republican nominee Barry Goldwater had run as a hawk in the campaign and had been trounced, his belligerence on Vietnam as thoroughly repudiated as it could have been....

[Nevertheless, Johnson] ... opted, as George C. Herring has put it, to wage war in "cold blood." There would be no national debate on Vietnam, no call-up of the reserves, no declared state of emergency. The United States would go to war on the sly. Historians have usually explained these decisions by pointing to LBJ's fear that a full-fledged debate on Vietnam would have jeopardized major pieces of Great Society legislation then pending in Congress, and to his belief that a low-key, gradual escalation reduced the chance of a major conflagration involving China and perhaps the Soviet Union. He may well have held these beliefs (though, in the case of the former, with dubious justification), but very likely he also had a third concern: that a public debate would bring out into the open the extent of the concerns in Congress and in the press and thereby undermine the shaky national consensus that existed on the conflict. Johnson knew as well as anyone that formidable players in Congress and elsewhere opposed Americanizing the war; it was not at all certain that his side would

win a debate. And so he gambled—on a short-term strategy. He gambled that, without taking exceptional measures, he could hold public support long enough to achieve his objectives.

Here then, we find a principal reason that Lyndon Johnson took the nation into war in 1965. In the short term, military escalation represented the path of least resistance for him. At the start of 1965, the United States had been actively involved in the Vietnam struggle for some fifteen years, first in support of the French war effort, and then, after 1954, in trying to create and sustain an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam. At each point during that span when a decision had to be made regarding whether to expand or contract U.S. involvement, presidents had chosen to expand it. Though there is a qualitative difference between these earlier decisions and the one LBJ now faced (none was as committing, as costly, as irreversible, as controversial, as dangerous in terms of domestic politics), it stands to reason that he, too, would give serious consideration to escalation. It is never easy for people in positions of authority to acknowledge the failure of an existing policy and embark on a new course; for those at the pinnacle of the political system, who have had to publicly defend that policy time and time again, it must be harder still. The president and his top Vietnam aides had put themselves in a box with their repeated affirmations of South Vietnam's importance to U.S. security (in the case of top advisors McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk, all of them holdovers from JFK, the affirmations went all the way back to 1961), and one can see why they might stay the course in the hope that the new measures would work.

The issue was credibility and the concern that it might be irreparably harmed by a failure to stand firm in the war. As most often interpreted by scholars, this imperative had to do with the credibility of America's commitments abroad—the fear that if the United States failed to prevail in Vietnam, friends and foes around the world would respect it less. American power would be much less credible, causing allies to lose heart and adversaries to become emboldened. But it was not merely a question of U.S. national credibility abroad: for at least some key players, including the president, also important were concerns about domestic political credibility and, especially, personal credibility. Call it credibility (cubed). Johnson worried about the harm that failure in Vietnam could do to his domestic agenda; even more, he feared the personal humiliation he imagined would inevitably accompany a defeat (and for him, a negotiated withdrawal constituted defeat). Top aides, meanwhile, feared for their reputations and careers should they abandon their previous support for a staunch commitment to South Vietnam's survival.

Idealism, too, entered into the equation, even if it did not drive the policy. Johnson believed—with what degree of conviction can be debated—that the United States could be a force for good in Vietnam, helping the Vietnamese to achieve a better way of life. He spoke of creating a Tennessee Valley Authority-type project on the Mekong River, which would bring benefits to both Vietnams. The same belief was held by many intellectuals in the foreign policy bureaucracy, who maintained that the United States could modernize Vietnam using the tools of foreign aid, development planning, and technical assistance. Vietnam, that is

to say, could be made more like the United States. Or, as LBJ put it, "I want to leave the footprints of America in Vietnam."...

Could the many influential voices warning against Americanization have done more to make themselves heard in 1964–1965? Unquestionably, internationally, major allied leaders who foresaw a calamity ahead should escalation occur failed to work hard to keep it from happening. Thus, while the French government of Charles de Gaulle forcefully disputed the administration's position at every turn (Johnson was embarking on an "absurd war," de Gaulle said), the more important American ally in London consistently refrained from doing so, despite the fact that Prime Minister Harold Wilson and other British officials largely shared the French leader's views. And even de Gaulle cannot be considered an agitator *per se* on negotiations in 1964–1965; for the most part, he was content to state his position—in that haughty and superior tone that drove U.S. officials to distraction—and see what the Americans chose to do.

Congress, meanwhile, in these months accorded the executive branch wide latitude in decision making, in terms of both the broad contours and narrow particulars of policy. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August 1964 gave Johnson broad power to wage war in Vietnam more or less as he saw fit. In early 1965, Democratic leaders in the Senate, though prescient in foreseeing problems in any attempt to Americanize the conflict, were unwilling to say forcefully what they really believed: that Vietnam was not worth the price of a major war and that a face-saving negotiated settlement was the best that could be hoped for. White House officials, all too aware of the deep misgivings on Capitol Hill—especially in the Senate—were relieved when no genuine debate on the war ever occurred in the first half of 1965. They noted with satisfaction that Majority Leader Mansfield, the closest thing in the Senate to a Vietnam expert (by virtue of his long-term interest in the conflict there and his having taught Asian history), concluded one cautionary memo by vowing to back the president publicly on the war, whatever the policy. "I want you to know," Mansfield wrote, "that you have my support on a personal as well [as] an official basis."

Just how to account for this congressional reticence about speaking up is not altogether easy. Surely it mattered that Mansfield took a deferential and compliant approach, seeing his role more as Johnson's floor leader in the Senate than as leader of the Senate Democrats. Partly, too, the reticence resulted from the certainty among the majority of Democrats that the president would not look kindly on public opposition to his actions: Johnson left little doubt that he expected party members to fall in line, and he ordered top advisors to apply pressure on wavering law makers. And partly it resulted from the administration's repeated vows that it was keeping all options open, that it genuinely sought a political solution, that it saw real reasons for optimism in the Saigon government's prospects; these claims caused many doubters to swallow their concerns and profess support for U.S. policy. At the same time, however, there was on Capitol Hill a certain willingness to be deceived, a willingness to be strong-armed by the president. Many legislators were quite content to escape responsibility from a policy issue that seemed to be growing more complex each day and for which few of them had a clear prescription.

Then, after the ground troops began arriving in March and April, a different dynamic took hold, one that would retain its power for the next half-dozen years: legislators now confronted the choice of supporting the policy or facing the political consequences of “abandoning the troops” in the field, Richard Russell, for one, promptly became a hawk, telling friends that supporting the troops meant supporting the war. Going against Johnson on the Vietnam issue, Rhode Island Democratic senator Claiborne Pen remarked, henceforth would be “like voting against motherhood.”

All of this suggests that it would be a mistake to reduce Vietnam simply to “Johnson’s war.” Many were responsible. The president chose war, but he was urged on by both civilian and military advisors. Especially important were the big three of McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk, the former two of whom warned LBJ, in late January 1965, of a “disastrous defeat” if the United States chose not to use its military power in Vietnam. Like Johnson, all three men—and especially McNamara—on occasion expressed doubts about the chances of success in the war; like him, they nevertheless pressed forward. Congressional leaders went along, and so did a general public that until mid-1965 remained largely ignorant and apathetic regarding Vietnam (notwithstanding the beginnings of campus dissent in the spring). The public could have forced a debate on the issue in the winter and spring of 1964–1965; enough information existed, notwithstanding the administration’s efforts to withhold information concerning the problems in South Vietnam and its plans to rectify them. Whatever the outcome of such a debate, there can be no denying that having it would have served the nation—and ultimately the president himself—well....



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A New Age of Limits: America and the World in the 1970s

The decade of the 1970s witnessed a series of economic and political upheavals that set limits on the optimism and exuberance of the 1950s and 1960s. In 1973, a historically new combination of inflation, high unemployment, and sluggish productivity—what economists and the media would come to call “stagflation”—sparked a major recession that lingered until the early 1980s. In October 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) contributed to a looming energy crisis when it declared a five-month oil embargo against the United States for its support of Israel in the October War. The oil embargo captured the growing dependency of the nation on oil from the Middle East, and it called into question the previously unchecked assumption that cheap and plentiful oil—the commodity that had fueled so much of the country’s economic growth since 1945—would always be there for the taking. The recessionary spiral, combined with the energy crisis, raised new concerns about the future of the middle class: Would children continue to improve on the lives of their parents, as so many had done during the postwar years? Meanwhile, the escalating Watergate scandal gradually engulfed the Nixon administration, culminating with President Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. The first presidential resignation in the nation’s history, Nixon’s departure contributed to a widening crisis of public trust in governmental institutions.

These economic and political upheavals led to new kinds of activism and a deepening polarization in American society. The 1970s saw a surge of grassroots mobilization on the political right, as activists formed think tanks, political action groups, and direct mail campaigns that aimed to roll-back or reverse the gains that liberals had made in the previous years. Many of these efforts were spearheaded by evangelical Christians, who were growing in number in the 1970s and were becoming newly influential in electoral politics. These activists were spurred in part by the feminist and gay liberation movements, which they believed posed a threat to the traditional patriarchal family. At the same time, many blue-collar voters responded to the economic convulsions of the era by shifting their political loyalties away from New Deal Democrats and embracing conservative candidates. Yet the 1970s were also vital years on the political left. Movements like feminism,

environmentalism, and gay and lesbian liberation were gaining momentum throughout the decade, and many other struggles on the left moved to the local arena, as activists worked on issues ranging from prison abolition to indigenous rights, from police brutality to workplace organizing. While these struggles did not garner the same national media attention accorded to the earlier civil rights and anti-war movements, they represented the endurance of those earlier movements as activists revised their tactics in order to adapt to a shifting political landscape.

Most commentators and observers at the time interpreted the economic and political disruptions of the 1970s as symptomatic of a crisis in national authority. Many worried that American power was on the wane and that the United States, not unlike the Roman Empire, had entered a new era of decline. But recently, historians have argued that the shocks of the 1970s were less symptomatic of a national crisis and instead represented the birth pangs of what has come to be called “globalization.” The rise of a global economy no longer tethered to national rules and institutions, the growth of multinational corporations, the transition within the United States away from manufacturing and to a service-based economy, and the advent of new technologies that allowed people for the first time to envision an interdependent, world community: All of these transformations had their origins in the decade. As such, the history of the 1970s is, in many crucial respects, the history of our own time.



DOCUMENTS

The following documents reflect the dual sense of limits and possibility that animated American politics and culture in the 1970s. Among the movements that were gaining momentum in the 1970s was the environmental movement. The first view of earth from space was captured in December 1968, and the inaugural celebration of Earth Day took place less than two years later in April 1970. Among the most disturbing insights of the movement was that human population growth was taxing the planet's finite resources, a theme Paul Ehrlich explored in his 1968 book *The Population Bomb* (excerpted in Document 1). The gay liberation movement was also growing in the 1970s, and cities like San Francisco became places of refuge for the country's gay men and lesbians. In Document 2, “Activist Carl Wittman Issues a “A Gay Manifesto,” 1970” gay liberation activist Carl Wittman explains why gay people flocked to San Francisco, as well as the risks and rewards of “coming out.” Observing what he perceived to be a turn to social movements based on the pursuit of self-realization and self-discovery, journalist Tom Wolfe dubbed the 1970s the “Me Decade” (Document 3). Wolfe argued that the decade was in the throes of a third great awakening, as more and more Americans turned to religion and spirituality for personal meaning. Among the religious groups that were growing in both size and influence during these years were evangelical Christians, who were preoccupied with the future of the traditional family, which they believed was imperiled by feminism and gay liberation. The struggle over the ERA reflected an escalating fight between those who endorsed the cultural transformations of the recent past and those who opposed them. In Document 4, New Right activist Phyllis Schlafly warns that the Equal Rights Amendment will actually hurt

rather than help the majority of women, a warning that helped to derail the ratification of the ERA, which died in Congress in 1982. These struggles over feminism, the family, and sexuality were joined by a series of economic and political shocks. Document 5 is an excerpt from an address on energy shortages delivered by President Nixon in November 1973. In the address, Nixon warns Americans that the country is heading toward the most acute shortage of energy since World War II, and he calls on them to make personal changes in their energy habits in order to help the nation weather the crisis. While the Nixon administration tried to stay focused on the oil embargo, growing revelations about the scope of the Watergate scandal were coming into fuller view. On November 12, 1973, only five days after Nixon gave his energy address, the editors of *Time Magazine* called on the president to resign (Document 6). The centrality of energy to the politics of the decade was also evident in a series of local struggles over nuclear power plant sitings, an issue that took on heightened urgency in March 1979, when an accident at the Three Mile Island plant outside of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, raised the possibility of both a meltdown and an explosion. In Document 7, two residents who lived near the Three Mile Island plant explain their sense of betrayal in the wake of an accident that they had been told was a virtual impossibility. The ongoing political, economic, and cultural struggles of the 1970s eventually culminated in the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, who secured electoral victory with the help of evangelical leaders like Jerry Falwell, who linked the renewed strength of the American nation to a return to what he called “biblical morality” (Document 8).

1. Biologist Paul Ehrlich Describes the Coming Population Explosion, 1968

A general answer to the question, “What needs to be done?” is simple. We must rapidly bring the world population under control, reducing the growth rate to zero or making it go negative. Conscious regulation of human numbers must be achieved. Simultaneously we must, at least temporarily, greatly increase our food production. This agricultural program should be carefully monitored to minimize deleterious effects on the environment and should include an effective program of ecosystem restoration. As these projects are carried out, an international policy research program must be initiated to set optimum population–environment goals for the world and to devise methods for reaching these goals....

The key to the whole business, in my opinion, is held by the United States. We are the most influential superpower; we are the richest nation in the world. At the same time we are also just one country on an ever-shrinking planet. It is obvious that we cannot exist unaffected by the fate of our fellows on the other end of

From *The Population Bomb* by Dr Paul R. Ehrlich, copyright © 1968, 1971 by Paul R. Ehrlich. Used by permission of Ballantine Books, a division of Random House, Inc. Any third party use of this material, outside of this publication, is prohibited. Interested parties must apply directly to Random House, Inc. for permission.

the good ship Earth. If their end of the ship sinks, we shall at the very least have to put up with the spectacle of their drowning and listen to their screams. Communications satellites guarantee that we will be treated to the sights and sounds of mass starvation on the evening news, just as we now can see Viet Cong corpses being disposed of in living color and listen to the groans of our own wounded. We're unlikely, however, to get off with just our appetites spoiled and our consciences disturbed. We are going to be sitting on top of the only food surpluses available for distribution, and those surpluses will not be large. In addition, it is not unreasonable to expect our level of affluence to continue to increase over the next few years as the situation in the rest of the world grows ever more desperate. Can we guess what effect this growing disparity will have on our "shipmates" in the UDCs? Will they starve gracefully, without rocking the boat? Or will they attempt to overwhelm us in order to get what they consider to be their fair share?

We, of course, cannot remain affluent and isolated. At the moment the United States uses well over half of all the raw materials consumed each year. Think of it. Less than 1/15th of the population of the world requires more than all the rest to maintain its inflated position. If present trends continue, in 20 years we will be much less than 1/15th of the population, and yet we may use some 80% of the resources consumed. Our affluence depends heavily on many different kinds of imports: ferroalloys (metals used to make various kinds of steel), tin, bauxite (aluminum ore), rubber, and so forth. Will other countries, many of them in the grip of starvation and anarchy, still happily supply these materials to a nation that cannot give them food? Even the technological optimists don't think we can free ourselves of the need for imports in the near future, so we're going to be up against it. But, then, at least our balance of payments should improve!

So, beside our own serious population problem at home, we are intimately involved in the world crisis. We are involved through our import-export situation. We are involved because of the possibilities of global ecological catastrophe, of global pestilence, and of global thermonuclear war. Also, we are involved because of the humanitarian feelings of most Americans.

We are going to face some extremely difficult but unavoidable decisions. By how much, and at what environmental risk, should we increase our food production in an attempt to feed the starving? How much should we reduce the grain-finishing of beef in order to have more food for export? How will we react when asked to balance the lives of a million Latin Americans against, say, a 30 cent per pound rise in the average price of beef? Will we be willing to slaughter our dogs and cats in order to divert pet food protein to the starving masses in Asia? If these choices are presented one at a time, out of context, I predict that our behavior will be "selfish." Men do not seem to be able to focus emotionally on distant or long-term events. Immediacy seems to be necessary to elicit "selfless" responses. Few Americans could sit in the same room with a child and watch it starve to death. But the death of several million children this year from starvation is a distant, impersonal, hard-to-grasp event. You will note that I put quotes around "selfish" and "selfless." The words describe the behavior only out of context. The "selfless" actions necessary to aid the rest of the world and stabilize the population are our only hope for survival. The "selfish" ones

work only toward our destruction. Ways must be found to bring home to all the American people the reality of the threat to their way of life—indeed to their very lives.

Obviously our first step must be to immediately establish and advertise drastic policies designed to bring our own population size under control. We must define a goal of a stable optimum population size for the United States and display our determination to move rapidly toward that goal. Such a move does two things at once. It improves our chances of obtaining the kind of country and society we all want, and it sets an example for the world. The second step is very important, as we also are going to have to adopt some very tough foreign policy positions relative to population control, and we must do it from a psychologically strong position. We will want to disarm one group of opponents at the outset: those who claim that we wish others to stop breeding while we go merrily ahead. We want our propaganda based on “do as we do”—not “do as we say.”

So the first task is population control at home. How do we go about it? Many of my colleagues feel that some sort of compulsory birth regulation would be necessary to achieve such control. One plan often mentioned involves the addition of temporary sterilants to water supplies or staple food. Doses of the antidote would be carefully rationed by the government to produce the desired population size. Those of you who are appalled at such a suggestion can rest easy. The option isn't even open to us, thanks to the criminal inadequacy of biomedical research in this area. If the choice now is either such additives or catastrophe, we shall have catastrophe. It might be possible to develop such population control tools, although the task would not be simple. Either the additive would have to operate equally well and with minimum side effects against both sexes, or some way would have to be found to direct it only to one sex and shield the other. Feeding potent male hormones to the whole population might sterilize and defeminize the women, while the upset in the male population and society as a whole can be well imagined. In addition, care would have to be taken to see to it that the sterilizing substance did not reach livestock, either through water or garbage.

Technical problems aside, I suspect you'll agree with me that society would probably dissolve before sterilants were added to the water supply by the government. Just consider the fluoridation controversy! Some other way will have to be found. Perhaps the most workable system would be to reverse the government's present system of encouraging reproduction and replace it with a series of financial rewards and penalties designed to discourage reproduction....

2. Activist Carl Wittman Issues a “Gay Manifesto,” 1970

San Francisco is a refugee camp for homosexuals. We have fled here from every part of the nation, and like refugees elsewhere, we came not because

“A Gay Manifesto” by Carl Wittman, from *Out of the Closets: Voices of Gay Liberation*, edited by Karla Jay and Allen Young, © 1972, 1978, 1992. Reprinted by permission of the editors.

it is so great here, but because it was so bad there. By the tens of thousands, we fled small towns where to be ourselves would endanger our jobs and any hope of a decent life; we have fled from blackmailing cops, from families who disowned or "tolerated" us; we have been drummed out of the armed services, thrown out of schools, fired from jobs, beaten by punks and policemen.

And we have formed a ghetto, out of self-protection. It is a ghetto rather than a free territory because it is still theirs. Straight cops patrol us, straight legislators govern us, straight employers keep us in line, straight money exploits us. We have pretended everything is OK, because we haven't been able to see how to change it—we've been afraid.

In the past year there has been an awakening of gay liberation ideas and energy. How it began we don't know; maybe we were inspired by black people and their freedom movement; we learned how to stop pretending from the hip revolution. Amerika in all its ugliness has surfaced with the war and our national leaders. And we are revulsed by the quality of our ghetto life.

Where once there was frustration, alienation, and cynicism, there are new characteristics among us. We are full of love for each other and are showing it; we are full of anger at what has been done to us. And as we recall all the self-censorship and repression for so many years, a reservoir of tears pours out of our eyes. And we are euphoric, high, with the initial flourish of a movement.

We want to make ourselves clear: our first job is to free ourselves; that means clearing our heads of the garbage that's been poured into them....

... To pretend to be straight sexually, or to pretend to be straight socially, is probably the most harmful pattern of behavior in the ghetto. The married guy who makes it on the side secretly; the guy who will go to bed once but who won't develop any gay relationships; the pretender at work or school who changes the gender of the friend he's talking about; the guy who'll suck cock in the bushes but who won't go to bed.

If we are liberated we are open with our sexuality. Closet queenery must end. *Come out.*

But in saying come out, we have to have our heads clear about a few things: 1) Closet queens are our brothers, and must be defended against attacks by straight people; 2) The fear of coming out is not paranoia; the stakes are high: loss of family ties, loss of job, loss of straight friends—these are all reminders that the oppression is not just in our heads. It's real. Each of us must make the steps toward openness at our own speed and on our own impulses. Being open is the foundation of freedom: it has to be built solidly; 3) "Closet queen" is a broad term covering a multitude of forms of defense, self-hatred, lack of strength, and habit. We are all closet queens in some ways, and all of us had to come out—very few of us were "flagrant" at the age of seven! We must afford our brothers and sisters the same patience we afforded ourselves. And while their closet queenery is part of our oppression, it's more a part of theirs. They alone can decide when and how....

3. Journalist Tom Wolfe Explores the “Me Decade,” 1976

We are now—in the Me Decade—seeing the upward roll (and not yet the crest, by any means) of the third great religious wave in American history, one that historians will very likely term the Third Great Awakening. Like the others it has begun in a flood of *ecstasy*, achieved through LSD and other psychedelics, orgy, dancing (the New Sufi and the Hare Krishna), meditation, and psychic frenzy (the marathon encounter). This third wave has built up from more diverse and exotic sources than the first two, from therapeutic movements, from hippies and students of “psi phenomena” and Flying Saucerites as well as charismatic Christians. But other than that, what will historians say about it?

The historian Perry Miller credited the First Great Awakening with helping to pave the way for the American Revolution through its assault on the colonies’ religious establishments and, thereby, on British colonial authority generally. The sociologist Thomas O’Dea credited the Second Great Awakening with creating the atmosphere of Christian asceticism (known as “bleak” on the East Coast) that swept through the Midwest and the West during the nineteenth century and helped make it possible to build communities in the face of great hardship. And the Third Great Awakening? Journalists (historians have not yet tackled the subject) have shown a morbid tendency to regard the various movements in this wave as “fascist.” The hippie movement was often attacked as “fascist” in the late 1960s. Over the past several years a barrage of articles has attacked “the Moonies” (followers of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon) along the same lines.

Frankly, this tells us nothing except that journalists bring the same conventional Grim Slide concepts to every subject. The word *fascism* derives from the old Roman symbol of power and authority, the *fascis*, a bundle of sticks bound together by thongs (with an ax head protruding from one end). One by one the sticks would be easy to break. Bound together they are invincible. Fascist ideology called for binding all classes, all levels, all elements of an entire nation together into a single organization with a single will.

The various movements of the current religious wave attempt very nearly the opposite. They begin with ... “Let’s talk about Me.” They begin with the most delicious look inward; with considerable narcissism, in short. When the believers bind together into religions, it is always with a sense of splitting off from the rest of society. We, the enlightened (lit by the sparks at the apexes of our souls), hereby separate ourselves from the lost souls around us. Like all religions before them, they proselytize—but always on promising the opposite of nationalism: a City of Light that is above it all. There is no ecumenical spirit within this Third Great Awakening. If anything, there is a spirit of schism. The contempt the various seers have for one another is breathtaking. One has only to

ask, say, Oscar Ichazo of Arica about Carlos Castaneda or Werner Erhard of est to learn that Castaneda is a fake and Erhard is a shallow sloganeer. It's exhilarating!—to watch the faithful split off from one another to seek ever more perfect and refined crucibles in which to fan the Divine spark ... and to *talk about Me*.

Whatever the Third Great Awakening amounts to, for better or for worse, will have to do with this unprecedented post-World War II American development: the luxury, enjoyed by so many millions of middling folk, of dwelling upon the self. At first glance, Shirley Polykoff's slogan—"If I've only one life, let me live it as a blonde!"—seems like merely another example of a superficial and irritating rhetorical trope (*antanaclasis*) that now happens to be fashionable among advertising copywriters. But in fact the notion of "If I've only one life" challenges one of those assumptions of society that are so deep-rooted and ancient, they have no name—they are simply lived by. In this case: man's age-old belief in serial immortality.

The husband and wife who sacrifice their own ambitions and their material assets in order to provide "a better future" for their children ... the soldier who risks his life, or perhaps consciously sacrifices it, in battle ... the man who devotes his life to some struggle for "his people" that cannot possibly be won in his lifetime ... people (or most of them) who buy life insurance or leave wills ... and, for that matter, most women upon becoming pregnant for the first time ... are people who conceive of themselves, however unconsciously, as part of a great biological stream. Just as something of their ancestors lives on in them, so will something of them live on in their children ... or in their people, their race, their community—for childless people, too, conduct their lives and try to arrange their postmortem affairs with concern for how the great stream is going to flow on. Most people, historically, have not lived their lives as if thinking, "I have only one life to live." Instead they have lived as if they are living their ancestor's lives and their offspring's lives and perhaps their neighbors' lives as well. They have seen themselves as inseparable from the great tide of chromosomes of which they are created and which they pass on. The mere fact that you were only going to be here a short time and would be dead soon enough did not give you the license to try to climb out of the stream and change the natural order of things. The Chinese, in ancestor worship, have literally worshiped the great tide itself, and not any god or gods. For anyone to renounce the notion of serial immortality, in the West or the East, has been to defy what seems like a law of Nature. Hence the wicked feeling—the excitement!—of "If I've only one life, let me live it as a ———!" Fill in the blank, if you dare.

And now many dare it! In *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville (the inevitable and ubiquitous Tocqueville) saw the American sense of equality itself as disrupting the stream, which he called "time's pattern": "Not only does democracy make each man forget his ancestors, it hides his descendants from him, and divides him from his contemporaries; it continually turns him back into himself, and threatens, at last, to enclose him entirely in the solitude of his own heart." A grim prospect to the good Alexis de T.—but what did he know about ... *Let's talk about Me!*

Toqueville's idea of modern man lost "in the solitude of his own heart" has been brought forward into our time in such terminology as *alienation* (Marx), *anomie* (Durkheim), *the mass man* (Ortega y Gasset), and *the lonely crowd* (Riesman).

The picture is always of a creature uprooted by industrialism, packed together in cities with people he doesn't know, helpless against massive economic and political shifts—in short, a creature like Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times*, a helpless, bewildered, and dispirited slave to the machinery. This victim of modern times has always been a most appealing figure to intellectuals, artists, and architects. The poor devil so obviously needs *us* to be his Engineers of the Soul, to use a term popular in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. We will pygmalionize this sad lump of clay into a *homo novus*, a New Man, with a new philosophy, a new aesthetics, not to mention new Bauhaus housing and furniture.

But once the dreary little bastards started getting money in the 1940s, they did an astonishing thing—they took their money and ran. They did something only aristocrats (and intellectuals and artists) were supposed to do—they discovered and started doing on *Me!* They've created the greatest age of individualism in American history! All rules are broken! The prophets are out of business! Where the Third Great Awakening will lead—who can presume to say? One only knows that the great religious waves have a momentum all their own. Neither arguments nor policies nor acts of the legislature have been any match for them in the past. And this one has the mightiest, holiest roll of all, the beat that goes ... *Me ... Me ... Me ... Me ...*

4. Phyllis Schlafly Explains What's Wrong with Equal Rights for Women, 1972

Of all the classes of people who ever lived, the American woman is the most privileged. We have the most rights and rewards, and the fewest duties. Our unique status is the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances.

1. We have the immense good fortune to live in a civilization which respects the family as the basic unit of society. This respect is part and parcel of our laws and our customs. It is based on the fact of life—which no legislation or agitation can erase—that women have babies and men don't.

If you don't like this fundamental difference, you will have to take up your complaint with God because He created us this way. The fact that women, not men, have babies is not the fault of selfish and domineering men, or of the establishment, or of any clique of conspirators who want to oppress women. It's simply the way God made us.

Our Judeo-Christian civilization has developed the law and custom that, since women must bear the physical consequences of the sex act, men must be required to bear the *other* consequences and pay in other ways. These laws and customs decree that a man must carry his share by physical protection and financial support of his children and of the woman who bears his children, and also by a code of behavior which benefits and protects both the woman and the children.

Phyllis Schlafly, "What's Wrong with Equal Rights for Women?," *The Phyllis Schlafly Report* 5, no. 7 (February 1972): 1-4.

The Greatest Achievement of Women's Rights

This is accomplished by the institution of the family.... It assures a woman the most precious and important right of all—the right to keep her own baby and to be supported and protected in the enjoyment of watching her baby grow and develop.

The institution of the family is advantageous for women for many reasons. After all, what do we want out of life? To love and be loved? Mankind has not discovered a better nest for a lifetime of reciprocal love. A sense of achievement? A man may search 30 to 40 years for accomplishment in his profession. A woman can enjoy real achievement when she is young—by having a baby. She can have the satisfaction of doing a job well—and being recognized for it.

Do we want financial security? We are fortunate to have the great legacy of Moses, the Ten Commandments, especially this one: "Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long upon the land." Children are a woman's best social security—her best guarantee of social benefits such as old age pension, unemployment compensation, workman's compensation, and sick leave. The family gives a woman the physical, financial and emotional security of the home—for all her life.

The Financial Benefits of Chivalry

2. The second reason why American women are a privileged group is that we are the beneficiaries of a tradition of special respect for women which dates from the Christian Age of Chivalry. The honor and respect paid to Mary, the Mother of Christ, resulted in all women, in effect, being put on a pedestal....

In other civilizations, such as the African and the American Indian, the men strut around wearing feathers and beads and hunting and fishing (great sport for men!), while the women do all the hard, tiresome drudgery including the tilling of the soil (if any is done), the hewing of wood, the making of fires, the carrying of water, as well as the cooking, sewing and caring for babies.

This is not the American way because we were lucky enough to inherit the traditions of the Age of Chivalry. In America, a man's first significant purchase is a diamond for his bride, and the largest financial investment of his life is a home for her to live in....

The Real Liberation of Women

3. The third reason why American women are so well off is that the great American free enterprise system has produced remarkable inventors who have lifted the backbreaking "women's work" from our shoulders.

In other countries and in other eras, it was truly said that "Man may work from sun to sun, but woman's work is never done." Other women have labored every waking hour—preparing food on wood-burning stoves, making flour, baking bread in stone ovens, spinning yarn, making clothes, making soap, doing the laundry by hand, heating irons, making candles for light and fires for warmth, and trying to nurse their babies through illnesses without medical care.

The real liberation of women from the backbreaking drudgery of centuries is the American free enterprise system which stimulated inventive geniuses to pursue their talents—and we all reap the profits. The great heroes of women's liberation are not the straggly-haired women on television talk shows and picket lines, but Thomas Edison who brought the miracle of electricity to our homes to give light and to run all those labor-saving devices....

The Fraud of the Equal Rights Amendment

In the last couple of years, a noisy movement has sprung up agitating for "women's rights." Suddenly, everywhere we are afflicted with aggressive females on television talk shows yapping about how mistreated American women are, suggesting that marriage has put us in some kind of "slavery," that housework is menial and degrading, and—perish the thought—that women are discriminated against. New "women's liberation" organizations are popping up ... and purporting to speak for some 100,000,000 American women.

It's time to set the record straight. The claim that American women are downtrodden and unfairly treated is the fraud of the century. The truth is that American women never had it so good. Why should we lower ourselves to "equal rights" when we already have the status of special privilege?

The proposed Equal Rights Amendment states: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex." So what's wrong with that? Well, here are a few examples of what's wrong with it.

This Amendment will absolutely and positively make women subject to the draft.... Foxholes are bad enough for men, but they certainly are *not* the place for women—and we should reject any proposal which would put them there in the name of "equal rights."...

Another bad effect of the Equal Rights Amendment is that it will abolish a woman's right to child support and alimony, and substitute what the women's libbers think is a more "equal" policy, that "such decisions should be within the discretion of the Court and should be made on the economic situation and need of the parties in the case."

Under present American laws, the man is *always* required to support his wife and each child he caused to be brought into the world. Why should women abandon these good laws—by trading them for something so nebulous and uncertain as the "discretion of the Court"?...

By law and custom in America, in case of divorce, the mother always is given custody of her children unless there is overwhelming evidence of mistreatment, neglect or bad character. This is our special privilege because of the high rank that is placed on motherhood in our society. Do women really want to give up this special privilege and lower themselves to "equal rights"...? I think not.

Women's Libbers Do NOT Speak for Us

The "women's lib" movement is *not* an honest effort to secure better jobs for women who want or need to work outside the home. This is just the superficial

sweet-talk to win broad support for a radical "movement." Women's lib is a total assault on the role of the American woman as wife and mother, and on the family as the basic unit of society.

Women's libbers are trying to make wives and mothers unhappy with their career, make them feel that they are "second-class citizens" and "abject slaves." Women's libbers are promoting free sex instead of the "slavery" of marriage. They are promoting Federal "day-care centers" for babies instead of homes. They are promoting abortions instead of families....

If the women's libbers want to reject marriage and motherhood, it's a free country and that is their choice. But let's not permit these women's libbers to get away with pretending to speak for the rest of us. Let's not permit this tiny minority to degrade the role that most women prefer. Let's not let these women's libbers deprive wives and mothers of the rights we now possess.

Tell your Senators NOW that you want them to vote NO on the Equal Rights Amendment. Tell your television and radio stations that you want equal time to present the case FOR marriage and motherhood.

5. President Nixon Addresses the Nation on Energy Shortages, 1973

Good evening:

I want to talk to you tonight about a serious national problem, a problem we must all face together in the months and years ahead.

As America has grown and prospered in recent years, our energy demands have begun to exceed available supplies. In recent months, we have taken many actions to increase supplies and to reduce consumption. But even with our best efforts, we knew that a period of temporary shortages was inevitable.

Unfortunately, our expectations for this winter have now been sharply altered by the recent conflict in the Middle East. Because of that war, most of the Middle Eastern oil producers have reduced overall production and cut off their shipments of oil to the United States. By the end of this month, more than 2 million barrels a day of oil we expected to import into the United States will no longer be available.

We must, therefore, face up to a very stark fact: We are heading toward the most acute shortages of energy since World War II. Our supply of petroleum this winter will be at least 10 percent short of our anticipated demands, and it could fall short by as much as 17 percent.

Now, even before war broke out in the Middle East, these prospective shortages were the subject of intensive discussions among members of my Administration, leaders of the Congress, Governors, mayors, and other groups. From these discussions has emerged a broad agreement that we, as a nation, must now set upon a new course.

In the short run, this course means that we must use less energy—that means less heat, less electricity, less gasoline. In the long run, it means that we must develop new sources of energy which will give us the capacity to meet our needs without relying on any foreign nation.

The immediate shortage will affect the lives of each and every one of us. In our factories, our cars, our homes, our offices, we will have to use less fuel than we are accustomed to using. Some school and factory schedules may be realigned, and some jet airplane flights will be canceled.

This does not mean that we are going to run out of gasoline or that air travel will stop or that we will freeze in our homes or offices anyplace in America. The fuel crisis need not mean genuine suffering for any American. But it will require some sacrifice by all Americans.

We must be sure that our most vital needs are met first—and that our least important activities are the first to be cut back. And we must be sure that while the fat from our economy is being trimmed, the muscle is not seriously damaged.

To help us carry out that responsibility, I am tonight announcing the following steps:

First, I am directing that industries and utilities which use coal—which is our most abundant resource—be prevented from converting from coal to oil. Efforts will also be made to convert powerplants from the use of oil to the use of coal.

Second, we are allocating reduced quantities of fuel for aircraft. Now, this is going to lead to a cutback of more than 10 percent of the number of flights and some rescheduling of arrival and departure times.

Third, there will be reductions of approximately 15 percent in the supply of heating oil for homes and offices and other establishments. To be sure that there is enough oil to go around for the entire winter, all over the country, it will be essential for all of us to live and work in lower temperatures. We must ask everyone to lower the thermostat in your home by at least 6 degrees so that we can achieve a national daytime average of 68 degrees. Incidentally, my doctor tells me that in a temperature of 66 to 68 degrees, you are really more healthy than when it is 75 to 78, if that is any comfort. In offices, factories, and commercial establishments, we must ask that you achieve the equivalent of a 10-degree reduction by either lowering the thermostat or curtailing working hours.

Fourth, I am ordering additional reductions in the consumption of energy by the Federal Government. We have already taken steps to reduce the Government's consumption by 7 percent. The cuts must now go deeper and must be made by every agency and every department in the Government. I am directing that daytime temperatures in Federal offices be reduced immediately to a level of between 65 and 68 degrees, and that means in this room, too, as well as in every other room in the White House. In addition, I am ordering that all vehicles owned by the Federal Government—and there are over a half-million of them—travel no faster than 50 miles per hour except in emergencies. This is a step which I have also asked Governors, mayors, and local officials to take immediately with regard to vehicles under their authority.

Fifth, I am asking the Atomic Energy Commission to speed up the licensing and construction of nuclear plants. We must seek to reduce the time required to

bring nuclear plants on line—nuclear plants that can produce power—to bring them on line from 10 years to 6 years, reduce that time lag.

Sixth, I am asking that Governors and mayors reinforce these actions by taking appropriate steps at the State and local level. We have already learned, for example, from the State of Oregon, that considerable amounts of energy can be saved simply by curbing unnecessary lighting and slightly altering the school year. I am recommending that other communities follow this example and also seek ways to stagger working hours, to encourage greater use of mass transit and carpooling.

How many times have you gone along the highway or the freeway, wherever the case may be, and see hundreds and hundreds of cars with only one individual in that car? This we must all cooperate to change.

Consistent with safety and economic considerations, I am also asking Governors to take steps to reduce highway speed limits to 50 miles per hour. This action alone, if it is adopted on a nationwide basis, could save over 200,000 barrels of oil a day—just reducing the speed limit to 50 miles per hour.

Now, all of these actions will result in substantial savings of energy. More than that, most of these are actions that we can take right now—without further delay.

The key to their success lies, however, not just here in Washington but in every home, in every community across this country. If each of us joins in this effort, joins with the spirit and the determination that have always graced the American character, then half the battle will already be won.

But we should recognize that even these steps, as essential as they are, may not be enough. We must be prepared to take additional steps, and for that purpose, additional authorities must be provided by the Congress.

I have therefore directed my chief adviser for energy policy, Governor Love, and other Administration officials, to work closely with the Congress in developing an emergency energy act.

I met with the leaders of the Congress this morning, and I asked that they act on this legislation on a priority, urgent basis. It is imperative that this legislation be on my desk for signature before the Congress recesses this December.

Because of the hard work that has already been done on this bill by Senators Jackson and Fannin and others, I am confident that we can meet that goal and that I will have the bill on this desk and will be able to sign it.

This proposed legislation would enable the executive branch to meet the energy emergency in several important ways:

First, it would authorize an immediate return to daylight saving time on a year-round basis.

Second, it would provide the necessary authority to relax environmental regulations on a temporary, case-by-case basis, thus permitting an appropriate balancing of our environmental interests, which all of us share, with our energy requirements, which, of course, are indispensable.

Third, it would grant authority to impose special energy conservation measures, such as restrictions on the working hours for shopping centers and other commercial establishments.

And fourth, it would approve and fund increased exploration, development, and production from our naval petroleum reserves. Now, these reserves are rich

sources of oil. From one of them alone—Elk Hills in California—we could produce more than 160,000 barrels of oil a day within 2 months.

Fifth, it would provide the Federal Government with authority to reduce highway speed limits throughout the Nation.

And finally, it would expand the power of the Government's regulatory agencies to adjust the schedules of planes, ships, and other carriers.

If shortages persist despite all of these actions and despite inevitable increases in the price of energy products, it may then become necessary—may become necessary—to take even stronger measures.

It is only prudent that we be ready to cut the consumption of oil products, such as gasoline, by rationing or by a fair system of taxation, and consequently, I have directed that contingency plans, if this becomes necessary, be prepared for that purpose.

Now, some of you may wonder whether we are turning back the clock to another age. Gas rationing, oil shortages, reduced speed limits—they all sound like a way of life we left behind with Glenn Miller and the war of the forties. Well, in fact, part of our current problem also stems from war—the war in the Middle East. But our deeper energy problems come not from war, but from peace and from abundance. We are running out of energy today because our economy has grown enormously and because in prosperity what were once considered luxuries are now considered necessities.

How many of you can remember when it was very unusual to have a home airconditioned? And yet, this is very common in almost all parts of the Nation.

As a result, the average American will consume as much energy in the next 7 days as most other people in the world will consume in an entire year. We have only 6 percent of the world's people in America, but we consume over 30 percent of all the energy in the world.

Now, our growing demands have bumped up against the limits of available supply, and until we provide new sources of energy for tomorrow, we must be prepared to tighten our belts today....

6. Time Magazine Editors Urge President Nixon to Resign, 1973

Richard Nixon and the nation have passed a tragic point of no return. It now seems likely that the President will have to give up his office: he has irredeemably lost his moral authority, the confidence of most of the country, and therefore his ability to govern effectively.

The most important decision of Richard Nixon's remarkable career is before him: whether he will give up the presidency rather than do further damage to his country. If he decides to fight to the end, he faces impeachment by the House, for he has indeed failed his obligation under the Constitution to uphold the law. Whether two-thirds of the Senate would vote to convict him cannot be certain. But even if he were to be acquitted, the process would leave him and the

country devastated. Events have achieved an alarming momentum; additional facts that would be brought out under subpoena power at an impeachment trial could strike in many unforeseen and dangerous directions.

Moreover, a trial would take at least several months, during which the country would be virtually leaderless. The White House would be paralyzed while the U.S. and the world awaited the outcome. The Republic would doubtless survive. But the wise and patriotic course is for Richard Nixon to resign, sparing the country and himself this agony.

Nixon should of course be succeeded by a Republican. The Republicans did win the presidency last November (not because of Watergate or dirty tricks), and fortunately there seems no disposition among congressional Democrats to try to rewrite the election returns. We assume and hope that Congress will speedily confirm Gerald Ford's nomination as Vice President. If Nixon did leave office before this confirmation and Speaker Carl Albert became President, there is good reason to think that Albert would resign as long as Ford was confirmed.

Gerald Ford would be an unmistakable improvement over the grievously wounded Nixon. Barring some unforeseen revelations, Ford has the immense asset of a corruption-free reputation. He has a solid if unimaginative record in domestic policy, stands somewhere near the American center, and is generally liked and respected on Capitol Hill. In foreign affairs, he is obviously inexperienced, but other Presidents have risen above such limitations, as the example of Harry Truman demonstrates. With Henry Kissinger's help, Ford should be able to carry on the basically sound Nixon policies. He would have one overriding advantage in dealing with foreign powers: their certainty that Ford would be in the White House for at least three more years. Nixon's great skills in foreign affairs are now alarmingly offset by the uncertainties about his future and his patent loss of power at home.

It was just one year ago this week that Richard Nixon was celebrating his fabulous electoral sweep and seemed to stand at the very summit of power and opportunity. Hard-core Nixon haters may gloat over his fall from those heights; for most Americans it is a matter of profound disappointment. The editors of Time Inc., speaking on the editorial page of TIME's sister publication LIFE, have endorsed Nixon for President three times, in 1960, 1968 and 1972. We did so with acknowledgments that aspects of the Nixon record and temperament were troubling, but we believed that his strengths of intellect and experience and his instinct for political leadership equipped him well for the office. In endorsing Nixon in 1972, following on his first-term achievements in foreign policy, we expressed a hope that by the end of his second term we could "salute him as a great President." Thus we come with deep reluctance to our conclusion that he must leave office. We consider the situation so unprecedented, the issue so crucial to the country, that we publish this first editorial in TIME's 50-year history.

In the almost daily rush of revelations, it is not easy for the numbed citizen to keep in mind the full enormity of "Watergate." Despite ample instances of past Government corruption, nothing can be found in U.S. history even remotely approaching the skein of events that the word Watergate no longer defines or contains. A Vice President, twice personally chosen by Nixon, forced to resign to escape jail. A former Attorney General and intimate adviser to Nixon under

indictment. Another former Cabinet member under indictment. One of the two most powerful presidential aides under indictment. Six other White House aides or Administration officials indicted, convicted or having pleaded guilty; seven more fired or resigned. Most of them shown to have been either in charge of, or aware of, illegal operations. The whole White House pervaded by an atmosphere of aggressive amorality—amorality almost raised to a creed. A ruthless determination to hide as much of this as possible from the public and investigators.

The question that once seemed so important—Did the President know about the cover-up?—was always somewhat beside the point. Whatever he knew or did not know, he must be held accountable for the actions of his top aides and the standards he established. To the extent that the question had meaning, it was almost impossible from the start to answer it in the President's favor; the men involved were too close to him to make his ignorance plausible; after initial indignant denials, each of his later explanations gradually admitted more knowledge, thereby conceding each previous explanation to have been at least partly false. One cannot think of any organization, public or private—including some dictatorships—where a Chief Executive could survive in office after such a performance.

The catalogue of the President's involvement in illegal or grossly improper acts has become all too familiar. He approved the so-called Huston plan, which permitted illegal means (including burglary) to combat radicals. He established the "plumbers" unit, ostensibly to plug leaks, and it used illegal methods (wire-taps, forgery) to embarrass or spy on political foes. He impeded an investigation of the plumbers or specious national-security grounds while his aides tried to use the CIA and FBI to help the cover-up. He had a job offer (chief of the FBI) dangled before the judge presiding over the trial of Daniel Ellsberg. He withheld knowledge of the Ellsberg-psychiatrist burglary from that judge for at least a month. His aides offered Executive clemency to some of the Watergate defendants; others, including his personal lawyer, used campaign contributions for payments to Watergate defendants.

President Nixon's most recent actions come as a staggering climax to all that went before. We devoutly hope that it *is* the climax. When he originally refused to hand over the White House tapes either to the Senate Watergate committee or to Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, his argument for the confidentiality of the President's deliberations certainly deserved consideration. Then the court narrowed the issue in such a way that confidentiality could be largely safeguarded: only the judge was to hear the tapes, and only for the purpose of deciding whether any parts were potential evidence in the cases arising from Watergate. If the President had wanted to contest this ruling he had a clear opportunity to have the matter settled in the Supreme Court, by whose decision he had earlier said that he would abide.

Instead, the President and his lawyer worked out the "compromise" under which summaries would be provided (they would not hold up as evidence in court), and Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox was to be forbidden any further recourse to the courts in seeking presidential papers. Cox sensibly refused, and was promptly fired in flagrant violation of the President's pledge to the Senate, through then—Attorney General-designate Richardson, that Cox would be

independent and could be dismissed only for gross improprieties. That brought on the resignation of Richardson and the dismissal of his principal assistant, honorable men who both refused to carry out the President's order to fire Cox. After an outpouring of indignation from Congress and country, which saw Nixon as defying the courts and setting himself above the law, came the President's abrupt reversal and his decision to hand the tapes to the court after all. And only a few days ago, there was the sudden claim that two crucial tapes do not exist.

Now the President has found a new Attorney General and a new special prosecutor, equipped with not quite convincing promises of independence. Both are reputable men, but it seems to us that these appointments, or even the possible appointment of a prosecutor by the court, can no longer clear away the hopeless miasma of deceit and suspicion.

The right of free men to choose their leaders is precious and rare in a world mainly ruled by authoritarian governments. It is the genius of the American Constitution that it combines stability with liberty; it does so in part by fixing a term for the Chief Executive and largely protecting him from the caprices of parliamentary governments. An American President must be given the widest freedom of action, the utmost tolerance, the most generous benefit of every doubt. It is a system that has served us well.

A President's Gallup rating can fluctuate as much as the Dow Jones. He may push unpopular programs or oppose popular ones. Being a political as well as a national leader, he may dissemble within more or less accepted political limits. His Administration may be touched by corruption, provided that he does not condone it. He may make mistakes, many of them. He may fight the other branches of Government, for this is sometimes necessary to get things done. None of these matters—especially since they are always subject to partisan interpretation—are sufficient in themselves to justify the removal of a President.

Yet there is a limit beyond which even such "permissible" offenses, even such instances of "mere" misgovernment, become intolerable. And the situation changes fundamentally when the effect of the President's actions and the actions of his appointees is to subvert the constitutional system itself. He then betrays his formal oath of office and his informal compact with the people.

There are legitimate fears about the precedent that would be set by the President's resignation or impeachment. In two centuries, no American President has been removed from office other than by death or the voters' will. Once the spell is broken, would it become too easy for political opponents of any future President to oust him? We think not. Watergate is unique. In fact, the really dangerous precedent would be the opposite: to allow a President with Nixon's record to continue in office. This would be a terrible circumstance to lodge in our history, a terrible thing to explain to our children and their children.

In recent decades, the American presidency has assumed an almost sacrosanct aura. It is time to remember that quite literally, and not as a flourish of speech, the sovereign in America is not the President but the people. It is true that the people elect him, which gives him his unique mandate, but to conclude from this that a President must be preserved in all circumstances, at any cost, is the first unwitting step toward dictatorship.

As Watergate and related events emerged in congressional hearings and in the press, many patriotic Americans were nagged by a sense of disproportion. Crookedness and corner cutting? Yes. Crimes? No doubt—but after all, as the phrase went, “No one was killed!” How could these acts, however shady or offensive, be weighed against the life-and-death responsibilities of the President? This rationalization will not stand; a President’s “big decisions” cannot be put into a compartment separate from his other actions, his total behavior. His integrity and trustworthiness are perhaps the most important facts about him to his country and to the world. And these Nixon has destroyed.

The nightmare of uncertainty must be ended. A fresh start must be made. Some at home and abroad might see in the President’s resignation a sign of American weakness and failure. It would be a sign of the very opposite. It would show strength and health. It would show the ability of a badly infected political system to cleanse itself. It would show the true power of popular government under law in America.

7. Two Local Residents Respond to the Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island, 1979

Mrs. Reigle, a resident on Londonderry Township, ¼ mile from the plant, testified before The President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, May 19, 1979

I’d like to say, I love this country. I’m one of those minorities whose eyes still fill with tears when I hear “The Star-Spangled Banner.” But I sit here in total loathing and disgust for the legislators, all parties, and I have worked very actively in political parties. I can’t understand why human beings in a civilized country such as ours have a total disregard for other human beings. Why we even have to sit here and discuss closing a power plant that should have been almost an instant decision! I can’t fathom that as a private citizen.

I’ve deliberated in what capacity I should speak. As a mother, who will worry till my death about the genes and chromosomes of my child, my grandchildren? As an angry victim, who has accumulated a library of 300 preventive medicine books, who eats health foods? I think it’s a joke. It’s an irony that I probably will be done in by something that I cannot taste, feel, or see. This is a laugh.

So I decided to come as a property owner. Because, unfortunate as it is, people’s ears are in their pocketbooks. And legislators will hop on the economic issue before the health issue. I would like to propose a different aspect of the problem to the distinguished committee before me. Would you propose to the president, the federal government, Met Ed, whatever, to have some consideration for us in that quarter-mile perimeter?

The nightmare still continues for us. It’s difficult to put into words how one feels. Feelings are abstract. I invite each and every one of you to live in my house. It’s nicely furnished. I just housecleaned before the accident. See how ominous it

feels to see these towers, experience the sirens, see them emit the smoke at night. They sneak it out in fire trucks at night, the radioactive waste. The trucks sneak over onto the island with their lights off at night to pick it up. And ungodly noises. These noises have been happening since they fired up Unit Two.

I have here a letter from Met Ed. I have called periodically every two or three weeks about these noises. Not because of the noises, but because of what they represented. I was told that they were generator shutdown. Now these noises were different. But they still gave the same reasoning. Some of them sound like thirteen supersonic jets. It's like Chinese torture, it's so piercing. You think that you're going to lose your mind. The letter here tells me it's fine, don't worry. It's a very well written letter, it's a public relations letter. But we've got to remember: communists aren't the only ones who use propaganda. This is a propaganda-type letter.

Now, just to tell you of some of the plight of some of us that live close to the island: I've had swollen lymph glands. I've had laryngitis, sore throat. Some people were bleeding from the colon. Iodine enters through the colon and settles in your thyroid. And for those who say this is psychosomatic, I invite you to meet my dog. I have a collie dog, and whenever anything is going on at the island, he becomes very frustrated. He paces, saliva comes out of his mouth. He's not going into seizure; he has done this several times. One time he woke me, it was Tuesday morning, 2:20. I looked out the window, and I saw smoke being emitted from below the cooling towers, not from the cooling towers themselves. This is now twice that these types of emissions have happened. It is not the same consistency as the smoke from the cooling towers, which is clear, sort of transparent. This was much denser, thicker, almost cottony. What it is, I don't know. It lasted twenty minutes. I telephoned the neighbor. I said, "Would you please look out the window?" I told her, "At this point I eat, drink and think Three Mile Island; may be I'm hallucinating." So she verified this fact.

I telephoned Representative Reed's office the next morning. They've reassured me I'd receive an answer, but I've never received answers to any of this. As I said, come down and live in my house to appreciate what's going on....

Richard Swartz, Middletown Council meeting, June 20, 1979

Ladies and gentlemen of Middletown, members of the Borough Council:

We didn't come here tonight to ask for better plans for evacuation, or seek the assurances from Metropolitan Edison or from our state government or our national government. Right here is why we came.

[A man in the audience holds up a child.]

How many watts is that kid worth? How many jobs is that kid worth? We're here because we feel endangered, and the next generation, and the next century, and their children. That's why we're here. Ladies and gentlemen, as long as there's faulty equipment operating in a nuclear power plant, as long as we have management and utility companies who care more for money than people, as long as there is the possibility of human error in the operation of nuclear power plants, considering Metropolitan Edison's past record and the fact that

no one can any longer trust the people who control the nuclear situation in crisis events and in the day-to-day operation of these plants, I petition you tonight to not only slow down the reopening of Metropolitan Edison's Three Mile Island plant, but to close it down permanently.

A long time ago, some idiot had the idea of putting x-ray machines in shoe stores. They were dangerous. No one knew it at the time, or those who knew weren't doing anything about it. The people of Pennsylvania were the first to outlaw those things. They took a stand. They fought the battle. Tonight I ask the people of Middletown to begin that battle and once again have Pennsylvanians in the forefront of the war against nuclear insecurity in our own neighborhood. You know Ralph Nader, a great American, said that nuclear power plants are technology's Viet Nam. We have it right here, baby. It's not 25,000 miles away. It's 2½ miles away. Someone's going to die. Eventually there's going to be a disaster. You know it, if you don't shut them down. I don't want it to happen here. I can't look at these little kids sitting around here, the little one the man held up. Look at him. Do you want it to happen to him? It can't. That's why we're here. You know it's time that we all prepare to take this battle door to door, to the newspapers, the government, and to the gates of the Metropolitan Edison Three Mile Island plant if necessary.

[Applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, tonight I ask you to be patriots. For once, don't let them dictate to you. Don't listen to the big corporations. Don't listen to the big national government that can't, that doesn't touch you anymore. Ladies and gentlemen, be Americans. This is our town. This is our land. And these are our kids. Don't let them down....

8. Evangelical Reverend Jerry Falwell Calls on Americans to Return to Biblical Morality, 1980

I believe that Americans want to see this country come back to basics, back to values, back to biblical morality, back to sensibility, and back to patriotism. Americans are looking for leadership and guidance. It is fair to ask the question, "If 84 per cent of the American people still believe in morality, why is America having such internal problems?" We must look for the answer to the highest places in every level of government. We have a lack of leadership in America. But Americans have been lax in voting in and out of office the right and the wrong people....

It is now time to take a stand on certain moral issues, and we can only stand if we have leaders. We must stand against the Equal Rights Amendment, the feminist revolution, and the homosexual revolution. We must have a revival in this country. It can come if we will realize the danger and heed the admonition of God found in 2 Chronicles 7:14, "If my people, which are called by my name, shall humble

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themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land." ...

While sins of America are certainly many, let us summarize the five major problems that have political consequences, political implications, that moral Americans need to be ready to face.

1. **ABORTION**—Nine men, by majority vote, said it was okay to kill unborn children. In 1973, two hundred million Americans and four hundred thousand pastors stood by and did little to stop it. Every year millions of babies are murdered in America, and most of us want to forget that it is happening. The Nazis murdered six million Jews, and certainly the Nazis fell under the hand of the judgment of God for these atrocities. So-called Christian America has murdered more unborn innocents than that. How do we think that we shall escape the judgment of God?
2. **HOMOSEXUALITY**—In spite of the fact that the Bible clearly designates this sin as an act of a "reprobate mind" for which God "gave them up" (Rm. 1:26–28), our government seems determined to legalize homosexuals as a legitimate "minority." The National Civil Rights Act of 1979 (popularly referred to as the Gay Rights Bill) would give homosexuals the same benefits as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, meaning they could not be discriminated against by any employing body because of "sexual preference." Even the ancient Greeks, among whom homosexuality was fairly prevalent, never legally condoned its practice. Plato himself called it "abnormal." If our nation legally recognizes homosexuality, we will put ourselves under the same hand of judgment as Sodom and Gomorrah.
3. **PORNOGRAPHY**—The four-billion-dollar-per-year pornographic industry is probably the most devastating moral influence of all upon our young people. Sex magazines deliberately increase the problem of immoral lust and thus provoke increased adultery, prostitution, and sexual child abuse. Jesus said that if a man looks upon a woman and lusts after her in his heart, he has committed adultery with her already! Pornography is certainly the No. 1 enemy against marital fidelity and therefore against the family itself. Recent psychological studies are showing without a doubt that divorce caused by adultery is having a devastating affect upon children. Pornography is not a victimless crime—the real victims are wives and children!
4. **HUMANISM**—The contemporary philosophy that glorifies man as man, apart from God, is the ultimate outgrowth of evolutionary science and secular education. In his new book *The Battle for the Mind*, Dr. Tim LaHaye argues that the full admission of humanism as the religion of secular education came after prayer and Bible reading were excluded from our public schools. Ultimately, humanism rests upon the philosophy of existentialism, which emphasizes that one's present existence is the true meaning and purpose of life. Existentialism has become the religion of the public schools. Applied to psychology, it postulates a kind of moral neutrality that is detrimental to Christian ethics. In popular terminology it explains, "Do your

own thing,” and “If it feels good, do it!” It is an approach to life that has no room for God and makes man the measure of all things.

5. **THE FRACTURED FAMILY**—With a skyrocketing divorce rate, the American family may well be on the verge of extinction in the next twenty years. Even the recent White House Conference on Families has called for an emphasis on diverse family forums (common-law, communal, homosexual, and transsexual “marriages”). The Bible pattern of the family has been virtually discarded by modern American society. Our movies and magazines have glorified the physical and emotional experience of sex without love to the point that most Americans do not even consider love to be important at all anymore. Bent on self-gratification, we have reinterpreted our moral values in light of our immoral life styles. Since the family is the basic unit of society, and since the family is desperately in trouble today, we can conclude that our society itself is in danger of total collapse. We are not moving toward an alternate family life style; we are moving closer to the brink of destruction....



ESSAYS

Both of these essays examine how and why conservatism gained momentum in American politics in the 1970s by looking at two distinct sets of historical actors. In “Something’s Happening to People Like Me,” historian Jefferson Cowie uses one man’s personal journey to chart the complicated and multiple reasons why so many blue-collar workers shifted their political allegiances away from New Deal Democrats and to Ronald Reagan by the end of the decade. In “The Conservative Struggle and the Energy Crisis,” Meg Jacobs looks at some of the specific challenges that conservative policy-makers confronted as they attempted to use the tools of governance to respond to energy shortages while simultaneously touting the merits of a smaller, leaner government, a defining tenet of contemporary conservatism. Taken together, the two essays provide a sense of the potent political, economic, and cultural brew that set the stage for Reagan’s 1980 election.

Something’s Happening to People Like Me

JEFFERSON COWIE

At only twenty-six years of age, sporting long sideburns, slicked back hair, and mod striped pants, autoworker Dewey Burton could barely contain his rage over the state of politics or his frustration with his job in the spring of 1972.

Dewey loved nothing more than customizing and racing automobiles, transforming old parts into dazzling metallic-flake creations, but he could barely tolerate his job at the Wixom Ford plant just outside of Detroit where he felt sentenced to

a trivial role in assembling them. Satisfied with his pay, he was part of a widespread movement across the heartland fighting the mind-numbing tedium of industrial production. Reflecting the broad discontent on the floors of the nation's factories, some of which grew into open revolt, he remarked, "I hate my job, I hate the people I work for.... It's kind of stupid to work so hard and achieve so little."

Politically, Burton identified himself as a committed New Deal Democrat, but he was livid over plans to bus his son across Detroit in order to conform to the Supreme Court's idea of racial integration—policies driving his politics quickly to the right. Like the nation as a whole, Burton was simply being torn in too many directions at once. He was a figure in transition, the type of person journalist Pete Hamill had in mind when he wrote "The working-class white man is actually in revolt against taxes, joyless work, the double standards and short memories of professional politicians, hypocrisy and what he considers the debasement of the American dream."

Dewey Burton may not have been the typical disgruntled worker of the 1970s, but the *New York Times* believed that he came pretty close. He proved to be an able ambassador to the newspaper's professional middle-class readership interested in the increasingly exotic state of disaffected blue-collar America.... The media attention lavished on workers like Burton was part of a broad blue-collar revival in the 1970s, as working-class America returned to the national consciousness through strikes, popular culture, voting booths, and corporate strategy. Making sense of what *Newsweek* called the "far-ranging, fast spreading revolt of the little man against the Establishment" bordered on a national obsession. *Fortune*, along with countless other magazines and television news features, recognized the workers of the early seventies as "restless, changeable, mobile, demanding" and headed for "a time of epic battle between management and labor" given the "angry, aggressive and acquisitive" mood in the shops. As many big contracts expired, inflation ate up wage gains, and workers challenged the rules of postwar labor relations, the country witnessed the biggest wave of strike activity since 1946 (which was the biggest strike year in all of U.S. history). In 1970 alone there were over 2.4 million workers engaged in large-scale work stoppages, thirty-four massive stoppages of ten thousand workers or more, and a raft of wildcats, slowdowns, and aggressive stands in contract negotiations. Like so many other observers of the seventies labor scene, *Time* magazine connected the seventies' unrest to the battered ideals of the Depression decade. "Blue collar workers," the newsmagazine reported, "are gaining a renewed sense of identity, of collective power and class that used to be called solidarity."

... [But] the workers bursting upon the national stage in the seventies were hardly the stock proletarian character of the 1930s popular imagination. They appeared less as social-realist heroes of the industrial age than in ways that were simultaneously profound and strange, militant and absurd, traditional and new, male and female, insurgent and reactionary, as well as white, black, and brown. Whether re-christened as the "hardhats," "the unmeltable ethnics," the "forgotten man," the "Silent Majority," the "working class majority," the "middle Americans" or the "new militants" depended upon at whom the observer looked; whether the Dewey Burtons of the world were in the midst of an industrial insurgency or political backlash depended upon where the observer stood....

Political forecasters in the seventies saw working people's hope layered with anxiety and their traditions undermined by a confusing phalanx of new problems. The seventies had the potential, as two labor intellectuals put it, of becoming "Labor's Decade—Maybe." Advancing the old class politics of the thirties in concert with the new social movements of the sixties could make the 1970s "not the dawning of the Age of Aquarius," but "a new era for the working-man." Famed left wing intellectual Michael Harrington, trying to make sense of the crosscurrents in blue-collar America, said that the nation was moving "vigorously left, right, and center at the same time."

Burton found himself caught in the turbulence. After the tumultuous 1968 primary campaign and the disaster of the Chicago Democratic Convention, he readily toed the unions' line for their bread-and-butter man, Hubert Humphrey. Regarding himself "as a union man coming from a long line of F.D.R. Democrats," it seemed the only sensible position for a worker to take. "People have been telling me since I was a child that when the Democrats were in office, everybody was put to work," Dewey noted. That 1968 race, however, was the last time Burton would call himself an unwavering Democrat as busing all but shattered his faith in the mainstream of the party. Extending the separate-is-not-equal logic of *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), the Supreme Court decided in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education* (1971) that integrating school children through mandatory busing was an appropriate remedy for racial segregation in the public schools. And in Burton's Detroit, plans were to integrate not just the schools within the city, but the suburbs with the city. "What burns me to the bottom of my bones is that I paid an excessive amount of money so that my son could walk three blocks to school," he explained about his family's small bungalow on the edge of Detroit. The leafy affluence of the term "suburb," however, hardly matched the rows of plain-stoop homes of Dewey's Redford, a township hugging the border of Detroit where many streets, including the Burtons', still remained unpaved. "I'm not going to pay big high school taxes and pay more for a home so that somebody can ship my son 30 miles away to get an inferior education," he declared.

Burton decided that the answer to the busing threat was to pull the lever for the pivotal political figure of the era, George Wallace, for the Democratic nomination for president in 1972. The governor of Alabama, who famously stood in the schoolhouse doorway to defend segregation and who swore never to be "out niggered" in politics, was busy rattling the stale presumptions of both major parties. As an independent candidate in 1968, Wallace drew together the segregationist South with anti-liberal northerners concerned about blacks moving into their neighborhoods, fearful of the riots, and feeling simply forgotten. His candidacy enabled the political transformation of a substantial slice of white working people to become dislodged from the Roosevelt coalition and move toward what Kevin Phillips famously called *The Emerging Republican Majority* (1969). By the time George Wallace returned as an insurgent candidate in the fragmented Democratic primaries in 1972, his performance was roughly equal to any major candidate. He earned Dewey Burton's vote en route to a victory in the Michigan primary on the day after he was crippled by the bullet of a would-be assassin in suburban Baltimore....

The DayGlo® “This Family WILL NOT Be Bused” sticker on the Burtons’ screen door was a complicated thing. Many anxious old liberals and impatient New Leftists dismissed votes like Dewey’s as clear racism, but his political choices cannot be dismissed so simply. Raised poor (the first indoor running water he had was when he moved from southern Illinois to Detroit as a teenager), Dewey nonetheless profited from generations of segregated housing patterns, silent white privilege, and occupational segregation. Still, he felt open to black people as both leaders and neighbors. He touted his black union local leader as “the best president we’ve ever had” and claimed that he would welcome anyone into his neighborhood. “If a black mom and daddy buy or rent a house here and send their kids to [my son] David’s school and pay their taxes, that’s fine. Busing black kids to white neighborhoods and white kids to black neighborhoods is never going to achieve integration. It’s upsetting. It’s baloney.” Like Wallace, Burton also detested “welfare freeloaders,” pointing to an unruly white family that lived down the block. His protest against liberalism had as much to do with control of his life, the fate of his family, and his modest and tenuous place on the social ladder as it did anything else....

The mercurial nature of the politics of ’72 was such that when Wallace was eliminated from the race, Dewey voted for the most left-leaning candidate of any major party in the twentieth century, Democratic senator George McGovern. The choice did not come easily. The autoworker was genuinely stumped about whether incumbent Richard Nixon’s Silent Majority or challenger George McGovern’s soggy populism best represented his interests. It would be a betrayal of everything he stood for to vote for a Republican, he believed, but he had grave concerns about McGovern and his entourage of student radicals.... Much of the labor movement, especially the hierarchy of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), could not stomach McGovern’s New Politics with its anti-war positions, youth movements, and commitment to open up the Democratic Party to wider spectrum of Americans. The labor federation, fearing for its traditional kingmaker role in the Democratic Party, fought the McGovern insurgency with every scrap of institutional power it could muster.

Meantime, Richard Nixon, taking his cues from Wallace, was designing his own heretical strategy to woo white working-class voters away from the party of Roosevelt. His plans to build a post-New Deal coalition—the “New Majority” he liked to call it—around the Republican Party in 1972 was based on making an explicit pitch for white, male, working-class votes by appealing to their cultural values over their material needs. His targets were men like Burton, who had first been dislodged from the Democratic mainstream by George Wallace. Despite Nixon’s courtship of Dewey’s vote, the autoworker remained suspicious of Nixon’s loyalties. “Nixon hasn’t proved anything to me when he raises the prices of new cars and freezes the wages of the people who build them,” Burton explained about falling back on bread-and-butter Democratic politics with his vote for the left-leaning McGovern. “I really don’t think McGovern will win,” he finally concluded. “But maybe if we vote for him we can show Nixon what we want, what the working man wants.” The majority of white working-class voters disagreed, selecting Nixon by wide margins over the most pro-labor candidate ever produced by the American two-party system.

The early seventies' political confusion had its analogue in the discontent boiling up on the shop floors. Employees at the Wixom Ford plant where Burton worked were a minor part of a national epidemic of industrial unrest in the first half of the 1970s. They fought with supervisors on the line, clogged up the system with grievances, demanded changes in the quality of work life, walked out in wildcat strikes, and organized to overthrow stale bureaucratic union leadership. Yet it was a conflicted set of movements. As Dewey explained, workers were harnessed to union pay but longed to run free of the deadening nature of the work itself—and sometimes free of the union leaders who spoke on their behalf. "Once you're there, there's no other way to make as much money and get the benefits. Ford's our security blanket. I'm a scaredy-cat. If I leave, I lose eight years seniority," he lamented. Chained to his paycheck, he dreaded his future at the plant. "Each year I felt like I accomplished something. Suddenly I realized that I'm at a dead end and I'll probably be hacking on the line for 30 years." Burton's "mouthing off" at the plant had resulted in a string of disciplinary notices for relatively minor infractions, which blocked his hopes of improving his skills and position at Ford. Too "pushy" and outspoken, according to his foreman, Burton was trapped at the bottom of the industrial order. As one of his co-workers lamented, "There's only three ways out of here. You either conform and become deader each day, or you rebel, or you quit."

Commentators often referred to the unruliness on the assembly lines as the "Lordstown syndrome," after the infamous three-week-long strike in 1972 by a group of young, hip, and inter-racial autoworkers at a General Motors (GM) plant in Lordstown, Ohio, who battled the fastest—and most psychically deadening—assembly line in the world. "With all the shoulder-length hair, beards, Afros and mod clothing along the line," explained *Newsweek* of the notorious GM plant, "it looks for all the world like an industrial Woodstock"—suggesting the possibility of an upheaval in class relations for the seventies equal to those of race and culture of the 1960s. "At the heart of the new mood," declared the *New York Times*, "there is a challenge to management's authority to run its plants, an issue that has resulted in some of the hardest fought battles between industry and labor in the past."...

Working class discontent was puzzling to a generation accustomed to assuming that "the labor question" had long been answered. The problems of workers and class may have once existed in the United States, went the dominant logic, but it was solved back in the thirties by union recognition and the enlightened New Deal state. The "liberal consensus," the reigning ideology of the postwar era produced by that bargain, was in fact premised on the assumption that the set of problems that haunted capitalism for one hundred years had been resolved in the technocratic settlement that recognized workers' representatives as junior partners in the success story. In a trenchant critique of the "ideology of the liberal consensus," however, Godfrey Hodgson exposed how class conflict may have been "contained" in postwar America, but "the abolition of the working class, in fact, was a myth." By the seventies, as workers grew restless with their containment, it became clear that the immense institutional achievements of the previous generation—from labor legislation to the building of big unions to the

strength of the Democratic Party—were both sources of power as well as systems of constraint on the future fortunes of the American working class.

The complexity of Dewey Burton's life cuts against the simplistic "hard hat" stereotype that dominated the decade and that was brought to life each week in the most popular sitcom of the decade, *All in the Family*. Dewey found little opportunity for leisure or entertainment, other than his passion for customizing cars, but, like the rest of the country, he never missed the break-through CBS show he and his wife, Ilona, affectionately referred to by the name of its iconic main character, "Archie." *All in the Family* served as a sort of national therapy session as the generations, the races, the genders, and the classes clashed over post-sixties values and politics in some of the finest, most controversial, and popular television ever created. His wife, Ilona, feared that the *New York Times* reporter saw her as too much of an "Edith"—inadequately liberated and at the mercy of the needs of her family even though she, too, clocked in for a full shift installing trim for GM. Despite Archie becoming the national symbol for the bigoted blue-collar worker, however, Dewey Burton saw nothing of himself in the main character. "He's a fool," Dewey reported about Archie. "He's taken hate and bigotry and turned them into the most funny things I know. It's like Mark Twain's satire—it's hilarious."

All in the Family may have been the most important representation of white working-class men in popular culture during the early seventies, but it was hardly the only one. A multifaceted resurrection of blue-collar America appeared in commercial culture from Nashville to Hollywood, echoing the issues in the factories and the voting booths. In addition to America's weekly encounter with Archie, the top shows in the mid-1970s included *The Waltons* (return of the Great Depression); *Welcome Back Kotter*, *Good Times*, and *Sanford and Son* (life and poverty in the inner city); *The Jeffersons* (black upward mobility); *Laverne and Shirley* (working girls in the classless fifties), and *One Day at a Time* and *Alice* (working single mothers take on the world). The new shows' emphases on class-infused social problems were a far cry from their staid but popular predecessors like *Marcus Welby* and *Gunsmoke*.

Exaggerated pathologies of violent, angry white men received the bulk of the attention in popular culture during the first half of the decade, but the overall message was more akin to what The Temptations called the "Ball of Confusion" in the nation as a whole. The ideological breakdown was evident all around. Reporters descended on factories for special programs to explain the "blue collar blues," and filmmakers turned their lenses toward working-class themes across the spectrum—from Peter Boyle's portrayal of the neo-fascist Joe to Al Pacino's brilliant identity meltdown in *Dog Day Afternoon* to Jack Nicholson's use of the blue-collar world as a playground of authenticity in *Five Easy Pieces*. Similarly, the themes of country music, a genre that once expressed the simple longings of lost souls and broken hearts, became embattled terrain in the class wars of the 1970s. By mid decade, however, any faith in the future of the common man was becoming difficult to hold. Robert DeNiro's portrayal of the pathologically alienated Travis Bickle in *Taxi Driver*—based on the Warholian diary of the man who shot George Wallace solely for the fame it would deliver—provided the nation with a new and threatening vigilante anti-hero living outside the

boundaries of civil society. Just as in the nation's politics and workplaces, there was a tug of war in popular culture over the meaning and political potential of the working class, a struggle not fully reconciled until the second half of the decade.

The hope and possibility marbled throughout the confusion of the early part of the decade began to fade into the despair of the new order emerging in the second half. "I wanted to be somebody," Dewey Burton declared in 1974. "It wasn't the money so much as that I just want to have some kind of recognition, you know, to be more tomorrow than I was yesterday, and that's what I was working for." In addition to plugging away down at the Ford plant, Burton had been trying to start his own custom auto painting business, chipping away slowly at a college degree, and even playing guitar. "He drove himself," Ilona explained. "He'd work all day and study all night and then take his books with him to work and read on his breaks." Looking a lot more "sixties" by the mid-1970s, with his long hair and black turtleneck, he decided to surrender his hopes for the future in order to "concentrate on today," as he put it. "It takes so much to just make it that there's no time for dreams and no energy for making them come true—and I'm not so sure anymore that it's ever going to get better," he explained with a poetic fatalism....

When Dewey made those remarks in late 1974, he stood not simply at the middle of a decade but at a watershed between eras. The 1970s might appropriately be thought of as half post-1960s and half pre-1980s, but they were also more than that—they served as a bridge between epochs.... The period has been named "pivotal" not because of its monumental events, its great leaders, or its movements, but because society, from its economic foundations to its cultural manifestations, really did move in a new direction. It stands as a bookend to the New Deal era: that which was built in the thirties and forties—politically, economically, and culturally—was beginning to crumble barely two generations later. More than a time of mere fads for which it is mercilessly teased, it was a time of fundamental realignments.

Part of Burton's "no time for dreams" sensibility was reconciling himself to his future on the line, but another part was more than personal—it was a national disposition.... [The] year [1973 saw] the buildup to a troika of disasters that rattled the American psyche—the oil embargo that threatened the nation's supply of energy, the beginning of the stagflation that sapped the nation's economic strength, the president's 1974 resignation that drained its faith—and then the fall of Saigon in 1975 shattered the remains of national purpose. Writing in 1974, Michael Harrington noted "a collective sadness" that had descended upon the nation as if it were in mourning for a dying era—the promise of modernity itself slipping out of reach.

Above all, the mid-1970s marked the end of the postwar boom. The years prior to the 1973–74 crisis had been the most economically egalitarian time in U.S. history, the point on the graph where the bounty was shared most equitably, and unemployment was at historic lows. The year 1972 was also the apex of earnings for male workers. Starting in the 1973–74 years, real earnings began to stagnate and then slide as workers began their slow and painful dismissal from their troubled partnership with postwar liberalism. By mid-decade the

record-breaking strikes, rank-and-file movements, and vibrant organizing drives that had once promised a new day for workers were reduced to a trickle in the new economic climate. They were then replaced by layoffs, plant closures, and union decertification drives. White male workers' incomes had risen an astonishing 42 percent since 1960, but those incomes stagnated or fell for the next quarter century following the early seventies. Real earnings first stagnated and then were driven down by oil shocks and inflation; deindustrialization, plant closings, and anti-unionism; and a global restructuring of work itself that would continue over the ensuing decades. Most telling of the lost opportunities was that even the relative rise of women's wages since the 1970s was greatly attributable to the decline in male earnings.

Burton too saw little hope or opportunity in the new emerging reality at mid-decade. Peering out from underneath what he called his "despondency," he framed the problem as effectively as any of the sociologists of the time. "Something's happening to people like me—working stiffs, as they say—and it isn't just that we have to pay more for this or that or that we're having to do without this or make do with a little less of that. It's deep, and hard to explain, but it's more like more and more of us are sort of leaving all our hopes outside in the rain and coming into the house and just locking the door—you know, just turning the key and 'click,' that's it for what we always thought we could be."

Dewey Burton managed to make it to the polls for the 1974 midterm elections, but his heart was not in it. The nation delivered the famously liberal sweep to Congress in the wake of the Republican humiliation of Watergate, but the class of '74 consisted of a new breed of post-1960s, free-market, social liberals, who were skeptical of workers' needs and suspicious of their institutions. The new politicians, inspired to do something about urgent issues of race and gender inequality, also tended to be chary of structural solutions in an era of inflation. For Dewey, however, the problem centered less upon his political choices than the lack of meaning in the entire political process.... "You can't blame it all on the politicians," Burton argued.... "But I wish just for once that one of them would say, 'now folks, I swear to God, if you'll elect me, I won't do a damn thing.' That's the fellow I'd vote for. Somebody who'd just let us alone."...

By the turning point election of 1980, Dewey Burton's earlier rebelliousness had melted into a defensive gratitude for the limited job security he possessed. Back in 1972, a unionized manufacturing job seemed like an existential dead end, but, in the twilight of the industrial golden age, that same job had become a rare and coveted source of security. The dwindling numbers of workers who had claim on those high-paying industrial jobs found themselves to be labor's new aristocracy—shrinking in numbers, paid beyond the imagination of the vast unorganized majority, and politically detached from those toiling in the swelling ranks of the non-unionized service sector. Dewey was certainly doing quite well. He had earned a slot painting parts and then, finally, a much-sought-after position in the skilled trades. His promotions, ironically, were partially management's reaction to his media fame. While he continued to pour his soul into building his T-bucket hot rods, Burton's advancements allowed him to move his family up and out

toward the more comfortable suburbs further outside of Detroit. He had come to reflect AFL-CIO president George Meany's boast that modern union members have "a great deal more to lose" than in the past. With little concern for the unorganized or labor's dwindling power, Meany complacently explained, "The more of the world's goods a person has, the more conservative he becomes."

Dewey Burton may have been a good deal more comfortable than he had ever been, but, as he might have told a complacent George Meany, he was also the last of a dying breed. "It's the first time in 16 years that I've ever been threatened with losing my job," he reported in 1980. Like much of the economy as a whole, the auto industry was in a tailspin as Chrysler turned to a federal bailout and Ford and GM slashed employment levels. "A lot of my friends lost their jobs. They won't never come back to the plant," he lamented about a layoff of 3,200 workers at the Wixom Ford plant—a pattern that rippled across the heartland. Organized labor lost not just the percentage of workers they represented in the economy, but, by the end of the decade, the problem had crossed into the loss of real numbers as well (and even then, dramatic growth in the public sector masked dramatic losses in the private sector). The complacency evident in labor's failure to organize new workers or to help create a more expansive working-class identity beyond the industrial core of the AFL-CIO became evident as organized labor's strength began to dissolve. Without a strong counter-presence in the growing and diverse service and clerical industries—as well as political reforms, new labor leadership, and new voices necessary to organize new sectors—the unions' ability to withstand the attacks from politicians and business leaders weakened along with their industrial base.

By 1980 Burton completed the most significant transformation in postwar political history: from New Deal faithful to icon of discontent to Reagan Democrat. In his mind, there was little choice for the 1980 general election. "Carter's had four years. He didn't stabilize the country. Don't give me no more promises. Let me try somebody else's promises for a change," he concluded in his last interview. "If Carter's so good for the working people, how come they're not working?" he demanded about the president's disastrously ineffective first and only term. Organized labor rallied to defeat Reagan, but Burton believed that the unions' political influence on him and the rest of the rank and file had greatly diminished over the course of the decade. He also knew that even the UAW's support for Carter was little more than "lukewarm"—if for no other reason than the union had supported Ted Kennedy's attempt to unseat Carter from the left in the 1980 primary. On the eve of the 1980 election, the *New York Times* concluded its decade-long look at one autoworker, noting, "Dewey Burton has become a happy man, and he will gladly vote for Ronald Reagan for president on November 4 ... [even though] he is a strong union man, a Democrat by upbringing and conviction."

Burton's choice for the presidency in 1980 helped usher in a new and complex era of working-class political history. The new, more populist right proved effective in offering cultural refuge for blue-collar whites, while also being the central protagonist in the new economic transformations devastating working-class

communities across the heartland. At a time when the traditional working-class ally, the Democratic Party, offered precious little material comfort to working people, Ronald Reagan's New Right offered a restoration of the glory days by bolstering morale on the basis of patriotism, God, race, patriarchy, and nostalgia for community. The Reagan administration did squeeze inflation out of the economy but only by allowing historic levels of unemployment, industrial decline, and the decimation of the collective bargaining system—all of which combined to fight inflation by lowering wages and raising unemployment. After the president's attack on organized labor, most dramatically in the firing of over ten thousand striking members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization; and the restructuring of the tax schedule in favor of the wealthy, he looked a lot less like the working man's champion. In many parts of the industrial belt, the Depression-era analogy became true not in terms of working-class insurgencies as it had in the early seventies but, by the early eighties, in terms of material reality. As Dewey later confessed, "Reagan blindsided us."

As in the political world, the range of working-class possibilities in popular culture was similarly diminished by the second half of the 1970s. Working-class story lines hardened into three options: escape one's class position; find ways to forget it; or, lacking any civic outlets, bury its pains deep inside. Tony Manero, the lead in the immensely popular and decade-defining film *Saturday Night Fever*, declared his loser buddies in Brooklyn to be all "assholes back there" before escaping to upwardly mobile Manhattan. His pals were left behind in a simmering racial and ethnic stew with neither a future nor any narrative sense of what might happen to them. The future belonged to the chosen ones who could get out. Not surprisingly, the urban professionals—the "yuppies"—would become for the eighties what workers had been for the media in the seventies. By 1980 the ruthless oil baron J.R. Ewing of the immensely popular television show *Dallas* eclipsed Dewey's beloved working-class Archie as the media's new totem for the new decade.

To absorb the narratives of popular culture of the late seventies was to relegate the working class to faraway times and places—including the most distant, the isolated hearts of working people themselves. The runaway popularity of Johnny Paycheck's country novelty song, "Take This Job and Shove It" captured the new powerlessness. The blue-collar anthem saturated the radio stations, workplaces, and bars of the nation during the second half of the decade. Despite the title, the song is less about open rebellion than it is about a "hidden transcript" of resistance that takes place internally, far from the outward contest of power relations that defined the first half of the seventies. The narrator is unable to act; his rebellion is only a fantasy: "I'd give the shirt right off of my back/If I had the nerve to say/Take this job and shove it!" The surface militancy of the song was actually more about what two sociologists dubbed the smoldering "inner class warfare" of the seventies, in which "struggle between men leads to struggle within each man." Bruce Springsteen followed up his Whitmanesque paeans of mid-decade escape with ballads of rustbelt workers who failed to make it out, left to struggle alone "in the darkness on the edge of town." Music, television, and film turned from the hopeful crosscurrents of the early years toward a rather unified message: save yourself or face irrelevance.

What many pegged as the promise of a working-class revival in the early 1970s turned out to be more of a swan song by decade's end. The fragmented nature of the labor protests—by organization, industry, race, geography, and gender—failed to coalesce into a lasting national presence. The mainstream labor movement failed in its major political initiatives. Market orthodoxy eclipsed all alternatives, and promising organizing drives ended in failure. Deindustrialization decimated the power of the old industrial heartland. The vague class alliances of the major parties began to lose their distinction. As hip-hop writer Nelson George put it, "The first story is full of optimism and exalted ideas about humanity's ability to change through political action and moral argument. The next story, the plot we're living right now, is defined by cynicism, sarcasm, and self-involvement raised to art. The turning point was the early seventies." By 1981, *Time* magazine predicted little more than "Gloom and Doom for Workers."

The 1970s, mocked as an era of questionable fashion and bad politics, simultaneously appear both irrelevant and the foundation of our own time. Yet the history of class in America reveals the profundity in the nothingness of the decade, a wholesale transformation without a narrative. One of the great constructs of the modern age, the unified notion of a "working class," crumbled, and the new world order was built on the rubble. Issues from stagflation to racial backlash, Vietnam to deindustrialization, have been fingered as the culprit for the decline of the impulse that animated the chaotic great strikes of the Gilded Age, fueled the concerns of the middle-class reform impulse of the Progressive Era, finally built the New Deal, and then voted in the Great Society. Yet the seventies suggest the fragility at the heart of the self-definition of "the working class." It was a conceptual unity that could briefly but imperfectly be identifiable as a unionized voting block from the New Deal to the 1970s. It ultimately died of the many external assaults upon it, yes, but mostly of its own internal weaknesses....

The Conservative Struggle and the Energy Crisis

MEG JACOBS

The energy crisis of the 1970s marked the end of an era—the end of the post-World War II prosperity, the end of the country's obsession with the big gas-guzzling cars of the 1950s and 1960s, and the end of America's standing as an economic superpower. During the Arab boycott of 1973–1974, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut oil shipments to the United States and raised prices sharply. Prices at the pump doubled and then tripled. Gas lines that snaked for miles appeared as a constant reminder of what seemed like the nation's imminent decay and decline. A second oil shock struck in 1979 in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, once again making Americans feel vulnerable.

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In his Pulitzer Prize-winning novel *Rabbit Is Rich*, written at the end of this tumultuous decade, John Updike captured the doomsday mentality. Published in 1979, the novel begins: “Running out of gas, Rabbit Angstrom thinks ... The people out there are getting frantic, they know the great American ride is ending.”

To the nation’s young conservative policymakers, just assuming positions of influence inside Washington, the energy crisis, as it turned out, marked an important beginning. For these anti-government reformers, the energy crisis posed a serious challenge: how to govern, especially amid a crisis, without increasing the power of the federal government. Up until the 1970s, almost all modern crises, from war to depression to inflation to labor unrest to civil rights, increased the power, prestige, and regulatory authority of the federal government. The response of many Americans to the energy crisis was in favor of more government, not less.

But conservatives, who came to power under Richard Nixon, sought to fight against the impulse for a big government solution to a national crisis. A new breed of Washington policymakers and intellectuals, these young conservatives saw themselves more as crusaders than as policy wonks, as anti-bureaucrat ideologues working against establishment elites, even as they occupied the very seats of government power. Their historic challenge, as they understood it, was to transform the crisis in oil into a crisis of governance—that is, the challenge was to use the crisis as a way to discredit government activism and to renew faith in the free market.

Theirs was not an easy job. The Arab embargo brought into sharp relief the ... halting nature of the nation’s rightward turn. It proved hard to purge Americans of their expectations that Washington would come to the rescue, especially in moments of economic crisis. In 1973, many Americans were old enough to remember how the federal government had helped Americans through the Depression, defeated the Nazis, built the nation’s highways, and sent a man to the moon. Just as a car that is running out of gas, New Deal liberalism came to a slow, sputtering halt; indeed, at moments, even after it appeared to have no more life in it, liberalism could continue running on fumes. Though twice winning election on promises of scaling back government, Republican Richard Nixon himself was willing to flirt with new forms of government intervention.

This [essay] explores how, in the face of a crisis, conservatives fought liberalism from inside the corridors of power. If they did not fully succeed, then at least they understood the challenge and began to devise new strategies, both ideological and political, for the battles ahead.

When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, liberalism was far from dead. Under Nixon’s watch, the years that preceded the energy crisis witnessed anything but a rightward turn, with the 1960s leading to an enormous increase in government regulation of the economy. As corporate profits boomed in the 1960s, liberal activists won wide popular support for the idea that companies could afford to end poverty, make safer products, pollute less, protect their workers more, and still make a profit. Congress enacted a flurry of bills to mandate corporate social responsibility, and the environmental and consumer movements were at their peak. In April 1970, 20 million Americans turned out for the inaugural Earth Day. The oil industry, long seen as the embodiment of corporate malfeasance and having recently scandalized the general public with a deadly spill

off the coast of Santa Barbara, hardly escaped the regulatory avalanche. In that same year, Nixon signed the Clean Air Act Amendment and the Environmental Protection Act, both of which would saddle petroleum producers and refiners with costly and invasive regulations.

From the point of view of oil executives, the country was hardly shifting right in the early 1970s. They not only faced new threats, but in this charged political climate, they now worried about losing old privileges. Since 1926, the industry had been the beneficiary of the oil depletion allowance, an arcane, though very contentious, provision in the tax code that gave oil companies annual tax breaks worth billions of dollars to drill for new wells. For decades, oilmen spread money around to politicians to maintain the depletion allowance, funneling funds to oil-state senators to use for their own campaigns and to enhance their power by distributing donations, in turn, to other candidates in exchange for their political support. The nation's oil producers watched in horror when President Lyndon Johnson, a friend of the industry during his days as a Texas politician, took the first stab at trimming oil's tax breaks. In 1969, even with Republican Richard Nixon in the White House, the much hated depletion allowance was finally scaled back.

Oil representatives cried that this legislative attack on the industry came at the worst possible moment. While much of the economy was booming in the late 1960s, the oil industry was running up against real geological constraints. In 1970, the American oil industry reached its peak of domestic production. American reserves were plenty, but never again would the daily number of barrels pumped out of the ground increase. Even as supply declined, the price of this increasingly scarce commodity remained fixed. The Federal Power Commission, a regulatory holdover from the New Deal, had continued its charge under both Democratic and Republican administrations to keep natural gas prices low, which in turn held down oil prices. In the summer of 1971, the Nixon administration imposed price controls directly on oil, as well as on other industries, in an effort to battle the inflation that was beginning to besiege the economy. Regulated U.S. prices, oilmen argued as they watched world prices begin to rise, prevented the accumulation of capital necessary for domestic exploration and alternative energy research. In 1971, the American Petroleum Institute spent \$4 million on its television and newspaper campaign to warn the public of an impending energy crunch and to push for deregulation: "A country that runs on oil," it cautioned the nation, "cannot afford to run short." Oil executives, meanwhile, gave Nixon \$5 million, which amounted to 10 percent of all donations, for his 1972 campaign war chest.

On the eve of the Arab embargo, how, then, did Richard Nixon see oil politics? Supporting oil interests bolstered his electoral strategy of trying to capture the South from Democrats and appealed to newly rising southern Republicans like George H. W. Bush of Texas, who had been an independent oilman, served as a congressman in the late 1960s, and then became the Republican national chairman. Promoting domestic oil interests also seemed vital for American national security. Between 1970 and 1973, American imports doubled and accounted for one-third of the U.S. energy supply. Just as domestic oil

production began to decline, OPEC production levels soared. And so, too, did OPEC's willingness to use its market power to influence American foreign policy, particularly on the question of Israel. Through its control of oil, Arab leaders could disrupt Western economies and dictate foreign policy demands. In the wake of Vietnam, with the country constrained in its use of military force, it appeared that the United States could do little to exert its national interest.

Within the White House, the oil industry found friends who shared their growing concerns. A sympathetic young Kenneth Lay, who would later achieve fame, fortune, and disgrace as head of Enron, was then deputy secretary of energy. "Our problem," he told Richard Nixon as oil supplies fell, "has resulted from outmoded Government policies, from excessive tinkering with the time tested mechanisms of the free market." George Bush echoed Kenneth Lay. America would once again become self-sufficient in energy only if the federal government got out of the way. "The freer the market," said Bush, "the better." For foreign policy and domestic political considerations, Nixon was inching closer to the oil industry's point of view.

Then, in October 1973, the Nixon administration's worst fears were realized when the Arab-Israeli War (also known as the Yom Kippur War) began. On October 6, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel, and in retaliation for American support of Israel, OPEC cut off oil exports to the United States. The embargo lasted until March 1974 and led to a 10 percent decline in the nation's fuel supply. The energy crisis was dynamite. It reached into every home and workplace. As energy supplies dwindled and prices shot skyward, schools closed, factories shut down, and gas lines grew long and ugly. Station attendants began packing pistols for self-protection while fistfights broke out among angry customers. A Miami Amoco dealer complained, "If you can't sell them gas, they'll threaten to beat you up, wreck your station, run you over with a car." The most disruptive display of frustration came when the nation's 100,000 independent truckers staged a violent strike in February 1974, shutting down the country's highways for eleven days and leaving supermarket shelves bare as they demanded that the government roll back prices at the pump.

Nixon was in a bind. On the one hand, this shrewd politician devoted his time in office to creating what contemporaries called a "New Majority," one that would bring the white South into the Republican Party while also winning support from ethnic blue-collar Democrats in the North. Nixon successfully appealed to this "Silent Majority" in his landslide reelection in 1972 by promising to scale back expansive ... government social programs, such as busing and welfare, that many white Democrats had come to resent.... On the other hand, the idea that government should protect the public from corporate excesses, especially in hard times, still had a strong hold on American politics, particularly among working-class Democrats who had only recently ... come into Nixon's New Majority. Ever the political strategist, Nixon understood that the political loyalties of average Americans, from the small businessman in Peoria to the working-class housewife in Dayton, ... were still up for grabs. In spite of the 1972 landslide, the New Majority was not fully cemented, and amid economic crisis, the white ethnic working-class Democrats might defect.

In the early weeks of the crisis, the president leaned to the Right. Addressing the nation, Nixon unveiled his Project Independence, ... an ambitious deregulatory program designed to stimulate domestic production, eliminate oil imports by 1985, and push back against environmental reforms Nixon had once supported. The very name suggested American independence from Arab oil and also business independence from government regulation. America's survival, the president declared, required the deregulation of natural gas prices, the acceleration of offshore drilling, and the construction of a Trans-Alaska pipeline. Now more than ever, it was essential to lift environmental restrictions. "If you are going to freeze to death," the president told the nation's governors, "it doesn't matter much whether or not the air is clean." To achieve self-sufficiency in energy, the government had to move out of the way. "We can't fight the economics of the market place," said Nixon.

But this kind of small government conservatism was a hard sell as the energy crisis ... contributed to the biggest economic catastrophe since the Great Depression. In the 1970s, the American economy simultaneously experienced stagnant growth and rising prices, a new phenomenon contemporaries called *stagflation*. ... The energy crisis was not the sole cause of these economic woes, but energy prices compounded inflation, and to the public, the gas lines were emblematic of a declining economy, complete with a cast of villains to blame and hold accountable. The vast majority of Americans believed that Big Oil companies artificially engineered the crisis to jack up prices. Consumer advocate Ralph Nader called the shortage "the most phony crisis" in the nation's history while rumors swirled about oil tankers waiting offshore until prices went even higher. The public demanded that the government "do something" to check what was popularly perceived as excessive and corrupt corporate greed. The problem, it seemed, stemmed not from a shortage of gas but from a shortage of effective government leadership. From a rural village in North Carolina, a citizen wrote to the White House, expressing a newly commonplace state of alarm: "People are spending every waking hour worrying over the gasoline situation."

Nixon would have a difficult time ignoring this growing discontent. As *Newsweek* reported, "the American people seem on the verge of psychic rebellion." The prominent pollster Daniel Yankelovitch laid out the problem for the White House: "No issue has such a potential for producing social instability of the magnitude of the depression as does the energy crisis. This crisis entails a radical change ... Their lives will be disrupted and altered at the gut level." This issue, Yankelovitch warned the president's top advisers, would "either make him or break him." "If people get the impression that no one is in charge, or that there is no advance planning, or that they are being asked to make sacrifices while the oil industry raises big profits, they are going to get very angry and this issue will destroy Nixon." A Maryland citizen summed up the public mood: "We the American people are tired of the lack of competent and effective leadership."

So what would Nixon do? This longtime politician was, above all, an opportunist, which in the early seventies meant the occasional lurch toward New Deal solutions when he was in trouble.... Perhaps the greatest act of opportunism came with the president's imposition of wage and price controls in the summer

of 1971 to clamp down on inflation. With inflation in check, he was then free to increase federal spending to prop up the economy before the 1972 election. As journalist and former Nixon adviser William Safire explained, "When his back is to the wall, Mr. Nixon tends to adopt the economic suggestions of his Democratic opponents, and with a vengeance." ... As Safire was writing, a Democratic-sponsored windfall tax bill was working its way through Congress as was legislation requiring oil companies to roll back prices at the pump.

Democratic senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson from the state of Washington took the lead on the energy situation. On foreign policy he was to the right of the Nixon administration, opposing détente ... and fighting for an increase in the military budget. But Jackson was also a New Deal liberal ... [who] believed that the federal government had to solve the energy crisis. A presidential aspirant, he also recognized he could tap into and fan populist sentiment.... For Jackson, Big Oil played a starring role as the profit-seeking villains, the suffering small independent oil refiners and gas dealers appeared as the virtuous little man being squeezed out of the market by the seven Big Oil major corporations, and the angry victimized public was the script's heart and soul. Casting himself as the hero, Jackson called for government to step in. Top on his list was a ten-year \$20 billion research and development program for alternative fuel, which he likened to the Manhattan Project or the 1960s Apollo space program. Jackson also fought to have the government roll back gas prices while forcing the major oil companies to sell their scarce products to independent retailers, whose historically lower prices served as competition to the majors' own gas stations.

As soon as the embargo began, Scoop Jackson, with the help of other leading Democrats, went on the warpath. He subpoenaed top oil executives to a televised Senate hearing, accusing them of conspiring against the American public and of reaping "obscene profits." This so-called cheat probe made good nightly news theatrics and kept pressure on the administration and its Republican allies. As conservatives feared, the cut in oil supply put intense pressure on Nixon as momentum gained for governmental action. Liberal Democrats, especially those from the heavy oil-consuming states of the northeast, formed an alliance with representatives from regions, mostly in the Midwest and the Plains states, with a higher proportion of independent refiners and dealers, who were being driven out of business by the majors. Both political groups were eager to make the major oil companies pay. In November, Jackson got a mandatory allocation bill passed with overwhelming support, 93 to 3 in the Senate and 348 to 46 in the House, effectively putting the oil industry under government control; an amendment to the act requiring a World War II-style nationwide federal rationing program fell only eight votes short in the Senate. For the rest of the decade, the government would set the price of oil. A newly created Federal Energy Office would oversee these new bureaucratic regulations.

... Nixon also came under strong pressure from a new group of conservative advisers committed to scaling back government activism.... Nixon's people ... were Californian entrepreneurs, Wall Street buccaneers, and independent oilmen from Texas. Nixon himself came from a lower-middle-class California grocer family and grew up with deep resentment for the establishment elite. From his

earliest political days, he ran against New Deal government bureaucracies, including the wartime Office of Price Administration, where he developed his anti-government disdain while serving in the tire-rationing department. Like Assistant Treasury Secretary William Simon, who was soon to become the nation's chief energy bureaucrat and had made millions as a Wall Street bond trader, many of Nixon's appointees cut their teeth in businesses that were very different from such big bureaucracies as General Motors, AT&T, and the U.S. Army. By the time Nixon took office, the Chicago school of free-market economics was in the ascendance, as was clear in the appointment of Herbert Stein, trained at the University of Chicago and recommended by Milton Friedman, as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. To be sure, there were others in the Nixon administration who came out of a New Deal world ... But a big-government vision, while pushed opportunistically by some, was facing increasing competition from Nixon's own brain trust.

Inside government, there was a core ideological group who saw as their mission the undoing of the regulatory world that had been in place since the New Deal. Chief among them was Roy Ash, a longtime Nixon supporter who served as his budget director and had benefited from the booming Cold War economy of Southern California as cofounder of Litton Industries, a Beverly Hills-based multinational conglomerate and defense contractor.... Ash ... recommended that Nixon "avoid overreacting by getting government into activities that can and will be better done by private industry ... What the government can most usefully do is remove impediments it has constructed, provide some incentives, and keep out of the way ... *In short, this is not primarily a government problem.*" Instead, Ash told Nixon, this was a job for the private sector. "We must, of course, establish the perception of Federal leadership ... but we should recognize the problem as essentially a market phenomenon." All the president's top advisers, including Ash, recommended that Nixon veto any bill to roll back prices.

Beyond his ideological sympathy with these anti-government arguments, the Watergate investigation was also pushing Nixon to the Right. In the winter of 1973, as the Watergate scandal escalated, Nixon faced a complicated political landscape. As the investigation drew closer to the president, it weakened Nixon's capacity to take independent action. His declining popularity made him cleave to the Right as he searched for political friends and loyal allies.... Within the White House, the most ideologically committed policymakers had the greatest influence. As the Watergate investigations gained momentum, Nixon adopted a bunker mentality, surrounding himself with and soliciting advice from only the most dedicated.... In words that echoed those of his sympathizers, Nixon affirmed his resolve to resist calls for a federal response, telling his top aides, "Let's not lose sight of our goal to keep government out of people's pockets and off their backs."

Yet, as Ash had counseled, the president had to create the perception of government leadership. On December 4, 1973, Nixon announced that William Simon would become the head of a newly created Federal Energy Office. It was set up explicitly as a temporary office to manage an immediate problem and to avoid institutionalizing a permanent role for government. Simon was the nation's most unlikely energy czar. He had no first-hand knowledge or experience in the

oil industry; as a former Wall Street whiz kid, Simon was fiercely committed to market solutions and had little faith in Washington bureaucrats. As he commented to chief of staff Alexander Haig, "It is really quite an experience to work in a place that has more horses' asses than horses." His appointment came from the support of his key allies, Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz and the Council of Economic Advisers' Herbert Stein, whom together William Safire had dubbed the "free market mohicans." All shared the belief that only higher prices, by stimulating domestic production, would end the energy crisis.

Over the next few decades, conservatives mounted their campaign against government intervention from within the halls of power. In spite of his political beliefs, Simon, a proponent of the free market, sat atop a new government agency with vast regulatory powers given him by a Democratic-controlled Congress. Yet, much like foxes sent to guard a henhouse, these conservatives assumed control of the very institutions they sought to discredit. Exxon president John Jamieson told Simon, "I can sleep better each night knowing you are the energy czar." They would undermine the legitimacy of the twentieth-century state, if by a thousand self-administered cuts.

Here the political scuffle over rationing demonstrates the expansion of an increasingly hollow state. Unable to completely retrench the American state that had emerged in the New Deal and Great Society, conservatives learned that they would have to work at limiting ... government by controlling the levers of power. During the 1970s, conservatism was transformed from an opposition ideology premised on radically eliminating government to an ideology of office-holders who struggled to contain ... the government they ... mistrusted. As the situation at gas stations grew increasingly chaotic, Democratic leaders, organized labor, consumer activists, liberal intellectuals, and every other political force to the left of the administration demanded that the federal government institute a nationwide system of rationing to stop the mad scramble and long lines at the gas pumps. Under pressure, the president ordered Simon to print up monthly rationing booklets, each entitling its holder to thirty-five gallons. "Maybe that will shut them up," said Nixon. But Simon was careful in how he designed the program, making it function much like a market. Citizens could sell their unused coupons for whatever someone was willing to pay, thereby undermining the purpose of rationing and price controls. Even if this program would allow prices to rise as high as the market would bear, Simon had no real intention of allowing rationing to go forward. Instead, the White House urged Americans to save gas voluntarily. In the 1970s, environmentalists and anti-growth advocates often made the loudest calls for conservation. When Nixon and other conservatives asked Americans to change their "wastrel ways," they were adopting the message of the ecological Left, but for a larger political purpose. If individuals cut back on energy use, those voluntary efforts might help diminish the need for government to create an enormous bureaucracy to mandate conservation.

Even as they presided over the regulatory institutions foisted on them by a Democratic Congress, these conservatives argued that the market, not the government, was the solution to national crisis. Simon took a leading role in discrediting the state's ability to act, ... articulating a free-market argument from the

center of the state regulatory apparatus itself. The tools he had to combat the energy crisis, including allocations and price controls, were classic regulatory measures generated by a Democratic Congress and New Deal statecraft. But as they reluctantly deployed these statist measures, these anti-government conservatives repeatedly told themselves and the public that they were illegitimate. By his own account, Simon was a "rotten bureaucrat." ... Set up in reaction to a crisis, the Federal Energy Office was an "outrage." If Simon had his way, he would "abolish the agency and close its doors tomorrow." As he put it, "No group of men could be attacking the problem more sensibly than we are, but ... no group of men, we or anyone else, could ever replace the free market."

According to conservatives, the gas lines were but the most obvious symptom of liberalism's failing. The allocation measures designed by Congress were ... stifling, and price controls discouraged more gasoline from coming onto the market. When Simon stalled on rationing, states implemented their own programs by which owners of cars with license plates ending in even numbers could buy gas on even calendar days, and vice versa for odd-numbered plates. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia had alternating fuel purchase days, and nine other states drew up plans. But these were blunt instruments not well suited to the complexities of gasoline use. Without an elaborate bureaucracy—the Office of Price Administration employed over 100,000—to enforce equity, this improvised system seemed bungling at best. Whereas the automobile had once been the symbol of American preeminence, these long lines of cars with half-filled tanks were now a sign of the country's evident weakness, which the government seemed to be making worse rather than better.

Conservatives in this era were feeling their way forward. They needed to solve pressing political problems while keeping in view their larger vision of smaller government. They would get there, but it would take time. And thus Nixon and his team ... did not succeed in thwarting the intrusion of government into energy markets. By the spring of 1974, Watergate was sapping his strength day by day, and the Democrats, with their commanding majorities, were making political hay. On May 7, 1974, Nixon signed legislation to extend controls and allocations for two years and to establish the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) to oversee these regulations. Six weeks later, the House Judiciary Committee passed three articles of impeachment against the president, and a newly released tape, the so-called smoking gun, implicated Nixon directly in the Watergate cover-up. To avoid impeachment, Nixon resigned on August 9.

The FEA would live on. The conservatives were right: once controls were in place, they were hard to remove. Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford, who was even more committed to the market, surrounded himself with a coterie of young ideological advisers like Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Alan Greenspan. To them, freeing energy markets was essential both as a marker of conservative ascendance and as the key to a revitalized foreign policy. Unless the United States achieved energy independence, it would be hamstrung in its efforts to assert its will not only in the Middle East but even among its Western allies. Yet Ford came under the same political pressure for governmental action as had Nixon, with a public unwilling to accept higher

prices at the pump. After a protracted ... political battle championed by his conservative staff, Ford signed legislation to extend the life of the FEA for three more years.

The plan had not worked out exactly as these conservatives had hoped. When Richard Nixon had created the Federal Energy Office, Secretary George Shultz said to William Simon, "I'm so glad it's you who's heading up the energy bureaucracy. That way it will go out of business, and you'll be able to keep the damage in check." But it did not turn out that way. As Simon recalled with regret in 1976, "Well, I didn't keep the damage in check—it outlasted me. 'We' are all out now, 'they' are all in now, and 'our' detestable bureaucratic creations, devised by 'their' standards, are in place, waiting to be used for purposes 'we' privately deplore." Indeed, these conservatives had thought that if they were in charge, they could chart their own course, discrediting the government from within while restoring the free market. But, as Simon concluded after Jimmy Carter had taken office, "It is obvious to me that one does not acquire virtue by becoming a 'better type' of prostitute. Nor, obviously, does one win votes." For the moment, the hens had chased the foxes out of their henhouse.

And yet, the energy crisis taught these conservative reformers a valuable lesson: fighting liberalism was hard. Trench warfare over energy policy made clear that reforming government and changing popular expectations were no easy tasks. Out of office during the Carter years, they continued to refine their anti-government arguments. Their message was simple: the only solution to the energy crisis was less government, not more. As Milton Friedman, who would soon win the Nobel Prize in Economics, explained, if the Federal Energy Office shut down, as Simon had hoped it would, oil would flow freely and gas station attendants would once again wash customers' windshields. In 1977, Ronald Reagan, who would soon assume the conservative mantle and mobilize grassroots support for a rightward turn, announced, "Our problem isn't a shortage of oil. It's a surplus of government." It would not be until 1981, when Reagan came to power, that an ideologically conservative administration could finally decontrol the regulatory apparatus built up over half a century and chart a new conservative course.



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Politics and Popular Cultures of the 1980s

Some historians have described the closing decades of the twentieth century as “the age of Reagan,” and not without good reason. His presidency marked the ascendancy of conservatism as the nation’s dominant political ideology, and Reagan himself left as deep an imprint on American politics and culture as any modern president. At a historical moment when the institution of the presidency had been shaken by assassination and the Watergate resignation, the one-time-actor-turned-politician reinvigorated the office and imbued it with charismatic authority. Just as Franklin D. Roosevelt had done during the 1930s, Reagan sought to dramatically remake the relationship between the state and its citizens. Having begun his political career as a New Deal Democrat, Reagan responded to the social and economic upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s by repudiating his earlier commitment to liberalism and embracing the positions that would shape his presidency: faith in an unfettered, deregulated free market, a drive to shrink the government and transfer power back from the federal to the local arena, and a restoration of American military might in the wake of Vietnam. Thus, scholars confront in Reagan what was at the time a historical anomaly: a candidate who ran for the nation’s highest office on an anti-government, pro-military platform.

Having entered the White House in the midst of a lingering economic recession, Reagan pledged to stem inflation, lower taxes, reduce government spending, and deregulate the market. He succeeded in some of these efforts, although not always in the ways that his supporters had predicted and not necessarily in ways that produced all the benefits that they claimed would follow. He halted inflation through the classic Republican strategy of high interest rates and the cold bath of a major recession. He lowered taxes, especially on the wealthy, and he presided over a wave of deregulation (initiated in the 1970s) during which regulatory structures that had been in place for decades were either eliminated or radically revised. Reagan was also heavy-handed with public sector unions, captured most dramatically when his administration fired over 11,000 air traffic controllers who went on strike in August 1981. One irony of Reagan’s presidency was that he conspicuously failed to reduce government spending. Steep increases in defense spending, coupled with lower taxes, contributed to what were then the largest annual deficits in American history.

In foreign affairs, too, Reagan represented a sharp break from his predecessors. Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter had responded to U.S. military failure in Southeast Asia by scaling back the globalism of the 1950s and 1960s and pursuing a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and China. By the time that Reagan won the 1980 election, many conservative policymakers had come to believe that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the transfer of control of the Panama Canal, and the Iranian hostage crisis all signaled a dangerous decline in American power. Many of these policymakers became members of Reagan's foreign policy team, and they pursued a massive military buildup, first in conventional weapons and then through Star Wars, a highly controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which proposed to defend the nation with an "umbrella" of costly electronic weapons. The United States also pursued a renewed interventionism, especially in Central America, where the Reagan administration invaded the tiny island of Grenada and launched a covert campaign to overthrow the left-wing Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Reagan's militarism sparked a nationalist revival that combined a return to Cold War patriotism with a new preoccupation with the perceived threat of terrorism from the Middle East. By 1986, however, the administration was in deep trouble: The national debt was skyrocketing, and the Iran-Contra scandals revealed that the president and his top advisers were implicated in an illegal attempt to trade arms for hostages and divert the proceeds to the Contras in Nicaragua. Still, to his many supporters, Reagan remains to this day a hero of modern conservatism.

While Reagan's influence over the 1980s was no doubt profound, an exclusive focus on his presidency elides other transformations in the political culture of the decade. Many protest movements gained momentum in the 1980s, some of them in direct response to the Reagan administration's renewal of the Cold War and its heightened military interventionism. These included a global campaign to halt the nuclear arms race, a solidarity movement that emerged in response to U.S. foreign policy in Central America, and a student-led effort to call public attention to the ravages of apartheid in South Africa. Among the most passionate and poignant political movements of the 1980s emerged in response to the AIDS crisis, as gay men—many of them in the throes of the deadly disease—used direct action to indict the government for not responding more quickly to the epidemic and to demand access to experimental drugs that might save lives. These movements give us a glimpse of the vibrancy, dynamism, and diversity of political life in the age of Reagan.

DOCUMENTS

When the decade of the 1980s began, fifty-two Americans were being held hostage in Iran. The Iranian hostage crisis, which began in November 1979 and ended in January 1981, became a media obsession and sparked a renewed American nationalism rooted in feelings of righteous anger and victimization. In Document 1, *New York Times* reporter Steven V. Roberts looks at how everyday Americans linked the crisis to the waning of the nation's power in recent years. It was this perception of decline that helped set the stage for the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, who capitalized on the economic and political failures of the Carter administration, as shown in a campaign speech he delivered in September 1980 at the International Business

Council (Document 2). Once elected, Reagan oversaw a Cold War military build-up that raised anew the fear of nuclear war, an unfathomable scenario that Jonathan Schell considered in his 1982 book *The Fate of the Earth* (excerpted in Document 3). Part of Reagan's political genius was his capacity to appeal to diverse constituencies—not simply to business elites and members of the military, but also to evangelical Christians, who were becoming newly influential in American politics. In March 1983, Reagan reached out to the National Association of Evangelicals, affirming his commitment to both the defeat of the Soviet Union and to conservative social and cultural values (Document 4).

In addition to being a decade of political transformation, the 1980s were also a decade of rapid technological change. A now-iconic advertisement for Apple's first Macintosh appeared in 1984 (Document 5), and in the years that followed, the personal computer would transform literally every dimension of American life. The advent of new technologies helped to fuel the economic recovery of the mid-1980s, yet the problems of poverty and class inequality actually worsened over the course of the decade. Policymakers within the Reagan administration believed that it was the welfare state itself that was to blame for the persistence of poverty, a position explored by libertarians like Charles Murray, whose book *Losing Ground* is excerpted in Document 6. The AIDS epidemic also brought the issue of inequality to the fore, as gay rights activists like Vito Russo charged the government—and in particular, the Food and Drug Administration—with failing to respond quickly to the spread of the disease because its primary victims were gay men and poor people of color (Document 7). Finally, the environmental movement not only continued to grow in the 1980s, but by the end of the decade, it was presciently paying more attention to the threat of global climate change. Document 8 is excerpted from Bill McKibben's *The End of Nature*, the first published book on the topic.

1. Americans Respond to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 1980

... As the year of the hostage drew to a close on Election Day 1980, there were signals that the crisis might soon be resolved. But whether the Americans were freed or held captive, their ordeal had left a lasting mark on the national psyche. Americans everywhere have seemed to doubt their leaders, their country, themselves. The articles of faith that carried them through the postwar world, faith in perpetual prosperity and predominant power, have been eroded by continuing inflation at home and continuing impotence abroad. To many Americans, the Star-Spangled Banner has needed mending. America the

Beautiful has become America the Vulnerable. We are having trouble meeting the monthly payments on the American Dream.

... In the 60's and 70's, of course, America was riven with problems: civil-rights protests, race riots, antiwar demonstrations, all choreographed to music by the Beatles, and fueled by regular doses of marijuana and birth-control pills. But there was something joyful, even hopeful, at least zealous, about those days. Americans clashed bitterly, but they were fighting for something, some vigorous vision of where the country should be going. Today, the mood is more leaden, gloomy, depressed. We seem to be waiting in line to fill up with a new sense of national purpose, but, for the moment, at least, the pumps of promise have run dry.

There are many varied reasons for the mood but no event symbolized it more graphically than the seizure of the hostages. It was as if the whole nation had been blindfolded and hogtied, hauled through the streets of a strange city with people taunting them in a foreign tongue. Americans' sense of futile rage grew even sharper last April after they tried and failed to rescue the hostages. No myth goes deeper in the American character than the belief that good will triumph in the end, that the cavalry will ride over the hill at the last minute and save the day. Accordingly, the spectacle of American troops, trapped by swirling sand and faulty helicopters in a remote desert, then crashing into one another in their haste to escape, could hardly have been more humiliating. A nation that was raised on the battle cry, "We have not yet begun to fight," found itself unable to fight at all. A nation that once put a man on the moon couldn't even get as far as Teheran. John Wayne had stopped the cavalry charge at the last minute and returned to the fort because a horse had thrown a shoe. The good guys had lost—again.

Harry McPherson, a Washington lawyer and author who worked in Lyndon Johnson's White House, called the hostage stalemate a "classic paradigm" of America's troubles and explained, "The last time we got involved with some two-bit country we lost 50,000 men. Now we were involved with another one, and there was nothing we could do about it. That gave us an increasing sense of impotency."

"We really operated on two levels," he went on, "On one, we were negotiating and doing all we could to keep those people from getting killed, and a lot of that is very reasonable. We recognize that you just don't go rushing in. But on another level we're furious and frustrated. We felt we should be stronger, that we should be able to have some effect on them. We felt wronged, morally wronged. It's as if your wife were spat upon and there was nothing you could do about it. And that made it all the more enraging."

To many other analysts as well, the public reaction to the hostage crisis was directly linked to the United States experience in Vietnam. In Southeast Asia, America was victimized by its own optimism, the belief that it could do anything. Now, in the Middle East, it was plagued by the reverse conviction, that it could do little or nothing to control events. "We've lost face and everybody knew it," said Joel L. Fleishman, director of the Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs at Duke University. "This really reached way down to our subconscious. America had always been the great, powerful nation. We stood for things we admire; we were able to get things done; we'd never lost a war.

Now, we've not only lost a war, we're losing the peace. We see our friendships being chipped away, and the real trauma is that we can't do anything about it, because we don't want to risk a war."

Anita Staenberg, wife of an insurance agent in South Orange, N.J., one of scores of voters interviewed during the last several weeks, said, "Our whole prestige has been diminished. I feel our position of strength is at its very lowest ebb. It makes me feel terrible; we're laughed at abroad." Howard Cox, data processor in Akron, Ohio: "We're so degraded that if you go to a foreign country they spit on you." Diane Wilks, a grocer in Nashville, Tenn.: "I think we've lost a lot of respect, and self-respect, too. We don't feel good about it—it looks bad."

This is not the way that Americans are used to thinking. This is not what the patriotic songs and political speeches taught them to expect. And many of them share the surprise and confusion of Janice Ray, the wife of a photographer in Nashville, who says, "The impression we're leaving the rest of the world is that American superiority is gone. Growing up, we learned in history that America was the best at everything. We had the respect of the whole world. But where can you go today and be respected for being American?"

As Mrs. Ray's comments indicate, the hostage issue had been simmering just beneath the surface of the campaign all fall, but it did not intrude directly into the debate until rumors started spreading that the 52 prisoners might soon be released (14 were set free subsequent to the initial seizure). Ronald Reagan, thrown on the defensive by assertions that he was a warmonger, tried to regain momentum by blaming the President for the year-long incarceration of the Americans and adding: "The fact that they've been there that long is a humiliation and a disgrace." Mr. Carter retorted that his opponent had turned the hostages into a "political football."

Listening to this debate, some Americans felt that, even if the hostages were released, the price paid had been unconscionable. For some, the issue itself revealed a deeper problem—that America's military might, and the will to use it, was deteriorating dangerously. "We've lost stature in our own eyes; we've lost confidence in ourselves," said Bob Tigert, a toy-store manager in Nashville, "If we had a stronger foreign policy, I don't think Iran would have taken advantage of us the way they did." Americans feel vulnerable. "Other countries do whatever they want to do," complains Karman Martin, a young mother in Terre Haute, Ind. "It seems like we can't get anything done."

Frank Kennedy is retired from the Air Force now, and he and his wife, Kathleen, both work in civilian jobs at Tinker Air Force base outside Oklahoma City. When we talked one evening at a shopping center near the base, they both felt that President Carter bungled the whole hostage issue. "We should have gone in a long time ago," Kathleen asserted. "A strong President and a strong Government wouldn't let Iran get away with that."

"I've lived all over the world," Frank said, "and years ago, when I went into the service, the United States had respect in foreign countries. Then along came Vietnam, and we fought a pitiful war we wouldn't really let the military fight—and we ended up losing. I agree with Teddy Roosevelt. Walk softly but carry a big stick. And club the hell out of them if you need to." Kathleen added bitterly, "Our stick is down to a toothpick."...

2. Presidential Candidate Ronald Reagan Calls for New Economic Policies, 1980

Almost two months ago, in accepting the Presidential nomination of my party, I spoke of the historically unique crisis facing the United States. At that time I said:

Never before in our history have Americans been called upon to face three grave threats to our very existence, any one of which could destroy us. We face a disintegrating economy, a weakened defense and an energy policy based on the sharing of scarcity....

I'd like to speak to you today about a new concept of leadership, one that has both the words and the music. One based on faith in the American people, confidence in the American economy, and a firm commitment to see to it that the Federal Government is once more responsive to the people.

That concept is rooted in a strategy for growth, a program that sees the American economic system as it is—a huge, complex, dynamic system which demands not piecemeal Federal packages, or pious hopes wrapped in soothing words, but the hard work and concerted programs necessary for real growth.

We must first recognize that the problem with the U.S. economy is swollen, inefficient government, needless regulation, too much taxation, too much printing-press money. We don't need any more doses of Carter's eight- or 10-point programs to "fix" or fine tune the economy....

Only a series of well-planned economic actions, taken so that they complement and reinforce one another, can move our economy forward again.

We must keep the rate of growth of government spending at reasonable and prudent levels.

We must reduce personal income tax rates and accelerate and simplify depreciation schedules in an orderly, systematic way to remove disincentives to work, savings, investment, and productivity.

We must review regulations that affect the economy and change them to encourage economic growth.

We must establish a stable, sound, and predictable monetary policy.

And we must restore confidence by following a consistent national economic policy that does not change from month to month....

One of the most critical elements of my economic program is the control of government spending. Waste, extravagance, abuse, and outright fraud in Federal agencies and programs must be stopped.... [B]illions of the taxpayers' dollars ... are wasted every year throughout hundreds of Federal programs, and it will take a major, sustained effort over time to effectively counter this....

The second major element of my economic program is a tax rate reduction plan. This plan calls for an across-the-board, three-year reduction in personal income tax rates—10 percent in 1981, 10 percent in 1982, and 10 percent in 1983....

... Reagan sought to re-
 Americans economic security.
 ↳ security ↳ confidence

Another vital part of this strategy concerns government regulation....

Government regulation, like fire, makes a good servant but a bad master. No one can argue with the intent of this regulation—to improve health and safety and to give us cleaner air and water—but too often regulations work against rather than for the interests of the people. When the real take-home pay of the average American worker is declining steadily, and 8 million Americans are out of work, we must carefully re-examine our regulatory structure to assess to what degree regulations have contributed to this situation. In my administration there should and will be a thorough and systematic review of the thousands of Federal regulations that affect the economy.

Along with spending control, tax reform, and deregulation, a sound, stable, and predictable monetary policy is essential to restoring economic health. The Federal Reserve Board is, and should remain, independent of the Executive Branch of government. But the President must nominate those who serve on the Federal Reserve Board. My appointees will share my commitment to restoring the value and stability of the American dollar.

A fundamental part of my strategy for economic growth is the restoration of confidence. If our business community is going to invest and build and create new, well-paying jobs, they must have a future free from arbitrary, government action. They must have confidence that the economic “rules-of-the-game” won’t be changed suddenly or capriciously.

In my administration, a national economic policy will be established, and we will begin to implement it, within the first 90 days.

Thus, I envision a strategy encompassing many elements—none of which can do the job alone, but all of which together can get it done. This strategy depends for its success more than anything else on the will of the people to regain control of their government....

The time has come for the American people to reclaim their dream. Things don’t have to be this way. We can change them. We must change them. Mr. Carter’s American tragedy must and can be transcended by the spirit of the American people, working together.

Let’s get America working again.

The time is now.

3. Jonathan Schell Describes a Nuclear Bomb Attack on New York City, 1982

One way to begin to grasp the destructive power of present-day nuclear weapons is to describe the consequences of the detonation of a one-megaton bomb, which possesses eighty times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb, on a large city, such as New York. Burst some eighty-five hundred feet above the Empire State Building, a one-megaton bomb would gut or flatten almost every building between Battery Park and 125th Street, or within a radius of four and

four-tenths miles, or in an area of sixty-one square miles, and would heavily damage buildings between the northern tip of Staten Island and the George Washington Bridge, or within a radius of about eight miles, or in an area of about two hundred square miles. A conventional explosive delivers a swift shock, like a slap, to whatever it hits, but the blast wave of a sizable nuclear weapon endures for several seconds and "can surround and destroy whole buildings" (Glasstone). People, of course, would be picked up and hurled away from the blast along with the rest of the debris. Within the sixty-one square miles, the walls, roofs, and floors of any buildings that had not been flattened would be collapsed, and the people and furniture inside would be swept down onto the street. (Technically, this zone would be hit by various overpressures of at least five pounds per square inch. Overpressure is defined as the pressure in excess of normal atmospheric pressure.) As far away as ten miles from ground zero, pieces of glass and other sharp objects would be hurled about by the blast wave at lethal velocities. In Hiroshima, where buildings were low and, outside the center of the city, were often constructed of light materials, injuries from falling buildings were often minor. But in New York, where the buildings are tall and are constructed of heavy materials, the physical collapse of the city would certainly kill millions of people. The streets of New York are narrow ravines running between the high walls of the city's buildings. In a nuclear attack, the walls would fall and the ravines would fill up. The people in the buildings would fall to the street with the debris of the buildings, and the people in the street would be crushed by this avalanche of people and buildings. At a distance of two miles or so from ground zero, winds would reach four hundred miles an hour, and another two miles away they would reach a hundred and eighty miles an hour. Meanwhile, the fireball would be growing, until it was more than a mile wide, and rocketing upward, to a height of over six miles. For ten seconds, it would broil the city below. Anyone caught in the open within nine miles of ground zero would receive third-degree burns and would probably be killed; closer to the explosion, people would be charred and killed instantly. From Greenwich Village up to Central Park, the heat would be great enough to melt metal and glass. Readily inflammable materials, such as newspapers and dry leaves, would ignite in all five boroughs (though in only a small part of Staten Island) and west to the Passaic River, in New Jersey, within a radius of about nine and a half miles from ground zero, thereby creating an area of more than two hundred and eighty square miles in which mass fires were likely to break out.

If it were possible (as it would not be) for someone to stand at Fifth Avenue and Seventy-second Street (about two miles from ground zero) without being instantly killed, he would see the following sequence of events. A dazzling white light from the fireball would illumine the scene, continuing for perhaps thirty seconds. Simultaneously, searing heat would ignite everything flammable and start to melt windows, cars, buses, lampposts, and everything else made of metal or glass. People in the street would immediately catch fire, and would shortly be reduced to heavily charred corpses. About five seconds after the light appeared, the blast wave would strike, laden with the debris of

a now nonexistent midtown. Some buildings might be crushed, as though a giant fist had squeezed them on all sides, and others might be picked up off their foundations and whirled uptown with the other debris. On the far side of Central Park, the West Side skyline would fall from south to north. The four-hundred-mile-an-hour wind would blow from south to north, die down after a few seconds, and then blow in the reverse direction with diminished intensity. While these things were happening, the fireball would be burning in the sky for the ten seconds of the thermal pulse. Soon huge, thick clouds of dust and smoke would envelop the scene, and as the mushroom cloud rushed overhead (it would have a diameter of about twelve miles) the light from the sun would be blotted out, and day would turn to night. Within minutes, fires, ignited both by the thermal pulse and by broken gas mains, tanks of gas and oil, and the like, would begin to spread in the darkness, and a strong, steady wind would begin to blow in the direction of the blast. As at Hiroshima, a whirlwind might be produced, which would sweep through the ruins, and radioactive rain, generated under the meteorological conditions created by the blast, might fall. Before long, the individual fires would coalesce into a mass fire, which, depending largely on the winds, would become either a conflagration or a firestorm. In a conflagration, prevailing winds spread a wall of fire as far as there is any combustible material to sustain it; in a firestorm, a vertical updraft caused by the fire itself sucks the surrounding air in toward a central point, and the fires therefore converge in a single fire of extreme heat. A mass fire of either kind renders shelters useless by burning up all the oxygen in the air and creating toxic gases, so that anyone inside the shelters is asphyxiated, and also by heating the ground to such high temperatures that the shelters turn, in effect, into ovens, cremating the people inside them. In Dresden, several days after the firestorm raised there by Allied conventional bombing, the interiors of some bomb shelters were still so hot that when they were opened the inrushing air caused the contents to burst into flame. Only those who had fled their shelters when the bombing started had any chance of surviving. (It is difficult to predict in a particular situation which form the fires will take. In actual experience, Hiroshima suffered a firestorm and Nagasaki suffered a conflagration.)

In this vast theatre of physical effects, all the scenes of agony and death that took place at Hiroshima would again take place, but now involving millions of people rather than hundreds of thousands. Like the people of Hiroshima, the people of New York would be burned, battered, crushed, and irradiated in every conceivable way. The city and its people would be mingled in a smoldering heap. And then, as the fires started, the survivors (most of whom would be on the periphery of the explosion) would be driven to abandon to the flames those family members and other people who were unable to flee, or else to die with them. Before long, while the ruins burned, the processions of injured, mute people would begin their slow progress out of the outskirts of the devastated zone. However, this time a much smaller proportion of the population than at Hiroshima would have a chance of escaping. In general, as the size of the area of devastation increases, the possibilities for escape decrease. When the devastated area is relatively small, as it was at Hiroshima, people who are not incapacitated will have a

good chance of escaping to safety before the fires coalesce into a mass fire. But when the devastated area is great, as it would be after the detonation of a megaton bomb, and fires are springing up at a distance of nine and a half miles from ground zero, and when what used to be the streets are piled high with burning rubble, and the day (if the attack occurs in the daytime) has grown impenetrably dark, there is little chance that anyone who is not on the very edge of the devastated area will be able to make his way to safety. In New York, most people would die wherever the blast found them, or not very far from there....

4. President Reagan Proclaims America's "Spiritual Reawakening," 1983

... I'm pleased to be here today with you who are keeping America great by keeping her good. Only through your work and prayers and those of millions of others can we hope to survive this perilous century and keep alive this experiment in liberty, this last, best hope of man.

I want you to know that this administration is motivated by a political philosophy that sees the greatness of America in you, her people, and in your families, churches, neighborhoods, communities—the institutions that foster and nourish values like concern for others and respect for the rule of law under God.

Now, I don't have to tell you that this puts us in opposition to, or at least out of step with, a prevailing attitude of many who have turned to a modern-day secularism, discarding the tried and time-tested values upon which our very civilization is based. No matter how well intentioned, their value system is radically different from that of most Americans. And while they proclaim that they're freeing us from superstitions of the past, they've taken upon themselves the job of superintending us by government rule and regulation. Sometimes their voices are louder than ours, but they are not yet a majority....

But the fight against parental notification is really only one example of many attempts to water down traditional values and even abrogate the original terms of American democracy. Freedom prospers when religion is vibrant and the rule of law under God is acknowledged. When our Founding Fathers passed the first amendment, they sought to protect churches from government interference. They never intended to construct a wall of hostility between government and the concept of religious belief itself....

Last year, I sent the Congress a constitutional amendment to restore prayer to public schools. Already this session, there's growing bipartisan support for the amendment, and I am calling on the Congress to act speedily to pass it and to let our children pray....

More than a decade ago, a Supreme Court decision literally wiped off the books of 50 States statutes protecting the rights of unborn children. Abortion on

Excerpts from Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983." *The Public Papers of President Ronald Reagan* (Simi Valley, Calif.: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library). Online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/30883b.htm>.

6. Libertarian Political Scientist Charles Murray Describes the Failures of the Welfare State, 1984

A Proposal for Public Welfare

I begin with the proposition that it is within our resources to do enormous good for some people quickly. We have available to us a program that would convert a large proportion of the younger generation of hardcore unemployed into steady workers making a living wage. The same program would drastically reduce births to single teenage girls. It would reverse the trendline in the breakup of poor families. It would measurably increase the upward socioeconomic mobility of poor families. These improvements would affect some millions of persons....

The proposed program, our final and most ambitious thought experiment, consists of scrapping the entire federal welfare and income-support structure for working-aged persons, including AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, Worker's Compensation, subsidized housing, disability insurance, and the rest. It would leave the working-aged person with no recourse whatsoever except the job market, family members, friends, and public or private locally funded services. It is the Alexandrian solution: cut the knot, for there is no way to untie it.

It is difficult to examine such a proposal dispassionately. Those who dislike paying for welfare are for it without thinking. Others reflexively imagine bread lines and people starving in the streets. But as a means of gaining fresh perspective on the problem of effective reform, let us consider what this hypothetical society might look like.

A large majority of the population is unaffected. A surprising number of the huge American middle and working classes go from birth to grave without using any social welfare benefits until they receive their first Social Security check. Another portion of the population is technically affected, but the change in income is so small or so sporadic that it makes no difference in quality of life. A third group comprises persons who have to make new arrangements and behave in different ways. Sons and daughters who fail to find work continue to live with their parents or relatives or friends. Teenaged mothers have to rely on support from their parents or the father of the child and perhaps work as well. People laid off from work have to use their own savings or borrow from others to make do until the next job is found. All these changes involve great disruption in expectations and accustomed roles.

Along with the disruptions go other changes in behavior. Some parents do not want their young adult children continuing to live off their income, and become quite insistent about their children learning skills and getting jobs. This attitude is most prevalent among single mothers who have to depend most critically on the earning power of their offspring.

Parents tend to become upset at the prospect of a daughter's bringing home a baby that must be entirely supported on an already inadequate income. Some become so upset that they spend considerable parental energy avoiding such an eventuality. Potential fathers of such babies find themselves under more pressure not to cause such a problem, or to help with its solution if it occurs.

Adolescents who were not job-ready find they are job-ready after all. It turns out that they can work for low wages and accept the discipline of the workplace if the alternative is grim enough. After a few years, many—not all, but many—find that they have acquired salable skills, or that they are at the right place at the right time, or otherwise find that the original entry-level job has gradually been transformed into a secure job paying a decent wage. A few—not a lot, but a few—find that the process leads to affluence.

Perhaps the most rightful, deserved benefit goes to the much larger population of low-income families who have been doing things right all along and have been punished for it: the young man who has taken responsibility for his wife and child even though his friends with the same choice have called him a fool; the single mother who has worked full time and forfeited her right to welfare for very little extra money; the parents who have set an example for their children even as the rules of the game have taught their children that the example is outmoded. For these millions of people, the instantaneous result is that no one makes fun of them any longer. The longer-term result will be that they regain the status that is properly theirs. They will not only be the bedrock upon which the community is founded (which they always have been), they will be recognized as such. The process whereby they regain their position is not magical, but a matter of logic. When it becomes highly dysfunctional for a person to be dependent, status will accrue to being independent, and in fairly short order. Noneconomic rewards will once again reinforce the economic rewards of being a good parent and provider.

The prospective advantages are real and extremely plausible. In fact, if a government program of the traditional sort (one that would “do” something rather than simply get out of the way) could *as plausibly* promise these advantages, its passage would be a foregone conclusion. Congress, yearning for programs that are not retreads of failures, would be prepared to spend billions. Negative side-effects (as long as they were the traditionally acceptable negative side-effects) would be brushed aside as trivial in return for the benefits. For let me be quite clear: I am not suggesting that we dismantle income support for the working-aged to balance the budget or punish welfare cheats. I am hypothesizing, with the advantage of powerful collateral evidence, that the lives of large numbers of poor people would be radically changed for the better.

There is, however, a fourth segment of the population yet to be considered, those who are pauperized by the withdrawal of government supports and unable to make alternate arrangements: the teenaged mother who has no one to turn to; the incapacitated or the inept who are thrown out of the house; those to whom economic conditions have brought long periods in which there is no work to be had; those with illnesses not covered by insurance. What of these situations?

The first resort is the network of local services. Poor communities in our hypothetical society are still dotted with storefront health clinics, emergency

relief agencies, employment services, legal services. They depend for support on local taxes or local philanthropy, and the local taxpayers and philanthropists tend to scrutinize them rather closely. But, by the same token, they also receive considerably more resources than they formerly did. The dismantling of the federal services has poured tens of billions of dollars back into the private economy. Some of that money no doubt has been spent on Mercedes and summer homes on the Cape. But some has been spent on capital investments that generate new jobs. And some has been spent on increased local services to the poor, voluntarily or as decreed by the municipality. In many cities, the coverage provided by this network of agencies is more generous, more humane, more wisely distributed, and more effective in its results than the services formerly subsidized by the federal government....

... Local or even state systems leave much more room than a federal system for everyone, donors and recipients alike, to exercise freedom of choice about the kind of system they live under. Laws are more easily made and changed, and people who find them unacceptable have much more latitude in going somewhere more to their liking.

... A federal system must inherently employ very crude, inaccurate rules for deciding who gets what kind of help. ... At the opposite extreme—a neighbor helping a neighbor, a family member helping another family member—the law loses its validity nearly altogether. Very fine-grained judgments based on personal knowledge are being made about specific people and changing situations. In neighborhoods and small cities, the procedures can still bring much individualized information to bear on decisions. Even systems in large cities and states can do much better than a national system; a decaying industrial city in the Northeast and a booming sunbelt city of the same size can and probably should adopt much different rules about who gets what and how much....

The ultimate unresolved question about our proposal to abolish income maintenance for the working-aged is how many people will fall through the cracks. In whatever detail we try to foresee the consequences, the objection may always be raised: We cannot be *sure* that everyone will be taken care of in the degree to which we would wish. But this observation by no means settles the question. If one may point in objection to the child now fed by Food Stamps who would go hungry, one may also point with satisfaction to the child who would have an entirely different and better future. Hungry children should be fed; there is no argument about that. It is no less urgent that children be allowed to grow up in a system free of the forces that encourage them to remain poor and dependent. If a strategy reasonably promises to remove those forces, after so many attempts to "help the poor" have failed, it is worth thinking about.

But that rationale is too vague. Let me step outside the persona I have employed and put the issue in terms of one last intensely personal hypothetical example. Let us suppose that you, a parent, could know that tomorrow your own child would be made an orphan. You have a choice. You may put your child with an extremely poor family, so poor that your child will be badly clothed and will indeed sometimes be hungry. But you also know that the parents have worked hard all their lives, will make sure your child goes to school

and studies, and will teach your child that independence is a primary value. Or you may put your child with a family with parents who have never worked, who will be incapable of overseeing your child's education—but who have plenty of food and good clothes, provided by others. If the choice about where one would put one's own child is as clear to you as it is to me, on what grounds does one justify support of a system that, indirectly but without doubt, makes the other choice for other children? The answer that "What we really want is a world where that choice is not forced upon us" is no answer. We have tried to have it that way. We failed. Everything we know about why we failed tells us that more of the same will not make the dilemma go away....

7. A Gay Rights Activist Responds to the AIDS Crisis, 1988

A friend of mine in New York City has a half-fare transit card, which means that you get on buses and subways for half price. And the other day, when he showed his card to the token attendant, the attendant asked what his disability was and he said, I have AIDS. And the attendant said, no you don't, if you had AIDS, you'd be home dying. And so, I wanted to speak out today as a person with AIDS who is not dying.

You know, for the last three years, since I was diagnosed, my family thinks two things about my situation. One, they think I'm going to die, and two, they think that my government is doing absolutely everything in their power to stop that. And they're wrong, on both counts.

So, if I'm dying from anything, I'm dying from homophobia. If I'm dying from anything, I'm dying from racism. If I'm dying from anything, it's from indifference and red tape, because these are the things that are preventing an end to this crisis. If I'm dying from anything, I'm dying from Jesse Helms. If I'm dying from anything, I'm dying from the President of the United States. And, especially, if I'm dying from anything, I'm dying from the sensationalism of newspapers and magazines and television shows, which are interested in me, as a human interest story—only as long as I'm willing to be a helpless victim, but not if I'm fighting for my life.

If I'm dying from anything—I'm dying from the fact that not enough rich, white, heterosexual men have gotten AIDS for anybody to give a shit. You know, living with AIDS in this country is like living in the twilight zone. Living with AIDS is like living through a war which is happening only for those people who happen to be in the trenches. Every time a shell explodes, you look around and you discover that you've lost more of your friends, but nobody else notices. It isn't happening to them. They're walking the streets as though we weren't living through some sort of nightmare. And only you can hear the screams of the people who are dying and their cries for help. No one else seems to be noticing.

And it's worse than a war, because during a war people are united in a shared experience. This war has not united us, it's divided us. It's separated those of us with AIDS and those of us who fight for people with AIDS from the rest of the population.

Two and a half years ago, I picked up Life Magazine, and I read an editorial which said, "it's time to pay attention, because this disease is now beginning to strike the rest of us." It was as if I wasn't the one holding the magazine in my hand. And since then, nothing has changed to alter the perception that AIDS is not happening to the real people in this country.

It's not happening to us in the United States, it's happening to them—to the disposable populations of fags and junkies who deserve what they get. The media tells them that they don't have to care, because the people who really matter are not in danger. Twice, three times, four times—The New York Times has published editorials saying, don't panic yet, over AIDS—it still hasn't entered the general population, and until it does, we don't have to give a shit.

And the days, and the months, and the years pass by, and they don't spend those days and nights and months and years trying to figure out how to get hold of the latest experimental drug, and which dose to take it at, and in what combination with other drugs, and from what source? And, how are you going to pay for it? And where are you going to get it? Because it isn't happening to them, so they don't give a shit....

And they don't spend their waking hours going from hospital room to hospital room, and watching the people that they love die slowly—of neglect and bigotry, because it isn't happening to them and they don't have to give a shit. They haven't been to two funerals a week for the last three or four or five years—so they don't give a shit, because it's not happening to them.

And we read on the front page of The New York Times last Saturday that Anthony Fauci now says that all sorts of promising drugs for treatment haven't even been tested in the last two years because he can't afford to hire the people to test them. We're supposed to be grateful that this story has appeared in the newspaper after two years. Nobody wonders why some reporter didn't dig up that story and print it 18 months ago, before Fauci got dragged before a Congressional hearing.

How many people are dead in the last two years, who might be alive today, if those drugs had been tested more quickly? ...

Why are we here together today? We're here because it is happening to us, and we do give a shit. And if there were more of us AIDS wouldn't be what it is at this moment in history. It's more than just a disease, which ignorant people have turned into an excuse to exercise the bigotry they have always felt.

It is more than a horror story, exploited by the tabloids. AIDS is really a test of us, as a people. When future generations ask what we did in this crisis, we're going to have to tell them that we were out here today. And we have to leave the legacy to those generations of people who will come after us.

Someday, the AIDS crisis will be over. Remember that. And when that day comes—when that day has come and gone, there'll be people alive on this

earth—gay people and straight people, men and women, black and white, who will hear the story that once there was a terrible disease in this country and all over the world, and that a brave group of people stood up and fought and, in some cases, gave their lives, so that other people might live and be free.

So, I'm proud to be with my friends today and the people I love, because I think you're all heroes, and I'm glad to be part of this fight. But, to borrow a phrase from Michael Callen's song: all we have is love right now, what we don't have is time.

In a lot of ways, AIDS activists are like those doctors out there—they're so busy putting out fires and taking care of people on respirators, that they don't have the time to take care of all the sick people. We're so busy putting out fires right now, that we don't have the time to talk to each other and strategize and plan for the next wave, and the next day, and next month and the next week and the next year.

And, we're going to have to find the time to do that in the next few months. And, we have to commit ourselves to doing that. And then, after we kick the shit out of this disease, **we're all going to be alive to kick the shit out of this system, so that this never happens again...**

8. Environmentalist Bill McKibben Describes the End of Nature, 1989

... The idea of nature will not survive the new global pollution—the carbon dioxide and the CFCs and the like. This new rupture with nature is different not only in scope but also in kind from salmon tins in an English stream. We have changed the atmosphere, and thus we are changing the weather. By changing the weather, we make every spot on earth man-made and artificial. We have deprived nature of its independence, and that is fatal to its meaning. Nature's independence *is* its meaning; without it there is nothing but us.

If you travel by plane and dog team and snowshoe to the farthest corner of the Arctic and it is a mild summer day, you will not know whether the temperature is what it is "supposed" to be, or whether, thanks to the extra carbon dioxide, you are standing in the equivalent of a heated room. If it is twenty below and the wind is howling—perhaps absent man it would be forty below. Since most of us get to the North Pole only in our minds, the real situation is more like this: if in July there's a heat wave in London, it won't be a natural phenomenon. It will be a man-made phenomenon—an amplification of what nature intended or a total invention. Or, at the very least, it *might* be a man-made phenomenon, which amounts to the same thing. The storm that might have snapped the hot spell may never form, or may veer off in some other direction, not by the laws of nature but by the laws of nature as

they have been rewritten, blindly, crudely, but effectively, by man. If the sun is beating down on you, you will not have the comfort of saying, "Well, that's nature." Or if the sun feels sweet on the back of your neck, that's fine, but it isn't nature. A child born now will never know a natural summer, a natural autumn, winter, or spring. Summer is going extinct, replaced by something else that will be called "summer." This new summer will retain some of its relative characteristics—it will be hotter than the rest of the year, for instance, and the time of year when crops grow—but it will not be summer, just as even the best prosthesis is not a leg.

And, of course, climate determines an enormous amount of the rest of nature—where the forests stop and the prairies or the tundra begins, where the rain falls and where the arid deserts squat, where the wind blows strong and steady, where the glaciers form, how fast the lakes evaporate, where the seas rise.... A child born today might swim in a stream free of toxic waste, but he won't ever see a natural stream. If the waves crash up against the beach, eroding dunes and destroying homes, it is not the awesome power of Mother Nature. It is the awesome power of Mother Nature as altered by the awesome power of man, who has overpowered in a century the processes that have been slowly evolving and changing of their own accord since the earth was born.

Those "record highs" and "record lows" that the weathermen are always talking about—they're meaningless now. It's like comparing pole vaults between athletes using bamboo and those using fiberglass poles, or dash times between athletes who've been chewing steroids and those who've stuck to Wheaties. They imply a connection between the past and the present which doesn't exist. The comparison is like hanging Rembrandts next to Warhols; we live in a post-natural world. Thoreau once said he could walk for half an hour and come to "some portion of the earth's surface where man does not stand from one year's end to another, and there, consequently, politics are not, for they are but the cigar-smoke of a man." Now you could walk half a year and not reach such a spot. Politics—our particular way of life, our ideas about how we should live—now blows its smoke over every inch of the globe.

About a half mile from my house, right at the head of the lake, the town has installed a streetlight. It is the only one for miles, and it is undeniably useful—without it, a car or two each summer would undoubtedly miss the turn and end up in the drink. Still, it intrudes on the dark. Most of the year, once the summer people have left, there is not another light to be seen. On a starry night the Milky Way stands out like a marquee; on a cloudy night you can walk in utter pitch-black, unable to see even the dog trotting at your side. But then, around the corner, there is the streetlamp, and soon you are in its sodium-vapor circle, a circle robbed of mystery by its illumination. It's true that the bugs love the lamp; on a June night there is more wildlife buzzing around it than in any square acre of virgin forest. But it breaks up the feeling of the night. And now it is as if we had put a huge lamp in the sky, and cast that same prosaic sterile light at all times on all places....

✦ ESSAYS

The essays in this chapter explore two political crises of the 1980s—the first within the realm of foreign policy, and the second within the realm of domestic policy. In “Iran, Islam, and the Terrorist Threat,” American Studies scholar Melani McAlister looks at how and why the Iranian hostage crisis became a national media obsession that placed the problem of terrorism at the center of Reagan’s foreign policy agenda. Meanwhile, historian Bradford Martin explores the ways that gay men—angered by the government’s neglect of the rapidly escalating AIDS crisis—used direct action to place pressure on the Food and Drug Administration to speed up drug trials. Martin cites ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) as one of a number of examples that illustrate the vibrancy, creativity, and passion that animated grassroots politics in the 1980s.

Iran, Islam, and the Terrorist Threat

MELANI McALISTER

In the United States, the 1980s began with the nightly spectacle of Americans held hostage by Iranian militants in Tehran. During the 444 days of their captivity, which began on November 4, 1979, and ended on January 21, 1981, the day Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as president, the hostages in Iran became a national symbol. Many Americans marked their solidarity with the captives with yellow ribbons or white armbands. People in coffee shops and on radio talk shows debated what should be done to free them. And for more than a year, Walter Cronkite, who in 1979 was rated in polls as the most trusted person in the United States, closed his nightly news broadcast with a reminder of the hostages and their fate: “And that is how it was on January ___, the ___ day of the hostages’ captivity.” Similarly, ABC’s late-night newscast *Nightline* began with a marker of the hostage crisis: Day 148 and Day 233 became signifiers in a tally whose referent needed no explanation. The United States existed on two calendars, with the number of days in captivity superimposed over the Gregorian dates. In fact, the Iran crisis became one of the most widely covered stories in television history, gaining as much sustained attention as civil rights, Vietnam, or Watergate. One Kennedy School of Government study summarized the overall coverage this way: “Instead of receding with time, eclipsed by fresh-breaking news, the story of the ‘hostage crisis’ mushroomed, becoming a virtual fixation for the nation and its news organizations throughout much of the fourteen-month embassy siege.”

On the day of the hostages’ release in January 1981, President Reagan used his inaugural address to announce that “terrorism” would replace “human rights” as the nation’s primary foreign policy concern. Over the next decade, the “war against terrorism” played a significant role as the theoretical structure that supported the Reagan-Bush military buildup and the determined reassertion of U.S. political and military hegemony in the Middle East, a reassertion that included, among

other things, U.S. military intervention in Lebanon (1981–1983), military and logistical support for Iraq in the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1983), the sale of arms to Iran in the Iran–Iraq war (the Iran–Contra deal, 1983–1985), the U.S. bombing of Libya (1986), and the expansion of arms sales to Saudi Arabia (1985–1988).

[Although] terrorism was already a visible concern in foreign policy and an available plot device for films and novels in the 1970s, ... the discourse of terrorist threat developed in new and important ways as public reactions to the Iran hostage crisis were staged in the speeches of policymakers, in television news reports, and in the activities of communities around the country.... For the fourteen months that it dominated the U.S. nightly news, and for nearly a decade after in various cultural texts, the Iran story became the paradigmatic signifier of America as a nation imperiled by terrorism....

The discourse of terrorist threat formed in the context of the Iran hostage crisis depended on the underlying structure of a captivity narrative—those stories of whites taken by Indians that had dominated the literature of early America. The hostages in Iran, like those early captives, came to represent an entire nation in its conflict with another culture; the public concern over their captivity was part of a larger story about national identity, foreign policy, and racial constructs. Gender was central to the Iranian captivity story, as it was significant at earlier points in American history, and family, domesticity, and marriage figured visibly in public understandings of the crisis. The United States was distinguished from Iran (and captives distinguished from captors) in large part by the ways that the hostages were positioned within their families, as part of the private sphere. The private sphere, identified with the activity of women and the affective life of the family, and imagined as separate from public life and politics, became politicized precisely through the staging of an imminent threat to its autonomy. With the family under siege as a highly visible trope, the preservation of a privileged site for the non-political life of individuals became the signifier of American national identity....

... On November 4, 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tehran was taken over by Iranian militants. Sixty-five Americans were taken hostage on the first day of what was to become the 444-day Iranian hostage crisis. Acting quickly, ABC managed to get a reporter and camera crew on the scene in Tehran. Shortly after the ABC correspondents' arrival, Iran began refusing entrance to other news teams. For more than four days, ABC was the only network able to produce its television coverage from Tehran, and it fully exploited the advantage. On November 8, ABC ran a special broadcast at 11:30 P.M., after the local news, called *The Crisis in Iran: America Held Hostage*. The show opened with exclusive footage of American hostage Barry Rosen being paraded before the cameras by his captors. "Look at this," the anchor began, "one American, blindfolded, handcuffed, today in the courtyard of the American embassy in Tehran." The hour-long news special went on to showcase the images and themes that would soon become nightly rituals: Iranians marching in the streets, U.S. flags burning, tearful interviews with families of the hostages, a concerned president considering various diplomatic and/or military options, and interviews with angry U.S. citizens. "When I see what they do to that flag," said one longshoreman, "it just gets me in the heart."

Initially, both the U.S. and the Iranian governments expected the hostage crisis to be resolved relatively quickly. The takeover of the U.S. embassy by a group of students loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini had taken most Iranian officials by surprise, and Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan promised that his government would assure the hostages' safety and quick release. But the actual politics on the ground in Iran were more complicated. Bazargan was one of the more moderate leaders in a country still in the midst of consolidating a revolution, and he soon lost the internal power struggle to hard-liners close to Khomeini. Khomeini threw his support behind the students at the embassy, and the hostages quickly became national symbols in Iran, caught up in the new government's determination to prove Iran was capable of defying the United States.

The United States had long played a highly visible role in Iran, as the primary ally of the recently deposed Shah. The Shah had ruled Iran since 1941; in the early 1950s, he had maintained his throne in the face of an emerging democracy movement only with the help of the CIA. A Westernizing, secular leader, the Shah had established a certain base of support among the urban middle classes but had maintained his rule through the ruthless suppression of dissent. The internal security police in Iran, SAVAK, were known for torture and murder; they were also known to be trained and funded by the CIA. By the late 1970s, the Shah had inspired opposition that included both liberal, secular elements opposed to his antidemocratic rule and religious leaders opposed to the rapid secularization and Westernization he had introduced into the country.

Despite this opposition, the Shah was widely considered to have a stable hold on power, in large part because of the very strong alliance between Iran and the United States. That alliance had provided him with a wide range of military and political resources, the most important of which was access to advanced weapons technology. In the 1960s and 1970s, successive U.S. governments cultivated the relationship because, perhaps more than any other ruler in the Middle East, the Shah could and did shore up the stated goals of U.S. foreign policy in the region: the supply of oil, support of Israel, and containment of the Soviet Union. A major oil-producing nation, Iran consistently supported the continuing flow of oil to the United States and its allies; it was one of the few Middle Eastern nations that had not participated in the 1973 oil embargo. The Shah also had positive relations with Israel, which included security and intelligence sharing. Most important, Iran under the Shah was strongly anti-Soviet and served as a valued cold war partner for the United States. The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 had declared that, in the wake of Vietnam, the United States would shore up its international military and political position by supporting regional allies. In the Middle East in the 1970s, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran became the primary pillars of that policy, each of which then provided the United States with some combination of military support, intelligence data, and political backing. (After the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt also became a major U.S. ally.) President Nixon had apparently explained U.S. expectations to the Shah with remarkable candor at a 1972 meeting. At the end of talks aimed at expanding U.S.-Iranian relations, Nixon looked across the table and said to the Shah, simply: "Protect me."

The Shah played the role of regional client to the hilt, and as the oil wealth flowed in, the United States allowed Iran to buy virtually any and all weapons

(except for nuclear weapons) in the U.S. arsenal. One analyst has described the Shah's buying frenzy as "a stampede": in the period between 1972 and 1976, the Shah ordered more than \$9 billion worth of U.S. weaponry, including more advanced planes, tanks, and artillery than the Iranian army could easily absorb.

With this kind of backing, neither U.S. officials nor the Shah himself expected his government to be overthrown, and certainly not with the extraordinary rapidity that it was. But opposition to the Shah's rule had mounted significantly in the later 1970s, as "modernization" proceeded with little regard for most people's religious sensibilities, and oil wealth remained in the hands of a few, while calls for democracy were ruthlessly suppressed. Despite his well-deserved reputation for ruthlessness, however, the Shah, secretly ill with cancer, was increasingly unwilling or unable to repress the mounting demonstrations that developed at the end of the decade. The protests, which were staged by a coalition of religious organizations (with different views about the role of Islam in the state), secular moderates, and leftists, soon became a call for the Shah's removal. In January 1979, the Shah left the country, effectively abdicating his throne. Shortly thereafter, the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile to lead what political scientist Richard Cottam has described as "quite possibly the most popular revolution in human history."

The Iranian government under Khomeini's leadership was, like most postrevolutionary governments, composed of a complex set of disparate elements that had little in common but their desire to get rid of the Shah and a broadly shared hatred of the United States as the Shah's backer. With the Shah gone, the struggle over power and policy ensued in earnest. The Shah and his rule were still the source of enormous anger and frustration; the wealth he had apparently taken out of the country when he fled was a potent reminder of the misrule and corruption of the monarchy. When, just eight months after the revolution, the Carter administration decided to allow the ailing Shah to come to the United States for medical treatment, angry students stormed the U.S. embassy in protest. The hostages who were taken on November 4, 1979, became both symbol and stake in the internal struggle to define the nature of postrevolutionary Iran. Over the next fourteen months, as the Carter administration negotiated with various members of the Iranian leadership, U.S. officials often found themselves talking to Iranian officials who were soon replaced, as the Iranian government became more and more dominated by radical Islamic clergy. As long as the hostages remained in Iran, they were a living symbol of the new government's refusal to be dominated by the United States; the students later called the takeover "the second revolution." The hostages, Khomeini sometimes said, would not be released until the United States learned a lesson about the new realities of power in Iran.

The captivity of the hostages riveted U.S. audiences, who watched the evening news in unprecedented numbers in the first weeks after the embassy takeover.... Six days after the takeover of the embassy, ABC began running a news special on Iran every night. The head of ABC News, Roone Arledge, ... made the decision, he said, because everyone he saw was obsessed with the crisis. From his elevator man to his taxi driver to the pilot on his plane—"all these people care about now are the hostages in Iran." Most people at ABC expected the news special to be a two- to three-week commitment; instead, "America Held Hostage" went on the air every night for four months, until March 1980,

when ABC replaced it with the more generic late-night news program *Nightline*, anchored by Ted Koppel. In the early months of the broadcast, ABC estimated that the hostage specials reached an average of twelve million viewers each night. The show regularly beat *The Tonight Show* in audience share, prompting one columnist to comment that “ABC has finally found someone who can beat Johnny Carson. Khomeini.”

The task of putting together thirty minutes of daily coverage on the same story was made considerably easier by the Carter administration’s decision to keep the crisis in the public eye. According to Hodding Carter, then assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs, “the decision was made for there to be a very visibly concerned president who said in effect that the hostages’ fate is a primary concern of the president of the United States.” On reflection, one ABC staff member made clear the interdependence of news makers and policy-makers: “We needed a daily news peg. If they had said, ‘No, we’re not going to talk about the hostage crisis anymore,’ that show would have ultimately perished.” Regular evening news broadcasts were also dominated by the hostages: one analyst has estimated that, over the entire year of 1980, coverage of the hostages in Iran took up more than 20 percent of all television news; on ABC, coverage averaged 4.1 minutes out of every 22-minute broadcast.

ABC’s initial presentation of the crisis stressed the innocence of the hostages, their captivity, and their national identity. The first shots had focused on the humiliating vision of “one American” held captive. As *America Held Hostage* continued, the initial shot of hostage Barry Rosen in a blindfold became a staple image, a constantly invoked symbol, used at least once in most broadcasts as the illustrative on-screen icon. Updates on the hostages or reports on Iranian demonstrations and flag burnings were often introduced with this photo, which became perhaps the single most visible symbol of the crisis overall. This image soon came to represent the nation itself: if the hostages were important in Iran because of their symbolic meaning, they were important to Americans for the same reason. Both sides saw the people held inside the embassy as representing the United States, and the question of how the “United States” should be treated became the underlying political stakes of the drama being played out in Tehran.

Within the television news accounts, the hostages represented the United States not because they worked for the U.S. embassy but because of their status as private individuals, as “typical Americans.” The fact that most of the hostages were American diplomatic personnel (“official Americans,” in State Department lingo) was all but ignored. Instead, the hostages were consistently identified by their positions within their families, by their relationship to “home.” Throughout the months of the crisis, the human drama of parents, wives, and children waiting for the hostages’ return structured the news stories of Iranian demands, diplomatic negotiations, and foreign policy complexities. Gary Sick, an official in the Carter administration, described the coverage as “the longest running human interest drama in the history of television”: “Never had a news story so thoroughly captured the imagination of the U.S. public. Never had the nation sat so totally transfixed before its television sets awaiting the latest predictable chants of ‘Death to America’ alternating with the day’s interview with a brave relative of one of the hostages.” Although the reporters narrating the interviews

and family stories usually indicated whether the hostage was in the military or part of the diplomatic staff, and listed briefly his or her title, those were not significant distinctions; very little was ever said of the specifics of a particular hostage's job within the embassy, or of his or her political convictions. Instead, television audiences learned the names of the hostages and saw frequent interviews with their families. The hostages were individualized—they had weeping mothers and stoic fathers—but not distinguished from each other.

The suffering of the families of the hostages was painfully clear, as, in interview after interview, they struggled to maintain hope for the safe return of their family members. At Christmas the first year, and again the second year, television crews went to homes and church services, interviewed children and neighbors, filmed presents being opened around Christmas trees in families with missing fathers or sons or daughters. As the months wore on, the "hostage families" became a new kind of figure in American public life: they gave interviews, held their own press conferences, and attended commemorative events in local communities. They also had a powerful status as moral agents in the realm of politics. Families traveled to meetings with government officials in Europe, and on one occasion, Ted Koppel arranged for the wife of one of the hostages to confront an Iranian diplomat on *Nightline*. These families represented their husbands or children in the Tehran embassy, but they also became more broadly representative; they were not the nation-state as public institution but the national community constituted through its families, and now under siege. The hostages were identified with the private sphere, allied with family, emotions, and domesticity, rather than diplomacy, officialdom, or politics.

The yellow ribbons that soon became the predominant public symbol of concern for the hostages were another important instance of this framework: the ribbons appeared on streetlights, pinned to blouses, and on bumper stickers. In January 1980, a gigantic yellow ribbon was wrapped around the outside of the Super Bowl stadium. The yellow ribbons had a complicated history as a symbol of female fidelity to husbands or boyfriends in times of war; they symbolized the promise of love and reentry into private life for soldiers, and now for hostages. The practice of placing yellow ribbons was a material part of the construction of meanings about Iran; it also provided private citizens with a simple way to identify as part of the "family" that would welcome the hostages home. The location of the hostages in the world of "private life" became a way of marking them as nonpolitical, and their "freedom from politics" became one of the primary aspects of the political narrative that developed around them.

In a similar way, ABC's icon of Barry Rosen invited the audience to see the crisis as a simple story of human suffering. The moral distinction between Iranian "fanaticism" and the haunting image of a single, blindfolded man's face was the not-very-subtle subtext of many of the ABC reports. This depoliticization of the individual, his or her insertion into a position of virtuous selfhood, is the classic move of the captivity narrative; it identifies the hostage with the feminized space of family and sexuality. Identification with the private sphere is the guarantee of "innocence"; it is what constitutes the captive as the virtuous victim resisting illegitimate domination. In the case of Iran, these private individuals were counterposed to the mass of Iranians chanting outside the embassy, fists raised, their fury turned either on the people inside or on the effigies of Carter they burned

outside the gates. The contrast invited those in the American audience to feel their own furious bewilderment. And despite the fact that some news accounts explained something of the history of U.S.-Iranian relations under the Shah, a determined incomprehension remained the dominant stance. The news media made something of a virtue of this incomprehension. In February, after more than three months of near-saturation reporting, CBS anchor Walter Cronkite could still open his report on diplomatic developments in the hostage situation with the comment that the breakthrough might help solve "the gigantic puzzle that for the last 103 days has been Iran."

The Iranian students at the embassy and their supporters, on the other hand, did everything in their power to emphasize the "guilt" of the hostages and their status as U.S. government representatives. Statements by Khomeini or other Iranian officials often referred to the embassy as a "den of spies," a designation that emphasized the official, and potentially hostile, status of the embassy employees. In fact, as is the case with almost all embassies, some of the U.S. personnel stationed in Tehran did have espionage responsibilities....

The Iranian attempt to stage an ideological rather than personal confrontation was perhaps most evident in the decision, two weeks after the initial takeover, to release some of the hostages. Right after the embassy attack, boxer Muhammad Ali had volunteered to replace the hostages, saying that the militants' actions were against the spirit of Islam. His offer was ignored, but soon thereafter, with the PLO serving as negotiator, the students agreed to release any women and black men who were not being held as suspected spies, on the argument that neither of these groups was as central as white men to the dominant power structure in the United States. The goal was also apparently to split U.S. public opinion; on the day the release was announced, a demonstrator in Tehran was filmed carrying a sign obviously meant for the U.S. television cameras on the scene: "American Blacks! Rais [*sic*] Up against Carter!"

Although this rather crude attempt at revolutionary incitement got little hearing, the Iranian students had more success in getting their views across to one of the first group of released hostages. One young marine, Sergeant William Quarles, told reporters in Tehran that he had made some friends among his captors. Quarles's statement also indicated that he had been receptive to some of the political frameworks the Iranians had presented. "In a way, I kinda hate to leave them. Some of them are pretty nice people," Quarles told reporters. "I've learned a lot from what I've read and what I've seen, and I'm very saddened by some of the things that went on under the Shah's regime." The history of the U.S. relationship with the Shah, he seemed to suggest, might deserve some inquiry. Before televising this apparently shocking statement, the ABC reporter explained to viewers that Quarles's apparent sympathy for his captors was a syndrome well known to psychologists. American officials later admitted that they were "concerned about some of the statements the freed hostages have made since their release."

But the explanatory power of such explicitly political approaches was overridden by the personalist and ahistorical approaches of the hostage captivity narrative. When that narrative did attempt to explain Iranian actions (rather than simply assume a posture of appalled bafflement), it did so through Islam, rather

than the specific history of U.S.-Iranian relations. "Militant Islam" quickly became the primary narrative device for the U.S. news media; long essays and editorials in many major publications explained "Islam" as a single, unchanging cultural proclivity to mix faith with politics, and to express both through violence. The vast variety of Muslim beliefs and practices, spread across four continents, were summarized in simplistic, often overtly hostile summaries of the "essence" of Islam, which was now allegedly on display in Tehran. This explanation of events as both produced by, and exemplary of, Islam also enabled a certain categorization of persons: Muslims were those who made politics out of simple human suffering.

Islam was contrasted explicitly with Christianity, and perhaps in no other political situation in the 1970s did the mainstream media and politicians so insistently present the United States as a "Christian" nation. In 1979, after almost two decades of slow secularization of U.S. political life (and just before the political victories of the emerging Christian Right), it was relatively uncommon for the mainstream media to evoke Christianity as a public symbol of nationalism.... But as "Islam" emerged as the category for understanding Iran, Christianity became remarkably prominent in the media accounts.

This mobilization of religion-as-nation was particularly evident in one dramatic segment of ABC's *America Held Hostage* on December 21, 1979, six weeks after the takeover of the embassy. The anchor introduced a report on a demonstration in support of the hostages by commenting that Americans and Iranians were "worlds apart in their view of the world, their values, their principles, and surely in their demonstrations." This American demonstration, the anchor opined, "was totally unlike *anything* we have seen in Iran." In fact, the "demonstration" was a gathering of foreign service officers and marines, the colleagues of the hostages, who marched silently in Washington, D.C., then gathered for a short service, where they sang "God Bless America" and several other songs. With only a minimum of voice-over (which explained that the songs were being sung at the request of one of the hostages), the camera panned the crowd, first in straight-on close-ups, then in medium close-ups shot from below, so that the camera and the television audience looked up into the faces of those singing. The camera then pulled back to a wide-angle shot of the crowd with one large American flag waving in the middle. That shot seemed to end the broadcast; anchor Frank Reynolds signed off with the American flag and the crowd in a still image beside him. But before the credits rolled, the film of the demonstration recommenced, serving as a kind of coda: a young marine, in full-dress uniform, went to the front of the stage to sing "Go Down Moses." The (white) marine's performance of the old African American spiritual was formal, almost operatic, but its resonance with the exodus story and its African American revisions were clear—this time, "the people" were not African American slaves or their descendants, nor new nations struggling against colonialism, nor even just the hostages in Iran, but the entire American nation those hostages were seen to represent. This re-invocation and reinterpretation of the black Christian use of the exodus narrative mobilized its nationalist connotations. As the singer intoned the repeated phrase "let my people go," the camera lingered on his face; when the young man stepped away from the podium, the camera pulled back to medium shot. The final frozen image was of a serious

but proud marine, smiling slightly at the applause that greeted his evocative rendition of the ancient story of captivity and redemption.

The reporting on the hostage crisis took on a different tone when, in April 1980, five months after the initial embassy takeover, the U.S. government attempted a military rescue of the hostages, code-named Operation Eagle's Claw. The rescue plan called for helicopters to be flown to the Iranian desert, from where they would carry members of the Delta Force special operations team (formed in 1977 in part in response to the successes of the Israelis at Entebbe) into the heart of Tehran. The team would then drive pre-positioned vehicles to the embassy, extract the hostages, and bring them back to the desert for pickup. On April 24, a visibly shaken President Carter announced that the mission had been aborted at stage one, after three of the helicopters had been taken out of service for malfunction or navigational problems. Then, as the rescue team had prepared to leave the Desert One staging area outside of Tehran, one of the helicopters accidentally collided with one of the transport planes, killing eight military personnel and seriously wounding five others.

Television news coverage of the rescue failure was extraordinary in both its intensity and its tone. Several long news specials described the mission, naming the members of the rescue team who had died, interviewing their families, and detailing the furious reactions of people from across the political spectrum. The Carter administration defended its decision to launch the rescue, and the decision to abort it, amid a storm of protest from those European allies and congressional representatives who said that military measures should not have been used, as well as the outcry from those who strongly supported the idea of a rescue but who angrily discussed the mission's failures of planning and execution. Meanwhile, both television and print media produced in-depth accounts of the attempted rescue, to the extent that information was available, showing detailed maps and step-by-step illustrated explanations of the rescue plan, with arrows and charts explaining what had gone wrong, and where, and why....

Then, too, there was the issue of the bodies. Left in the burned wreckage of the plane, the bodies of the eight servicemen quickly became tangible signifiers of national failure.... [T]he U.S. operation would be symbolized by the humiliation of those bodies left behind. The day after the mission, ABC anchor Frank Reynolds opened his broadcast with a melodramatic summary: "We tried, we failed, and we have paid a price: the bodies of eight young Americans still lie in the Iranian desert, victims of a daring and tragic end to the rescue mission in Iran." Unremarkable in its casual claim to "we"—by this time, television news had become all but the official mouthpiece for an outraged nationalist response to the crisis—the report also signaled what would be television's near-universal narration of the event: it was good to have tried a rescue but inexcusable to have failed. The tenor of helpless anger only increased when the bodies were taken to Tehran, where some religious authorities joined the Iranian students in unwrapping charred corpses before a gathering of demonstrators—and, of course, the television cameras. No network showed the exposed bodies, but ABC allowed close-ups of the cloth-covered bodies and footage of the beginning of the unwrapping process, thus getting close enough to the display to be shocking.

In the months following the April rescue attempt, the hostage story stayed in the news, with hopes for a negotiated end rising and waning. Conventional wisdom had it that another rescue had been made impossible, though in fact the Carter administration began planning a second try two days after the failure of the first. But during the next months, little else happened to promise hope, despite ongoing negotiations....

The last six months of the hostages' captivity were dominated by reports of the possibility of their release. From late July to September, a negotiated solution looked very likely. But on September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iranian territory, crossing four strategic junctures, including the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway, and launching what would become the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Many Iranians were convinced that the Iraqi attack was instituted, or at least backed, by the United States, so the onset of hostilities with Iraq made negotiations with the United States much more difficult. With the hostages still in Tehran, Jimmy Carter proved to be unelectable and on November 4, 1980 (the first anniversary of the embassy attack), Ronald Reagan won the presidential election decisively. Another Christmas passed, commemorated in television specials and, once again, long interviews with the hostage families. The Iranian government was by then engaged in furious negotiations with the Carter administration. The conservative clerics in power had now become convinced that the continued holding of hostages was doing their government more harm than good. Finally, in the last weeks of the Carter administration, terms for the release of the hostages were settled upon and enacted. These terms included the release of more than \$8 billion in Iranian assets held in the United States. On January 21, 1981—the day of Reagan's inauguration, and thus the last day that Iran could be sure that the arrangements it had made with Carter would be honored—the hostages were released. As a result of their 444-day captivity, the United States had, indeed, been taught a lesson about the limits of its power. But over the course of the 1980s, the impact of that lesson was surely not what any of the revolutionary elements in Iran would have hoped....

The Shock Troops of Direct Action: ACT UP Confronts the AIDS Crisis

BRADFORD MARTIN

On a March morning in 1987 a group of 250 protesters assembled for a demonstration on New York City's Wall Street, a site selected for its connection to American business and to big pharmaceutical companies particularly. At the time of the protest, Burroughs Wellcome, the manufacturer of AZT, the lone federally approved drug for AIDS treatment, held a monopoly on the drug's patent. This contributed to ballooning prices for AIDS patients, estimated as high as \$10,000 annually, that made the drug cost prohibitive for an alarming portion of affected patients already forced to endure a number of harmful side effects associated with AZT. The demonstration featured a direct action protest designed to interrupt business as usual and

gamer media attention to raise public awareness for the protesters' cause. Ultimately, seventeen demonstrators were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. A photo in the following day's *New York Times* under the heading "Homosexuals Arrested at AIDS Drug Protest" shows demonstrators lying limp in classic 1960s-era civil disobedience style, with one protester being dragged away by two of New York City's finest. The demonstrators' demands, enumerated on a flyer they distributed, revealed detailed knowledge of which corporations and universities were conducting research on particular AIDS drugs. These demands conveyed the conviction that people with AIDS should play a vital part in the decision making that affected their lives and treatment. The list identified specific individuals and institutions as the "villains" of the AIDS crisis, seeking to make them publicly accountable. Drug companies were implored to "Curb your greed!" and, underscoring the failure of the Great Communicator to address the epidemic, protesters exhorted, "President Reagan, nobody is in charge!" The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) had made its first big splash.

If urban problems, widening economic inequality, and social welfare received callous treatment in Reagan-era America, the AIDS crisis labored to receive any treatment at all. By 1987, what had begun in the early 1980s as a mysterious "gay plague" had claimed an estimated twenty-five thousand lives. Events such as the death of the 1950s and 1960s screen icon Rock Hudson received copious media coverage, but the epidemic had yet to receive serious attention from the federal government. In his public speeches, President Reagan refrained from using the term "AIDS" for the first six years of the crisis.

In response to the worsening epidemic, ACT UP, initially a New York-based group, functioned as the shock troops of AIDS activism. Quickly becoming the movement's radical cutting edge, its anger and intelligence, theatrics and persistence, and creativity and militancy prodded targeted institutions with heightened urgency. Through its street-level presence, media savvy, and visual imagery, ACT UP's direct action protests also battled the larger issues of prejudice and discrimination surrounding the AIDS crisis, from combating myths regarding the disease's transmission, to arguing (often against gay conservatives) for the need to maintain a "sex positive" outlook, to safe sex campaigns and clean needle exchanges. But ACT UP's dramatic public profile told only part of the story. Internally, the group created a palpable sense of community for the activists who participated in and shared its vibrant movement culture. While sometimes drawing, consciously or subconsciously from the radical activist movements of the 1960s, ACT UP pioneered innovative aesthetic and organizational strategies infused with a gay cultural sensibility to establish its own distinctive brand of activism.

ACT UP originated from the need to agitate for quicker progress in response to the AIDS crisis. Popular history holds that the playwright Larry Kramer founded ACT UP in 1987 because the Gay Men's Health Crisis (GMHC), also founded by Kramer in 1982, had become too institutionalized, too beholden to its financial underwriters, too cautious politically, and too preoccupied with attending to people who were dying, to meet the necessary challenges of the rapidly expanding AIDS crisis. As Kramer admonished the GMHC, "No longer do you fight

for the living; you have become a funeral home." Several ACT UP members have quibbled with this iconic account, citing the GMHC's service to the community of people with AIDS as a vital form of activism in its own right and pointing to the role of activists other than Kramer in ACT UP's founding. What is clear is that while the GMHC stressed a multifaceted approach to the prevention, treatment, and cure of AIDS/HIV, ACT UP's mission explicitly called for direct action protest and public demonstration.

From the very beginning, ACT UP's protests combined direct action and civil disobedience with a heavy dose of theatrics, suggesting that ACT UP principals had gleaned a lesson or two from their forebears about using symbolic politics to raise public awareness and attract media attention. At the initial Wall Street demonstration, the group hung an effigy of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) commissioner Frank Young. It also staged "die-ins," including one in Chicago that echoed Vietnam War-era theatrical protests such as the Living Theatre's "Plague" piece and the Guerrilla Art Action Group's "Blood Bath." Sometimes ACT UP borrowed from the theater-as-politics playbook of 1960s trickster activists such as the Yippies and Diggers, who mounted such absurdist spectacles as nominating a pig for president and staging a "Death of Money" parade in full funeral regalia in order to dramatize radical critiques of mainstream politics and values. In one episode, ACT UP infiltrated the Republican National Convention using fake badges secured by ingratiating themselves with the Kinko's staff. In another, more elaborate guerrilla theatre ruse, ACT UP members invented fake names and posed as Republican women to gain admittance to a Republican Women's Club where Senator Alfonse D'Amato was speaking. Maria Maggenti, for instance, wore a "little red shift and these really cute Pappagallo shows." Inventing a cover story to explain away her nose ring, a badge of subterranean downtown New York at the time, Maggenti told the guests that her father had served in India during the Nixon administration. When D'Amato began, they stripped away the costumes that facilitated "passing" as Republicans to reveal giant buttons proclaiming LESBIANS FOR BUSH and hoisted up an assortment of ACT UP posters and flyers. Though some ACT UP members preferred to distance themselves from the radical politics of a generation before or plead ignorance of its vocabulary of activist tactics, many of the techniques and sensibilities of theatricalized protest had so institutionalized themselves by the late 1980s that ACT UP's activists could draw from them seamlessly, even as they updated and adapted the repertoire for their own ends.

... [T]he group was fueled by a sense of outrage and anger over drug company greed and federal government inaction. ACT UP's official "self-definition," or mission statement, asserted that its fundamental purpose was to unite "in anger" to fight AIDS. On the front lines of demonstrations, the group's signature rhythmic chant—"ACT UP! Fight Back! Fight AIDS!"—seemed a perfectly straightforward accompaniment to direct action, but on closer inspection it embodied a couple of the group's core principles. The verb "to act up," as the AIDS activist Jon Greenberg explained, indicated misbehavior that was "not so severe as to be morally wrong," but rather "inconvenient" or discomfiting, and that challenged the limits of authority. This kind of "acting up" was central from the outset: the group had established its militant acronym before settling on AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power as the

words for which that acronym stood. Its actions provoked authority and confronted the general public's ingrained prejudices. The second part of the chant, "Fight back!" conveyed the sense of opposition that pervaded the group's actions. ACT UP urged demonstrators and sympathetic bystanders to "fight back" and actively combat authorities and institutions that inhibited a swift and effective response to the AIDS crisis. Moreover, the rhetoric of "fighting back" captured the adversarial relationship ACT UP had with the Reagan administration and the FDA, opponents that had already proven hostile. "To be a movement activist during Reagan/Bush was to work in the Resistance," one member wrote. It required a daily "war to influence policy and widen the public space to live as lesbian, gay, and bisexual people."

In October 1988 more than a thousand demonstrators disrupted business as usual at the FDA's Rockville, Maryland, headquarters, in an action called Seize Control of the FDA that resulted in 176 arrests. Activists targeted the FDA as the federal government agency most responsible for testing and approving drugs for AIDS treatment, contending that its laggard approval process was responsible for a mounting cost in the lives of their friends and loved ones. One of ACT UP's defining goals was getting "drugs into bodies" as quickly as possible. When the FDA cited its mission to make sure drugs were safe and effective before appearing on the market, AIDS activists countered that people already dying of AIDS risked little by trying promising experimental drugs. With its action at the FDA headquarters, ACT UP blamed a dysfunctional bureaucracy for the dozens of daily AIDS deaths. ACT UP placards trenchantly featured the skulls of three corpses and bore the inscription *TIME ISN'T THE ONLY THING THE FDA IS KILLING*.

The FDA protest signaled a change within the dynamics of ACT UP. As Gregg Bordowitz observed, it shifted "the group away from a defensive posture to an offensive posture." At the FDA protest, ACT UP abandoned its early program of reacting to conservative cultural attacks on AIDS victims and the gay community and came up with "a vision for the way that health care should be done in this country, the way that drugs should be researched, and sold, and made available." ACT UP's ability to articulate this vision rested on the arduous research efforts of the group's Treatment and Data Committee (T&D), which diligently researched and analyzed myriad complex, technical AIDS-related treatment issues. During the months leading up to the FDA action, the committee educated the group's general membership about the agency's role and functions. T&D produced a detailed *FDA Action Handbook* that explained the nature and history of the FDA, its role in controlling access to AIDS drugs, and its misdeeds in the drug approval process.

ACT UP's Mark Harrington, a spearhead in the handbook's creation, explained the need for this educational effort: "In those days, a lot of people thought that the FDA actually tested the drugs. They didn't understand that they actually just oversee the testing, which is done by NIH or by industry." He continued, "So, there was a whole lot of explaining about an institution, a set of regulations and laws, and some scientific concepts that had to be done in two months, so that everybody in ACT UP could understand it, so that we could get across the message to the American people when we went to the

FDA." Harrington's remarks underscore how ACT UP's internal educational process represented a kind of AIDS treatment consciousness-raising designed in turn to promote a media-friendly public message. To this end, ACT UP's Media Committee prepared a detailed press kit that alerted the media to the group's conviction that experimental new AIDS therapies constituted a crucial component of health care and that people with AIDS ought to be entitled to access to these therapies as a right.

Echoing one of the main tenets of 1960s-style participatory democracy—that ordinary citizens ought to be involved in the critical decision making that affects their lives—Bordowitz pointed to ACT UP's placement of people with AIDS at the forefront of public discussion as one of the group's major accomplishments. Prior to ACT UP, discussion of AIDS treatment had been dominated by the technical jargon of the scientific/medical community, bureaucratic health-care institutions, and politicians revving up homophobic, socially conservative constituencies by calling for mandatory testing. Within a year after the protest, the FDA and NIH increasingly allowed people with AIDS to take part in discussions surrounding the drug approval process and even came to seek their participation. ACT UP, Bordowitz explained, had "wrested control" of the AIDS discussion from the "hands of the right wing" and steered it toward the control of "people with the disease itself." Rather than simply "making statements that responded to assaults from the right," ACT UP sought to seize control of the FDA and, in Bordowitz's words, "run the fucking thing ourselves." "We knew we weren't actually going to do that," he explained, "but ... it was incredibly important to stay on point with that rhetoric." What Bordowitz meant by this reflected ACT UP's desire to transform the language surrounding the AIDS epidemic.

While the 1988 FDA protest addressed AIDS on a national stage, ACT UP confronted the crisis militantly at the grass roots as well. The group's original New York chapter focused attention on Mayor Edward Koch's administration and its negligence on a variety of interrelated urban health issues connected with AIDS. Prior to its March 1989 Target City Hall action, ACT UP recruited numerous new protestors who were similarly concerned about the state of health care in New York City. The group then used the momentum of this expanded out-reach to mount its largest demonstration to date. *The New York Times* reported that three thousand demonstrators ringed City Hall, calling for additional health-care funding, the expansion of overcrowded hospitals, and increased housing for homeless people with AIDS. ACT UP crafted a handbook similar to the one it had made for the FDA action, which educated demonstrators about the complex of interrelated public health issues they wanted the Koch administration to address. Demonstrators carried placards laden with clever, incisive double entendres, such as SINCE THE CITY CUT AIDS EDUCATION, MORE KIDS GET TO LEAVE SCHOOL EARLY and FOR MANY BLACKS AND LATINOS UNABLE TO AFFORD AIDS CARE THE COST OF LIVING IS TOO HIGH. Even though the New York City government was ostensibly the focus of Target City Hall, by addressing a range of public health issues, ACT UP highlighted systemic issues of social and economic inequality pervasive in the 1980s, such as homelessness and lack of affordable health care, thus indicting Reagan-era national priorities as well.

Target City Hall, like Seize Control of the FDA, demonstrated a surprising potential for activism to convey complex messages about socioeconomic inequality, municipal governance, and an alarming health-care crisis. At the street level, however, it remained a direct action protest that disrupted the public space with noise, blocked traffic, and paraded banners to dramatize the cause....

Many of the most memorable images associated with AIDS activism emanated from Gran Fury, a collective associated with ACT UP who were committed to making “guerrilla art” to raise public awareness of issues affecting people living with AIDS. Though Gran Fury took its name from the Plymouth model widely used as an undercover police cruiser in New York City, the name also evoked the cathartic anger that the ACT UP acronym embodied. The collaboration of some of its artists predated the name Gran Fury and even the establishment of ACT UP itself. In 1986 several artists who later became Gran Fury designed a poster that eventually became the iconic image of AIDS activism. It showed a pink triangle, referencing the Nazi symbol for homosexual prisoners, with SILENCE = DEATH written in large white capital letters underneath, all against a black background. Below the “Silence = Death” message, in smaller white lettering, the fine print detailed the rationale for this equation: “Why is Reagan silent about AIDS? What is really going on at the Centers for Disease Control, the Federal Drug Administration, and the Vatican? Gays and lesbians are not expendable ... Use your power ... Vote ... Boycott ... Defend yourselves ... Turn anger, fear, grief into action.” The poster used the postmodern art technique of appropriating recognizable symbols and juxtaposing them with written language to produce fresh meanings. Silence = Death came to emblemize AIDS activism, appearing on T-shirts, buttons, and stickers. It was adapted and redeployed prodigiously for demonstrations and actions, shining a bright light on individuals and institutions criticized as “silent.”

After ACT UP's 1987 founding, members of what later became Gran Fury coalesced around an installation called *Let the Record Show*. The ACT UP member and New Museum of Contemporary Art curator Bill Olander initiated this project, offering ACT UP space in the museum's window to create an artwork about AIDS. The ensuing project mobilized the diverse skills of an array of artists. One component involved gathering AIDS statistics from news media sources to quantify the dimensions of the crisis. These statistics, displayed on an LED sign in the style of the renowned 1980s deconstruction artist Jenny Holzer, revealed the inadequate government funding for AIDS research and education, the disproportionate correlation of incidences of AIDS to racial minorities such as blacks and Hispanics, and the epidemic's rising death toll, implicitly indicting the Reagan administration's inactivity. The artists and activists also collected a selection of “horrific” quotes from cultural and political conservatives whom AIDS activists viewed as the opposition and whom they wished to implicate publicly. The project took comments—such as the Moral Majority founder Jerry Falwell's opinion that “AIDS is God's judgment of a society that does not live by His rules” and Senator Jesse Helms's remark that “the logical outcome of testing is a quarantine of those infected”—and literally cast them in concrete slabs for the

historical record the installation's title referenced. Ronald Reagan was also represented, but the concrete slab underneath his photographic image was left intentionally blank to symbolize his crime as one of silence. The Silence = Death graphic reinforced this point, displayed in full neon signage above the rest of the installation. The artists concluded that the best way to hold these figures accountable was to metaphorically put them on trial, and so, continuing Silence = Death's appropriation of Holocaust imagery, *Let the Record Show* employed a photomural of the Nuremberg trials as a backdrop to suggest a connection between the fatal implications of the Reagan administration's lack of an AIDS policy, the callousness of American society at large, especially on the part of conservatives, and Nazi war criminals.

The *Let the Record Show* artists developed a creative process that both drew on and transcended examples of activist visual art of the Vietnam War era. In the 1960s the Art Workers' Coalition (AWC) voiced its political opposition to the war with a special focus on the war's effect on the art world milieu in which its members operated. Like the AWC, the *Let the Record Show* collaborators sought to create "non-commodifiable" art that could deliver a political and social message and resist commercial co-optation. As Gran Fury's Michael Nesline remarked, "There's not going to be any art product at the end of it that can be resold and could accumulate in value." Their aesthetic drew from art but always gave politics precedence. The group's style eschewed the modernist artistic emphasis on originality, giving priority to the need to "try to arrest the viewer to stop and look at stuff." Marlene McCarty explained, "We never, ever, ever, came together and said, 'We're going to make art.'" Rather, she claimed that Gran Fury's goal was to deliver messages to the mainstream world in the most "raw and rambunctious" way possible. Though the precedence of political commitment over aesthetics echoed the art world activists of the 1960s, the *Let the Record Show* artists and later Gran Fury succeeded in mobilizing a far wider visual vocabulary in the service of AIDS activism.

Gran Fury created several visuals to accompany the nationwide Nine Days of Protest campaign during the spring of 1988. One of the most striking of these, epitomizing the group's aesthetic and rhetorical style, showed the logo of the medical profession, two serpents intertwining around a staff, on a plain white background. This image, juxtaposed with the statement "All People with AIDS Are Innocent," challenged the mainstream media's suggestion that people with AIDS usually belonged to one or more marginalized and presumably "deviant" groups—including homosexuals, IV drug users, and prostitutes—that implicitly bore greater culpability for their disease than "innocent" victims of AIDS such as children, hemophiliacs, and heterosexuals. It also held the medical community responsible for offering the best possible treatment to all people living with AIDS, regardless of social position. At the very bottom line of the poster, in elegant yet understated cursive lettering, the group placed its own signature.

Gran Fury developed a vocabulary of what one member called "snappy one-liners": pointed, brief, often double-entendre-crammed barbs to counter homophobic, unenlightened, and misguided apathetic views that it aimed to overturn. The SEXISM REARS ITS UNPROTECTED HEAD poster contained one of

Gran Fury's most notorious images, featuring an erect penis with the provocative admonition **MEN: USE CONDOMS OR BEAT IT** to counter the media stereotype of AIDS as a prohibitively gay male disease. The message **AIDS KILLS WOMEN** highlighted that point at the bottom of the poster.

Another Gran Fury poster positioned a bloody red handprint between the broad agitprop accusation **THE GOVERNMENT HAS BLOOD ON ITS HANDS** at the top of the poster and a factoid highlighting the crisis's severity—**ONE AIDS DEATH EVERY HALF HOUR**—at the bottom. Appearing originally in poster form, "The Government Has Blood on Its Hands" was then reproduced in diverse formats, such as on T-shirts and stickers that were sold in an **ACT UP** gift shop. Gran Fury excerpted the "Men: Use Condoms or Beat It" line from "Sexism Rears Its Unprotected Head" and created a popular and highly visible sticker with this catchy barb. So while Gran Fury eschewed making commodifiable art, its members were not averse to making commodifiable paraphernalia to bankroll AIDS activism and disseminate its ideas to a wider audience.

Considering the art critic Lucy Lippard's observation that artists "are by nature unequipped for group thinking or action," Gran Fury enjoyed a relatively lengthy career, spanning half a dozen years in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Oral history interviews with Gran Fury artists suggest that members' shared enthusiasm for working collectively played a vital role in this longevity. "It was amazing," Gran Fury's Marlene McCarty remembered, "to be able to come together with these eleven people, and just like, everybody was in there throwing out their two bits. Some of the comments were completely out in left field, but everything was processed and processed. And you saw how eleven people were better than one." While McCarty describes the collaborative creative process at its best, even Gran Fury artists who acknowledged its frustrations concurred that it was ultimately deeply rewarding. Robert Vasquez-Pacheco, who came to Gran Fury with a painting background and had never worked in a collective, recalled, "We would sit down and bring ideas to the table and say yes, no, reject them, change them. That was something totally new for me. I had never had that experience for someone to say, 'No, we're not going to do it that way. We're going to do it this way.'" Ultimately, however, Vasquez-Pacheco concluded that despite the fact that individual artistic vision was subject to collective revision, "It was good, it was fun." The secret to collective fun trumping personal artistic disappointment and frustration in Gran Fury lay in the precedence of activism over art. As Marlene McCarty explained, "We were not like, 'Let's do something that's never been done,' we were just, 'Oh, that works, let's do that.'" McCarty's comment illuminates Gran Fury's process of appropriation from the wide palette of postmodern art. The group drew eclectically from such sources as Barbara Kruger's deconstruction art, Jenny Holzer's pioneering incorporation of language and text in works of art, and the commercial aesthetics of modern advertising. Whatever visual elements might most effectively serve the cause made it into Gran Fury's work. The goal, in McCarty's words, was not about being in a "rarefied, contemplative environment," but rather "to be outside, where people might read some of these texts or images who would not necessarily go into an art gallery."

Gran Fury's strategy of deploying imagery in public venues to reach new audiences outside the art world was epitomized by the 1989 Kissing Doesn't Kill campaign. The group installed panels on buses in cities including New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. The panels' design borrowed substantially from modern advertising, particularly the United Colors of Benetton campaign that famously featured groups of children and young adults representing a multicultural array of backgrounds to sell its sweaters, scarves, hats, and other vestments. Kissing Doesn't Kill foregrounded three multiethnic couples kissing to evoke the Benetton ads, but Gran Fury added a new twist—two of the three couples were same-sex couples. Above the male-female, male-male, and female-female couples, Gran Fury placed the heading KISSING DOESN'T KILL: GREED AND INDIFFERENCE DO. Smaller text targeted specific sectors of American society that ACT UP deemed responsible: "Corporate Greed, Government Inaction, and Public Indifference Make AIDS a Political Crisis." Kissing Doesn't Kill displayed the full range of Gran Fury's graphic and rhetorical skill. It featured a quintessential snappy one-liner that repudiated public misinformation about how AIDS was transmitted, it redirected accountability toward powerful institutions and away from victims, and by adopting the visual feel of hip advertising, it broached new audiences, enticing them to decipher its juxtaposition of image and text. Moreover, it sexualized AIDS activism by affirming that sexuality and pleasure themselves hung in the balance. In ACT UP's language, Kissing Doesn't Kill was "sex positive."

From the beginnings of the AIDS epidemic, tensions arose over how sexual expression would be redefined in the context of the crisis, both within the gay community and the larger American public. One branch of the gay community avoided challenging and even reinforced the mainstream media characterization of AIDS as the result of a culture of promiscuity inherent in the gay lifestyle. In this vein, Randy Shilts's seminal tome, *And the Band Played On*, chronicles public and institutional inaction during the epidemic's early years, while reinforcing the idea that promiscuity was in part to blame. The story follows a male flight attendant, dubbed "Patient Zero," whose licentious philandering is implicated in a disproportionate number of early cases of infection. Shilts moralistically positions Patient Zero among the "arch villains" of the crisis, alongside governmental and health-care bureaucracies. For many gay activists, such sentiments reflected how the gay community had internalized the opinions of homophobes such as the Moral Majority's Jerry Falwell, who viewed AIDS as a divine judgment on sexual mores gone awry. Shilts and other gay conservatives hoped to win public sympathy and resources for treatment through publicly admitting complicity in the crisis and pledging more conservative sexual behavior going forward.

ACT UP's movement culture sought to combat this climate of sexual conservatism. While Gran Fury's Kissing Doesn't Kill and other graphics sexualized AIDS activism publicly, within ACT UP, members carved out a safe place for sexual expression amid a mainstream response to AIDS that rendered American sexual culture more conservative by the minute. ACT UP's weekly meetings emerged as one place where a safe haven existed. Gregg Bordowitz described

the overlapping political and sexual energies of the meetings—"There is all kinds of cruising going on on the sides, and eye catching and chattiness"—praising the group's remarkable mixture of intellectual ferment and passion and "erotic energy." Though some ACT UP-ers, such as Gedalia Braverman, focused exclusively on activism, citing a need "to attend to it as business" and explaining that this "wasn't a place for sexual exploits and to get laid all the time and meet cute guys," oral history interviews indicate that this compartmentalization of politics and sexuality was a minority position within ACT UP. As Jean Carlomusto put it, "We were negotiating with these issues of sexual attraction between the group all the time, and it crossed boundaries ... The men were having sex with the men, the women were having sex with the women, men and women were having sex with each other. It came down to the Emma Goldman saying: 'If I can't dance, I don't want your revolution.' If we can't fuck, what are we doing here?" This vision of sexuality as an integral part of a political and social movement echoed the 1960s counterculture's emphasis on sexual revolution as a vital aspect of the overall cultural transformation it sought. But where counter-culturalists sought sexual liberation, ACT UP's expressions of sexuality during the AIDS epidemic took on a different tenor as many of their friends and lovers were dying of a sexually transmitted disease and as the mainstream media popularized conservatives' calls to abstinence and monogamy. In their call for sexual freedom and openness, ACT UP aimed not so much at unleashing unbridled sexuality, but rather at making the post-AIDS world safe for sexual expression—particularly gay sexual expression.

Safe sex education was a vital part of this effort. The Testing the Limits Collective and DIVA TV were ACT UP-related video production groups that focused on raising awareness about safe sex. DIVA stood for Damned Interfering Video Activists. The "interfering" part called attention to its opposition to mainstream media coverage of the AIDS crisis and its attempts to undermine it. Both DIVA TV and Testing the Limits furthered ACT UP's two main public education goals: to "increase public awareness about modes of AIDS transmission and preventative measures" and to "alleviate irrational fears." To accomplish the latter, they hoped to debunk widespread homophobic stereotypes and to explain that AIDS threatened all people, not just a small gay male subculture. During the summer of 1988, in an effort to bring these messages to a more working-class and decidedly heterosexual audience, ACT UP traveled to Shea Stadium, home of baseball's New York Mets. Banners bore messages that linked AIDS with baseball and heterosexual sex, such as MEN WEAR CONDOMS, AIDS KILLS WOMEN, and NO GLOVE, NO LOVE. Jean Carlomusto praised it for successfully making "a distinctly male space into a medium for a message" that would not usually be conveyed there. ACT UP also staged numerous "Kiss-Ins" that similarly commandeered public space to perform a "positive, loving and affirming action" while also challenging misconceptions about how AIDS is transmitted.

Many ACT UP veterans cite the moral clarity of the group's early days as a key part of its appeal—knowing "the right thing to do, or the wrong thing to do," according to one. But for many participants there was also a social, fun side to ACT UP, a side of partying, drinking, revelry, and flirtation charged with

sexual attraction, even amid tremendous anger and grief. At one gay pride party during a stiflingly hot summer evening, several ACT UP partygoers spontaneously jumped into the baby pool at nearby Tompkins Square Park. They returned to the party "half naked and dripping wet." Henceforth, this "bunch of boys" became famously known as the "Swim Team" within ACT UP. Tom Kalin referred to the Swim Team as a "micro-culture" within ACT UP, noting that they were "considered to be physically attractive boys—almost exclusively white, almost exclusively symmetrical in muscle, almost exclusively with versions of the '50s rockabilly haircut ... who knew how to wear, with exact perfection, the black wide belts and the torn jeans and the combat boots and the T-shirts." "They were the collective object of desire in the room," Kalin continued, adding that the Swim Team represented a "buff kind of gorgeous" that contributed to a public image of ACT UP as a sexy group.

Far from a quaint sidebar of ACT UP's movement culture, such sex-positive affirmations infused the group's public politics with vital energy. This rebutted the conservative and homophobic elements within the 1980s cultural and political climate, which encouraged an "easy slippage" from the reality that many gay men were getting sick with AIDS to indicting gay sexual culture as a whole. ACT UP's Kendall Thomas saw this as reflecting the tendency to "move toward moralism" in public discussions of gay sexuality amid the epidemic. ACT UP assaulted this moralism—which reflected the Christian Right's rising influence in public life during the Reagan-Bush years—with a unique cultural politics that embraced sexual pleasure and sexual play. Thomas also credited ACT UP's sexualized cultural politics as integral to personal survival: "The sex-positive, gay affirmative, politically empowering force that was in that room and in the streets of New York or DC at ACT UP actions—I do feel it saved my life. And there was some great sex that came out of it too."

Many ACT UP activists locate the group's most important achievements in its "drugs into bodies" initiative: the successful pressure to reform the FDA's practices for the testing, approval, and availability of new medications; the impact on the health-care bureaucracy; and changing the course of public debate surrounding AIDS. Yet these considerable accomplishments represent only part of the group's legacy. ACT UP also raised the public visibility of the AIDS epidemic and improved the image of gay men and lesbians at a time when more hostile responses roiled just beneath and sometimes above the surface. Carlomusto observed, "It did an enormous amount to really shake people up about their homophobia: 'Are you so homophobic that you're really glad these folks are dying?'" Moreover, ACT UP re-enchanted activism itself, pioneering innovations in political art, video documentation of activism, organizational strategy, sexual politics, and approaches to the media. This provided a powerful object lesson in the value of activism, educating "a whole generation of people" with "the sense that activism works." Michael Nesline observed that ACT UP "became a vehicle for younger people to get a sense of what it means to be politically active" and to presume "some power that they can impact the political life of our culture." Mark Harrington concurred, citing his own experience: "Before ACT UP I didn't have any faith in

mass political action—in any political action. I thought politics was the realm of hypocrisy and shallow platitudes.” By contrast, Harrington remarked on what impressed him about ACT UP: “I was in a room full of young people who didn’t subscribe to the media’s view that our generation was apolitical, careerist and materialistic. And anybody could speak, anybody could run for office—it was like ancient Athens.” That ACT UP managed such an achievement at a time when the nation’s mainstream political culture was overwhelmingly arrayed against them testifies to the group’s remarkable efficacy.

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Late Capitalism and the Rise of Globalization: Work, Labor, and Inequality in the New Century

By the closing decades of the twentieth century, the structures of capitalism in the United States looked very different than they had fifty years earlier, when the nation's economy had been dominated by industrial megaliths like automobiles and steel. As we saw in Chapter Nine, the 1970s ushered in a new era of globalization, a term used by scholars and journalists to refer to several related transformations: the reduction of trade barriers and the acceleration of the movement of capital, goods, and services across national borders; the increasingly multinational reach of corporations whose interests are no longer neatly aligned with those of individual nation states; and the advent of laws and policies that foster economic integration across nations and the creation of a global marketplace. Within the United States, this new global era was marked by the emergence of what some have called a "new economy." This is an economy marked by an ongoing shift away from manufacturing to services, rapid technological innovation, increased organizational flexibility, more fluid capital and labor markets, and a decline in organized labor unions. The introduction of new computer technologies radically changed patterns of work and consumption, while both deregulation and corporate restructuring transformed American businesses. The U.S. economy had stagnated throughout the 1970s, but after 1982, it entered the longest period of sustained economic growth since World War II. By the end of the twentieth century, the sense of limits that had been acute in the 1970s felt far away, as the country seemed awash in personal computers, cell phones, and gas-guzzling sport-utility vehicles.

The rewards of this new economy were not shared by all, however, and some Americans were asked to shoulder its considerable risks more than others. While the economy of the old postwar order had been characterized by stability and security, the new economy was marked by volatility and constant change. In the 1950s, many blue-collar and white-collar workers could realistically anticipate lifetime employment by a single company. By the 1990s, students graduating from college were told to expect as many as six to

seven careers—much less jobs—over the course of their working lives. The new economy was also startlingly unequal compared to the economy of the 1950s and 1960s, which had fostered growing equality and the expansion of the American middle class. The change was due in part to the dramatic contraction of organized labor, which had played a powerful political role in the immediate postwar years. As the middle class contracted, the rich also became richer. By the end of the twentieth century, the top 1 percent of American households possessed more wealth than the bottom 95 percent. Meanwhile, almost thirty-five million people remained below the poverty line, earning about \$13,000 per year for a three-person family. For more and more Americans, maintaining even a tenuous foothold in the middle class required two incomes, a patchwork of jobs, mounting consumer debt, and long commutes that left less and less time for family and leisure.

The disastrous consequences of this heightened volatility and growing inequality became apparent in 2007–2008, when the global economy experienced one of its most serious financial disasters since the Great Depression. The deregulation of the banking industry had allowed the housing and mortgage industries to engage in a practice called “subprime lending,” enabling millions of Americans to take on mortgages that they could not afford and creating a housing bubble (a run up in housing prices fueled by both demand and speculation). The bubble began to deflate in 2006, sparking a global economic recession that revealed how precarious the edifice of the new economy was: Several financial institutions approached the brink of bankruptcy, millions of Americans lost their pensions and savings as the stock market plummeted, unemployment rates in some states exceeded 10 percent, and hundreds of thousands of homes were left empty, as many homeowners were forced to foreclose on their mortgages. At the time of this writing, many of the issues that came to the fore in the early 1970s—growing class inequality, the shrinking of the middle class, and the volatility and crisis-prone nature of late capitalism—have returned with a vengeance.



DOCUMENTS

Both Democratic and Republican policymakers were architects of the “new economy.” In Document 1, economists associated with the centrist positions of the Clinton administration (1992–2000) offer an analysis that contrasts the defining features of the “old” and “new” economies. One of the contrasts hinged on the transition from a manufacturing to a service-based economy in the United States. In Document 2, cultural critic Barbara Ehrenreich describes her experience working for minimum wage at Wal-Mart, which by the early twenty-first century was the single largest employer of American women. Another characteristic that set the new economy apart from the old was growing inequality, a theme explored by the liberal group Americans for Democratic Action in Document 3. The highly mobile and competitive nature of the new economy compelled manufacturers to constantly relocate to different parts of the globe in search of cheaper labor, a dynamic the personal consequences of which are examined in Document 4. The underlying fragility of the new economy was brought home during the financial crisis of 2008. In Document 5, economist Paul Krugman explains how the crisis came about. By the fall of 2011, the ongoing recession

had provoked worldwide protests against both dominant financial institutions and the governments that provided them backing. Coordinating some of these protests was the “Occupy” movement, which held its first action in New York City in September 2011 and spread quickly throughout the United States and the world. Speaking out against the skewed distribution of wealth and on behalf of what it called the “ninety-nine percent,” the Occupy movement issued a declaration on September 29, 2011 (Document 6). The final document (Document 7) is an excerpt from a *New York Times* article published in January 2012 that exposed the dangerous working conditions in the factories where Chinese workers assembled the Apple iPads and iPhones coveted by so many consumers. The Apple Corporation had long capitalized on its origins in California (all of its products included a “Designed in California” label), but the article made clear that when it came to the pursuit of cheap labor, the company was hardly immune to the imperatives of globalization.

1. New Democrats Hail the New Economy, 1998

The U.S. economy is undergoing a fundamental transformation at the dawn of the new millennium. Some of the most obvious outward signs of change are in fact among the root causes of it: revolutionary technological advances, including powerful personal computers, high-speed telecommunications, and the Internet. The market environment facilitated by these and other developments in the last decade and a half has been variously labeled the “information economy,” “network economy,” “digital economy,” “knowledge economy,” and the “risk society.” Together, the whole package is often simply referred to as the “New Economy.”

The story of how businesses are changing in today’s economy has been told and retold with such frequency in recent years that it has become something of a cliché: the new rules of the game require speed, flexibility, and innovation. New, rapidly growing companies are selling to global markets almost from their inception, and established companies are being forced to reinvent their operations to stay competitive in the new terrain. This is the part of the New Economy that was born in Steve Jobs’ and Steve Wozniak’s garage, at Bell Labs, Xerox PARC, and in the trunk of Michael Dell’s car. It is Silicon Valley: Netscape, Yahoo!, and the next Big Thing. And of course it is Microsoft, with a market capitalization now second only to General Electric’s.

But this New Economy is about more than high technology and the frenetic action at the cutting edge. Most firms, not just the ones actually producing technology, are organizing work around it. The New Economy is a metal casting firm in Pittsburgh that uses computer-aided manufacturing technology to cut costs, save energy, and reduce waste. It is a farmer in Nebraska who sows genetically altered seeds and drives a tractor with a global satellite

From “The ‘New Economy’ of the 1990s,” by Robert D. Atkin and Randolph H. Court. Introduction to “The New Economy Index: Understanding America’s Economic Transformation” (Policy Report, 1995). Reprinted by permission of the Progressive Policy Institute.

positioning system. It is an insurance company in Iowa that uses software to flatten managerial hierarchies and give its workers broader responsibilities and autonomy. It is a textile firm in Georgia that uses the Internet to take orders from customers around the world.

It is also as much about new organizational models as it is about new technologies. The New Economy is the Miller brewery in Trenton, Ohio, which produces 50 percent more beer per worker than the company's next-most-productive facility, in part because a lean, 13-member crew has been trained to work in teams to handle the overnight shift with no oversight....

Beyond the technological advances, what is actually new about the so-called New Economy? In one respect, nothing. We still work at jobs for a living, and we still buy, sell, and trade products and services, just like we always have. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has noted, the heart of the economy is, as it always has been, grounded in human nature, not in any new technological reality. In Greenspan's analysis,

The way we evaluate assets, and the way changes in those assets affect our economy, do not appear to be coming out of a set of rules that is different from the one that governed the actions of our forebears.... As in the past, our advanced economy is primarily driven by how human psychology molds the value system that drives a competitive market economy. And that process is inextricably linked to human nature, which appears essentially immutable and, thus anchors the future to the past.

Nonetheless, Greenspan and other economists agree that some of the key rules of the game are changing, from the way we organize production, to our patterns of trade, to the way organizations deliver value to consumers....

The United States is ahead of the curve in a number of areas. Here, one of the most noticeable structural changes in the New Economy is the degree to which dynamism, constant innovation, and adaptation have become the norm. One of the keys to the recent strong U.S. economic performance has been the country's ability to embrace these changes. Nearly three quarters of all new jobs are being created by 350,000 new fast-growing "gazelle" firms (companies with sales growth of at least 20 percent per year for four straight years). Almost a third of all jobs are now in flux (either being born or dying, added or subtracted) every year. This churning of the economy is being spurred by new technology, but also by increasing competition, a trend that is in turn partly a product of increasing globalization. Between 1970 and 1997, U.S. imports and exports grew three and a half times faster than GDP [Gross Domestic Product] in 1992 dollars.

Another striking structural characteristic of the New Economy is occupational change. Between 1969 and 1995, virtually all the jobs lost in the production or distribution of goods have been replaced by jobs in offices. Today, almost 93 million American workers (which amounts to 80 percent of all jobs) do not spend their days making things—instead, they move things, process or generate information, or provide services to people....

Today, though the foundations for the New Economy are in place, widespread benefits haven't yet been realized. Despite job growth, low unemployment, and other notable signs of economic progress—and despite gushing press accounts of fabulous new wealth and opportunities—a central paradox of the emerging New Economy is that the 1980s and 1990s have seen productivity and per capita GDP growth rates languish in the 1.25 percent range, while income inequality has grown. Our challenge is to create a progressive economic policy framework that will encourage a new era of higher growth, while promoting and enabling a broad-based prosperity that produces the widest possible winner's circle.

Old economic policy, shaped by the Great Depression, largely focused on creating jobs, controlling inflation, and managing the business cycle. The New Economy brings new concerns. Technology, as well as a highly competent Federal Reserve policy, may have lessened the importance and severity of the domestic business cycle....

The New Economy puts a premium on what Nobel Laureate economist Douglas North calls "adaptive efficiency"—the ability of institutions to innovate, continuously learn, and productively change. In the old economy, fixed assets, financing, and labor were principal sources of competitive advantage for firms. But now, as markets fragment, technology accelerates, and competition comes from unexpected places, learning, creativity, and adaptation are becoming the principal sources of competitive advantage in many industries. Enabling constant innovation has become the goal of any organization committed to prospering, and should also become the goal of public policy in the New Economy....

2. Social Critic Barbara Ehrenreich Describes Working at Walmart, 2001

... [W]hen I arrive in the morning for the ten-to-six shift, no one seems to be expecting me. I'm in "softlines," which has a wonderful, sinuous sound to it, but I have no idea what it means. Someone in personnel tells me I'm in ladies' wear (a division of softlines, I learn) and sends me to the counter next to the fitting rooms, where I am passed around from one person to the next—finally ending up with Ellie, whose lack of a vest signals that she is management. She sets me to work "zoning" the Bobbie Brooks knit summer dresses, a task that could serve as an IQ test for the severely cognitively challenged. First the dresses must be grouped by color—olive, peach, or lavender, in this case—then by decorative pattern—the leafy design on the bodice, the single flower, or the grouped flowers—and within each pattern by size. When I am finished, though hardly exhausted by the effort, I meet Melissa, who is, with only a couple of weeks on the job, pretty much my equivalent. She asks me to help her consolidate the Kathie Lee knit dresses so the Kathie Lee silky ones can take their place at

the “image,” the high-traffic corner area. I learn, in a couple of hours of scattered exchanges, that Melissa was a waitress before this job, that her husband works in construction and her children are grown. There have been some disorganized patches in her life—an out-of-wedlock child, a problem with alcohol and drugs—but that’s all over now that she has given her life to Christ.

Our job, it emerges in fragments throughout the day, is to keep ladies’ wear “shoppable.” Sure, we help customers (who are increasingly called “guests” here as well), if they want any help. At first I go around practicing the “~~aggressive~~ ~~hospitality~~” demanded by our training videos: as soon as anyone comes within ten feet of a sales associate, that associate is supposed to smile warmly and offer assistance. But I never see a more experienced associate do this—first, because the customers are often annoyed to have their shopping dazes interrupted and, second, because we have far more pressing things to do. In ladies’ wear, the big task, which has no real equivalent in, say, housewares or lawn and garden, is to put away the “returns”—clothes that have been tried on and rejected or, more rarely, purchased and then returned to the store. There are also the many items that have been scattered by customers, dropped on the floor, removed from their hangers and strewn over the racks, or secreted in locations far from their natural homes. Each of these items, too must be returned to its precise place, matched by color, pattern, price, and size. Any leftover time is to be devoted to zoning. When I relate this to Caroline on the phone, she commiserates, “Ugh, a no-brainer.”

But no job is as easy as it looks to the uninitiated. I have to put clothes away—the question is, Where? Much of my first few days is devoted to trying to memorize the layout of ladies’ wear, one thousand (two thousand?) square feet of space bordered by men’s wear, children’s wear, greeting cards, and underwear. Standing at the fitting rooms and facing toward the main store entrance, we are looking directly at the tentlike, utilitarian plus sizes, also known as “woman” sizes. These are flanked on the left by our dressiest and costliest line (going up to \$29 and change), the all-polyester Kathie Lee collection, suitable for dates and subprofessional levels of office work. Moving clockwise, we encounter the determinedly sexless Russ and Bobbie Brooks lines, seemingly aimed at pudgy fourth-grade teachers with important barbecues to attend. Then, after the sturdy White Stag, come the breezy, revealing Faded Glory, No Boundaries, and Jordache collections, designed for the younger and thinner crowd. Tucked throughout are nests of the lesser brands, such as Athletic Works, Basic Equipment, and the whimsical Looney Tunes, Pooh, and Mickey lines, generally decorated with images of their eponymous characters. Within each brand-name area, there are of course dozens of items, even dozens of each *kind* of item. This summer, for example, pants may be capri, classic, carpenter, clam-digger, boot, or flood, depending on their length and cut, and I’m probably leaving a few categories out. So my characteristic stance is one of rotating slowly on one foot, eyes wide, garment in hand, asking myself, “Where have I seen the \$9.96 Athletic Works knit overalls?” or similar query. Inevitably there are mystery items requiring extra time and inquiry: clothes that have wandered over from girls’ or men’s, clearanced items whose tags haven’t been changed to reflect their new prices, the occasional one-of-a-kind.

Then, when I have the layout memorized, it suddenly changes. On my third morning I find, after a few futile searches, that the Russ shirt-and-short combinations have edged Kathie Lee out of her image. When I groaningly accuse Ellie of trying to trick me into thinking I'm getting Alzheimer's, she's genuinely apologetic, explaining that the average customer shops the store three times a week, so you need to have the element of surprise. Besides, the layout is about the only thing she *can* control, since the clothes and at least the starting prices are all determined by the home office in Arkansas. So as fast as I can memorize, she furiously rearranges.

My first response to the work is disappointment and a kind of sexist contempt. I could have been in plumbing, mastering the vocabulary of valves, dangling tools from my belt, joshing around with Steve and Walt, and instead the mission of the moment is to return a pink bikini top to its place on the Bermuda swimwear rack. Nothing is heavy or, as far as I can see, very urgent. No one will go hungry or die or be hurt if I screw up; in fact, how would anyone ever know if I screwed up, given the customers' constant depredations? I feel oppressed, too, by the mandatory gentility of Wal-Mart culture. This is ladies' and we are all "ladies" here, forbidden, by store-wide rule, to raise our voices or cuss. Give me a few weeks of this and I'll femme out entirely, my stride will be reduced to a mince, I'll start tucking my head down to one side.

My job is not, however, as genteel as it at first appears, thanks to the sheer volume of clothing in motion. At Wal-Mart, as opposed to say Lord & Taylor, customers shop with supermarket-style shopping carts, which they can fill to the brim before proceeding to the fitting room. There the rejected items, which are about 90 percent of try-ons, are folded and put on hangers by whoever is staffing the fitting room, then placed in fresh shopping carts for Melissa and me. So this is how we measure our workload—in carts. When I get in, Melissa, whose shift begins earlier than mine, will tell me how things have been going—"Can you believe, eight carts this morning!"—and how many carts are awaiting me. At first a cart takes me an average of forty-five minutes and there may still be three or four mystery items left at the bottom. I get this down to half an hour, and still the carts keep coming. → even MODERN ASSEMBLY LINE

Most of the time, the work requires minimal human interaction, of either the collegial or the supervisory sort, largely because it's so self-defining. I arrive at the start of a shift or the end of a break, assess the damage wrought by the guests in my absence, count the full carts that await me, and plunge in. I could be a deaf-mute as far as most of this goes, and despite all the orientation directives to smile and exude personal warmth, autism might be a definite advantage. Sometimes, if things are slow, Melissa and I will invent a task we can do together—zoning swimsuits, for example, a nightmarish tangle of straps—and giggle, she in her Christian way, me from a more feminist perspective, about the useless little see-through wraps meant to accompany the more revealing among them. Or sometimes Ellie will give me something special to do, like putting all the Basic Equipment T-shirts on hangers, because things on hangers sell faster, and then arranging them neatly on racks. I like Ellie. Gray-faced and fiftyish, she must be the apotheosis of "servant leadership" or, in more secular terms, the vaunted "feminine" style of management. She says "please" and "thank you";

she doesn't order, she asks. Not so, though, with young Howard—*assistant manager* Howard, as he is uniformly called—who rules over all of softlines, including infants', children's, men's, accessories, and underwear. On my first day, I am called off the floor to an associates' meeting, where he spends ten minutes taking attendance, fixing each of us with his unnerving Tom Cruise-style smile, in which the brows come together as the corners of the mouth turn up, then reveals (where have I heard this before?) his "pet peeve": associates standing around talking to one another, which is, of course, a prime example of time theft....

3. Americans for Democratic Action Reports Growing Poverty and Inequality, 2004

The widening income gap between the wealthiest Americans and the rest of Americans continues to be one of the most challenging economic trends facing this nation. Extreme inequality of income and wealth gives economic and political power to big corporations and the richest families and weakens the sense of community and common purpose essential to a democracy.

This assessment was expressed eloquently by Nobel Laureate economist Kenneth Arrow in the early '80's: "The vast inequalities of income weakens a society of mutual concern. The sense that we are all members of the social order is vital to the meaning of civilization."

Income inequality is far greater in the United States than in other major countries. Australia, Canada and 10 European countries have much more equal distribution of income.

The latest Census Bureau statistics show that the rich are still getting much richer, middle income Americans are just barely raising their incomes, and the poor are still falling further behind on the income ladder. Table 1 shows average family income from 1950 through 2002, expressed in constant 2002 dollars to eliminate the impact of inflation.

It shows the disproportionately greater gains for the top 20% of families and top 5%, ranked by income, compared to lower-income Americans.

The gap between rich and poor is now bigger than it has been since the 1930s. An incredible 98% of the 1979–1992 gain in total household income went to the wealthiest twenty percent of households. The remaining 2% gain in total household income was shared by the remaining 80% of households.

Two examples of these wide disparities are especially dramatic—the increase in the number of millionaires and income for corporation chief executive officers. In 1979 there were 13,500 households declaring income over \$1 million. By the mid 90's the number of millionaires had jumped to close to 100,000. The steep trend continued during the late 90's when the number of millionaires more than doubled, rising to 205,000. And big business salaries for top corporation CEOs have skyrocketed out of sight. In 1980, CEO compensation was 42 times

TABLE 1 **Average Real Family Income 1950–2002 by Fifths (Twenty Percent) and Top 5% of Families**

Quintile	1950	1970	1980	2002	Percent Change 1950–1980	Percent Change 1980–2002
Poorest 20%	\$5,345	\$12,096	\$13,252	\$14,071	+147.9%	+5.8%
Second 20%	\$14,254	\$26,747	\$28,848	\$32,521	102.4%	12.7%
Middle 20%	\$20,668	\$38,674	\$43,580	\$51,869	110.9%	19.0%
Fourth 20%	\$27,795	\$52,168	\$60,462	\$77,145	117.5%	27.6%
Top 20%	\$50,719	\$89,168	\$101,800	\$159,298	100.7%	56.5%
Top 5%	\$82,196	\$136,602	\$144,717	\$278,790	76.1%	92.6%

(Constant 2002 dollars)

the average American worker's pay. In 2001, CEO compensation was 411 times the average worker's pay, jumping spectacularly in the past twenty years. Also, the average CEO compensation of FORTUNE 500 companies was \$37.5 million, while the average worker's salary of all companies was \$38,000, or a ratio of 1000 to 1. Note the difference in other industrial countries: in Japan a typical executive makes eleven times what a typical worker brings home and in Britain, twenty-two times.

When we take wealth, in addition to income, into consideration, note that the top 20% of American households control 83 percent of the nation's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent of Americans control only about 17 percent of the nation's wealth.

Poverty is still a blot on America's conscience. A total of 34.6 million Americans, 12.1% of the population in 2002, live in poverty. One-third of America's poor are White, with a 10% poverty rate; at 20%, the rate for African Americans and Hispanics is twice that of Whites. Black and Hispanic median family income is 37% below the median income of White families. Nationally, one out of six children—11.7 million—lives in poverty. One out of every three Black and Hispanic children lives in poverty.

Many poor people are working people, and many of them work full-time, year-round but don't earn enough to lift themselves and their families out of poverty. Of 8.5 million people in poverty who did work in 2002, there were 2.6 million on the job full-time, year-round. Another 6.0 million worked full time for part of the year, but remained in poverty. With the minimum wage of \$5.15 an hour enacted in September 1997, the \$10,700 annual earnings of a minimum wage worker employed full-time, year-round is still \$3,628 less than the three-person family poverty line, and \$7,604 below the four-person family poverty threshold.

Wages and salaries—the main source of income for most Americans—have been lagging and stagnating, while corporate business profits have been booming. This is a central cause of growing inequality. Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that average hourly wages for private non-farm production and

non-supervisory workers (about 80% of all workers) were \$14.95 in 2002. By comparison, in the last years of the 1970s, the average hourly wage in 2002 dollars was \$14.50. These official government figures tell us that the buying power of workers' hourly wages in 2002 were virtually the same as twenty years earlier!

Inequality and poverty do not have simple causes. Huge campaign contributions from big-money corporations and wealthy individuals too often dominate politics, economics, and social policies. Conservative and reactionary government policies such as the unfair Reagan tax cuts of the 1980's, attacks on unions by anti-union employers, the extremely regressive Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2002, continued delays in raising the minimum wage to an adequate level. Republican attacks against basic social welfare programs, including Social Security and Medicare, are among the many factors contributing to growing inequality and poverty in the United States....

4. An Immigrant Garment Worker Describes the Contemporary Sweatshop, 2001

I was born on May 31, 1946 in a little town called Bustamante, Nuevo León, Mexico. My parents worked as farmers. When there was no more money in farming, they moved. My mother died at the very early age of 28 years old, when I was only 5. She had a baby in this small town they say is only a *rancho*. The hospital services were very poor, no doctors, nobody. In those days women had their babies at home. I think they did not take care of my mom very well, so she developed problems.

My little sister, the baby that my mom bore, died. A few days later my mom died, too. That left us five kids, my four brothers and myself. I was in the middle. When my mother died, my father felt lost. He couldn't stand that my mother had died, so he left us. After that, my grandfather moved me and my brothers to Nuevo Laredo. He took care of us kids until we got married.

It was sad for me. I made a lot of sacrifices and suffered when I was young because my ma died. I don't think anybody cares about you the way your mother does because you are born from her. That's what I tell my kids now, "You only have one mother in your life." I didn't have a mother. [eyes water] But in a way, my grandparents did something good for me because now I can live with dignity. When I was young I had to respect myself. I was always praying that I would not do something that was going to degrade me. I always tell my girls, "Respect yourself no matter what. You've got to have respect to receive respect."

After years and years my father came back and we accepted him. But I don't have the kind of love for him I would like to have because he never lived with us when we were little, when we needed him. When I got married I had all this sadness stored up in my heart that I had to let go of, that used to bother me. But now I have my family and a wonderful husband. He helps me a lot. I've got my

four kids. My daughter turned 27 in August. My oldest boy is 26, my small boy is 22, and my girl is 17.

I met my [future] husband in *el mercado* [the market] in Nuevo Laredo when I was 15. Then I left to work in the United States for three or four years. We knew this family very well in Laredo, Texas. They asked my aunt if I could work for them. I worked in their house for two straight years without going to see my family. I had to clean the floors on my hands and knees and wash windows and change everything every month.

When I was 17, I was able to go home to Nuevo Laredo on the weekends, then come back to work by Monday. I went back and forth like that. I cleaned the house because I just went to six years of school in Mexico. At that time there was no opportunity to go to school or college. So I had to *¡Hijole!* work as a maid and serve them. They had two kids, and I had to put them to bed every night, give them their clothes, prepare them for school, make breakfast, and do all the housework. There was a wife, but of course I was the maid! [laughs] I only made \$10 a week.

I went back to Nuevo Laredo to the same place where I had worked and started talking with my [future] husband. One time, when I was getting off from work, I called his house and asked, "What are you going to do today?" He said, "Well, nothing." I said, "Well, I'm going to go to the movies. Do you want to go with me?" He said right away, "Yeah!" My sister-in-law told me, "The day you called, we were all ready to go out, but he got so excited because he was going to go with you." So I'm the one who took the first step. [laughs] But it was only for that one day that he was just like a little chicklet with me. We have a very good relationship. We got married when I was 23 years old and Domingo was 27.

Three months later we came to the United States. All the kids were born here. I remember the first days were very bad because it was very cold. We didn't even have blankets to cover ourselves and the house didn't have any windows. Oooh! Then little by little we saved and began buying things. We are still in this house now.

After my third child was born I started working in a tortilla factory, counting tortillas on the night shift and taking care of my kids during the day. Then I moved to a restaurant where I was in charge of the kitchen and they paid me a very, very low wage, about \$60 or \$70 a week. I was hired three years and worked 6am to 4pm everyday, even Saturdays, making tortillas and everything. I was unsatisfied and felt like this was not all I could do.

People said that they were hiring at the Levi's factory on Zarzamora Street. The pay was very good. I said, "Well, wow! I would like to do this!" and decided to apply. I went one morning and took the test. I didn't even get back home before I already got a call. They told me to come in for an interview. So I went right away, and they hired me in 1976.

When I started working there, they were paying by levels A to D, with D getting higher pay—which I qualified for. I did the hard, more difficult operations, like sewing the pockets on the sides of the coat. For three and a half years I sewed this way before they put me on utility so I could do any operation. Then

they made me a trainer to teach the new people. I liked working with the girls and helping out. Finally they made me a supervisor for eight years. I was very happy with my job because I got to work closely with my co-workers.

The layoff happened on January 16, 1990. The Friday before the Martin Luther King holiday, they told us that all the supervisors and trainers had to go downtown for a meeting. We suspected something was wrong because we had heard a lot of rumors. Usually at Christmas they gave us a \$500 bonus, but not that year. We found out later that they decreased our hours because they were planning to shut us down. Nobody got the benefit of a pay increase based on 40 hours because we were working less hours.

We [supervisors] went downtown to a very fancy hotel on Tuesday. Everyone sat down around tables in a big room. Then all of a sudden we saw a lot of people coming with folders. We thought, "What's going on?" Finally, the person from Levi's started to speak and said that they were planning to shut us down because Levi's had to be competitive in the market. Everything turned black. We started screaming and saying "Why?"

They already had the package ready, knew who we were, and took us to different, individual rooms. Then they start explaining, "This is what you're going to get." I was very sad. I started crying. They told us, "Yeah, yeah, calm down. I know how you feel, I know." Ahhh! I told her [eyes water], "How in the hell do you know how I feel?" I mean I *love* my job. After the 14 years I worked for this company, they just turn us out like this. Our jobs are over. "You're going to tell me you know how I feel? You still have a job!"

We came back and went outside. We hugged each other and said, "What are we going to do?" "Ahhh!" "I just bought my car." "I just got my credit card to buy Christmas gifts." A lot of people were buying houses, then lost them. They lost their cars. I had two cars at the time. We lost everything because we couldn't pay no more, *sabes* [you know]? When they turned us away they said, "Oh, we want you to cooperate with us. We want you to help us to work with the people tomorrow." Everybody went back and said, "Oh no! You want us to help you when you are doing this to us?"

They had a lot of advisors [who] told us, "You poor lady, you're going to be all right." They gave some money to the city to provide services, but those services did not help Levi's workers directly, but instead went to the whole city with close to 10,000 people out of jobs. They [also] mishandled that money by renting a big office and buying a lot of things. We didn't get anything. About 1,150 workers were displaced.

When Levi's closed, it was a disaster for most of the families. My husband has had to work at two jobs since they shut us down. In the evening he's a cook at the Marriott Hotel and in the morning he's working with vegetables in a lot of grocery stores. Before I lost my job I sent one of my kids to college. My two older kids had everything that they needed, not what they wanted, but at least what they needed. The ones who suffered most were the small ones. They remember that we could buy five pairs of pants, one for each day. When I lost my job my small boy said, "Mom, how come we

can only buy two pants, one to use today and the other one tomorrow?" He asked, "Why did Junior have this and I cannot?" It was hard for them to understand....

5. Nobel Winning Economist Paul Krugman Explores the Origins of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 2009

The great U.S. housing boom began to deflate in the fall of 2005—but it took a while for most people to notice. As prices rose to the point where purchasing a home became out of reach for many Americans—even with no-down-payment, teaser-rate loans—sales began to slacken off. There was, as I wrote at the time, a hissing sound as air began to leak out of the bubble.

Yet housing prices kept rising for a while. This was to be expected. Houses aren't like stocks, with a single market price that changes minute by minute. Each house is unique, and sellers expect to wait a while before actually finding a buyer. As a result, prices tend to be based on what other houses have sold for in the recent past: sellers don't start cutting prices until it becomes painfully obvious that they aren't going to get a full-price offer. In 2005, after an extended period during which home prices had been rising sharply each year, sellers expected the trend to continue, so asking prices actually continued to rise for a while even as sales dropped.

By the late spring of 2006, however, the weakness of the market was starting to sink in. Prices began dropping, slowly at first, then with growing speed. By the second quarter of 2007, according to the widely used Case-Shiller home price index, prices were only down about 3 percent from their peak a year earlier. Over the course of the next year they fell more than 15 percent. The price declines were, of course, much larger in the regions that had experienced the biggest bubbles, like coastal Florida.

Even the gradual initial decline in home prices, however, undermined the assumptions on which the boom in subprime lending was based. The key rationale for this lending was the belief that it didn't really matter, from the lender's point of view, whether the borrower could actually make the mortgage payments: as long as home prices kept rising, troubled borrowers could always either refinance or pay off their mortgage by selling the house. As soon as home prices started falling instead of rising, and houses became hard to sell, default rates began rising. And at that point another ugly truth became apparent: foreclosure isn't just a tragedy for the homeowners, it's a lousy deal for the lender. Between the time it takes to get a foreclosed home back on the market, the legal expenses, the degradation that tends to happen in vacant homes, and so on, creditors seizing a house from the borrower typically get back only part, say half, of the original value of the loan.

In that case, you might ask, why not make a deal with the current homeowner to reduce payments and avoid the costs of foreclosure? Well, for one

thing, that also costs money, and it requires staff. And subprime loans were not, for the most part, made by banks that held on to the loans; they were made by loan originators, who quickly sold the loans to financial institutions, which, in turn, sliced and diced pools of mortgages into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) sold to investors. The actual management of the loans was left to loan servicers, who had neither the resources nor, for the most part, the incentive to engage in loan restructuring. And one more thing; the complexity of the financial engineering supporting subprime lending, which left ownership of mortgages dispersed among many investors with claims of varying seniority, created formidable legal obstacles to any kind of debt forgiveness.

So restructuring was mostly out, leading to costly foreclosures. And this meant that securities backed by subprime mortgages turned into very bad investments as soon as the housing boom began to falter.

The first moment of truth came early in 2007, as the trouble with subprime loans first became apparent. Recall that collateralized debt obligations established a seniority ranking for shares: owners of the more senior shares, the ones rating agencies declared to be AAA, had first dibs on payments, with those holding the less senior shares, which were given lower ratings, being paid only after the senior-share holders had received their due. Around February 2007 the realization sank in that the lower-rated shares were probably going to take serious losses, and prices of those shares plunged. This more or less put an end to the whole process of subprime lending: because nobody would buy the junior shares, it was no longer possible to repackage and sell subprime loans, and financing disappeared. This in turn, by removing an important source of housing demand, worsened the housing slump.

Still, for a long time investors believed that the senior shares in those CDOs were reasonably well protected. As late as October 2007, AAA-rated shares in subprime-backed mortgage pools were still trading at close to their face value. Eventually, however, it became clear that nothing related to housing was safe—not senior shares, not even loans made to borrowers with good credit ratings who made substantial down payments.

Why? Because of the sheer scale of the housing bubble. Nationally, housing was probably overvalued by more than 50 percent by the summer of 2006, which meant that to eliminate the overvaluation, prices would have to fall by a third. In some metropolitan areas, the overvaluation was much worse. In Miami, for example, home prices appeared to be at least twice as high as the fundamentals could justify. So in some areas prices could be expected to fall by 50 percent or more.

This meant that practically anyone who bought a house during the peak bubble years, even if he or she put 20 percent down, was going to end up with negative equity—with a mortgage worth more than the house. Indeed, there are probably around 12 million American homeowners with negative equity as this book goes to press. And homeowners with negative equity are prime candidates for default and foreclosure, no matter what their background. For one thing, some of them may simply choose to “walk away”—to walk out on their mortgage, figuring that they will end up ahead financially even after losing the house. It’s never been clear how important a phenomenon walking away really is, but there are plenty of other routes

to default. Job loss, unexpected medical expenses, divorce—all of these can leave a homeowner unable to make mortgage payments. And if the house is worth less than the mortgage, there is no way to make the lender whole.

As the severity of the housing bust sank in, it became clear that lenders would lose a lot of money, and so would the investors who bought mortgage-backed securities. But why should we cry for these people, as opposed to the homeowners themselves? After all, the end of the housing bubble will probably, when the final reckoning is made, have wiped out about \$8 trillion of wealth. Of that, around \$7 trillion will have been losses to homeowners, and only about \$1 trillion losses to investors. Why obsess about that \$1 trillion?

The answer is, because it has triggered the collapse of the shadow banking system....

6. The New York City General Assembly of the Occupy Movement Issues a Declaration, 2011

As we gather together in solidarity to express a feeling of mass injustice, we must not lose sight of what brought us together. We write so that all people who feel wronged by the corporate forces of the world can know that we are your allies.

As one people, united, we acknowledge the reality: that the future of the human race requires the cooperation of its members; that our system must protect our rights, and upon corruption of that system, it is up to the individuals to protect their own rights, and those of their neighbors; that a democratic government derives its just power from the people, but corporations do not seek consent to extract wealth from the people and the Earth; and that no true democracy is attainable when the process is determined by economic power. We come to you at a time when corporations, which place profit over people, self-interest over justice, and oppression over equality, run our governments. We have peaceably assembled here, as is our right, to let these facts be known.

- They have taken our houses through an illegal foreclosure process, despite not having the original mortgage.
- They have taken bailouts from taxpayers with impunity, and continue to give Executives exorbitant bonuses.
- They have perpetuated inequality and discrimination in the workplace based on age, the color of one's skin, sex, gender identity and sexual orientation.
- They have poisoned the food supply through negligence, and undermined the farming system through monopolization.
- They have profited off of the torture, confinement, and cruel treatment of countless animals, and actively hide these practices.
- They have continuously sought to strip employees of the right to negotiate for better pay and safer working conditions.

- They have held students hostage with tens of thousands of dollars of debt on education, which is itself a human right.
- They have consistently outsourced labor and used that outsourcing as leverage to cut workers' healthcare and pay.
- They have influenced the courts to achieve the same rights as people, with none of the culpability or responsibility.
- They have spent millions of dollars on legal teams that look for ways to get them out of contracts in regards to health insurance.
- They have sold our privacy as a commodity.
- They have used the military and police force to prevent freedom of the press.
- They have deliberately declined to recall faulty products endangering lives in pursuit of profit.
- They determine economic policy, despite the catastrophic failures their policies have produced and continue to produce.
- They have donated large sums of money to politicians, who are responsible for regulating them.
- They continue to block alternate forms of energy to keep us dependent on oil.
- They continue to block generic forms of medicine that could save people's lives or provide relief in order to protect investments that have already turned a substantial profit.
- They have purposely covered up oil spills, accidents, faulty bookkeeping, and inactive ingredients in pursuit of profit.
- They purposefully keep people misinformed and fearful through their control of the media.
- They have accepted private contracts to murder prisoners even when presented with serious doubts about their guilt.
- They have perpetuated colonialism at home and abroad.
- They have participated in the torture and murder of innocent civilians overseas.
- They continue to create weapons of mass destruction in order to receive government contracts*

To the people of the world,

We, the New York City General Assembly occupying Wall Street in Liberty Square, urge you to assert your power.

Exercise your right to peaceably assemble; occupy public space; create a process to address the problems we face, and generate solutions accessible to everyone.

To all communities that take action and form groups in the spirit of direct democracy, we offer support, documentation, and all of the resources at our disposal.

Join us and make your voices heard!

*These grievances are not all-inclusive.

7. *The New York Times* Exposes Working Conditions of Chinese Factories where Apple Products Are Assembled, 2012

The explosion ripped through Building A5 on a Friday evening last May, an eruption of fire and noise that twisted metal pipes as if they were discarded straws.

When workers in the cafeteria ran outside, they saw black smoke pouring from shattered windows. It came from the area where employees polished thousands of iPad cases a day.

Two people were killed immediately, and over a dozen others hurt. As the injured were rushed into ambulances, one in particular stood out. His features had been smeared by the blast, scrubbed by heat and violence until a mat of red and black had replaced his mouth and nose.

"Are you Lai Xiaodong's father?" a caller asked when the phone rang at Mr. Lai's childhood home. Six months earlier, the 22-year-old had moved to Chengdu, in southwest China, to become one of the millions of human cogs powering the largest, fastest and most sophisticated manufacturing system on earth. That system has made it possible for Apple and hundreds of other companies to build devices almost as quickly as they can be dreamed up.

"He's in trouble," the caller told Mr. Lai's father. "Get to the hospital as soon as possible."

In the last decade, Apple has become one of the mightiest, richest and most successful companies in the world, in part by mastering global manufacturing. Apple and its high-technology peers—as well as dozens of other American industries—have achieved a pace of innovation nearly unmatched in modern history.

However, the workers assembling iPhones, iPads and other devices often labor in harsh conditions, according to employees inside those plants, worker advocates and documents published by companies themselves. Problems are as varied as onerous work environments and serious—sometimes deadly—safety problems.

Employees work excessive overtime, in some cases seven days a week, and live in crowded dorms. Some say they stand so long that their legs swell until they can hardly walk.

Under-age workers have helped build Apple's products, and the company's suppliers have improperly disposed of hazardous waste and falsified records, according to company reports and advocacy groups that, within China, are often considered reliable, independent monitors.

More troubling, the groups say, is some suppliers' disregard for workers' health. Two years ago, 137 workers at an Apple supplier in eastern China were

"In China: Human Costs Are Built into an iPad," *New York Times*, January 25, 2012. Article can be accessed here: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/economy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all>. From *The New York Times*, January 25, 2012 © 2012 *The New York Times*. All rights reserved. Used by permission and protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States. The printing, copying, redistribution, or retransmission of this Content without express written permission is prohibited.

injured after they were ordered to use a poisonous chemical to clean iPhone screens. Within seven months last year, two explosions at iPad factories, including in Chengdu, killed four people and injured 77. Before those blasts, Apple had been alerted to hazardous conditions inside the Chengdu plant, according to a Chinese group that published that warning.

"If Apple was warned, and didn't act, that's reprehensible," said Nicholas Ashford, a former chairman of the National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health, a group that advises the United States Labor Department. "But what's morally repugnant in one country is accepted business practices in another, and companies take advantage of that."

Apple is not the only electronics company doing business within a troubling supply system. Bleak working conditions have been documented at factories manufacturing products for Dell, Hewlett-Packard, I.B.M., Lenovo, Motorola, Nokia, Sony, Toshiba and others.

Current and former Apple executives, moreover, say the company has made significant strides in improving factories in recent years. Apple has a supplier code of conduct that details standards on labor issues, safety protections and other topics. The company has mounted a vigorous auditing campaign, and when abuses are discovered, Apple says, corrections are demanded.

And Apple's annual supplier responsibility reports, in many cases, are the first to report abuses. This month, for the first time, the company released a list identifying many of its suppliers.

But significant problems remain. More than half of the suppliers audited by Apple have violated at least one aspect of the code of conduct every year since 2007, according to Apple's reports, and in some instances have violated the law. While many violations involve working conditions, rather than safety hazards, troubling patterns persist.

"Apple never cared about anything other than increasing product quality and decreasing production cost," said Li Mingqi, who until April worked in management at Foxconn Technology, one of Apple's most important manufacturing partners. Mr. Li, who is suing Foxconn over his dismissal, helped manage the Chengdu factory where the explosion occurred.

"Workers' welfare has nothing to do with their interests," he said.

Some former Apple executives say there is an unresolved tension within the company: executives want to improve conditions within factories, but that dedication falters when it conflicts with crucial supplier relationships or the fast delivery of new products. Tuesday, Apple reported one of the most lucrative quarters of any corporation in history, with \$13.06 billion in profits on \$46.3 billion in sales. Its sales would have been even higher, executives said, if overseas factories had been able to produce more.

Executives at other corporations report similar internal pressures. This system may not be pretty, they argue, but a radical overhaul would slow innovation. Customers want amazing new electronics delivered every year.

"We've known about labor abuses in some factories for four years, and they're still going on," said one former Apple executive who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of confidentiality agreements. "Why? Because the

system works for us. Suppliers would change everything tomorrow if Apple told them they didn't have another choice."

"If half of iPhones were malfunctioning, do you think Apple would let it go on for four years?" the executive asked.

Apple, in its published reports, has said it requires every discovered labor violation to be remedied, and suppliers that refuse are terminated. Privately, however, some former executives concede that finding new suppliers is time-consuming and costly. Foxconn is one of the few manufacturers in the world with the scale to build sufficient numbers of iPhones and iPads. So Apple is "not going to leave Foxconn and they're not going to leave China," said Heather White, a research fellow at Harvard and a former member of the Monitoring International Labor Standards committee at the National Academy of Sciences. "There's a lot of rationalization."...

In 2010, Steven P. Jobs discussed the company's relationships with suppliers at an industry conference.

"I actually think Apple does one of the best jobs of any companies in our industry, and maybe in any industry, of understanding the working conditions in our supply chain," said Mr. Jobs, who was Apple's chief executive at the time and who died last October.

"I mean, you go to this place, and, it's a factory, but, my gosh, I mean, they've got restaurants and movie theaters and hospitals and swimming pools, and I mean, for a factory, it's a pretty nice factory."

Others, including workers inside such plants, acknowledge the cafeterias and medical facilities, but insist conditions are punishing.

"We're trying really hard to make things better," said one former Apple executive. "But most people would still be really disturbed if they saw where their iPhone comes from."...

◆ ESSAYS

The two essays here examine the flip sides of globalization and its effects on the U.S. economy: on the one hand, the outsourcing and relocation of factories to diverse parts of the globe; and on the other, the world of service work that has emerged to fill the void left by deindustrialization. In "Unmade in America," Barry Lynn takes a close look at the costs of what he calls the "global assembly line," suggesting that globalization has made national economies simultaneously more integrated but also more crisis-prone, as events on the other side of the globe can have dramatic reverberating effects within the United States. In "Service Work and the Service Ethos," Bethany Moreton explores how Wal-Mart, the world's largest retail corporation, was able to tap into a new labor source: that of married women with children, many of whom came from the farming communities in the Ozarks. Moreton shows how Wal-Mart drew on this new labor source, not only to stock inventory and ring up purchases but also to cultivate a distinct "service ethos" that set out to endow service work with cultural and emotional content.

Unmade in America: The True Cost of a Global Assembly Line

BARRY LYNN

Globalization is many things, and much has been written about it and said. But throw all the tomes and studies and placards into a giant try-works, and you'll render two simple arguments:

(1) Globalization is good because it spreads what is good in America, such as a liberal approach to business, and McDonald's.

(2) Globalization is bad because it spreads what is worst about America, such as a liberal approach to business, and McDonald's.

But while so much energy was spent these last few years studying the extent to which the Happy Meal affects a nation's quality of life, hardly anyone bothered to examine in depth the fundamental changes that were taking place in the nature of the manufacturing corporation, and in the nature of manufacturing itself, as thousands of companies scrambled to adapt themselves to a world radically remade by the sudden economic opening of dozens of countries and the simultaneous arrival of the information age.

Watch one of the new commercials for UPS and it's hard not to feel inspired by the images of all those jets full of cargo ricocheting round the world, round the clock. Whether Chevrolet fuel pump, Baxter intravenous-infusion pump, or Ralph Lauren faux-lizard pump, the average modern product contains parts that are more well traveled than are most of us. After conception in a design studio—perhaps in Detroit, perhaps in Milan—these components embark on the modern equivalent of a Grand Tour. East Asia, South America, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, Central America—all the premier destinations of the developing world may be visited before the product makes its way at last to the final assembly line somewhere, perhaps, in North America. But, even as the corporations celebrate with their 30-second symphonies the rise of the globalized industrial network, almost no one asks what would happen if just one of the still very sovereign nations that underlie this web were to grab hold of a few of the strands and start yanking. Almost no one studies how “our” corporations have quite literally manufactured new forms of foreign dependence for the United States that may soon leave us gazing fondly back to the days when our nation was joined at the aorta only to such dear fellow citizens of the world as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.

... Dell Computer [is] the perfect archetype of the post-national manufacturer. Dell assembles its OptiPlex business desktop at the Topfer Manufacturing Center in Austin, Texas. The operation is relentless, the plant floor a tight maze of conveyor belts and elevators amidst which men and women work, often hidden from view, in nestlike workstations or “build cells.” For eight or more hours each day, the employees on the line face near terror. From the moment an elevator delivers a tray loaded with a half-made computer until the moment the elevator

returns to take the tray back to the overhead conveyor line, a worker has only one to three minutes to install his or her components. Drop goggles in the elevator gearing and the light atop the workstation will flick from green to red. Since Dell's success depends at least as much on the efficiency of its processes as on the quality of its product, nothing is dreaded more than a red light.

These days, Dell's anxiety is not limited merely to the smooth functioning of its North American plants. The modern Dell assembly line actually stretches out far past the trucks parked at the delivery dock and down Interstate 10 to the monitor plants of Tijuana. And it stretches back through Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport to the component manufacturers strung from Malaysia to Korea and clustered especially thickly in Taiwan and China. From those suppliers it stretches on back through another three or four "tiers" to the subsuppliers and sub-subsuppliers. To ensure green lights at all points along this line, Dell logisticians must watch hundreds of potential bottlenecks around the world, as some 4,500 parts from hundreds of suppliers make their way to Austin, Texas. On any day, a single missing shipment of components can slow or stop the whole operation.

Five years ago, when Compaq Corporation bestrode the personal-computer industry, manufacturers commonly kept 60 or even 120 days of inventory on hand, and most moved this material from one company-owned plant to another. When Dell passed Compaq last year to become the world's top PC maker, it had trimmed its inventory to four days' worth, and most of that now flows to and from plants owned not by Dell but by companies that supply Dell. In essence, the Dell production model is to cut inventory and other forms of sunk capital as low as possible, largely by relying on other companies to do the manufacturing. To keep pace, Compaq for years has hacked ruthlessly and relentlessly at its own inventory, while following Dell into dependence on components made by Taiwanese and Chinese companies. Yet still Compaq loses ground to Dell, as do the personal-computer divisions of Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Sony. Which only increases the pressure to cut further or, in the case of Compaq, to give up and sell out to Hewlett-Packard.

Not that electronics firms are alone in playing this game. Even the biggest of traditional "multinational" corporations now operate very differently than when the first George Bush sat in the White House. The ability to sell in many more markets, and to manufacture in many more countries, has created two vital imperatives: Corporations must now race against their direct competitors for global scale, which means they must grow so big that another company cannot beat or buy them. And they must keep costs low by structuring their worldwide operations as efficiently as possible. This is what Ford does if, say, it centralizes production of a particular fuel injector at a plant in Brazil while closing similar lines in Michigan and Germany.

Aided by recent radical advances in information management and communications, and by the never-ending effort to rethink corporate structure, a growing number of industries have "rationalized" along global lines. This is what happens if, say, General Motors and DaimlerChrysler hire, perhaps unknowingly, the same fuel-injector manufacturer that Ford relies on in Brazil to manufacture their components as well. In many instances, especially in the electronics

industry, such a back-door consolidation has already taken place. Last year, nearly 90 percent of the world's scanners and most of the world's computer motherboards were manufactured in Taiwan, many in a single industrial park in Hsinchu.

Some see beauty in this system. In a borderless world, each company and each community can concentrate on what it does best, be it growing artichokes, stamping out motorcycle gears, designing marketing strategies, or engineering global assembly lines. Unfortunately, such concentration—the growing reliance by entire industries on single sources of supply—violates one of the most basic rules of manufacturing, which is always to have an alternative at the ready.

On September 21, 1999, an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale killed some 2,500 people in Taiwan. Within days, the stock prices of Dell, Apple, and Hewlett-Packard plummeted as investors focused for a short moment on just how much these companies depend on Taiwan-based factories. Although most of the island's suppliers were back on line within a week, worldwide orders for electronics in October fell 7 percent. Had the quake been a few tenths of a point stronger, or centered a few miles closer to the vital Hsinchu industrial park, great swaths of the world economy could have been paralyzed for months.

In March 2000, in the midst of Taiwan's presidential campaign, China threatened war if Taiwanese voters chose the candidate Beijing opposed. Again the stock prices of Dell and other Taiwan-dependent firms dropped, as investors remembered, if only for a moment, the missiles China landed near the island before the 1996 elections and the resulting *de facto* blockade.

Then came September 12, 2001. Much of the manufacturing activity in the United States came to a halt after the Bush Administration closed U.S. borders and grounded all flights in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, and Toyota North America were among the companies that shut plants when they found themselves cut off from supplies.

This is not Henry Ford's vision of manufacturing. Ford's immense industrial experiment during the 1920s, at the River Rouge complex in Michigan, was revolutionary in that he gathered in one place everything needed to manufacture an automobile. Fed up with poor quality and spotty delivery by outside suppliers, Ford wanted to oversee production of all the parts and components that went into one of his cars: seats, mirrors, and tires as well as engines and chassis. By 1927 ships were unloading iron ore at one end of the complex while employees drove finished Model A's onto railroad cars at the other. Companies such as General Electric, Westinghouse, and Xerox soon emulated the River Rouge concept. Nothing was too small to make in-house. Hewlett-Packard was famous for machining its own screws; Nortel for cooking its own silicon.

Today, we are witnessing the breaking up of empire, the dismantling of the River Rouge concept, as hundreds of vertically integrated manufacturers cast their constituent operations to the far corners of the world. Most start by off-loading the manufacture of a cheap component or a light assembly operation. Many then go further: In January 2001, mobile-phone maker Ericsson sold off all its manufacturing and transport operations to a Singapore-based company

named Flextronics. Even high-end manufacturers such as Sony and IBM can't resist sloughing off a factory or four.

How else, really, to compete with a company like Cisco Systems, which in the 1990s grew to be the world's largest manufacturer of communications equipment, and for a time the most highly valued corporation in the world, by operating as a "virtual company." This means that Cisco relies almost entirely on a stable of other companies to do everything from design its chips to manufacture its circuit boards to deliver its Cisco-brand products. The company's role, its executives say, is to exert a sort of postindustrial "Command and Control" over this vast network of outsourced production. Much the same can be said of Dell. Despite the fact that a tiny American flag graces each of the company's Web pages, Dell, in the words of one semiconductor executive, is really little more than "a delivery channel for Taiwanese-made products." Think Wal-Mart, but in place of store shelves jammed with foreign-made toys and towels substitute laptops loaded with foreign-made components: CD-ROM drives and video cards and memory chips.

Executives and consultants have for years debated the wisdom of this disintegration, but there has been no coherent mainstream discussion about whether this scattering leaves the global industrial system—and by extension the entire global economy—more liable to catastrophic shutdowns like the one barely avoided after the Taiwan quake. At River Rouge, Henry Ford could walk from one end of his operation to the other. At Cisco and Dell, it is unlikely that any employee has visited all the suppliers, and certainly no one has visited all the sub-suppliers. If the production of door handles fell behind schedule at River Rouge, Ford could throw on more machines and people, and in the meantime survive out of inventory. These days big manufacturers have almost no inventory on which to rely while they fix any problem, and ever less ability to spot potential bottlenecks in their worldwide supply chains. Until the Taiwan-based TSMC stopped shipping semiconductors after the 1999 quake, for instance, Dell executives knew almost nothing of their dependence on the chipmaker, because the actual purchases were made not by Dell but by Dell's suppliers.

Our modern faith in globalization was founded, at least in part, on the premise that it was the right thing to do. We were outmaneuvering the Europeans and Japanese for new export markets. Better yet, American investments abroad would spread skills and wealth among the beggared and benighted. This consensus had formed even before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The oil shocks and debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s had choked off growth in much of Latin America and Asia, and by the late 1980s reformist politicians in many countries were ready to ally themselves with the transnationalists to the north. In exchange for debt relief and direct investment in their countries, the local reformers pledged to sell off state companies and hack away the thicket of tariffs and regulations that protected local industry and labor. To voters in these countries, the promise at times seemed nothing less than freedom—from corrupt authoritarian governments, from treasury-looting populists, from hyperinflation, from inefficient local business monopolies. Foreign companies, so it was often believed (and so it sometimes proved), would bring better services, lower prices, and more jobs.

Yet by the middle of the next decade evidence began to mount that these grand reforms would never deliver all the promised economic benefits. Some prices fell, but others rose. Foreign companies brought higher-quality products, but they manufactured fewer in-country. Hyperinflation was indeed choked off, but so too was growth. Not that we bothered to notice. Sure, *Doonesbury* made a few of us question what shoes we wore on our feet, and, yes, we did make Kathie Lee cry, but how many of us actually twisted around to check what was printed on the labels of our underwear? Crises came—Mexico in '94, Asia in '97, Russia in '98, Argentina again and again—but our cars grew brawnier, our computers grew brainier, and all this new wealth burdened us with new existential challenges. What would a soaring Nasdaq do to our core values? How badly would we spoil the children?

By the late Clinton years, globalization had come to mean simply that someone else would do the dirty work, someone far away. Our own industrial workers, once we emancipated them from the lines? Why, they could wait tables and drive FedEx vans. They could answer the phones in our new charitable foundations and lug around buckets of goat milk on our hobby farms. Our national duty was no longer to produce but to consume. The slightest twitch in Peoria set off klaxons a world away, calling workers by the thousands to their stations. "America's women need a half inch more on their heels! America's men need ten million more inflatable Budweiser chairs!"

Yes, the market would provide. To this mantra, this Muzak of the '90s, we listened and we believed. Right through the end of the Cold War, we never lost the conviction that government was the proper means by which to share our wealth and to protect ourselves. But our faith now began to shift. Speed and efficiency, we came to believe, were the forces that would bring us comfort and riches. And sure enough, these last ten years the goods kept coming, unloaded into our malls at night from tractor trailers, delivered at high noon by UPS. Everything the mind could conjure, in Faustian profusion. So why not cut another of those harnesses that government once dared to set on the shoulders of capital? Why not ignore the transnational alchemies eating away at the institutions that for two centuries have provided us our only shelter? Compaq, Chrysler, Xerox, Thailand, Argentina, Japan—there is no security even for giant corporations and powerful states. Yet we still cling to the belief that some sort of secret social compact will always hold for us. That our state, however battered, however corroded, will continue to shield our bodies should our new best friend, the global market, ever turn against us.

When Robert Schuman, the foreign minister and former prime minister of France, first proposed the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, he was a sixty-four-year-old pious Christian Democrat. Born to a French-speaking family from the Lorraine, Schuman had served in the German army in the First World War, then found himself a French citizen after Germany ceded control of the region in 1919. By 1950, Schuman's goal was to prevent a third war in Western Europe by making such a conflict economically impossible. He proposed placing control over the coalfields and blast furnaces that stretched from the Ruhr to the Lorraine under

a multinational institution, so that neither Germany nor France could ever build great numbers of weapons without the other being aware and, presumably, able to stop it. Despite the strong backing of the Truman Administration, it took the French government two years to gain approval for the plan, which grew to include the coal and steel industries of Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Even amidst the rubble and economic destitution left by the war, opposition to the plan was strong and complex. Communists throughout Western Europe marched in protest. Italian steelmakers, Belgian coal-mining companies, and De Gaulle's French nationalists denounced the plan. The British waffled, then opted to keep their own steel and coal industries independent. All the while, these newly restored democracies engaged in open, thoughtful, albeit sometimes bitter debate about what amounted to a sharing of sovereignty.

And here is America careening toward a similar economic integration with half the world amidst a near absence of debate and without any of the compelling reasons that drove Europeans together a half century ago. There is no recent history of war. There are no occupying armies to ensure fair use of the industrial capacity we "pool" with everybody. Many of our new partners are not democracies, and their internal workings, long-term goals, and ability to live peacefully in the world we imagine ourselves to be making remain obscure at best. The Europeans deliberately contemplated marriage; we have leaped, greased from head to toe, into a global orgy.

In the arguments over both NAFTA and the expansion of trade with China, Robert Schuman played a part in spirit if not in name. Back in the early 1990s, when Boris Yeltsin was clambering atop tanks, and Argentines were spending their dollar-guaranteed pesos, and Japan Inc. still loomed over the far Pacific, one of the main arguments in favor of expanding trade with China was that the flow of American money and expertise into that country would make us more secure. Not only would China come to depend on U.S. funds and technology but its citizens would perhaps be inspired to clamor again for political reform. So, anyway, said the first Bush Administration. So, too, said Bill Clinton.

Somehow, the inverse possibility—that economic interlinkage might make the United States dependent on China—was never considered, nor have we revisited this subject in depth in the ten years since. Even as U.S. corporations invested billions of dollars directly into China and Taiwan, and indirectly through outsourced production agreements, none of our elected officials or civil servants ever really examined in detail the risks of joining hands with one of the least stable and least transparent states on earth, China, and with that state's number-one potential target, Taiwan. A decade ago, no large U.S. company was dependent on China or Taiwan as either a market or a place for production. Today, hundreds are. When he took office early last year, George W. Bush inherited from his predecessor and from his own father perhaps the greatest failure in the history of American geopolitical thought.

Why did we so grievously fail to understand that running our ever more delicate assembly lines across so many fault lines, political and tectonic, might

endanger our power and our well-being? I had occasion late last year to put the question to Larry Wortzel, director of The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center. Wortzel was the assistant U.S. Army attaché in Beijing at the time of the Tiananmen protests, then directed the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. He has very close ties to some of the most anti-Beijing Bush appointees in the departments of State and Defense, as well as in the office of the Vice President. Wortzel maintained that involvement among the American, Chinese, and Taiwanese economies would not endanger America's security, because no large company would dare rely too much on sales in China. And what of cross-border supply chains, single sourcing, the Taiwan earthquake? Our economy, he insisted, in no way depends on manufacturing capacity located abroad. When I mentioned that Andrew Grove, the chairman of Intel—the largest manufacturer of semiconductors in the world—believes the integration of manufacturing activities has made war between the United States and China essentially impossible, Wortzel became red in the face. He lurched forward and said, "If Grove is that dependent on that source then he has assured the destruction of his own corporation."

Wortzel's reaction reveals the fundamental incompatibility of the two great political-economic systems that now operate in parallel. One is a global-manufacturing system created by companies such as Intel, which increasingly act independently of national considerations. Beneath that lies an older system, comprising governments whose ways of thinking date back to a time when economies were still largely national, when imports and exports were of raw materials and finished goods, and when the idea of a large, vital corporation moving its center of gravity abroad was unthinkable.

We have, it seems, outsourced one time too many. Often I have asked manufacturers to explain how they would keep their production lines running if the supply of a key component were suddenly cut off. Almost always they start by mentioning the robustness of their contingency plans: within days they could easily restart production elsewhere. And if an 8.5 quake strikes Hsinchu? Well, that might pose a challenge—a matter of weeks, not days. And if China ever invades Taiwan? Here the reassurances cease. "There are no models for that," the CEO of one electronics company told me. That, it would seem, is a question for Washington.

But does Washington know how to compose an answer? Would it be allowed to if it did? The CEOs who lobby the White House and Congress may hunt and fish and eat Delmonico steak like the American industrialists of old, yet Washington somehow ignores the fact that these men now represent corporations whose interests are no longer purely "American," and whose global expansions are driven more by panic than by political nuance. Our corporations have seemingly reduced the average individual "nation" to little more than a nasty knot of taxes, work rules, and other geographic idiosyncrasies to be unbound and intertwined with those of the neighbors, but sit through a discussion of trade policy at The Brookings Institution these days and you might be tempted to go buy tickets to a Senators game. You would think that America still swapped Xerox copiers for rusty tools and poorly dyed T-shirts, that there was still such a thing as "competition among nations," and among "national industries," for "export markets."

And as we prattle on here, what goes on twelve time zones away? China seems content to allow the great river of commerce to flow over its ledges and slip between its boulders. And why shouldn't it? As long as Beijing sits quietly and smiles, its palms upturned, the market will reward its patience and good humor with a steady increase in industrial capacity. Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Mexico, all fret about losing core industrial activity to China, and now Beijing pats its lap and winks at the global semiconductor industry. At the end of the day, who "owns" the actual semiconductor plant matters far less than where the plant is located, because whoever physically controls the production of semiconductors can paralyze thousands of the world's assembly lines with the flick of a switch. Beijing need not even declare a blockade of Taiwan, backed by a threat to use its missiles, in order to cause economic havoc. If it succeeds in luring enough key manufacturing capacity, Beijing will need only to threaten a peaceful closure of its own border, a sit-down strike if you will, organized by the most powerful labor syndicate in the world.

On being presented with this thesis, the experts in Washington revert to a stance learned a generation ago, in the era of thermonuclear gamesmanship. This, they insist, would be the economic equivalent of Mutually Assured Destruction. China could no more venture such a risk than could we. But there is doubt in their voices. And is there not some reason to fear a Falk-lands-like scenario in the event that China's own economy turns sour? Might it not one day prove perfectly rational for Beijing to shut down, if only temporarily, the world's assembly lines? Did Arab oil exporters not sacrifice immediate revenues for long-term power and plunder in 1973? Did Jefferson not attempt to exact greater respect from Great Britain and France by denying them American cotton, grain, and tobacco through the Embargo Act of 1807? Did Eisenhower not cut off oil supplies to coerce those same two countries out of Suez in 1956? Would a similar act, from Beijing's point of view, be any less valid?

For years Sovietologists have debated whether Lenin once said, "A capitalist would sell rope to his own hangman." Change "rope" to "supply chain," and, whether Lenin made the statement or not, it is still clearly true.

If terrorists ever want to strike at the heart of American manufacturing, they need not sneak into Ohio to do so. More certain success, with more concentrated results, awaits along the industrial boulevards of Taiwan. And what of the Philippine colonel or Indonesian autocrat who one day wakes to find that the electronics industry, in its rational wisdom, has placed 80 percent of the world's chip-assembly, or even chip-testing, operations in his country? Must we now abide and buy off cranks such as Malaysia's Mahathir the way we must abide the Dos Santos of the world and the families Saud? As our companies continue to scatter industrial capacity to the far corners of the globe, then to trim slack at home until they come to depend on that distant capacity, are we not witnessing the creation of a new strategic commodity like oil, control of which can be exploited to wrangle away our wealth and security? And once a country expropriates industrial capacity in this way would it not be able to use its influence to prevent the affected industry from ever building competing capacity elsewhere again?

Then there is China. Thirteen years ago, Francis Fukuyama wrote an essay called “The End of History?” Human political thought, he argued, had stumbled at last through the gates of a Hegelian heaven. Political perfection would forevermore be defined as Liberal Democracy supported by a capitalistic economic system. Published during the summer of Tiananmen, when it seemed that all the world’s authoritarian regimes were withering away, the article (perhaps unintentionally) set the tone for an American triumphalism that did not crest until well after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Yet atop the seas of champagne that engulfed the world in those days there floated an ark with so little in its hold, and so much blood on its deck, and such ridiculous Khrushchev-era weaponry, that it seemed barely worth another glance. It is clear now that the vessel did not sink, and that in its hull it carried an answer to, if not a refutation of, Fukuyama’s argument. The liberal democratic state, its powers continuously eroded by the immense forces of the modern market, simply leaves too much up for grabs. And grab is exactly what a more cohesive political entity than our own may try to do.

The greatest danger of all may not be that Beijing one day dares try to coerce the West but that the plan to undermine Beijing actually works, that the massive movement of money, goods, and ideas will lure freedom-seeking citizens back to Tiananmen. Revolutions, as we sometimes forget, can turn violent. How long, if violence strikes China, will we have to wait for our shipments of semiconductors and alternators and gaskets to arrive? Might we not find ourselves obliged one day, by the selfsame economic interdependence that was supposed to undermine Beijing, to prop up that regime in order to ensure the proper functioning of our own economy?

After two decades of deregulation, of voting away our few slight powers in exchange for BMWs and bass boats, we may soon discover, like Lear, that our children do not remain grateful for our generosity forever. We soared out of the 1990s convinced that we could inhabit forever our Cisco-style role as the commanders and controllers of an outsourced world. Now, barring a revolution in how we view business, we may be lucky to eke out a few good years as the corporate front end, the marketing department, for China. Unless, of course, Beijing decides to vertically integrate that activity too.

Service Work and the Service Ethos

BETHANY MORETON

“What a wonderful Christmas party we had at store no. 23 in Ruston, Louisiana,” rejoiced one of Wal-Mart’s female clerks in 1974. The managers’ wives had prepared the food and organized the event, complete with children’s games. “[T]hanks to Mr. Green [the store manager] for inviting the husbands, wives, children and dates of the younger ones. Anyone who didn’t come missed a blessing, because the fellowship together was the greatest gift of all.”

It was a sentiment that would have rung true for Jolene Kinzel, who in 1972 moved from Salem, Missouri, to Benton, Illinois. Ms. Kinzel had worked in Wal-Mart #27 in Salem, a small but successful store that had opened only the previous year. The Salem Wal-Mart was a lively work site. The local country station broadcast out of the store every Saturday morning, and for Easter employees had climbed onto the store roof and dropped 286 plastic eggs filled with gift certificates into the hands of waiting children. The boss, Jack Brewer, maintained good relations with his staff: when he left for a new Wal-Mart posting that spring, thirty employees and their families hosted a farewell party for the Brewers in the basement of Salem's city hall. "We're very happy for Mr. Brewer," wrote employee Pat Plank about the manager's promotion, "but we also hate to lose such a fine boss." No wonder, then, that Jolene Kinzel wrote back to her former Salem co-workers from Illinois that she was "homesick" for the store....

Although few had friendships with their co-workers before coming to work at the store, work itself offered plenty of opportunities to gather off the clock. "We just had a lot of fun," a Springdale store #54 employee emphasized. "We would stand outside after we got off and just talk for hours." For many, the weekly store meetings were more a social event than a work duty. Lunch-hour or after-closing parties in honor of weddings, birthdays, and retirements garnered the most enthusiastic participation, and the covered-dish lunch hour was a monthly feature at store #3 in the mid-1970s. In addition to the usual company Christmas parties, some stores seem to have seized almost any occasion to gather together. Leap year, 1976, was celebrated with a covered-dish lunch at Wal-Mart #129 in Ardmore, Oklahoma. As one participant said, in the language of the church social, "A fellowship hour like this makes you realize that Wal-Mart is the only place to work. Thank you, Mr. Walton, for starting all of this for us."...

Personal ties among hourly workers and between workers and managers created in many stores a level of loyalty that other companies could only envy. With work so intensely social, where the bulk of the tasks involved human interaction, the fabric of the relationships loomed large in estimations of the work itself. A new hire in Springdale praised the "kindness, friendliness, and patience of the entire store staff and management towards a new employee ... I hope to be worthy of being part of such a fine group." By staying with Wal-Mart for decades, a lifelong Benton County employee emphasized, "you developed these relationships, and if that's not why we're on this earth, I don't know what is." Some managers weren't up to standard, and one was a real problem, Alice Martin reports, but over her twenty-plus years at store #54, "I've been really lucky. And the [manager] I've got now—he's like my grandkid, and I just think the world of him." It is a difficult sentiment to imagine coming from a General Motors assembly line.

Despite frequent paeans to *laissez-faire* competition in the company newsletter, *Wal-Mart World*, management exhortations sought to abstract and inculcate the rather precapitalist values that early employees brought into the corporation. One long-time manager remembered of the original company, "Most people came out of a small-town environment where teamwork was valued ... Sure, people didn't want to fail, but it wasn't just because you wanted to keep your job—you also didn't want to let everyone else down."...

The classic rural goal of family subsistence—as opposed to individual advancement—meant that some early Wal-Mart employees in Northwest Arkansas evaluated their jobs in terms of their overall contribution to security, not strictly their wages or supervisory power. “During the years when I was not making what I felt like was a decent wage,” Alice Martin explains, “every year when I got my profit-sharing, I’d sit down with my calculator and I’d say forty hours a week with fifty-two weeks and divide that into what that was. Some years I made an extra dollar an hour and some years it was fifty cents an hour, and that made it worthwhile.” “The eighties were the golden years,” another remembered of the decade’s frequent stock splits. “You could give yourself a raise” by buying Wal-Mart stock on the employee discount.

Many interviewees remember to the penny the wages Wal-Mart offered when they started. While they do not hesitate to recognize the rate as low, they point out that no employer in the area was doing much better. “Back then, let’s face it,” says Bea Scott, “women didn’t make much.”... Nor were Wal-Mart workers entirely without recourse when it came to pay rates. After running the snack bar at store #54 for a while, Alice Martin asked to see the profit and loss statement for the area. “And so when I looked at it and saw the profits the snack bar was making, I went to him and told him I’d like to be considered for a merit raise. And I got one. It took me forever to get to five dollars, but I finally made that, too.” In most cases, the women’s incomes were one of several contributions to a family’s support. In-laws, sisters, and neighbors provided child care, or husbands looked after kids between hauls or took them on the road. Some former employees later babysat for their grandchildren while the mothers worked at Wal-Mart. Children or grandchildren might move home to help with sick relatives. At various points they have run small family businesses that employed multiple family members.

The ideal of an independent, self-sustaining, full-time wage, in other words, was not a prominent feature of their economic landscape. Rather, they emphasized Wal-Mart’s contribution to overall family stability, the access it provided to insurance, Social Security, and even investment. Several of the longtime employees stressed their gratitude for the company’s health and life insurance. Others mentioned that the old designation of “full-time” as twenty hours per week was an advantage, since it gave them access to benefits while allowing them to cover after-school child care. No one assumed these women were working for pin money, and no one thought their work ended when they left the store.

This was a calculus that paid off much better for these long-term employees during Wal-Mart’s go-go years of expansion in the 1970s and 1980s than it did before or has since. Even during the company’s growth years, the Ozarkers’ experience was wildly atypical: in 1993, only one employee in seventy, at any level, had amassed at least \$50,000 in Wal-Mart stock. And as employees were to find across the economy of the 1990s from dot-coms to Enron, compensation based on stock appreciation was a short-term bet. One hundred shares of Wal-Mart stock purchased in 1980 and sold after fifteen years would have fetched over \$300,000; the same one hundred shares bought by an employee in 1990 would have sold in 2005 for only \$20,000. Timing was everything.

Likewise, the Springdale employees’ long tenure in the company’s core territory meant their experience of benefits was quite different from most: Human

Rights Watch calculated that in 2002, Wal-Mart spent only about three-quarters as much on *all* benefits per covered worker as other major retailers averaged for their covered workers' health care alone. But for some, it was a bargain they found reasonable. In return for demanding work at underwhelming wages, they got to remain in the Ozarks, integrate work and family, and put a floor of security under their households' diversified earning strategies. "I had such a deep love for Wal-Mart," June Whitehead explained. "They were good to me, and I always tried to give them all I had." "When I say 'we,'" Alice Martin summed it up, "I mean Wal-Mart."

The family imagery that transferred from the rural heartland to Wal-Mart chain stores in the 1970s thus brought with it a variety of meanings: "natural" adult male authority, mutuality, sociability, subsistence over risk. Since Wal-Mart's early years, the same areas of the country that first welcomed Wal-Mart have also come to champion "family values" as the ruling metaphor of American public life. At the time, however, the family was not the only ideal available to a new workplace, nor even the most likely one. Married white women's mass entry into the waged labor force had sparked widespread concern over the mingling of men and women, the neglect of the domestic sphere, and the unsexing of women with independent incomes. In the case of Wal-Mart, however, the new work force's own meanings shaped the company's policies, both through emulation and through reaction. The result was a model that often boggled its principled critics: an economic colossus reliant on low-wage, part-time women's work, that nonetheless enjoyed an almost unshakeable reputation as a "family" company and that could command the loyalties of many with little in their pay packets to show for their devotion.

"What annoys me about the way some people talk about Wal-Mart today," asserted a former executive in 2004, "is that no one ever set out to create the biggest company in the world ... it's an affront to so many people, especially a lot of women in those small towns, to say that their work didn't count for anything, that they were just being used. They gave their lives to this work."... Mrs. Scott remembered a district manager who mentioned that women between the ages of thirty-five and fifty-five were Wal-Mart's best store employees, an observation that squared with her own experience. By that age, their children were in school and "they know what it is to get a husband off to work, they know what it is to come to work on time, pick up kids on time, take them to school—they've learned the value of scheduling. I had some ladies that worked there, and if I'd had 12 like them, I wouldn't have needed anybody else."...

The work of service introduces a unique element that finds no parallel in production: the direct relationship of the front-line service provider with the customer, or, in white-collar service, with the client. Regarding service as merely manufacturing *manqué* obscures this key relationship and its considerable consequences. Wal-Mart sources suggest the importance of this feature to the people who worked there in the early years. "On Saturdays," remembered Gail Hammond, "that was the place for everyone to go, to Wal-Mart! So we got to see all of the community." Although cashiers usually are at the bottom of the pay scale in retail, several Springdale women mentioned their preference for working checkout lines because of the increased customer contact. "I love talking to

people,” explained Mrs. Hammond, “so I liked being a cashier and moving on up to what we called the check-out supervisor.” Alice Martin was also glad to move to the cashier position, after finding her early work stocking housewares “kind of lonely.”

Shoppers met this interest with their own preferences for sustained interactions. Some regulars would deliberately head for a favorite cashier’s checkout line every time they shopped. In the ladies’ wear department at the Fayetteville store, June Whitehead saw some of the same customers two or three times a week, and kept the product displays rotating briskly with them in mind. Eleanor Cook, who started clerking in a Walton five-and-dime, still sees customers at store #54 “that I knew when I was working at Ben Franklin ... they’ve been here all these years. It’s so good to see them.”

If ringing up people’s purchases and helping them choose clothes over many years suggested some degree of intimacy, then working at the Wal-Mart pharmacy moved the relationship to another level. Kathleen Hollins described her pharmacy job as “taking care of customers,” using the vocabulary of health-care providers. “I love my customers,” said Alice Martin emphatically of her pharmacy work. She often saw her customers’ funerals listed in the paper. “The young ones, that’s the hardest. I went to the viewing the other night of a young man, and I went up to his folks, and I’ve got another one right now that’s not good, and I’ll go to his. He thinks he’s taking a vitamin, but he’s not.” With the prescriptions passing through their hands, the clerks ringing up the medications knew almost as much about their customers’ conditions as the pharmacists, and sometimes more than the patients themselves.

Many service providers report similarly satisfying relationships with customers, and even the routinization of mass service work does not seem able to stifle entirely the pleasures of personal interaction. In the small towns of Northwest Arkansas, moreover, the customer-clerk relationships weren’t confined to the store. Springdale’s store #54 often placed ads in the local paper that included photos of the hourly employees who headed up most merchandise departments. “Meet the Department Managers!” ran the headline, and thirty years later Gail Hammond could still name almost everyone in the photo: “There’s Erma, Virginia, Rose, Dina, Wilma, and now I don’t know him ...” The anonymous male department head may have moved on quickly to another store, but the core of local women became very familiar to area customers. “I’ll be out somewhere else and people’ll look at me and say, ‘I know you from somewhere,’” says Mrs. Hollins. “A lot of them will recognize me.” When Alice Martin and her husband celebrated their fiftieth wedding anniversary, multiple customers clipped the article from the paper and brought it to her at Wal-Mart.

Through this relationship between customers and clerks, the people in early Wal-Mart stores taught management how to function in the new economic niche it was creating. The manly ethos that had sanctified earlier forms of labor gave way in Wal-Mart to a corresponding ethos of service. Successful service work on a mass scale depended on “people skills.” This development did not mean that bottom-tier service workers became the new aristocracy of labor, with the lion’s share of job stability, compensation, or prestige. Nor did it

mean they deliberately chose the "soft" rewards of human relationships over more tangible compensation. What it did imply, rather, was a new ideological basis for valuing work and for explaining the radical inequalities it produced.

The corporate homage paid to the lowest-ranking workers was not a feature built into Wal-Mart from the first. In his 1992 autobiography, Walton made the by-then-familiar assertion that "the real secret to our unbelievable prosperity" at Wal-Mart had been "the relationship that we, the managers, have been able to enjoy with the associates." He continued with a confession: as much as he would like to claim that from the beginning management treated store employees as equals, the fact was that "none of it would be true." As former vice chairman Jack Shewmaker candidly admitted, the early Wal-Mart chain treated its employees as "robots, or mere statistics." It had to learn a new style, to demonstrate that the company's purpose was "going to make life better for others as well. That attitude does wonderful things."

Here the top executives cannot be doubted. Neither the managerial assertions of valuing store-level workers, nor the title "associates," nor the much-touted profit-sharing and benefits packages appeared until after employee unionization attempts at a pair of stores in southern Missouri prompted Walton to call in an antilabor lawyer, John Tate, in 1970. Tate—and, evidently, Helen Walton herself—urged Wal-Mart to "prove to them you care ... Let them share in the profits. Let them know you'll listen to what they have to say." With a certain lack of subtlety, this became the official "We Care" program, a promise to employees that raising concerns with management would not result in retribution. Only gradually did Wal-Mart learn from its employees and its customers to stress the emotional labor of service alongside the tight cost controls that had always taken the limelight.

Customers were explicit about what they valued in the service relationship. In 1979, a first-time Wal-Mart shopper wrote to praise a checker for "show[ing] a true interest in every customer that came through her aisle," and emphasized the evident sincerity of the woman's concern. A woman on a driving trip stopped at a Missouri store to buy an embroidery pattern and thread, and then realized she had no way to transfer the pattern to the material. The fabric-department staff borrowed an iron and ironed the pattern onto pillowcases for her. "I don't know of any nicer thing that could have cheered me, than the patience, consideration, and genuine niceness of these four women," whom the magazine then went on to name. A woman from Mountain Home, Arkansas, wrote the store manager of her local Wal-Mart to describe how she had spotted a display in the fabric department featuring a kind of shawl she had long been looking for. Upon asking to buy the pattern, she was told that it came not from a pattern book but from a store employee, Donna White. "I found Donna, who told me it was her grandmother's pattern, and she would send me a copy, if I would like her to. Several days ago a copy arrived. Donna took her leisure time and money to do a favor for a total stranger. Personnel like Donna give customers like me a friendly feeling toward the entire store."

Customers praised employees as well for tracking down out-of-stock items from other Wal-Mart stores, volunteering their own off-the-clock time to deliver goods to a customer's home, or assembling a complicated piece of equipment with

their own tools. Early Wal-Mart employees exercised considerable personal discretion in the lengths to which they could go to help customers, a nonmilitant form of worker control that nonetheless can enhance many jobs in service. The home office insisted that these were examples of employee loyalty to the company, but the customers and store employees stressed the personal relationships involved and the high calling of service itself. "Sunday I witnessed something I thought I would never see again, much less in a large and very busy store," a customer from Kansas wrote with feeling. An elderly lady had come through the checkout counter to purchase a lone bottle of perfume. In handing it to the checker, the customer dropped it. The checker asked her supervisor what to do about the shattered item, and he went back for a replacement vial. "He was so courteous, and so nice—not even a frown over the mess on the floor," the letter writer concluded. "It warmed the hearts of all who saw it."

Although serving customers at the Waltons' stores in the postwar decades had much in common with other forms of service work, certain aspects distinguished it as an unusually powerful model. As with the nineteenth-century development of department stores, the spread of mass consumption opened up a new category of "public" jobs for white women in which low wages might well be secondary to a relatively safe, agreeable workplace and service that did not automatically carry the stamp of servitude. But in contrast to earlier urban department stores, Wal-Mart shoppers and Wal-Mart workers were not separated by a gulf of class. Because of its small-farm heritage, Northwest Arkansas was home to an unusually flat class structure, so that customers were plausibly also "our friends, neighbors and loved ones." Moreover, the discount stores were not aiming for the luxury market; many women applied for their Wal-Mart jobs while on their routine shopping trips. The company's early avoidance of areas with large African-American populations and its homogeneous labor pool of "old-stock" whites meant that race and ethnicity rarely had a chance to differentiate the served from the servers. Unlike tipped jobs such as waitressing or physical care like nursing and babysitting, store service did not have a clear precedent in paid domestic service, nor were the women who performed it descended from servants or slaves, at least in recent history. Instead, they were incorporated into Wal-Mart through the metaphor of a family, and store-level managers especially were men of their own family backgrounds and education. For them, service did not come with the degrading associations that clung to it in other settings.

Like their customers, and in contrast to official pronouncements from Bentonville, store employees themselves remarked upon acts of courtesy and respect as important managerial functions. When the break room at one store was improved in 1977, the workers thanked their all-male management for "the privilege and convenience of our microwave. We here at Store #55-have had many occasions to be grateful for Management's concern for our comfort and great working conditions." A young clerk praised by a customer responded that the credit rightly belonged to her manager, who "work[ed] right along with his employees to help us build a better place for our customers to shop." Their approval was especially marked in the case of Walton himself, whom they held up within the company as a model of service. After accepting a promotion to the home office, former

store worker Ann Tuttle tutored newer employees with stories of the company's founder. "He came in one day," she related at her department's "culture meeting," "and he got down on one knee, and he said, 'If [the customers] ask you to kiss their behind, then you ask them which side they want you to start on.'"

As a self-service store, Wal-Mart was organized on the pattern pioneered by the Southern grocery chain Piggly-Wiggly in the 1910s and 1920s. Rather than placing the goods behind counters with clerks to assist, in other words, mass retailers explicitly drafted the labor of their own customers and trimmed their payrolls by reducing the number of clerks required to turn the stock. By avoiding delivery service, they also shifted to households—to wives—the burden of transporting goods, significantly increasing the time and effort involved in family provisioning and, in the process, changing the sex of the task. Thus the method of distribution in a Wal-Mart store combined the labor of mostly women servers and that of mostly women shoppers, who are themselves performing unwaged service to their families. The work formerly performed by clerks was divided between a proportionately reduced force of waged women and their customer counterparts—sometimes quite self-consciously. In 1974, a Springdale customer rated a photo in *Wal-Mart World* when she was discovered folding and straightening a T-shirt display.

More commonly, customers also participated in the emotional work of service by their interactions with the regular store staff. Cashiers at a Texas store in 1992 would find their registers decorated with balloons, ribbons, and banners on their birthdays, ensuring a steady stream of congratulations from customers throughout their shifts. When Ruby Holland, evidently an enthusiastic angler and one of the original employees at Wal-Mart #53, retired in 1977, her co-workers' tribute was structured to incorporate every customer in the store. Designating a "Ruby Holland Day," the managers pinned an orchid to her smock to encourage shoppers to congratulate her, and in honor of the avid fisher-woman, "all employees wore their fishing hats and jeans with a tag in the form of a fish, stating 'This Is Ruby Holland Day.'"

Thus the result of this reorganization of work was a new social relationship—not a fully reciprocal one, to be sure, but one distinct from the boss-subordinate kind. Early Wal-Mart publications bulge with reprinted letters from grateful customers who explained in precise terms what they found new and valuable about the emerging service ethos. "The clerks are always courteous, have smiles on their faces, making you feel like the most important customer to walk through the door," enthused one regular Wal-Mart shopper from Russellville, Arkansas. "The girls that waited on me were two of the sweetest girls I have met working in public," wrote another lady. "They had a smile for everyone and treated everyone alike." Among the items that women in Nashville, Arkansas, singled out as evidence of Wal-Mart's superiority was the longer hours, which "allow the working people to go shopping ... [Also,] Mrs. Winnie Bell Young, who takes care of the clothing department, always has good taste ... We are so thankful that she has seen to it that the stout women can be fitted as well as the smaller ladies." Shoppers were not shy about explicitly contrasting Wal-Mart to the old central shopping districts. A letter printed in a Fort Scott newspaper by an irate customer of downtown stores

complained about their rudeness, their credit-only returns policies, and their attempts to sell whatever was on the shelves when the items she wanted were out of stock. "No wonder the people of Fort Scott go out of town to shop and to the local Wal-Mart store ... Why don't you downtown merchants shape up???"

Though these extremes in customer service bubbled up from the stores, Wal-Mart headquarters was not blind to their cumulative effect. *Wal-Mart World* quoted a 1974 national survey, which demonstrated that two-thirds of the customers that a retailer lost took their business elsewhere in response to poor service. "This tells us how important it is for us to serve every customer as though he/she was the most important person in the world." "Mr. Sam has always felt that the customer was number one," an early manager remembered in an interview. "He talked to us about how important it was to talk to the customers about their chickens, their pigs, their cows, their kids." More to the point, recalled another, he pounded the table and threatened to fire any manager who couldn't get with the program.

Whether from the perspective of management or of labor, analyses of industrial work habitually divided workers by skill level, from the artisanal "aristocracy of labor" down through the "semi-skilled operative." But the measures of skill implicit in these rankings ignored the learned social skills that women brought *en masse* to the new factories of service. In its first generation of employees, Wal-Mart mined the resource of rural and small-town women's social training. After a high-ranking executive from a national chain visited half a dozen of the original Wal-Mart stores in 1973, Sam Walton reported, the rival told Wal-Mart's founder that what distinguished the stores in his mind was the employees' extreme friendliness and courtesy. "This is a quality that K-Mart, Sears, Penney's and many other regional discounters try hard to emulate," Walton wrote, "but, so far, haven't been able to get close to us. Whatever we have going for us, whether it's the fact that we're mostly small town folks or that people from Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Tennessee are just naturally friendly, let's keep this great thing going for Wal-Mart."...

Wal-Mart's enclosure of the farm family brought with it considerable advantages: the absence of other significant employers and the farm traditions of long hours and low cash flow made the company's frugality and demanding working conditions acceptable. The industrial economy's scorn for women's work skills meant they could be had for a bargain price. The mixture of communal work and natural male authority in household economies offered a work force segmented by status but unified in effort. The persistence of the household as the economic actor and its diversified subsistence strategy ensured a steady supply of part-timers....

The militant factory worker and the profit-maximizing rational subject are equally unhelpful models for understanding this context. Neither can capture the creative response to these challenges that arose in the new world of mass service. For when Wal-Mart's hourly employees talked about their work, they did not automatically emphasize the elements that find ready parallels in manufacturing—elements like surveillance, automation, antiunionism, or supervisory authority. Rather, they stressed the one element of service work that distinguishes it from all others: the relationship between the service provider and the customer....

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The 1990s and the Search for Post-Cold War Priorities

The end of the Cold War, culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, brought relief and a pervasive sense of triumph for many Americans. Although critics complained that the United States had become too militarized over the previous decades and had gone too far toward the brink of nuclear war, the nation had indisputably prevailed in its long confrontation with the Soviet bloc. Western-style democracy and capitalism, the principles that the United States had defended first from fascism during World War II and then from communism during the Cold War, appeared to be on the march nearly everywhere in the world as the new millennium approached.

The end of the East-West confrontation also brought uncertainties, however. For all its horrors, after all, the Cold War had encouraged a loose sense of solidarity among Americans on both domestic and foreign affairs by creating a sense of shared national purpose. When the conflict ended, so too did the rough consensus that had prevailed on numerous aspects of national life. In the international arena, the dissolution of the communist threat sparked debate over the nation's new priorities. Some Americans advocated that the nation reduce its international profile and focus its resources on domestic problems such as decaying schools and outdated infrastructure. Others contended that the nation must preserve its extraordinary diplomatic and military capabilities in order to assure its leadership of a stable and prosperous "unipolar" world built on American principles. Meanwhile, less optimistic commentators insisted that American power remained vital to protect the nation from new kinds of threats bound to emerge from the ashes of the Cold War, especially resurgent ethnic and religious tensions. Beset by conflicting points of view, the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton advocated the worldwide spread of democracy and open markets but in practice tacked between assertiveness and caution.

Disagreement over foreign policy paled in comparison to the fierce controversies that erupted over domestic policy. Election of the moderate Republican Bush in 1988 and the moderate Democrat Clinton in 1992 suggested strong centrist tendencies. Beyond the presidency, however, surging partisanship turned American politics into a battleground

where Democrats and Republicans argued bitterly about fundamental questions of economics, social policy, and even national values. Issues such as health care, abortion, and gay rights generated impassioned controversy. Political confrontation escalated especially in 1994, when outspoken Republicans led by House Minority Whip (and later House Speaker) Newt Gingrich, emboldened by major gains in the midterm congressional elections, proposed a "Contract with America" emphasizing tax cuts, reductions in federal entitlements, and a conservative social agenda. The new partisanship reached its high point in 1998, when the House of Representatives impeached Clinton on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice stemming from his extramarital affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Although the Senate acquitted Clinton, the episode underscored the increasing polarization of American politics—a trend that would accelerate in the early twenty-first century.



DOCUMENTS

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe signaled that the Cold War had come to an end. But what did this momentous shift in global affairs mean for the United States and the international community more generally? Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, a prominent commentator on global trends, offered a stunningly bold assessment in an article titled "The End of History?" Excerpted in Document 1, the essay argued that the whole world was on its way to embracing liberal democracy, ending centuries of strife among competing ideologies. Although few commentators or political leaders went as far as Fukuyama, many joined him in viewing the end of the Cold War as a major breaking point in world history. President George H. W. Bush expressed this opinion in a speech on September 11, 1990, a few weeks after forces commanded by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had invaded and occupied neighboring Kuwait. In his speech (Document 2), Bush insisted that the world must punish Iraqi aggression in order to help establish a "new world order" rooted in justice and harmony among nations.

Harvard University political scientist Samuel Huntington offered a different vision of the future in a seminal 1993 article—and later book—titled "The Clash of Civilizations." As Document 3 makes clear, Huntington foresaw a future not of peace and shared values but of conflict among the world's major cultural and religious groupings. In Document 4, Clinton's vice president, Al Gore, looks beyond the arena of international conflict to imagine another gloomy future marked by environmental crisis. Insisting that the end of the Cold War created new opportunities to focus on ecological problems, Gore called on the international community as well as American citizens to rethink their relationship with the natural world.

The environment was one of the few issues missing from the "Contract with America" (Document 5), a manifesto embraced by the Republican Party during the midterm election campaign in 1994. The contract helped the Republicans win control of Congress, but Clinton deftly turned the conservatives' victory to his own advantage over the following two years, depicting the new congressional

leaders as partisan extremists and capturing conservative issues such as deficit reduction and welfare reform as his own. He also touted his accomplishments in foreign affairs. In a speech on October 6, 1995 (Document 6), Clinton pointed to his successes in promoting peace in Bosnia and other areas while warning against any temptation to withdraw from international affairs.

In domestic policy, liberals were dismayed by Clinton's abandonment of traditional liberalism, not least his decision in 1996 to roll back welfare benefits. In Document 7, Peter Edelman, an aide to Clinton, explains why he resigned in protest against the president's welfare policy. But Clinton's strategy paid political dividends in the 1996 presidential election, when he easily defeated Republican candidate Robert Dole. Clinton's success in striking a moderate position and winning a mix of southern and northern states obscured growing polarization among the electorate as a whole. Indeed, by the end of the century, political commentators frequently invoked the image of an America sharply divided between conservative "red" states and liberal "blue" states. Document 8 suggests that income, education, and other factors divided cosmopolitan liberal states from poorer, rural states in the south and west. Other commentators and social scientists sought to debunk such sweeping generalizations, insisting that polarization was the product more of elite and media manipulation rather than the beliefs of the broader American population. Still, there was little doubt by 2000 that bipartisanship and political compromise were vanishing from American politics.

1. Political Theorist Francis Fukuyama Declares the "End of History," 1989

In watching the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that "peace" seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world. Most of these analyses lack any larger conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history, and are predictably superficial....

And yet, all of these people sense dimly that there is some larger process at work, a process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines. The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.

The triumph of the West, of the Western *idea*, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. In the past decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant reform movements in both. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants' markets and color television sets now omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of *Foreign Affairs*'s yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world *in the long run*....

In the past century, there have been two major challenges to liberalism, those of fascism and of communism. The former saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new "people" on the basis of national exclusiveness. Fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This was a defeat, of course, on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of the idea as well.... The ruins of the Reich chancellery as well as the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed this ideology on the level of consciousness as well as materially, and all of the pro-fascist movements spawned by the German and Japanese examples ... withered after the war.

The ideological challenge mounted by the other great alternative to liberalism, communism, was far more serious. Marx ... asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that could not be resolved within its context, that between capital and labor, and this contradiction has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West.... This is not to say that there are not rich people and poor people in the United States, or that the gap between them has not grown in recent years. But the root causes of economic inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our society, which remains fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist, so much as with the cultural and social characteristics of the groups that make it up, which are in turn the historical legacy of premodern conditions. Thus black poverty in the United States is not the inherent product of liberalism, but is rather the "legacy of slavery and racism" which persisted long after the formal abolition of slavery.

As a result of the receding of the class issue, the appeal of communism in the developed Western world, it is safe to say, is lower today than any time since the end of the First World War. This can be measured in any number of ways: in the declining membership and electoral pull of the major European communist parties, and their overtly revisionist programs; in the corresponding electoral success of conservative parties from Britain and Germany to the United States and Japan, which are unabashedly pro-market and anti-statist; and in an intellectual climate whose most "advanced" members no longer believe that bourgeois society is something that ultimately needs to be overcome. This is not to say that the opinions of progressive intellectuals in Western countries are not deeply pathological in any number of ways. But those who believe that the future must inevitably be socialist tend to be very old, or very marginal to the real political discourse of their societies....

The passing of Marxism-Leninism ... will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical significance. For while there may be some isolated true believers left in places like Managua, Pyongyang, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, the fact that there is not a single large state in which it is a going concern undermines completely its pretensions to being in the vanguard of human history. And the death of this ideology means the growing "Common Marketization" of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.

This does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se. For the world at that point would be divided between a part that was historical and a part that was post-historical. Conflict between states still in history, and between those states and those at the end of history, would still be possible. There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even in parts of the post-historical world. Palestinians and Kurds, Sikhs and Tamils, Irish Catholics and Walloons, Armenians and Azeris will continue to have their unresolved grievances. This implies that terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda. But large-scale conflict must involve large states still caught in the grip of history, and they are what appear to be passing from the scene.

The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come. Even though I recognize its inevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings for the civilization that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps

this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.

2. President George H. W. Bush Calls for a New World Order, 1990

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.

The test we face is great, and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world. America and the world must defend common vital interests—and we will. America and the world must support the rule of law—and we will. America and the world must stand up to aggression—and we will. And one thing more: In the pursuit of these goals America will not be intimidated.

Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the Earth. We do not exaggerate. Nor do we exaggerate when we say Saddam Hussein will fail. Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't.

Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.

"Address to Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis," September 11, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, 1990 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 1218–1222.

From the outset, acting hand in hand with others, we've sought to fashion the broadest possible international response to Iraq's aggression. The level of world cooperation and condemnation of Iraq is unprecedented. Armed forces from countries spanning four continents are there at the request of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to deter and, if need be, to defend against attack. Moslems and non-Moslems, Arabs and non-Arabs, soldiers from many nations stand shoulder to shoulder, resolute against Saddam Hussein's ambitions.

We can now point to five United Nations Security Council resolutions that condemn Iraq's aggression. They call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and categorically reject Iraq's cynical and self-serving attempt to annex Kuwait. Finally, the United Nations has demanded the release of all foreign nationals held hostage against their will and in contravention of international law....

We're now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders. We owe much to the outstanding leadership of Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The United Nations is backing up its words with action. The Security Council has imposed mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq, designed to force Iraq to relinquish the spoils of its illegal conquest. The Security Council has also taken the decisive step of authorizing the use of all means necessary to ensure compliance with these sanctions. Together with our friends and allies, ships of the United States Navy are today patrolling Mideast waters. They've already intercepted more than 700 ships to enforce the sanctions. Three regional leaders I spoke with just yesterday told me that these sanctions are working. Iraq is feeling the heat. We continue to hope that Iraq's leaders will recalculate just what their aggression has cost them. They are cut off from world trade, unable to sell their oil. And only a tiny fraction of goods gets through....

3. Political Scientist Samuel Huntington Predicts Turmoil and War, 1993

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be—the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes—emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes.... This nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization.... This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history....

Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries.... The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam....

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways....

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization....

4. Senator Al Gore Calls for New Focus on the Environment, 1992

... The edifice of civilization has become astonishingly complex, but as it grows ever more elaborate, we feel increasingly distant from our roots in the earth. In one sense, civilization itself has been on a journey from its foundations in the world of nature to an ever more contrived, controlled, and manufactured world of our own imitative and sometimes arrogant design. And in my view, the price has been high. At some point during this journey we lost our feeling of connectedness to the rest of nature. We now dare to wonder: Are we so unique and powerful as to be essentially separate from the earth?

Many of us act—and think—as if the answer is yes. It is now all too easy to regard the earth as a collection of “resources” having an intrinsic value no larger than their usefulness at the moment. Thanks in part to the scientific revolution, we organize our knowledge of the natural world into smaller and smaller segments and assume that the connections between these separate compartments aren’t really important. In our fascination with the parts of nature, we forget to see the whole.

The ecological perspective begins with a view of the whole, an understanding of how the various parts of nature interact in patterns that tend toward balance and persist over time. But this perspective cannot treat the earth as something separate from human civilization; we are part of the whole too, and looking at it ultimately means also looking at ourselves. And if we do not see that the human part of nature has an increasingly powerful influence over the whole of nature—that we are, in effect, a natural force just like the winds and the tides—then we will not be able to see how dangerously we are threatening to push the earth out of balance.

Our perspective is badly foreshortened in another way as well. Too often we are unwilling to look beyond ourselves to see the effect of our actions today on our children and grandchildren. I am convinced that many people have lost their faith in the future, because in virtually every facet of our civilization we are beginning to act as if our future is now so much in doubt that it makes more sense to focus exclusively on our current needs and short-term problems. This growing tendency to discount the value of investments made for the long term—whether of wealth, effort, or caution—may have begun with the realization that nuclear weaponry had introduced a new potential for an end to civilization. But whatever its genesis, our willingness to ignore the consequences of our actions has combined with our belief that we are separate from nature to produce a genuine crisis in the way we relate to the world around us. We seem to sense something of our jeopardy; we seem to share a restlessness of spirit that rises out of the lost connection to our world and our future. But we feel paralyzed, too attached to old assumptions and old ways of thinking to see a resolution to our dilemma....

Every education is a kind of inward journey, and my study of the global environment has required a searching reexamination of the ways in which political motives and government policies have helped to create the crisis and now frustrate the solutions we need. Ecology is the study of balance, and some of the same principles that govern the healthy balance of elements in the global environment also apply to the healthy balance of forces making up our political system. In my view, however, our system is on the verge of losing its essential equilibrium. The problem is not so much one of policy failures: much more worrisome are the failures of candor, evasions of responsibility, and timidity of vision that characterize too many of us in government. More than anything else, my study of the environment has led me to realize the extent to which our current public discourse is focused on the shortest of short-term values and encourages the American people to join us politicians in avoiding the most important issues and postponing the really difficult choices....

5. Republicans Propose a “Contract with America,” 1994

The Contract’s Core Principles

The Contract with America is rooted in 3 core principles:

Accountability—The government is too big and spends too much, and Congress and unelected bureaucrats have become so entrenched [as] to be unresponsive to the public they are supposed to serve. The GOP contract restores accountability to government.

Responsibility—Bigger government and more federal programs usurp personal responsibility from families and individuals. The GOP contract restores a proper balance between government and personal responsibility.

Opportunity—The American Dream is out of the reach of too many families because of burdensome government regulations and harsh tax laws. The GOP contract restores the American dream.

The Contract

As Republican Members of the House of Representatives and as citizens seeking to join that body we propose not just to change its policies, but even more important, to restore the bonds of trust between the people and their elected representatives.

That is why, in the era of official evasion and posturing, we offer instead a detailed agenda for national renewal, a written commitment with no fine print.

This year’s election offers the chance, after four decades of one-party control, to bring to the House a new majority that will transform the way Congress works. That historic change would be the end of government that

is too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money. It can be the beginning of a Congress that respects the values and shares the faith of the American family.

Like Lincoln, our first Republican president, we intend to act "with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right." To restore accountability to Congress. To end its cycle of scandal and disgrace. To make us all proud again of the way free people govern themselves.

On the first day of the 104th Congress, the new Republican majority will immediately pass the following major reforms, aimed at restoring the faith and trust of the American people in their government:

FIRST, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country also apply equally to the Congress;

SECOND, select a major, independent auditing firm to conduct a comprehensive audit of Congress for waste, fraud, or abuse;

THIRD, cut the number of House committees, and cut committee staff by one-third;

FOURTH, limit the terms of all committee chairs;

FIFTH, ban the casting of proxy votes in committee;

SIXTH, require committee meetings to be open to the public;

SEVENTH, require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase;

EIGHTH, guarantee an honest accounting of our Federal Budget by implementing zero base-line budgeting.

Thereafter, within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, we shall bring to the House Floor the following bills, each to be given full and open debate, each to be given a clear and fair vote, and each to be immediately available this day for public inspection and scrutiny.

1. The Fiscal Responsibility Act. A balanced budget/tax limitation amendment and a legislative line-item veto to restore fiscal responsibility to an out-of-control Congress, requiring them to live under the same budget constraints as families and businesses.

2. The Taking Back Our Streets Act. An anti-crime package including stronger truth-in-sentencing, "good faith" exclusionary rule exemptions, effective death penalty provisions, and cuts in social spending from this summer's "crime" bill to fund prison construction and additional law enforcement to keep people secure in their neighborhoods and kids safe in their schools.

3. The Personal Responsibility Act. Discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor mothers and denying increased AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] for additional children while on welfare, cut spending for welfare programs, and enact a tough two-years-and-out provision with work requirements to promote individual responsibility.

4. The Family Reinforcement Act. Child support enforcement, tax incentives for adoption, strengthening rights of parents in their children's education, stronger child pornography laws, and an elderly dependent care tax credit to reinforce the central role of families in American society.

5. The American Dream Restoration Act. A \$500 per child tax credit, begin repeal of the marriage tax penalty, and creation of American Dream Savings Accounts to provide middle class tax relief.

6. The National Security Restoration Act. No U.S. troops under UN command and restoration of the essential parts of our national security funding to strengthen our national defense and maintain our credibility around the world.

7. The Senior Citizens Fairness Act. Raise the Social Security earnings limit which currently forces seniors out of the work force, repeal the 1993 tax hikes on Social Security benefits, and provide tax incentives for private long-term care insurance to let Older Americans keep more of what they have earned over the years.

8. The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act. Small business incentives, capital gains cut and indexation, neutral cost recovery, risk assessment/cost-benefit analysis, strengthening the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and unfunded mandate reform to create jobs and raise worker wages.

9. The Common Sense Legal Reform Act. "Loser pays" laws, reasonable limits on punitive damages, and reform of product liability laws to stem the endless tide of litigation.

10. The Citizen Legislature Act. A first-ever vote on term limits to replace career politicians with citizen legislators.

Further, we will instruct the House Budget Committee to report to the floor and we will work to enact additional budget savings, beyond the budget cuts specifically included in the legislation described above, to ensure that the Federal budget deficit will be less than it would have been without the enactment of these bills.

Respecting the judgment of our fellow citizens as we seek their mandate for reform, we hereby pledge our names to this Contract with America.

6. President Bill Clinton Warns against New Isolationism, 1995

The common good at home is simply not separate from our efforts to advance the common good around the world. They must be one and the same if we are to be truly secure in the world of the 21st century.

"Remarks at Freedom House," October 6, 1995, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1995, vol. II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 1544-1551.

We see the benefits of American leadership in the progress now being made in Bosnia. In recent weeks, our military muscle through NATO, our determined diplomacy throughout the region, have brought the parties closer to a settlement than at any time since this terrible war began 4 years ago. Yesterday, we helped to produce an agreement on a Bosnia-wide cease-fire. Now, the parties will come to the United States to pursue their peace talks mediated by our negotiating team and our European and Russian counterparts.

We have a long way to go, and there's no guarantee of success. But we will use every ounce of our influence to help the parties make a peace that preserves Bosnia as a single democratic state and protects the rights of all citizens, regardless of their ethnic group....

We also saw the benefits of America's leadership last week at the White House where leaders from all over the Middle East gathered to support the agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. For nearly a half-century now, Democratic and Republican administrations have worked to facilitate the cause of peace in the Middle East. The credit here belongs to the peacemakers. But we should all be proud that at critical moments along the way, our efforts helped to make the difference between failure and success.

It was almost exactly a year ago that the United States led the international effort to remove Haiti's military regime and give the people of Haiti a real chance at democracy. We've succeeded because we've backed diplomacy with sanctions and ultimately with force. We've succeeded because we understood that standing up for democracy in our own hemisphere was right for the Haitian people and right for America.

American efforts in Bosnia, the Middle East, and Haiti and elsewhere have required investments of time and energy and resources. They've required persistent diplomacy and the measured use of the world's strongest military. They have required both determination and flexibility in our efforts to work as leaders and to work with other nations. And sometimes they've called on us to make decisions that were, of necessity, unpopular in the short run, knowing that the payoff would not come in days or weeks but in months or years. Sometimes they have been difficult for many Americans to understand because they have to be made, as many decisions did right after World War II, without the benefit of some overarching framework, the kind of framework the bipolar cold war world provided for so many years.

To use the popular analogy of the present day, there seems to be no main-frame explanation for the PC world in which we're living. We have to drop the abstractions and dogma and pursue, based on trial and error and persistent experimentation, a policy that advances our values of freedom and democracy, peace, and security.

We must continue to bear the responsibility of the world's leadership.... It is more than a happy coincidence that the birth of bipartisan support for America's leadership in the world coincides with the founding of this organization by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie in 1941 when for the first time Americans, both Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives and moderates, understood our special obligation to lead in the world.

The results of that responsible leadership were truly stunning: victory in the war and the construction of a post-cold-war world. Not with abstract dogma but again, over a 5-year period, basing experience on new realities, through trial and error with a relentless pursuit of our own values, we created NATO, the Marshall plan, Bretton Woods, the institutions that kept the peace in Europe, avoided nuclear conflict, helped to spread democracy, brought us unparalleled prosperity, and ultimately ensured the triumph of freedom in the cold war....

[I]t is important that we never forget that our values and our interests are one in the same. Promoting democracies that participate in this new global marketplace is the right thing to do. For all their imperfections, they advance what all people want and often fight and die for: human dignity, security, and prosperity. We know these democracies are less likely to go to war, less likely to traffic in terrorism, more likely to stand against the forces of hatred and intolerance and organized destruction.

Throughout what we now call the American century, Republicans and Democrats disagreed on specific policies, often heatedly from time to time, but we have always agreed on the need for American leadership in the cause of democracy, freedom, security, and prosperity. Now that consensus is truly in danger, and interestingly enough, it is in danger in both parties. Voices from the left and the right are calling on us to step back from, instead of stepping up to, the challenges of the present day. They threaten to reverse the bipartisan support for our leadership that has been essential to our strength for 50 years. Some really believe that after the cold war the United States can play a secondary role in the world, just as some thought we could after World War II, and some made sure we did after World War I.

But if you look at the results from Bosnia to Haiti, from the Middle East to Northern Ireland, it proves once again that American leadership is indispensable and that without it our values, our interests, and peace itself would be at risk.

It has now become a truism to blame the current isolationism on the end of the cold war because there is no longer a mainframe threat in this PC world....

I agree that America has challenges at home that have to be addressed. We have to revive our economy and create opportunity for all of our citizens. We have to put responsibility back into our social programs and strengthen our families and our communities. We have to reform our own Government to make it leaner and more effective. But we cannot do any of these things in isolation from the world which we have done so much to make and which we must continue to lead.

Look at what is going on. Many of the new democracies in this world, they're working so hard. I see their leaders all the time. They believe in the cause of freedom, and they are laboring out there in these countries against almost unbelievable obstacles. But their progress is fragile. And we must never forget that. We have to see them as growing, growing things that have to be nurtured in a process that could still be reversed.

And we also have to recognize that we confront a host of threats that have assumed new and quite dangerous dimensions, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the technology age, that can mean simply breaking open a vial of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway. It can mean hooking into the Internet and learning how to build a bomb that will blow up a Federal building in the heart

of America. These forces, just as surely as fascism and communism, would spread darkness over light, disintegration over integration, chaos over community. And these forces still demand the leadership of the United States.

Let me say again, the once bright line between domestic and foreign policy is blurring. If I could do anything to change the speech patterns of those of us in public life, I would almost like to stop hearing people talk about foreign policy and domestic policy and instead start discussing economic policy, security policy, environmental policy, you name it.

When you think about the world and the way that you live in it, you readily see that the foreign-domestic distinction begins to evaporate in so many profound ways. And if we could learn to speak differently about it, the very act of speaking and thinking in the way we live, I believe, would make isolationism seem absolutely impossible as an alternative to public policy....

7. President Clinton Ends “Welfare as We Know It,” 1996

I hate welfare. To be more precise, I hate the welfare system we had until last August, when Bill Clinton signed a historic bill ending “welfare as we know it.” It was a system that contributed to chronic dependency among large numbers of people who would be the first to say they would rather have a job than collect a welfare check every month—and its benefits were never enough to lift people out of poverty. In April of 1967 I helped Robert Kennedy with a speech in which he called the welfare system bankrupt and said it was hated universally, by payers and recipients alike. Criticism of welfare for not helping people to become self-supporting is nothing new.

But the bill that President Clinton signed is not welfare reform. It does not promote work effectively, and it will hurt millions of poor children by the time it is fully implemented....

Governor Clinton campaigned in 1992 on the promise to “end welfare as we know it” and the companion phrase “Two years and you’re off.” He knew very well that a major piece of welfare-reform legislation, the *Family Support Act*, had already been passed, in 1988. As governor of Arkansas he had been deeply involved in the enactment of that law, which was based on extensive state experimentation with new welfare-to-work initiatives in the 1980s, especially *GAIN* in California. The 1988 law represented a major bipartisan compromise. The Democrats had given in on work requirements in return for Republican concessions on significant federal funding for job training, placement activities, and transitional child care and health coverage.

The Family Support Act had not been fully implemented, partly because not enough time had passed and partly because in the recession of the Bush years the states had been unable to provide the matching funds necessary to draw down their full share of job-related federal money. Candidate Clinton ought

responsibly to have said that the Family Support Act was a major piece of legislation that needed more time to be fully implemented before anyone could say whether it was a success or a failure.

Instead Clinton promised to end welfare as we know it and to institute what sounded like a two-year time limit. This was bumper-sticker politics—oversimplification to win votes. Polls during the campaign showed that it was very popular, and a salient item in garnering votes. Clinton's slogans were also cleverly ambiguous. On the one hand, as President, Clinton could take a relatively liberal path that was nonetheless consistent with his campaign rhetoric. In 1994 he proposed legislation that required everyone to be working by the time he or she had been on the rolls for two years. But it also said, more or less in the fine print, that people who played by the rules and couldn't find work could continue to get benefits within the same federal-state framework that had existed since 1935....

Candidate Clinton, however, had let a powerful genie out of the bottle. During his first two years it mattered only insofar as his rhetoric promised far more than his legislative proposal actually offered. When the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994, the bumper-sticker rhetoric began to matter. So you want time limits? the Republicans said in 1995. Good idea. We'll give you some serious time limits. We now propose an absolute lifetime limit of five years, cumulatively, that a family can be on welfare. End welfare as we know it? You bet. From now on we will have block grants. And what does that mean? First, that there will be no federal definition of who is eligible and therefore no guarantee of assistance to anyone; each state can decide whom to exclude in any way it wants, as long as it doesn't violate the Constitution (not much of a limitation when one reads the Supreme Court decisions on this subject). And second, that each state will get a fixed sum of federal money each year, even if a recession or a local calamity causes a state to run out of federal funds before the end of the year.

This was a truly radical proposal. For sixty years Aid to Families with Dependent Children had been premised on the idea of entitlement. "Entitlement" has become a dirty word, but it is actually a term of art. It meant two things in the AFDC program: a federally defined guarantee of assistance to families with children who met the statutory definition of need and complied with the other conditions of the law; and a federal guarantee to the states of a matching share of the money needed to help everyone in the state who qualified for help. (AFDC was never a guarantor of income at any particular level. States chose their own benefit levels, and no state's AFDC benefits, even when coupled with food stamps, currently lift families out of poverty.) The block grants will end the entitlement in both respects, and in addition the time limits say that federally supported help will end even if a family has done everything that was asked of it and even if it is still needy....

This was *the* major milestone in the political race to the bottom. The President had said he was willing to sign legislation that would end a sixty-year commitment to provide assistance to all needy families with children who met the federal eligibility requirements. In the floor debate Senator Edward Kennedy, who voted against the bill, described it as "legislative child abuse."...

The game was over. Now no one could ever say again with any credibility that this President is an old liberal.

8. American Voters Split by Income, Education, Race, 2000

Top Five and Bottom Five States by Income, Education, Non-English Speakers, Commuting Times, and Vote for President in 2000

Median Income	Presidential Vote	College Education	Presidential Vote	Non-English Speakers	Presidential Vote	Commuting Times (in minutes)	Presidential Vote
<i>Top Five States</i>							
1. New Jersey (\$54,226)	Gore	1. District of Columbia (41.1%)	Gore	1. California (39.5%)	Gore	1. New York (31.2)	Gore
2. Connecticut (\$53,108)	Gore	2. Massachusetts (34.9%)	Gore	2. New Mexico (35.5%)	Gore	2. Maryland (29.2)	Gore
3. Alaska (\$52,876)	Bush	3. Colorado (33.4%)	Bush	3. Texas (32.0%)	Bush	3. New Jersey (28.7)	Gore
4. Maryland (\$52,436)	Gore	4. Connecticut (33.3%)	Gore	4. New York (27.5%)	Gore	4. District of Columbia (28.5)	Gore
5. Hawaii (\$51,046)	Gore	5. Maryland (31.5%)	Gore	5. Hawaii (26.1%)	Gore	5. Illinois (27.0)	Gore
U.S. Median \$41,343		U.S. Median 25.1%		U.S. Median 17.6%		U.S. Median 24.3	
<i>Bottom Five States</i>							
1. Kentucky (\$32,843)	Bush	1. Mississippi (18.6%)	Bush	1. Arkansas (3.8%)	Bush	1. Wyoming (17.1)	Bush
2. Arkansas (\$32,714)	Bush	2. Nevada (18.3%)	Bush	2. Kentucky (3.5%)	Bush	2. Nebraska (16.1)	Bush
3. Mississippi (\$32,955)	Bush	3. Kentucky (17.2%)	Bush	3. Alabama (3.3%)	Bush	3. Montana (16.0)	Bush
4. Louisiana (\$31,034)	Bush	4. Arkansas (16.6%)	Bush	4. Mississippi (2.9%)	Bush	4. South Dakota (15.6)	Bush
5. West Virginia (\$28,569)	Bush	5. West Virginia (14.1%)	Bush	5. West Virginia (2.2%)	Bush	5. North Dakota (15.4)	Bush

SOURCE: Eric Schmitt, "Census Data Show a Sharp Increase in Living Standard," New York Times, August 6, 2001. From *The New York Times*, August 6, 2001 © 2001 *The New York Times*. All rights reserved. Used by permission and protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States. The printing, copying, redistribution, or retransmission of this Content without express written permission is prohibited.

 ESSAYS

Researchers have only recently begun subjecting the 1990s to rigorous historical examination, but already a major theme stands out in the resulting body of work: the contrast between the enormous prosperity and opportunity of the era and the difficulties that Americans had in charting a new course for the nation following the end of the Cold War. In the first essay, journalist Haynes Johnson explores this theme in his examination of the “millennial” generation—the cohort of Americans who came of age during this period of profound change and uncertainty. In the second essay, historian Hal Brands shifts the focus to the international arena, examining the failures of American leaders to decide on a global strategy to replace containment, which became obsolete with the end of the East–West struggle.

A Paradoxical Age

HAYNES JOHNSON

When Thackeray presented *Vanity Fair* to the English-speaking people, he described it as “a novel without a hero.” He promised his readers they would encounter scenes of high life, scenes of low life, lovemaking for the sentimental, light comedy for the distracted, dreadful combats for the jaded. He hoped the characters strutting across his stage would prove as diverse as they were diverting, but warned sensitive souls they were entering “not a moral place certainly: nor a merry one, though very noisy.” For all the promise of that world, he confessed to “a feeling of profound melancholy” as his curtain rose to expose the bustling spectacle behind it.

Thackeray’s world was England at its nineteenth-century zenith, proud inheritor of western empires past, and so supreme, so confident in its multiple strengths and successes, that it was the envy of the then-modern world, and devil take those who dared suggest harsher realities existed. My story involves America at *its* zenith a century and a half later, a society so favored as it entered a new millennium that its people could be excused for believing they were experiencing their very best of times, no matter how the glow of new riches blinded them to the evidence of much worse around them. Looking to the future, America’s prospects appeared unlimited. Despite an unattractive tendency to boast loudly of their multiple advantages—*We’re number one!*—Americans could make a powerful case that not since the peak of the Roman Empire had another society occupied so dominant a world position as they did at century’s end.

They enjoyed unprecedented peace and prosperity. Their creation of wealth was unsurpassed, and it was a new wealth shared by more members of the society than ever before. Driven by the force of their longest continuous peacetime boom, the expanding American economy lifted what was already the highest

standard of living in the world to even greater heights. So rapid was the growth, so sustained the boom, that Americans were experiencing the best of all economic worlds: low inflation *and* low unemployment, high productivity *and* record high profits. These enviable conditions, emblems of a golden age, prompted scholars to search for comparable historic examples. Few, if any, were found. It was a “new economy,” the likes of which had never been experienced before.

In science, in technology, in medicine, in military power, Americans had no equals. As the clock ticked away on the twentieth century, their dominance grew stronger. Nor did their advantages end there. After the global terrors and tragedies into which they had been drawn throughout the century, by the closing years of that epoch they faced no crises domestic or foreign. No specter of another Great Depression then haunted them. American markets continued to soar, setting record after record. The seemingly unstoppable boom roared on. So rewarding was it, so driven by supposedly permanent new factors, that even cautious economic observers began suggesting historic up-and-down market forces had been repealed. Now, the movement was only up—and up, and up. There was no downside.

No threat of another global war existed. The Cold War, the defining episode of the post-World War II era, was over. For half a century, Americans had poured \$11 trillion of their treasure into deadly competition with the Soviet Union. They committed the greatest portion of their military, scientific, and technological resources to that struggle, and an incalculable amount of their psychic energy.

The Cold War affected national attitudes and behavior, government and politics, scientific and technological innovation, public priorities and personal values. The cost came high in other ways. Nearly one hundred thousand Americans died in the Cold War conflicts of Korea and Vietnam. The national debt exploded to historic levels. To finance the demands of the newly emerging National Security State, public funds were diverted to defense from health and education, public lands and parks, the environment and the infrastructure. With the Cold War won, no longer did Americans confront the threat of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, whose empire, even in name, had ceased to exist. Neither did the spiraling public debt now seem to pose a critical problem. Suddenly, the deficits turned into surpluses, projected officially to accumulate far into the next century until they reached \$6 trillion.

No new enemies challenged America, certainly none remotely posing the danger of a Hitler, a Stalin, a Tōjō, a Ho Chi Minh. The “isms” that bedeviled Americans and the world throughout the century—fascism, communism—receded into history’s pages. When America stumbled into a war in the Balkans, fears were expressed that the conflict could spread, like its European predecessors, into the kind of global conflagration that took more than 100 million lives throughout the twentieth century, making it by far the bloodiest of all centuries. Yet seventy-eight days after American involvement began, air strikes alone produced a military victory without the loss of a single life among the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. And this triumph was fashioned largely through technologically superior American “smart” weapons guided by American earth-orbiting satellites, assisted by American electronic surveillance,

radar-jamming aircraft, and unmanned drones, and delivered by American pilots flying the most modern American warplanes.

No wonder the great majority of Americans tuned out the war news long before it was over. The triumph of American technology simply served to strengthen an already powerful belief that what happens elsewhere has little effect on their lives. Like so many other events that briefly flickered across their television screens or over the Internet, the Balkan War was filed away as a momentary diversion as Americans turned back to another aspect of the post-Cold War era of which they were the great beneficiaries—the triumph of capitalism over communism after a nearly century-long contest. It was a robust, risk-taking variety of capitalistic entrepreneurship that flourished at the millennium, one that created new businesses, forged massive consolidations, amassed vast fortunes.

With all these assets, and with confidence in their future, solid grounds existed for Americans to think their good fortune would continue, perhaps even multiply, propelling them into an even more golden period. A disturbing disconnect was present, however. Despite their blessings, Americans increasingly felt something was wrong with their society.

How to describe *what* was wrong was another matter. It's this, it's that: vague, ill-defined undercurrents of discontent; a sense that something is missing. It's random violence: shootings in schools and workplaces; the terror of strolling down a city sidewalk at night. It's increasing incivility: lack of common courtesy, "road rage" and "air rage," outright hostility, disrespect writ large across the society. It's stress: accumulating pressures on two working parents, on single mothers, on single fathers, on aspiring students, on workers in the fiercely competitive job market. It's frustration: the disappointment at not meeting expectations—yours, your parents', your children's. It's distrust: the lack of confidence in lovers, bosses, coworkers, strangers, authority. It's fear: the growing dread of age, illness, early retirement, relocating, being alone, complex new machines, being overwhelmed by new information and the pace of technological change. It's failing to reach perfection: the perfect romance; the perfect body; the perfect workout; the perfect tummy tuck, eye lift, or penile implant promised by plastic surgeons flaunting youth-enhancing wonders in their glossy ads in the most fashionable magazines.

It's all of these, and none of these. But signals were flashing of surprising public unease—surprising in view of the extraordinary good times that graced America. Were these signs like the symptoms F. Scott Fitzgerald described at the peak of the boom of the Twenties before the crash: "A widespread neurosis began to be evident, faintly signaled, like a nervous beating of the foot"? Perhaps. Probably not.

It was undeniable, however, that a great paradox existed. For all their advantages, Americans felt alienated from their leaders and public institutions, and especially from their political system. Voter participation, a vital sign of the health of a democracy, declined steadily and reached record lows. Fueled by what seemed a wave of scandals, Americans turned inward. Distrust and disbelief spread. Personal, not public, concerns became paramount. The benefits of the boom and the spread of public scandals diverted attention from critical unsolved issues: continuing racial tensions and resentments; inner-city isolation and

violence; the failure of public education; the growing health and retirement needs of a rapidly aging population; a vastly widening chasm between the ranks of the very rich and the very poor, while those in the middle were struggling merely to maintain their position; sudden spasms of mass murder and the proliferation of ever more powerful guns in a society that already led all others in deaths from gunfire; alienation and discontent among the nation's children, especially those living in affluent areas supposedly free from the problems afflicting less fortunate youth; depletion of natural resources that threatened another energy crisis in carefree, spendthrift America.

The scandals, one after another, were fed by a mass media scrambling for survival in the face of an increasingly fragmented market. New cable TV outlets proliferated. They attracted viewers by offering sensation and spectacle, the more confrontational and accusatory the better. At the same time, all media, whether mainstream or new, faced fierce competitive challenges from an expanding Internet that fed information into homes and offices everywhere, with a speed and range previously unimaginable. If questions about a possible scandal arose, the most intimate acts of a person's private life were likely to receive the widest possible public exposure. Parents found children asking questions about the most graphic details of sexuality. Gossip, accusation, and rumor—however vile, however unproven—were elevated to new heights and spread instantaneously, unfiltered, into homes everywhere. As the climate of scandal enveloped Washington during the Nineties, it became apparent that something more serious than a series of lurid melodramas rivaling the prime-time TV soaps was at work. In time, everyone touched by them was affected, and all for the worse....

In large part, this is a story of opportunities missed: How the United States of America, having arrived at a moment of peak power and influence, possessing the resources and talents necessary to resolve long-term problems affecting all its citizens, given a historic chance to provide leadership for a world increasingly divided between haves and have-nots, and facing more, not fewer, complexities, permitted those opportunities to be squandered through self-destructive squabbles, petty political assaults, growing inattention, and the diversions of the electronic entertainment and scandal culture. It is also the story of how promising leaders betrayed their trust and, instead of rekindling faith, produced discord and cynicism about public institutions, public service, and the political system....

In 1997, as the then-seemingly unstoppable economic expansion surged to higher and higher historic levels, a national survey of American college students by a Big Five international accounting firm produced astonishing findings. Of all college students questioned, 77 percent said they expected to become millionaires in their lifetimes. Stunning as those findings were, they perfectly reflected the attitudes being created in a new generation by the benefits of a boom that more and more young Americans believed had become a permanent part of their lives.

Human nature and basic attitudes don't *really* change from generation to generation, but that doesn't stop cultural popularizers and commercial mass marketers of our aging but youth-obsessed society from trying to give each

wave of Americans distinctive characteristics, the better to label and profit from them—the Silent Generation, the Me Generation, the Baby-Boomer Generation. Most of these attempts to give each generation a name and its dominant attitudes a common value are of little use in determining fundamental generational change. Most of the opinion surveys sample only an infinitesimal fragment of the target group, providing at best transitory snapshots of American attitudes; and those attitudes are affected by constantly changing events.

One national survey, however, stands as a notable exception in tracking real long-term changes in attitudes and values of generations of young Americans from the Sixties through the Nineties. That is the annual survey of entering college freshmen attending two- and four-year colleges and universities conducted each fall by UCLA in association with the American Council on Education. As the millennium approached, the results of this survey documented a kind of best-and-worst-case scenario about the submillennial generation who are destined to lead America through the first half of the twenty-first century and beyond: Best—more sophisticated, more tolerant, more talented technologically, more concerned and careful about their health and physical and sexual habits; Worst—more cynical, more self-centered, more insensitive, more driven to succeed at any cost.

Since 1966, when the annual survey began, more than 9 million students attending some fifteen hundred institutions of higher learning have participated in it. Over the decades, the results track a steady turning away from public life, public service, political and social activism. In place of the idealism expressed by students in the Sixties, the survey shows young Americans placing increasing emphasis on making money and materialism.

By 1998, as the *New York Times* noted in reporting on the results of the annual student survey, the findings confirmed what college professors and administrators had long been sensing: “students are increasingly disengaged and view higher education less as an opportunity to expand their minds and more as a means to increase their incomes.” Thus, UCLA researchers concluded, two suggested goals of education—“to be very well off financially” and “to develop a meaningful philosophy of life”—had switched places. In 1968, for example, 82.5 percent of the students surveyed cited the importance of developing a philosophy as an essential life goal as opposed to the 40.8 percent who believed achieving financial security most important. Three decades later those numbers were reversed: 74.9 percent of the students said being well off was their essential goal while 40.8 percent chose developing a philosophy of life.

This means, the survey director, Linda J. Sax, told the *Times*, that students of the late Clinton years were “using education more as a means to an end, rather than valuing what is being learned.” Students’ strong interest in high incomes has been rising steadily over the years, according to Sax, who noted that “the trend took on more significance when added to the fact that incoming students showed unprecedented levels of academic and political disengagement.”

These trends continued as the boom accelerated and the social and cultural forces of the Nineties became even more distracting.

“Business executive (management administrator)” again topped the list of students’ probable career choices in the survey of 364,546 entering freshmen at

683 of the nation's two- and four-year colleges and universities conducted in the fall of 1999 and made public early in the year 2000. At the bottom, picked by only six-tenths of a percent of the students, were "policymaker/government" and "military service."

Student interest in politics continued to plummet. A record low of 25.9 percent of the millennial freshmen believed that "keeping up to date with political affairs" was either a very important or essential life goal. Thirty-four years earlier, in the first freshmen survey conducted in the mid-Sixties, 57.8 percent of the students embraced this goal. By 1999 only 14 percent of freshmen frequently discussed politics. More than twice as many did in 1968.

Further evidence of disinterest in civic affairs and declining commitment to social activism emerges strongly in that century-end survey data. Only 20.6 percent had voted in a student election. While a record number of freshmen—75.3 percent—performed some form of volunteer work in their last year in high school, much of it required and thought to be essential to gain a spot at a top college in today's pressure-filled college application process, only 18.9 percent expected to continue their community service work in college. And their long-term goals for social activism continued to drop.

The percentage of freshmen who thought it "very important or essential" to "influence social values" fell to 35.8 percent, its lowest point since the mid-Eighties. Their desire to participate in community action programs also reached its lowest point in over a decade (21.3 percent), while interest in becoming a community leader dropped four percentage points in the last three years—from 32.1 percent in 1996 to 28 percent in 1999.

Even more disturbing for what it says about the desire or willingness of the millennial generation to become involved in improving the quality of public life, the survey documents their declining social consciousness. Their commitment to "help clean up the environment" declined for the seventh straight year, reaching its lowest point (17.9 percent) in more than a decade. In 1992, as the boom was just getting underway, nearly twice as many wanted to become involved in environmental clean-up programs. Their commitment to "helping others who are in difficulty" declined for the third straight year, and also fell to its lowest point in more than a decade (59 percent). Similarly, commitment to "help promote racial understanding" declined for the third straight year, dropping to 28.4 percent, its lowest point in fourteen years. That represents a falloff of more than a third from the number of students who previously expressed a commitment to work for better racial understanding.

In another revealing commentary about attitudes on race, the percentage of college freshmen who agreed that "racial discrimination is no longer a major problem in America" increased to 23 percent. That marks the highest number recorded in the ten years since survey officials began asking students that specific question about the state of American race relations.

Not surprisingly for a generation greatly influenced by the technological revolution that sparked the boom and its good times, and a generation whose models for success are the young techies amassing new wealth, the millennials are highly proficient technologically. The survey results show them becoming even more dependent on their new electronic tools and toys.

By century's end, more than four out of five students used the Internet for research or homework. Nearly two-thirds communicated via e-mail. More than half participated in Internet chat rooms. Nearly three-quarters engaged in "other Internet use." More than 80 percent of the students played computer games at least occasionally.

All these findings naturally led Linda Sax, the survey director, to conclude that the Internet had become a way of life for the majority of America's college students. "What remains to be seen, however," she says, "is whether proficiency on the Internet enhances student learning during college."

The answer to that question won't be known for years, but there's no doubt how the millennial generation is being affected by another critical societal aspect of the technological revolution. Technotimes is exposing the inherent inequality that still divides America racially and economically, publicly and privately.

More than 80 percent of all freshmen attending private universities communicated with e-mail during their last year in high school. Yet only half that number, representing 41.4 percent of students at all the nation's public black colleges, used e-mail in high school.

In large part, this dramatic disparity reflects the woeful lack of access minorities, particularly blacks, have to computers in public schools from the earliest grade up, to say nothing of the availability of home computers. As a result, these young Americans are being culturally shortchanged by their inadequate training in the new technology that will be even more crucial for their success in the future. As I described earlier in examining the miserable public-school facilities and the dangerous world of minority inner-city children in South Central Los Angeles, these children are technologically handicapped, often hopelessly, by the circumstances of their birth. Even if they are able to attend a black public college, the millennial survey documents how they continue to operate at a disadvantage when compared to their more favored contemporaries.

And although the majority of freshmen at all institutions have used the Internet for research or homework, this figure ranges from a high of 90.2 percent among students entering private universities to a relative low of 77.6 percent among freshmen attending black public colleges. This finding provides further evidence of how blacks and whites begin their college years with markedly different levels of exposure to, familiarity with, and dependence on the computer.

What part racial, social, and economic inequities play in other striking disparities revealed by the latest survey data is not so easily determined, but the results illuminate a number of growing problems.

Rising numbers of college freshmen—a record high of nearly 40 percent of all entering college students in the millennial survey—frequently feel "bored in class." An all-time high record, 62.6 percent, "frequently or occasionally" come late to class, and another 36.2 percent, "overslept and missed class or (an) appointment"—nearly double the rate reported in 1968.

The hours students spend doing homework each week in their last year of high school continue to decline. In 1987, when researchers began asking students about their studying habits, 43.7 percent spent six or more hours a week on

homework. In 1999 a record low of 31.5 percent spent that much time on homework. At the same time, more and more are studying less than three hours a week, 40.2 percent, while 17.1 percent devote less than one hour a week to homework in their last high school year.

Growing numbers of students have to take remedial courses in high school before being admitted to college. The number of students who took remedial courses in mathematics and foreign languages rose to an all-time high, while those having to take remedial work in science soared to a twenty-year high. Moreover, the percentage of college freshmen taking at least one remedial course in high school, 18.3 percent, had increased by more than half since 1982.

These statistics all reveal what the survey analysts inadequately call evidence of the continuing rise of "academic disengagement." Whatever term best describes that phenomenon, the long-term societal implications are unnerving. Although the root causes are not easily determinable, one factor, a most familiar one in our story, is the impact of television on student attitudes and behavior.

Alexander W. Astin, who founded the annual college survey and heads UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute that conducts it, links the increasing amount of time young Americans watch TV to the evidence of an increase in student materialism, boredom, and disengagement. "Kids who started college in the late 60's had much less television," he says. "Today's kids never didn't have it. We tracked freshmen of 1985 for four years to see how much TV they watched during college. The more TV they watched, the more their materialistic tendencies were strengthened."

That's not surprising given the bombardment of commercial inducements flitting across their screens and the breathless tales of new fortunes being made by both their contemporaries and their idols in sports and entertainment.

That America is the greatest consumer society in history is not news; the ability of marketers to reach every element of the mass electronic culture will only stroke society's consumerism. Neither is it surprising that teachers find growing numbers of students adopting a consumerist view of education. Attending college is viewed as a means to a job, a practical way, as Professor Mark W. Edmundson of the University of Virginia put it in a *Harper's* article, "to learn a skill, a capacity that you can convert into dollars later on."

Sobering as these results are, they should *not* be interpreted as conclusive evidence the millennial generation is so obsessed with material gain and so driven by the dream of making money that these values eclipse all others. Nor do they prove that the soon-to-be leaders are basically selfish, lazy, or academically inattentive. In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that a wide gap exists between the rising number of bored, ill-prepared, disadvantaged under-achievers and those who come to college with greater advantages, better prepared, and more motivated to succeed. In that latter group are students who have never worked harder on their studies. They may well prove to be the most technologically accomplished, innovative, and talented group of young Americans ever.

One of the most telling of all the millennial survey findings involves the increasing pressures many students feel as they enter college. Record numbers of incoming college students, or 30.2 percent, say they experience such high

levels of stress that they frequently feel “overwhelmed by all I have to do.” That’s nearly twice as many as reported feeling “stressed-out” in 1985.

Obviously, the ever-rising cost of college, forcing increasing numbers of students to work full-time and assume heavy long-term debt to pay off student loans, looms as a major factor in creating greater feelings of stress. One out of every four entering freshmen—another record—reports facing either “some” or a “very good” likelihood of having to work full-time to meet collegiate and personal expenses. Survey director Linda Sax sees the rise in levels of student stress as “a reflection of an increasingly fast-paced society, made more so by computers and other media.... Students feel more competition, they’re applying to more colleges than ever before, they’re worried about having to work during college. That can be overwhelming.”

Most striking is how differently these pressures affect women and men.

Twice as many women students as men, or 38.8 percent, say they frequently are overwhelmed by multiple demands. Buried in the survey results are other findings that help explain the notable differences between women and men. More women than men, 69.6 percent vs. 57.2 percent, are worried they may not have enough money to finish college. Significantly larger numbers of women than men, or 44.1 percent vs. 33.3 percent, find they will need to get a job to pay for college expenses.

Another reason why women experience greater stress than men is that they spend their time differently. Women study more, volunteer more, participate more in student clubs and groups. They also bear the greatest burden of being the ones who, if married, must tend to child-care or housework responsibilities.

Men, on the other hand, spend more time than women exercising, playing sports and video games, watching television, partying. According to Linda Sax, “These findings suggest that women spend more time than men on goal-oriented and potentially stress-producing activities.”

If so, and the evidence for this is overwhelming, it is only more evidence that changes in gender roles are profoundly affecting American women, especially young American women, and most specifically the new millennial young women—and, beyond them, greatly affecting the nature of American society....

No amount of surveying and statistical analysis adequately defines the young millennials. Yes, they appear more materialistic, more pressured to succeed, more enamored—seduced?—by the visions of great wealth many of their contemporaries enjoyed before dotcoms began crashing and thousands of young people lost jobs. Yes, they do not seem as concerned with social activism and certainly not with politics. Yes, they are probably the most economically favored of all generations, but that doesn’t mean they all lack values or concern for others. Indeed, many who observe them most closely cite numerous positive signs about them. Robert McKinn, for example. He’s a distinguished Stanford professor who teaches a justly famous course there on the impact of science and technology on society. McKinn concedes he relies on anecdotal evidence to assess the new millennials he teaches, but what he sees makes him optimistic about their values.

"Except for the gung-ho, full-speed-ahead, damn-the-torpedoes engineering students who are coming here just to make the better microprocessor—the better nanoprocessors, the better nano-this, nano-that—who aim to grab on to the brass ring of the spinning merry-go-round," he says, "I'm finding there are a lot of kids here who are searching for a certain set of core values in terms of community, in terms of family, in terms of interpersonal relationships—character, beauty, whatever. We have people from a lot of different cultural backgrounds—ethnic, religious, moral—and yet I find a hunger among them for those core values, for achieving a way of life with qualities that make life worth living."

But neither McKinn nor anyone else watching them can fail to be struck by how many conflicting emotional and intellectual crosscurrents are affecting what I have come to call—for reasons that will be quickly apparent—the Good Life Generation.

Searching for a New Global Role

HAL BRANDS

If containment was the standard for foreign policy, ... meeting that standard would be difficult indeed. During the Cold War, anticommunism had provided an intellectual structure to foreign policy, allowing U.S. officials to prioritize commitments and objectives according to a fairly (and often deceptively) uncomplicated calculus. Although this litmus test misinformed as often as it guided, it still served as a relatively straightforward means of evaluating individual initiatives. By 1991, there was no longer such an obvious measure of foreign policy. Instead of facing a single dominant threat, the United States now confronted multiple perils. Moreover, although each of these challenges was no doubt dangerous, none was sufficiently menacing to rivet American attention as the Soviet bogey had. This was a basic problem of public thought on foreign policy in the early 1990s: it stated that U.S. diplomacy should be clear and coherent but failed to identify a single overriding threat or objective that would make it so. When Americans demanded a replacement for containment, they therefore sought a strategy that would reduce an undeniably complex situation to a one-size-fits-all formula.

Anticommunism also left an imposing political legacy. For more than forty years, the Cold War had served as an almost unbeatable rhetorical device. The specter of Sovietism had provided an enduring domestic consensus in support of containment. The political strength of the doctrine was obvious throughout the Cold War, as ethically questionable policies and hundreds of thousands of U.S. casualties altered only the tactics, but not the basic premise, of the nation's security strategy.

One source of containment's strength had been geopolitical, that is, the perception that Soviet foreign policy posed an imminent threat to U.S. interests and, indeed, lives. Roused by this danger, Americans accepted the globalist foreign policy, massive defense establishment, and intrusive internal practices

that had previously been taboo except in times of war. Additionally, the perception of threat limited the boundaries of dissent from U.S. policy, confining this debate to the particulars (massive retaliation, flexible response, détente, and containment's other various incarnations) rather than the generalities (the need to confront and restrain Soviet power).

An equally potent wellspring of anticommunism's vitality had been its moral clarity. Containment was not simply a means of protecting America's interests but also an opportunity to further its ideals; it was a crusade against slavery and on behalf of freedom. The fact that Washington's chief antagonist held utterly foreign conceptions of government, personal liberty, and religion allowed Americans to see the international situation as a struggle between good and evil. This identification of U.S. diplomacy with an ultimate moral end captured the nation's tendency toward idealism and contributed substantially to the political durability of anticommunism. With the end of the Cold War, though, both the geopolitical and moral taproots of domestic support for foreign policy had vanished. The threat was gone; the mission accomplished.

When U.S. officials attempted to fashion a new security strategy, they thus confronted a daunting precedent. In addition to identifying some organizing principle that would help them make sense of a world that looked more chaotic by the day, they had to relocate the sources of public consensus that had vanished with the close of the Cold War. Bush had entered office schooled in the verities of the U.S.-Soviet conflict, but it was this vastly different task that he faced in the second half of his term. As might have been expected, he struggled. Bush attempted to juggle the competing requirements of crafting a new strategy, but he ultimately failed to find a suitable balance between the diplomatic and political dictates of foreign policy. The president's idealistic rhetoric of human rights and democracy appealed to public observers but left his own strategists unmoved. A more pragmatic policy found support in the Pentagon but lacked public backing. As Bush left office, containment's replacement had yet to be found.

By the midpoint of Bush's presidency, the administration had become anxious to adapt its diplomatic thinking to the new order of things. In one sense, this urgency reflected growing perceptions of disorder and danger in the international environment. Uncertainty was the dominant theme; Dick Cheney remarked that "we have good reason to wonder about what might come next" in world affairs. Brent Scowcroft was more pessimistic, worrying about the destabilizing impact of the Cold War's end. "The outlines of a very messy world" were in view, he believed.

This impression grew stronger as the post-Cold War era unfolded. Regional conflicts in the Middle East, ethnic and civil strife in the Balkans and Africa, nuclear proliferation, and the prospect of post-Soviet chaos all loomed large in 1991 and 1992. "The final shape of the future is far from established," commented Robert Gates in early 1992. "We should expect continuing change and upheaval around the world." To ensure the nation's security, he believed, U.S. policies must "conform to the reality of an unstable, unpredictable, dangerously overarmed, and still transforming world."

Watching this transformation unfold, the White House looked to reset its priorities. "The old [defense] strategy that has dominated our thinking for so many years" had become irrelevant with bipolarity's end, Cheney argued. Without a new plan for managing foreign policy, Bush's advisers feared, the complexity of the dawning era would overwhelm U.S. officials. To manage the array of original dangers and reemerging threats that characterized the early 1990s, the administration needed a clear idea of American interests and capabilities, a framework that would structure the allocation of scarce resources and allow U.S. officials to focus on the most important matters. "Our new era brings with it a new need for new guideposts, for solutions and approaches that keep pace with the times," said Bush.

The need for new ideas also stemmed from the recent breakdown of the fifty-year consensus on foreign policy. With Sovietism defeated, domestic agreement on the basic underpinnings of U.S. strategy began to disintegrate. Between 1990 and 1992, public debate on foreign policy showed the emergence of a new discord not only about specific initiatives but also about the nation's fundamental diplomatic philosophy. Some observers looked to the Gulf War as precedent, arguing that the end of U.S.-Soviet hostility made possible the long-delayed realization of collective security. Political scientist Bruce Russett argued in 1991 that international cooperation against aggression could "change the parameters of the global order to something more favorable than existed under the prior status quo." Calling for the establishment of a permanent UN army, Russett pointed to coalition action against Iraq as proof of the Security Council's ability to work for "the maintenance of peace in a new world order." For Russett, the United Nations was the key to post-Cold War peace.

Hardly, replied neoconservatives such as Charles Krauthammer. Dismissing the prevalent idea that multipolarity would replace bipolarity, Krauthammer argued that the United States stood at the pinnacle of global affairs. Germany and Japan, rising powers in the late 1980s, "have generally hidden under the table since the first shots rang out in Kuwait," he derided. The end of the Cold War had led not to the diffusion of power but rather to its centralization. "The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar," he wrote. "It is unipolar. The center of world power is the United States, attended by its Western allies." Disdainful of those who contended the opposite, Krauthammer had even less patience for commentators who placed their faith in the United Nations. "The United Nations is guarantor of nothing," he wrote. It was the United States that had assembled the coalition and led the fight against Saddam Hussein, not some nebulous organization that "can hardly be said to exist." The solution to post-Cold War instability was not UN-imposed collective security but a Pax Americana. Only the United States had the power to create order from chaos. "If America wants stability, it will have to create it," Krauthammer concluded. "The alternative to unipolarity is chaos."

The neoconservatives were not united in their support for an assertive foreign policy, though. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, never shy about the need for diplomatic activism during the Cold War, sounded a distinctly different note in 1990. Following in the intellectual footsteps of Paul Kennedy, whose widely read

book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* had predicted in 1987 that the United States would soon succumb to "imperial overstretch," Kirkpatrick advocated a circumscribed approach to world affairs. With the Soviet Union defeated, she argued, the United States' real problems were domestic. Shouldering the burdens of foreign affairs, however necessary that task might have been when the Soviets wanted to conquer the world, had distracted the United States from critical social and economic issues at home. The end of the Cold War offered the opportunity to tend to these concerns. "It is time to give up the dubious benefits of super-power status," she wrote. The United States would be best served by abandoning its globalist pretensions and becoming "a normal country in a normal time."

The paleoconservatives agreed. Pat Buchanan, formerly a speech-writer for Richard Nixon, advocated the closest thing to outright isolationism. "With the Cold War ending, we should look ... with a cold eye on the internationalist set," he wrote, "never at a loss for new ideas to divert U.S. wealth and power into crusades and causes having little or nothing to do with the true national interest of the United States." Buchanan scorned the idea that the nation needed an activist foreign policy to ensure its defense. "Blessed by Providence with pacific neighbors, north and south, and vast oceans, east and west, to protect us, why seek permanent entanglement in other people's quarrels?"

Though many believed that such sentiments had been forever discredited by Pearl Harbor, Buchanan's argument appealed to a surprising number of Americans. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Texas billionaire Ross Perot picked up the banner of retrenchment with his emphasis on decreasing U.S. commitments abroad. "Our highest foreign-policy priority is to get our house in order and make America work again," Perot declared. Perot's appeals resonated in some quarters; the candidate received 19 percent of the national vote and likely would have done better had he not dropped out of the race temporarily.

The fragmentation of public debate on foreign policy, and especially the relative prevalence of isolationist sentiment, was profoundly troubling to Bush and his top aides. In the 1991 *National Security Strategy*, the administration warned against retrenchment. "In the 1920s, judging that the great threat to our interests had collapsed and that no comparable threat was evident, the Nation turned inward," the document reminded. "That course had near disastrous consequences then and it would be even more dangerous now." During the next two years, Bush's public statements frequently betrayed a fear of a creeping isolationism that would render the nation vulnerable to lurking threats. "Anyone who says we should retreat into an isolationist cocoon is living in the last century," he said.

For Bush, domestic concerns therefore merged with the fear of international instability, spurring the administration to enunciate a new doctrine. Order was needed in U.S. policy abroad and public debate at home. As the Cold War gave way to something new, Bush and his advisers looked for a solution to the confusion and disagreement that surrounded them.

Bush's first opportunity to chart this new course came in August 1990. While the president was pondering the dictates of national security and public consensus, he

found himself in need of a justification for taking the nation to the brink of war with Saddam Hussein. For Bush, the rationale was clear: the future shape of the Middle East, access to oil, and the United States' economic vitality were at stake. Yet the president's advisers feared that the public audience would not be receptive to appeals based solely on cold pragmatism. Bush needed a higher purpose, something to motivate the idealists. Early in the crisis, Colin Powell hinted at this problem. The need to confront Hussein was a given, he argued, "The question is how do you lay it out to the public."

This question seemed especially important in the aftermath of the initial deployment to Saudi Arabia. With both houses of Congress in Democratic hands, Bush was hardly assured of legislative support for Desert Shield. Within weeks, in fact, Democrats attacked the president's policy. Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska, a leading Democratic voice on foreign affairs, pronounced himself "profoundly uneasy about the instant deployment of over 100,000 American troops, sold to the American people on false assertions that Saddam Hussein is Adolf Hitler, that our way of life is at clear and present danger, that we have as much at stake as we did in World War II." Although public approval of Bush's policies held, nagging questions remained. Strong majorities of Americans believed that Bush's desire for a showdown stemmed from selfish economic concerns, with only 24 percent agreeing that "a moral principle" was the president's primary motivation. The potentially dangerous effect of this notion was confirmed when James Baker said that the crisis was about "jobs," and critics decried the administration's lack of altruism. In these circumstances, a unifying rationale for Desert Shield seemed all the more necessary.

In late August, Bush and Scowcroft hit on an answer to both the immediate problem and the larger need to reestablish a consensus on foreign policy. After retreating to the president's summer home in Maine to discuss the Gulf crisis, Bush and Scowcroft coined a phrase to justify U.S. involvement in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute as well as continued participation in post-Cold War international relations: the "New World Order." In their memoirs, Bush and Scowcroft claimed that the term signified a belief that the thawing of the Cold War had raised the prospect of greater international cooperation against the various forms of disorder that threatened in the early 1990s. The point, said Scowcroft, was to take advantage of the "collapse of the U.S.-Soviet antagonisms" to "build an order beyond [the Gulf] crisis." With the Cold War over, the United States could mobilize UN support in combating aggression and resolving humanitarian crises and ethnic conflicts. In this respect, the New World Order was, as Bush put it, "a challenge to keep the dangers of disorder at bay."

There may have been a geopolitical component to the New World Order, but at its heart, the notion was a domestic political creation. Although Bush and Scowcroft certainly believed that the concept could be useful in dealing with the challenges of international affairs, the national security adviser conceded in 1991 that the main rationale for the term was less noble. It was, he told a reporter, merely a "catch-phrase." As would soon become clear, the expression was useful in offering an attractive purpose for U.S. involvement in the Gulf, but less so for actually encapsulating the president's overall conception of policy.

During the Gulf crisis, the catchphrase's domestic political value was most salient. Fearing a rise in opposition to Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Bush's political advisers focused on providing an appealing rationale for U.S. policy. After reading a draft of a presidential address to be delivered at a joint session of Congress on September 11, White House aide Andrew Card wrote, "My thought—needs a bit more punch." Another adviser composed an outline of themes for the speech. The paper built on Bush's original conception of the New World Order, emphasizing the moral as well as the geopolitical connotations of the phrase. "Out of these troubled time, a new world order will emerge," it stated. "With the course we have charted, we can not only reverse the Iraqi aggression. We can also establish a cooperative precedent—making the post-Cold War era freer from the threat of terror; and making the community of nations stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace."

Bush's joint session address borrowed liberally from these suggestions, placing a moral and ethical slant on the New World Order. Indeed, the more Bush referred to the New World Order, the more he stressed its idealistic—rather than its practical—meanings. Addressing Congress, Bush made only passing reference to the demise of U.S.-Soviet competition and the consequent prospects for multilateral action, focusing on the grander moral import of the New World Order. "Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known," he declared. "A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak." Given this exalted language, observers could be pardoned for interpreting the New World Order largely as a moral statement.

The idea was popular at first, and as the crisis dragged on through late 1990 and early 1991, the administration returned to the theme. After Bush announced that the U.S. mission in the Gulf had gone from defense to offense, he again had to consider the prospect of public or congressional repudiation. Although ramping up the pressure on Hussein was not an unpopular move, there remained considerable public anxiety over the prospect of war. Forty percent of those surveyed thought it "very likely" or "somewhat likely" that military action would turn into "another prolonged situation like the Vietnam conflict." Many congressional observers reacted negatively to the offensive deployment, especially after Bush asked for authority to use force in early January. Influential Minnesota senator Paul Wellstone accused Bush of a "rush to war," and Representative James McDermott (D-Wash.) predicted that military conflict would result in "perhaps tens of thousands of deaths and casualties."

In light of these concerns, Bush and his spokesmen placed a heavy reliance on the moral appeal of the New World Order. Often, they could not resist endowing the term with grandiose meanings. Making a conscious effort to stay "on message," the White House Cabinet Affairs Office created "communications packages" outlining themes for U.S. officials to stress when dealing with the media. These packages generally minimized the geopolitical connotations of the New World Order in favor of its moral themes. "Morally, we must act so that

international law, not international outlaws, governs the post–Cold War world,” stated one version of the package. “We must act so that justice, not brutal force, governs this new era.” Law, justice, and freedom: these notions quickly became the public face of the New World Order.

As crisis turned to war, the moral undertones of the New World Order were ubiquitous. In press conferences and speeches, Bush rarely missed an opportunity to remind his audience that the Gulf War was about more than the Gulf; it was about the principles that would govern international relations after the Cold War. In a victory speech on March 6, 1991, he portrayed the war in the Gulf as a first step toward a just international order. Urged on by NSC staffer Richard Haass and aides who scoured the addresses of Winston Churchill and Woodrow Wilson for lofty ideas and choice phrases, White House speechwriters gave Bush’s remarks an exalted air. He stated grandly:

Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world in which “the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong.” A world where the United Nations—freed from cold war stalemate—is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.

With the Gulf War over, though, what would become of the New World Order? The president had not given it much thought, hardly considering what the term actually meant in practice. This paucity of substance was obvious as Bush avoided delving into the specifics of the New World Order during and after the Gulf crisis. Bush rarely touched on the concrete aspects of the notion, with the exception of an instance in February when he asserted that the New World Order would feature a “revitalized peacekeeping function” of the UN Security Council. The shallowness of the idea annoyed those advisers who had to deal with the details of everyday policy. One State Department official complained that the term was “a buzzword for nothing.”

What the New World Order lacked in meaning, however, it more than made up for in style. The term’s emphasis on morality and justice appealed to those looking for a new U.S. role in the world. The New World Order, argued conservative commentator Joshua Muravchik, offered the prospect of a more humane system. “This Pax Americana will rest not on domination but on persuasion and example as well as power,” he wrote enthusiastically. “It will consist not of empire but of having won over a large and growing part of the world not only to the joys of jeans and rock and Big Macs but also to our concept of how nations ought to be governed and to behave.” Having earned such glowing reviews, Bush refused to part with the phrase, and when pressed to elaborate on the still-vague New World Order, he duly responded. In April, Bush reinforced the Wilsonian underpinnings of the doctrine in a speech at the Air War College. “The new world order really is a tool for addressing a new world of possibilities,” Bush declared. “This order gains its mission and shape not just from shared interests but shared ideals.” These ideals encompassed “a set of principles

that undergird our relations: peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples."

Generalities aside, this speech gave away little in terms of how Bush planned to pursue his vision. Solidarity against aggression was fine in the abstract, but it was another thing altogether once the shooting started. In September, Bush gave slightly more body to the New World Order, advocating an enhanced UN role in resolving disputes and supporting human rights. "For the first time," he announced, "we have a real chance to fulfill the UN Charter's ambition of working 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.'" The speech was again light on specifics, but Bush seemed to envision the United Nations playing a key role in encouraging nations to honor the ideals of the New World Order. "Where institutions of freedom have lain dormant, the United Nations can offer them new life," he said.

Still, the New World Order was long on rhetoric and short on substance. The practicalities of the idea were unmentioned, the moral connotations undiminished. Whatever its shortcomings, however, the "catchphrase," as Scowcroft referred to it, accomplished its purpose. Although support for U.S. policy in the Gulf waxed and waned during the run-up to war, public commentators eventually embraced the notion that the conflict was about something grander than money, oil, and power. Bush's emphasis on human rights was particularly popular. One poll showed that 58 percent of respondents viewed "protecting and defending human rights in other countries" as "very important," with another 33 percent labeling it "somewhat important." Editorial comment on the New World Order was favorable as well, as the idea garnered praise from the *New York Times* and other media outlets.

Perhaps more important, the New World Order was successful in sparking optimism about the future of U.S. involvement overseas. Bush's rhetoric put the now-fleeting sense of hope engendered by the end of the Cold War to good use, giving Americans something to look forward to in post-Cold War foreign policy. Although self-described "realists" shook their heads and derided American naïveté, other observers were more receptive to the idea that U.S. policy could embody ideals as well as interests. A writer for the *Boston Globe* surveyed the public mood at war's end and concluded that the president's rhetoric "seemed to capture a widespread sense that the world had indeed reached some kind of turning point." There were signs that the domestic audience embraced Bush's high-toned principles as cornerstones of U.S. diplomacy. A poll taken in June 1991 revealed that 80 percent of those surveyed advocated the multilateral use of force against a regime that used unconventional weapons or violated the sovereignty of another country. More striking still, 91 percent believed that a dictator who violated the human rights of his own citizens represented a grave danger to international order. As a justification for the Gulf War and U.S. foreign policy, the New World Order was a hit.

Ironically, public enthusiasm for the New World Order exceeded the administration's willingness to pursue the ideas Bush espoused. During 1991 and 1992, it

became apparent that many of Bush's advisers (as well as Bush himself) were not persuaded by the centrality of international justice or the rationale for a morals-oriented, multilateralist foreign policy. In the end, the pragmatists triumphed, leaving the New World Order bankrupt both practically and politically.

Even at the outset, Bush's top advisers had not believed that the New World Order was as all-encompassing as the president publicly portrayed it to be. In 1991, Scowcroft complained that he had lost control of his own creation. Public commentators, he believed, were attributing "too much specificity" to the New World Order, giving it meanings he had never intended. For Scowcroft, the idea had been mainly a rhetorical abstraction, not a definitive conception of policy. The principles that the doctrine supposedly embodied, he conceded, were "not all that clear." The New World Order was "not a specific road map with inter-sections and left turns and right turns and ups and downs." The notion had some relevance in terms of the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to work together in extraordinary circumstances, he said, but little more. In short, the New World Order was no firm guide for U.S. policy, and certainly not to the morally grandiose extent of Bush's public statements.

Baker was no more enamored of the concept. Despite its expansive connotations, the New World Order was actually a rather narrow conception of U.S. interests. In early 1992, Baker explained to the Senate that the nation had a wide variety of objectives in the post-Cold War world. Washington should limit the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (weapons of mass destruction); seek stability in the former Soviet Union and other strategically important areas; attend to regional conflicts; expand opportunities for free trade; redefine NATO's mission for the 1990s; and promote democracy. These aims were numerous and potentially contradictory, and they defied easy expression in a phrase such as the *New World Order*. The United States had a number of goals, Baker implied, and would need a number of strategies to meet them.

Internal antipathy to the New World Order became clearer as U.S. officials delved into the specifics of the idea. Bush's public statements to the contrary, many of the president's advisers had grave reservations about the peacekeeping and humanitarian missions thought to be central to the New World Order. For certain officials in the State and Defense departments, peacekeeping was a black hole rather than a new mechanism for securing peace and justice. If the United States became embroiled in civil or ethnic conflicts, they feared, it would find itself trapped in bloody and inchoate situations without end. Accordingly, the State Department imposed strict tests for determining when and how Washington would support UN peacekeeping operations. "We do not view UN peacekeeping as the savior of lost causes, to be thrown into a crisis willy nilly when all else fails," State Department official John Bolton reassured the Congress. Peacekeeping missions should "have as clearly defined a mandate as possible," a fixed duration, and be "tied to a process which will clearly lead to a resolution of the underlying problem." Bolton envisioned U.S. intervention only in cases in which the issues were clear-cut and not particularly intractable. This stance implied a commitment to peacekeeping that was far smaller than Bush had hinted in his public statements.

The Pentagon was equally hostile to the type of missions that might fall within the purview of the New World Order. As Powell and Cheney grappled with the already difficult task of adapting U.S. military power to the post-Cold War era, they had little desire to dilute that might by excessive adventurism. In 1991 and 1992, Powell repeatedly emphasized that the role of the military was to defend vital U.S. interests, not to act as the guarantor of human rights or other ideals that were, at best, peripheral to national security. The "U.S. National Military Strategy," Powell stated, "is straightforward and simple: avoid fighting wars, deter aggression. Should deterrence fail, defend the vital interests of the United States and our friends in a world that is going to be very uncertain and will have major elements of instability for years to come." Powell did not say so explicitly, but it was clear that this definition left little room for peacekeeping or interventions in defense of high principles.

Powell, who had a near-visceral aversion to this type of action, soon emerged as a chief opponent of the New World Order. Powell's formative military experience had been the Vietnam War, and he resolved never to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors. "As a mid-level career officer," he recalled, "I had been appalled at the docility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fighting the war in Vietnam without ever pressing the political leaders to lay out clear objectives." In Powell's view, the United States should avoid the limited, open-ended interventions that had led to catastrophe in Vietnam and that seemed likely to result from attempts to deal with the ethnic and human rights crises of the early 1990s. Involvement in limited war, with political objectives that were hazy at best, seemed a surefire recipe for long-term commitments to conflicts whose very nature prevented the military from taking the steps necessary to win. "The Armed Forces of the United States exists to win if sent in harm's way," Powell argued, not to act as a global constabulary in situations with little direct import for national security. Furthermore, he warned, civil wars and ethnic conflict were like quicksand: one might enter with the intention of only dipping a foot but end up totally immersed. When certain officials suggested U.S. intervention in the Bosnian civil war in 1992, Powell was quick to point to the lessons of Vietnam. "I get nervous when so-called experts suggest that all we need is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack," he warned. "When the desired result isn't obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of a little escalation. History has not been kind to that approach."

Powell eventually refined his anti-interventionism to a science, or, to be more accurate, a doctrine. By 1992, Powell had adopted and slightly refashioned the ideas of former secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger. Late that year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman published an article in *Foreign Affairs* outlining rigid criteria for whether the United States should intervene in a given conflict. "Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood?" he asked. "Have all other non-violent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?" Under these conditions, U.S. involvement in anything short of a major war in a region of crucial strategic or

economic importance looked unlikely. To make sure that everyone got the point, Powell subsequently elaborated his dislike for excessive interventionism:

When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives. We must not, for example, send military forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish—such as we did when we sent the U.S. Marines into Lebanon in 1983. We inserted those proud warriors into the middle of a five-faction civil war complete with terrorists, hostage-takers, and a dozen spies in every camp, and said, “Gentlemen, be a buffer.” The results were 241 dead Marines and Navy personnel and a U.S. withdrawal from the troubled area.

As Powell’s, Bolton’s, Baker’s, and Scowcroft’s views on U.S. political and military strategy indicated, there was little internal support for the type of policies implied by the New World Order. The idea worked in a rhetorical and political sense, but not in terms of its applicability to the day-to-day imperatives of U.S. policy. This tension simply pointed back to the reality that although the New World Order contained a certain geopolitical logic, Bush and Scowcroft had conceived the idea mainly as a justification for foreign policy, rather than as a coherent policy itself. Only because Bush sold the notion so well did it achieve widespread recognition as doctrine. In practical terms, though, the New World Order was empty from the start....

Bush’s lack of commitment to the New World Order had been one problem with his attempt to define a new U.S. mission; the imperatives of the U.S. political system posed another. Just weeks after U.S. forces finally arrived in Somalia, lending some (but not much) credibility to Bush’s doctrine, the presidency changed hands. Bill Clinton thus assumed the task of shaping foreign policy in what, for lack of a better term, was still awkwardly referred to as the post-Cold War world.

In some respects, Clinton seemed less likely than his predecessor to meet this challenge. Whereas Bush was a seasoned diplomat in his own right, Clinton’s knowledge of foreign affairs was limited to course work at Georgetown and Oxford. Bush’s aides were well-respected pros; Clinton’s advisers sometimes seemed better suited to college seminar halls or congressional caucusing. Clinton had one important advantage over Bush, however: his lack of prior experience made the transition from Cold War to post-Cold War less traumatic. Bush’s training and background had made it difficult for him to adjust to the new order of things, as evidenced by his inability to determine what came next for U.S. policy. Clinton, less rooted in the truisms of superpower competition, was more of a blank slate.

Moreover, the problems that had been so vexing for Bush had come into clearer focus by the time of Clinton’s inauguration. From the start, Clinton and

his aides knew that in addition to organizing foreign policy, they had to frame it in a manner that was rhetorically persuasive enough to win the support of skeptical observers at home. The new administration was quick to realize that both the practice and the politics of foreign policy were at issue, and it tailored its diplomacy accordingly.

During his first year in office, Clinton sought to overcome the political half of this challenge by casting U.S. policy in ideals that appealed to Americans on an intuitive and emotional level. The administration wrapped its diplomacy in the rhetoric of human rights, prosperity, and democracy, hoping to capture the attention of the domestic audience and sell Americans on the notion that U.S. leadership was integral to maintaining the external and economic security of the country. Based on Wilsonian and Carteresque aims that, in principle at least, were practically indisputable, Clinton's strategy appeared promising in terms of sustaining public support for foreign policy.

In practical terms, too, Clinton's approach seemed calculated to meet the exigencies of post-Cold War affairs. "Enlargement," as Clinton called it, promised to provide a consistent worldview and lend cohesiveness to U.S. aims. The end of the Cold War had removed old constraints on multilateral diplomacy and intervention and highlighted the rising importance of economic issues. At the same time, currents in scholarly thought emphasized the strategic benefits of good governance. As an organizing principle, enlargement therefore appeared to be well matched to the international conditions of the 1990s. At the outset of Clinton's presidency, it seemed that U.S. policy might have found its post-bipolar footing.

The origins of enlargement were as much domestic as foreign. During the 1992 campaign, Clinton articulated what would eventually become the dominant themes of his foreign policy. Although Bush's record on international affairs was fairly impressive and Clinton largely avoided the topic, Richard Holbrooke, Anthony Lake, and Sandy Berger, the candidate's foreign policy advisers, believed that the incumbent was vulnerable on human rights issues. Holbrooke focused on Bush's refusal to intervene in Bosnia, calling the administration's response "weak and inadequate." Clinton seized on the allegation that Bush had been passive in confronting challenges to democracy and the rule of law and readily played the foil to the president's detached pragmatism. "We need to be a force for freedom and democracy," Clinton argued in one presidential debate. "We need to use our unique position to support freedom, whether it is in Haiti or China or any other place." At another point, Clinton alluded caustically to Scowcroft's trips to Beijing after the Tiananmen Square incident. "It is a mistake for us to do what this administration did when all those kids went out there carrying the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square, and Mr. Bush sent two people in secret to toast the Chinese leaders and basically tell them not to worry about it."

Clinton's fundamental complaint against Bush was that the president was preoccupied with power politics and therefore neglected the moral foundations of U.S. power. "I think there is an inconsistency in a lot of his actions," Clinton said in 1992, "because of the pull between the impulse, the deep

American impulse, to support freedom and democracy and his own preference for stability in his relationships with foreign leaders in a given area." Such practices might have been unavoidable during the Cold War; with the United States involved in a global struggle against a supposedly implacable enemy, amorality was a necessary evil. For Clinton, though, the end of the Cold War lessened this imperative. Here was an opportunity, he contended, to emphasize principle over simple pragmatism. In the post-Cold War world, interests could give way to ideals.

At times, the candidate's attacks approached the level of a new conception of foreign policy. According to Clinton, the end of the Cold War had produced an urgent need "to assert a new vision for our role in this dynamic world." Citing Bush's failure "to offer a compelling rationale for America's continued engagement in the world," Clinton charged that the administration had "invited a new birth of isolationism on the left and the right." Faulting Bush for his tendency to privilege "prudence without purpose," Clinton called for a foreign policy representative of American ideals. It was the nation's calling, he insisted, to lead "a global alliance for democracy as united and steadfast as the global alliance that defeated communism."

Rhetoric aside, during the campaign, it often appeared that Clinton was more concerned with winning votes at home than protecting freedom and liberty abroad. Although Clinton berated Bush for his diplomatic failures, he did not go so far as to advocate robust military intervention on behalf of these virtues. Stung by Bush's counterattacks, which portrayed Clinton as "naïve" about the realities of international diplomacy and "reckless" in his willingness to use force, the Arkansas governor stopped short of enunciating a comprehensively interventionist strategy for foreign affairs. Clinton must take care, warned one campaign adviser, not to look the "woolly-haired idealist intent on butting into the affairs of other countries all over the world, no matter how remote their connection to American national interests." Heeding this advice as the campaign neared its conclusion in October 1992, Clinton took a tone nearly identical to that of his opponent in arguing against U.S. involvement in "the tribal wars of Somalia." At this point, support for human rights and democracy was more electoral bludgeon than anything else.

Even as a campaign tool, Clinton's stance on foreign affairs was understated. To Bush's chagrin, the candidate turned the election away from a discussion of foreign policy (where Bush was strong) and toward a referendum on the state of the domestic economy (where he was not). At the outset of 1992, few observers gave Clinton better than an outside chance of winning the presidency, but the campaign mantra of adviser James Carville ("It's the economy, stupid") and the surprisingly strong showing of Ross Perot proved to be Bush's undoing. With the economy struggling and Perot splitting the conservative vote, Clinton slipped into the White House....

Despite these auspicious omens, enlargement lay in tatters only a year later. Armed humanitarianism had been written off after a haunting misadventure in

Somalia, which turned public observers away from the largely abstract attractions of interventionism and refocused their gaze on the painfully tangible costs thereof. Although it ultimately proved more durable than the politicomilitary aspect of enlargement, the economic half of Clinton's foreign policy also came under attack during this period. For groups to which free trade seemed more peril than promise, enlargement appeared poised not to safeguard domestic prosperity but to kill it. By late 1994, Clinton had retreated from his enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention and had lost momentum in the fight for international economic integration. Perhaps more telling, enlargement had lost its political currency, as Clinton no longer insisted that the doctrine was the new magnetic north for U.S. policy. The term quickly fell out of use, reopening the void in foreign policy.

In some cases, enlargement's failure owed to the practical shortcomings of the strategy, such as the president's unwillingness to pursue his goals in the face of serious domestic resistance. At other points, the administration's ambitious objectives outran its resolve to commit the necessary level of military resources or political capital. Yet the flaws of enlargement went deeper than means and ends. Fundamentally, the decline of the doctrine stemmed from Clinton's inability to convince Americans that free trade, human rights, and democracy were sufficiently integral to U.S. security to justify any meaningful sacrifice in their pursuit. As the inevitable costs of intervention and economic openness became evident, so did the superficiality of public support for enlargement. *National interest* became the catchphrase of the day as domestic commentators shied away from bearing the burdens associated with the president's strategy. In the absence of a clear threat to American well-being, Clinton could not overcome the basic self-interestedness of U.S. politics in the post-Cold War era, and by late 1994, enlargement was stalled at home and abroad.

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A Post-Racial America or a New Jim Crow? Contemporary Debates about Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration

In 1903, W. E. B. Du Bois famously declared, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line.” Over a century later, the problem of the color line has not gone away in the United States. The nation continues to struggle with questions of race and citizenship, and the tension persists between the country’s ostensible commitment to racial equality and inclusion and the endurance of discrimination, prejudice, and exclusion. Yet while the problem of the color line has not disappeared, it has undergone revision in complex ways. The Civil Rights Revolution of the mid-twentieth century has enabled more African Americans to enter the ranks of the middle and upper classes. The growing presence of African Americans in the nation’s workplaces, universities, and elite institutions culminated in 2008 with the election of the nation’s first African-American president. The electoral victory of Barack Obama, the son of a Kenyan father and a white mother from Kansas, was an event that had seemed impossible only a generation earlier. Obama’s family background reflected another salient feature of the racial landscape at the dawn of the twenty-first century: the ways that the nation had become more multiracial, not only through intermarriage, but through greater immigration from Asia and Latin America, particularly after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. That act was rooted in the processes of globalization discussed in Chapter 11. The influx of new immigrants from the global South and East emerged in response to globalization, which required a more mobile, flexible workforce. Within the United States, this influx was welcomed by many employers who sought workers willing to

accept low wages. But many other Americans saw new immigrants as competitors for jobs, housing, and government services, and they blamed them for the economic downturn. The result has been a series of spirited, and at times vitriolic, debates over immigration policy in recent years. These debates, in turn, have been exacerbated by the events of September 11th and the “war on terror,” which have made Muslim Americans potential targets of retaliation, bias, and intimidation.

While the election of Barack Obama reflected progress in American racial politics since the Jim Crow era, there were other signs that institutional racism had been transformed rather than disbanded. The rise of the prison industry in the closing decades of the twentieth century has made prisons a constitutive feature of the postindustrial economic landscape, and African-American men continue to be incarcerated at rates woefully disproportional to their numbers, many for nonviolent, drug-related offenses. Incarceration permanently alters the course of a prisoner’s life, not only during his sentence, but afterwards, as he struggles to secure housing and employment and remains stripped of certain political rights (such as voting and serving on juries). The dense web of ordinances and laws that set limits on prisoners’ and ex-prisoners’ life chances has been described by legal scholar Michelle Alexander as the “new Jim Crow,” a term that deliberately calls into question the triumphalist claim that the United States entered a “post-racial” society with the election of Barack Obama.



DOCUMENTS

The following documents provide a window into the changing dynamics of race, ethnicity, and immigration in American society in the new century. Document 1 provides data about changing rates of immigration from 1900 to the present. The first chart places the volume of immigration in a broad historical perspective, while the second chart and table highlight the changing composition of more recent immigrants. The renewal of large-scale immigration aroused fears among some Americans that often flared up during periods of economic recession and receded during periods of growth. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several campaigns emerged to restrict immigration, eliminate bilingual education, and declare “English” the nation’s “official” language. One such campaign was in support of California’s Proposition 187 (Document 2), a 1994 ballot initiative that sought to prohibit illegal aliens from using health care, public education, and other social services. Although the initiative passed in 1994, it was later found unconstitutional in federal court. The events of September 11th and the subsequent war on terror also made Muslims and Muslim-Americans targets for scapegoating, a dynamic that had a profound effect on immigrant communities (Document 3). Four years after 9/11, another disaster, Hurricane Katrina, brought into relief the persistence of race-based poverty in the nation’s Gulf Coast, as many poor, African American residents found themselves stranded during the storm and its aftermath (Document 4).

Over a decade after Proposition 187, the issue of immigration reform remained contentious. In Document 5, Congressman Gary Miller explains why he believes stricter restrictions are necessary. The unexpected ascent of Senator Barack Obama as a presidential candidate in 2008 illuminated the complexities of the nation's racial past. In March 2008, Obama delivered a speech in which he responded to charges that Jeremiah Wright, his longtime pastor, harbored anti-white sentiments. Obama's speech, excerpted here in Document 6, was quickly recognized as both historic in its content and as vital for helping Obama to allay racial fears and secure his party's nomination. In the course of his campaign, both Barack and Michele Obama became targets for numerous race-based accusations, including the charge that Obama was a Muslim and that his wife was a racial militant. Cartoonist Barry Blitt brilliantly satirized these charges in a *New Yorker* cover that appeared in July 2008. The cover sparked a debate on the role of political satire, with some praising the cover for its fearlessness and others worried that it would promote the very stereotypes it sought to dispel (Document 7). While those calling for tighter restrictions on immigration have pursued various forms of legislation, immigrant rights activists have done the same. The Dream Act, first introduced in 2001, provides permanent residency to illegal immigrants who arrived in the United States as minors and have graduated from high school. In June 2011, an eighteen-year-old Albanian-American woman, who had come to the United States at the age of four, appeared before Congress and explained how the act would allow her to achieve her dream of attending medical school (Document 8). Although the act did not pass Congress, President Obama signed an executive order in June 2012 indicating that his administration would stop deporting young illegal immigrants.

1. Immigrants Come to America, 1900–2010

Chart A
Immigrants Admitted: Fiscal Years 1900–2010





Chart B
Legal Immigrants by Region of Birth: Fiscal Years 1925–2010



Note: North America includes Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and Canada.

**Immigrants Admitted by Region and Top 20 Countries of Birth:
Fiscal Years 2000–02**

Category of Admission	2002		2001		2000	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
All countries	1,063,732	100.0	1,064,318	100.0	849,807	100.0
Africa	60,269	5.7	53,948	5.1	44,731	5.3
Asia	342,099	32.2	349,776	32.9	265,400	31.2
Europe	174,209	16.4	175,371	16.5	132,480	15.6
North America	404,437	38.0	407,888	38.3	344,805	40.6
Caribbean	96,489	9.1	103,546	9.7	88,198	10.4
Central America	68,979	6.5	75,914	7.1	66,443	7.8
Other North America	238,969	22.5	228,428	21.5	190,164	22.4
Oceania	5,557	.5	6,113	.6	5,136	.6
South America	74,506	7.0	68,888	6.5	56,074	6.6
Unknown	2,655	.2	2,334	.2	1,181	.1
Mexico	219,380	20.6	206,426	19.4	173,919	20.5
India	71,105	6.7	70,290	6.6	42,046	4.9
China	61,282	5.8	56,426	5.3	45,652	5.4
Philippines	51,308	4.8	53,154	5.0	42,474	5.0
Vietnam	33,627	3.2	35,531	3.3	26,747	3.1
El Salvador	31,168	2.9	31,272	2.9	22,578	2.7
Cuba	28,272	2.7	27,703	2.6	20,831	2.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	25,373	2.4	23,640	2.2	11,828	1.4
Dominican Republic	22,604	2.1	21,313	2.0	17,536	2.1
Ukraine	21,217	2.0	20,975	2.0	15,810	1.9
Korea	21,021	2.0	20,742	1.9	15,830	1.9
Russia	20,833	2.0	20,413	1.9	17,110	2.0
Haiti	20,268	1.9	27,120	2.5	22,364	2.6
Canada	19,519	1.8	21,933	2.1	16,210	1.9
Colombia	18,845	1.8	16,730	1.6	14,498	1.7
Guatemala	16,229	1.5	13,567	1.3	9,970	1.2
United Kingdom	16,181	1.5	18,436	1.7	13,385	1.6
Jamaica	14,898	1.4	15,393	1.4	16,000	1.9
Pakistan	13,743	1.3	16,448	1.5	14,535	1.7
Iran	13,029	1.2	10,497	1.0	8,519	1.0
Subtotal	739,902	69.6	728,009	68.4	567,842	66.8
Other	323,830	30.4	336,309	31.6	281,965	33.2

**2. Proposition 187: Californians Seek to Close the
Door to Undocumented Immigrants, 1994**

Summary

[By the California Secretary of State]. ILLEGAL ALIENS. INELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC SERVICES. VERIFICATION AND REPORTING. INITIATIVE STATUTE. Makes illegal aliens ineligible for public social services, public health care services (unless emergency under federal law), and attendance at public schools

(elementary, secondary, and post-secondary). Requires various state and local agencies to report persons who are apparent illegal aliens to the California Attorney General and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Mandates California Attorney General to transmit reports to INS and maintain records of such reports. Makes it a felony to manufacture, distribute, sell or use false citizenship or residence documents. Summary of estimate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance of fiscal impact on state and local government: Annual savings at the state level potentially in excess of \$100 million from withholding health and social services to undocumented persons. Annual savings at the local level potentially exceeding \$200 million primarily from withholding medical care from undocumented persons. School districts would likely incur additional costs of tens of millions of dollars in the first two years of implementation and in excess of \$10 million annually thereafter, to verify the legal status of students, parents and guardians. Savings to education, if any, are unknown.

Proponent

Ronald Prince Citizens for Legal Immigration Reform; P.O. Box 26288; Santa Ana, California 92799-6288; (714) 777-4653.

Initiative Text

SECTION 1. Findings and Declaration.

The People of California find and declare as follows:

That they have suffered and are suffering economic hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state.

That they have suffered and are suffering personal injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state.

That they have a right to the protection of their government from any person or persons entering this country unlawfully.

Therefore, the People of California declare their intention to provide for cooperation between their agencies of state and local government with the federal government, and to establish a system of required notification by and between such agencies to prevent illegal aliens in the United States from receiving benefits or public services in the State of California....

3. A Pakistani Immigrant Becomes a Suspect after 9/11, 2005

Muhammad Rafiq Butt had a wife and five children to support back home in Pakistan, and sending them money was his biggest concern in life, according to those who knew him. His two sons were too young to help, and his three daughters were close to marrying age. So he embarked on a journey as many others had, living among other men, alone, working without papers in the teeming anonymity of New York City's immigrant economy.

“He had a lot of pressure in his mind. His wish was one day to have enough money so his daughters can be married. His responsibility was to get them married. That is very important to our culture,” said his friend Rashid Ahmed. “He had a lot of burden, a lot of pressures.”

During his year in New York City, after arriving on a visitor visa in September 2000, Butt had been unable to find regular work. He spoke little English and his age, fifty-five, was a disadvantage when applying for the heavy labor and odd restaurant jobs he strung together. One of these jobs was at Shaheen Sweets, a restaurant and sweetshop in the “Little India” neighborhood of Jackson Heights. There, he worked alongside Ahmed and about a half-dozen other men and women in the basement, stirring vats of cheese and milk, molding mounds of dough into balls by hand, and filling white plastic bins full of the sticky-sweet *rashogollahs* that were boxed and shipped to suppliers around the country. Unbeknownst to anyone, perhaps even himself, Butt had a congenital heart defect and had developed blockages in his coronary arteries. But this didn’t keep him from working every day he had a job.

Ahmed, about the same age and also living alone and supporting his family in Pakistan, often gave Butt rides to the house in Queens that he shared with a nephew and several other roommates. Then came a day in September 2001 when Ahmed arrived at the restaurant and heard from the other workers that Butt had been taken by the FBI. That was all they knew, but it did not come as a complete surprise. Many others had also begun to disappear from the streets and homes of Jackson Heights, Astoria, Midwood, and other neighborhoods across Brooklyn and Queens, and fear was starting to spread.

“You know FBI has a big name everywhere in the world,” Ahmed said. “Rafiq was a very simple person. Can you imagine a person who was working for his family, who was a very simple man, how can he do anything like World Trade Center, like plane hijacking?”

On September 19, following a tip from a local caller, FBI agents arrested Muhammad Butt at his home in the middle of the night. After being held for a day at 26 Federal Plaza, immigration headquarters in Manhattan, he was transferred to Hudson County Jail in New Jersey. Inside the drab brown building, circled by barbed wire, Butt lived for the next five weeks. Out of the thousands of men being picked up and held in detention across the Northeast at that time, no one would have ever heard of him. But on October 23, 2001, his ailing heart gave out. Muhammad Butt now had the unfortunate distinction of having died in U.S. detention following the post-September 11 roundup.

A taxi driver named Bilal Mirza, whose niece was engaged to marry Butt’s nephew, got the phone call from the Pakistani consulate informing him of Butt’s death. Jail officials declared cardiac arrhythmia as the cause of death and closed the case, but rumors swirled in the community. A follow-up investigation by Human Rights Watch found that Butt had complained to his cellmate of chest pains and in the days leading up to his death had unsuccessfully tried to get medical attention. Mirza, who prepared the body in Muslim tradition for the funeral, waved aside rumors of any beatings. “No, no, no. I wash his body with my own hands, and I see he have no rash, no bruises,” he said.

Rashid Ahmed, nevertheless, refused to believe that his friend’s death had been due to natural causes. “I say it was not a natural death,” he said, sitting in

the Shaheen restaurant nearly four years later. "A person who never went to jail in his own country. He never face a single police officer in his own country. When he was in jail, maybe he thinking every time, what is happening, what is happening?"

Butt's body was shipped back to Pakistan, along with a thousand dollars he'd asked Ahmed to keep for him. It was his last remittance to his family....

On October 21, 2001, the Makki Masjid on Coney Island Avenue held a funeral ceremony for Muhammad Butt before his body was flown back to his family in Pakistan. Hundreds of Muslims filled the prayer hall. "I wish you could have seen the faces of the people," said Mohsin Zaheer, the journalist. "It was so scary. The fear was very obvious on their faces."

Zaheer reported the story for the weekly Urdu-language newspaper *Sada-e-Pakistan*, whose offices are next door to the mosque. During the funeral, he walked up to the coffin and took a picture of Muhammad Butt—"I wanted his friends to have a final last look." The photo ran the next day on the front page of the newspaper.

"It is up to us to decide," concluded Zaheer, "was he a victim or not?"

Since the mass sweeps stopped in 2002, at least five hundred Pakistanis have been deported from the New York area, according to Khan and others. Businesses have shut down and families have relocated to Canada and other countries. About twenty thousand people have left, according to local estimates. Coney Island Avenue today is a quiet street, once the lifeline of a vibrant and growing ethnic community.

Sada-e-Pakistan, housed in one L-shaped room at the end of two narrow flights of rickety stairs, was barely surviving as a newspaper, according to Zaheer. Before the September 11 fallout, businesses were growing very fast in the thickly populated area of Midwood and Flatbush. Zaheer estimated that 40 percent of the businesses have disappeared. The community had stopped growing, and Zaheer believed, "whatever is gone is gone. It will not come back."

He added, "The misery of this community—people blame not just Bush but President Musharraf. He has helped the U.S. all he can, but he did not take a stand for Pakistanis in America. We are deprived of rights and justice from both sides. It's a very sad story." ...

4. A Survivor Recalls Hurricane Katrina, 2005

The weather was like a tropical breeze blowing. I was cold because I was wet. Monday night I had stayed up on the porch until I went to sleep. By the time I woke up Tuesday morning, the water had got higher because we had a breach in the 17th Street Canal, which was like five blocks from where we were.

The water pump cracked. It wasn't working. It was a brand-new water pump that they built, and they didn't have the other water pumps on, which I think there were like seven of them. The brand-new one cracked, so we had so much water. And I didn't know how much higher that water was going to be

coming, and when it's dark and you can't see, it's scary looking at that water because the water was too high for me to stand up in and try to walk through.

There were some guys, some people riding around in canoes and small boats rescuing people. It was like private-owned boats, and then they had some like, wildlife officials riding around rescuing people.

They had electricity in some areas because I remember one boat with a man and a dog, and another boat that had three ladies on it, they were saying that they had come all the way from Metairie. And they had heard about the bridge, and they came out to save some people because they heard about it on the news, that it was flooding, and it was still coming up.

I had a big white towel and I was on my porch flagging it and calling for them, "Hey, hey." Finally, a man came and got me. I remember him as "the Man with the Dog." He was a white male, about seventy-five years old with a brown dog. He was like a hound dog.

It had to be like around noontime. I was so happy to be removed from that area because I didn't want to be there another night, in that dark, and getting bit by mosquitoes.

He asked me what I was doing there by myself, why I didn't have nobody else with me, where I came from. I told him the West Bank.

He said, "What in the world are you doing over here?"

He picked me up and he put me in the boat, and he picked up a girl, her husband, and her mama.

I was hearing that they opened up the Superdome again. It was forced to be open because there was so many people stranded, didn't have no other choice. They didn't make any kind of arrangements for us to evacuate, so we had no choice. Everybody who stayed home, they knew to go to the Superdome.

They opened up the Superdome for the first time when Hurricane Ivan came in 2004. They opened it at the last minute, but I mean, everybody got in there and everything. The storm passed by, wasn't that bad. But on the way out of the Convention Center and the Superdome, people were coming out with the sofas and the tables and stuff like that, and the mayor really got upset. To me, it was like he said, "I give y'all somewhere to stay and look what y'all did!" That was the truth. That's what I would have said.

So the Man with the Dog took us to the Superdome area, but he couldn't go all the way. They had bodies in the water. They had fish in the water. They had, like, big logs blocking the street, so we had to walk. The water was, like, right over my knees. It had started to begin getting the smell in the water. They had leaking gas in the water from the cars.

It was scary because we had bodies and we had to walk through these bodies, but you had no choice. It was either stay on the boat in the water or walk through all of that and get up on that ramp where everybody else was. And we wasn't the only people. They had lots of people coming from different areas who had tried to survive the storm from home, tried to ride it out. We were all walking from different areas.

I didn't have nothing. All I had was a pillow and a blanket, and by the time I got to the Superdome I didn't have that. I was looking for someone that I know, my family, my kids, but I didn't see nobody. All I had was me. I did have a little

wallet with my ID just in case. I was thinking, "What if I die? How they gon' know who I am?" So I had my ID, and my Social Security card in my pocket.

When I got to the Superdome ramp, they had so many people out on the ramp and they had so many people inside the Dome that you were trapped. Part of the Superdome roof, it was tore up from the storm. It had rained inside there. It was a mess, they had people that were dying. A lot of them were like children and babies. Well, all ages. A lot of them was overheated or dehydrated. Some needed to be on a machine, like they had people who were diabetic on dialysis. Different situations. And the Superdome wasn't equipped for that kind of stuff. They just opened the doors and let people in.

I couldn't walk too much because it was so packed full of people, and it was pushing and shoving and everybody was panicking, and I didn't want to go too far inside because I didn't wanna miss a ride if a ride came. I was more like on the edge of the ramp where the railings were, so I can see what was going on, you know, see if anybody was coming.

I got to the restroom area and I didn't want to stand there long. You can hear people screaming and hollering. It was a lot of crime, and yelling "help," and people dying. It was crazy. They were doing crazy stuff. They were stealing from each other, fighting, having sex. I felt like we was in a place called Sin City and Satan was going to take us all.

People was pushing and shoving all out on the ramp, as well as inside the Dome because we panicked. We don't know what to do. We don't have no one to organize nothing. We're just on our own and taking our own thoughts on what to do. And you have to fend for yourself because you are in the middle of different things going on, you know?

And me, I was by myself. I mean, I was with a whole lot of people that I didn't know but I wasn't with family or friends. So I had to mingle with people that was there, who was trying to do the same thing. It was like we're clinging onto life, so we're clinging on each other. That's all we had. We didn't know each other, but we know we needed to be together because we was all suffering and going through the same thing.

We were dehydrated. They had no changing clothes; I had to stay wet. And I had to wind up sleeping with those clothes on and drying in those same clothes. We couldn't use the bathroom. We didn't have no food. And I started dehydrating real bad. You had children, and the children were like, "I want to eat, I want to eat!" You know, they're starved. You hear little boys, they tell you they wanna eat. They're hungry, and there's nothing to eat.

You have to step over a baby, you gotta walk around a lady who said "Oh, I want something to drink so bad," and she just lie there and that was it. And people were scared. Some people when they go into stuff like this, it's so hard on them that they start panicking. You know, what can you do but try to assure them that it's gonna be all right? Don't give up. Just hang in there.

After doing that for so many days, a lot of people were dying. I thought I was going to die too because I was sick, and I wasn't using my medicine before I got there. And it went on for three days, four days till when we did get food, we got those MREs, the military-ready food. It was good, but I couldn't hold it down because I had been without food for so long....

Everybody in the Dome was mad.

The mayor wanted people to evacuate, but a lot of us couldn't evacuate. I mean, everybody don't own a car. Everybody didn't have means for transportation, no money to travel. But the city of New Orleans has cabs. They have schoolbuses, charters. They have public-service buses. They have planes, trains, boats. If it's mandatory, and he knew the city of New Orleans is under a Category 5, he should have thought about all those transportations, and let those people out. *You* got out, so you should've helped us out.

My sister lives on the West Bank in Stonebridge, and she said that the Sheriff's Department came around and were able to knock on each door, and took them on buses to where it was mandatory. They went house to house and moved them. But look at the area she stays in. Her husband, he is a seaman. He works on ships. She is a manager of the Jazz Fest. She books concerts for Jazz Fest.

Our area didn't get that. We just know from TV, on the news, that it's mandatory, must leave now. How you gonna leave if you don't have no money? Even if you have a car, if you don't have no money, you can't get no gas. So if you have five dollars to buy gas, you can't take a chance and leave with five dollars.

So you gonna have to fight it out. And that's why a lot of us got stranded. They planned the evacuation for some areas like I said, but they didn't plan it for a lot of other areas. It made me feel like a conspiracy at the time. It's a racist thing. All of us was overlooked. God didn't overlook us. We went through it.

I think some people look at it in a spiritual way. Some people look at it like Democratic and Republican way. Doesn't matter how you look at it. To me, you can look at it all ways, different ways. I'll never wanna stay like that in my life again.

They government's like, "New Orleans has all these low-income people keeping us down. We have to have so many tour sites, and get money in, keep the city going. So we're just gon' target this area here, and let the water come in, and don't even try to help anybody. Just open the Dome for 'em, and there you go."

Even while we was there for them days, that's too many days for people to—especially babies and elderly or sickly people—be stranded for that many days with no food, no water, no proper care for sickly people, elderly people. If you're gonna open up the Dome, make sure you have the equipment there because you have to think about different people with asthma, you know, different problems.

It's a horror story, really. It goes from being a storm by Mother Nature, or an act of God, into a horror. To me, it's a combination of having an act of Mother Nature and then an act of man....

5. Congressman Gary Miller Calls for Stricter Immigration Legislation, 2006

When I hear my colleagues, and individuals I consider friends, they get up before us and say, a guest worker program is needed to fill those jobs that Americans will

not do; I guess you have to define what are the jobs we are offering Americans. What wages are they offering Americans to work is probably the best question....

Talk to the individual who was a carpenter, who was a plumber, who poured concrete, who did masonry, who was honorably employed by a manufacturing company, that was paid good wages, and you saw this dramatic change start to occur during the recession in California of the 1990s. All of the sudden things were tighter. People started hiring individuals here in this country for a much lesser wage than the American citizen was willing to do that job for.

A good example, I remember seeing dry-wallers being laid off and an illegal being hired. It is not that illegals are bad people. By and large, they are really good people. They are just trying to come here to better their lives. So it is not a matter of race or discrimination. It is just the fact that can the United States accept all the poor that this world wants to send here? And if we decided to do that, why not accept them from India? Why not accept them from Asia? Why not accept them from anyplace in the world and double, triple, quadruple our population if we are just going to be benevolent and accept people who are poor and want to better their lives?

But the problem you have, and this is back to the dry-waller, then you see an illegal hanging dry wall and his wife and kids are going behind him nailing the dry wall off to get the job done quicker so the husband could produce more at a much lesser rate than the American citizen was paid before.

Now, how do you explain that to the American who was born here, who was educated here, who perhaps does not want to put a suit and tie on to go to work in the morning, who wants to work with his hands in that job that he is very capable of doing, but cannot afford to do for the reduced rate that an illegal is willing to work for? How do you tell that man he cannot support his family, educate his children and cannot afford a home anymore?...

I think we need to go pass a law today, a new law that is strict, enforceable and specific on what we are going to allow and not allow. We need to prove to the American people that we are going to send law-breakers back and we are going to hold employers accountable for hiring people that are here illegally.

Now, one argument that I hear repeatedly is, well, what are you going to do with all the people that came here illegally? They came here for a job, and if there is no job, they will go back home. The government does not need to provide buses. The government needs to remove the incentives that allow people to live here.

There are many. We need to crack down on employers, number one. We need to prohibit access to credit and financial service. We need to prevent illegals from gaining access to food stamps, low-income housing and health care....

Now, we are either a country of laws or we are not a country of laws, and today, we do not enforce the laws of this country at all. This concept we have in the Senate bill of earned citizenship will absolutely bankrupt our social fabric in this country. We cannot spend \$50 billion a year, as it is estimated, on those coming to this country who, once they become citizens, are eligible for every program on the social books that we have in this country. We cannot afford it. We should not tolerate it.

Go to California and look at the impact on schools. I have talked to teachers who said they are holding this class back because the bulk of the student body in

that class do not speak English. Now, yes, it is a benefit to those kids who are here illegally because they are being educated, but it is a tremendous detriment to the children of American citizens who are being held back because the rest of the class cannot speak English to be moved forward.

Go to an emergency ward in California. You will wait for hours. People go there that are illegal, cannot speak English, for a sprained ankle, for a headache, for a cold, for basic health care. That is not what an emergency ward is for. And who is paying the bill? The people who use the hospital, who are having to subsidize it because they are losing money treating illegals.

We are a compassionate country. There is no doubt about it. If someone is here and they have had an emergency and they need to go to the hospital, they should be treated. You should allow nobody to suffer, nobody to die, but you cannot tolerate 12 to 20 million people coming here with this concept that health care is free, because when they get it they do not have to pay it.

Well, you cannot blame them for that. The people you can blame are the people in this room, for not making sure the laws passed by this Congress are enforced in this country. We can no longer tolerate it. Once again, they are good people that are trying to get here, by and large not bad people. But the American citizen cannot afford it.

It is our responsibility, first of all, to protect and defend our borders. We are not doing it. And we should be concerned about the future of America and American citizens. Hopefully, when this debate continues and enough good people come here and talk about the impact on this country, we will fix the wrong that has occurred and make sure it does not happen again.

6. Senator Barack Obama Calls for a More Perfect Union, 2008

I am the son of a black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas. I was raised with the help of a white grandfather who survived a Depression to serve in Patton's Army during World War II and a white grandmother who worked on a bomber assembly line at Fort Leavenworth while he was overseas. I've gone to some of the best schools in America and lived in one of the world's poorest nations. I am married to a black American who carries within her the blood of slaves and slaveowners—an inheritance we pass on to our two precious daughters. I have brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, uncles and cousins, of every race and every hue, scattered across three continents, and for as long as I live, I will never forget that in no other country on Earth is my story even possible.

It's a story that hasn't made me the most conventional candidate. But it is a story that has seared into my genetic makeup the idea that this nation is more than the sum of its parts—that out of many, we are truly one.

Throughout the first year of this campaign, against all predictions to the contrary, we saw how hungry the American people were for this message of unity. Despite the temptation to view my candidacy through a purely racial lens, we won commanding victories in states with some of the whitest populations in the country. In South Carolina, where the Confederate Flag still flies, we built a powerful coalition of African Americans and white Americans.

This is not to say that race has not been an issue in the campaign. At various stages in the campaign, some commentators have deemed me either “too black” or “not black enough.” We saw racial tensions bubble to the surface during the week before the South Carolina primary. The press has scoured every exit poll for the latest evidence of racial polarization, not just in terms of white and black, but black and brown as well.

And yet, it has only been in the last couple of weeks that the discussion of race in this campaign has taken a particularly divisive turn.

On one end of the spectrum, we’ve heard the implication that my candidacy is somehow an exercise in affirmative action; that it’s based solely on the desire of wide-eyed liberals to purchase racial reconciliation on the cheap. On the other end, we’ve heard my former pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, use incendiary language to express views that have the potential not only to widen the racial divide, but views that denigrate both the greatness and the goodness of our nation; that rightly offend white and black alike.

I have already condemned, in unequivocal terms, the statements of Reverend Wright that have caused such controversy. For some, nagging questions remain. Did I know him to be an occasionally fierce critic of American domestic and foreign policy? Of course. Did I ever hear him make remarks that could be considered controversial while I sat in church? Yes. Did I strongly disagree with many of his political views? Absolutely—just as I’m sure many of you have heard remarks from your pastors, priests, or rabbis with which you strongly disagreed.

But the remarks that have caused this recent firestorm weren’t simply controversial. They weren’t simply a religious leader’s effort to speak out against perceived injustice. Instead, they expressed a profoundly distorted view of this country—a view that sees white racism as endemic, and that elevates what is wrong with America above all that we know is right with America; a view that sees the conflicts in the Middle East as rooted primarily in the actions of stalwart allies like Israel, instead of emanating from the perverse and hateful ideologies of radical Islam.

As such, Reverend Wright’s comments were not only wrong but divisive, divisive at a time when we need unity; racially charged at a time when we need to come together to solve a set of monumental problems—two wars, a terrorist threat, a falling economy, a chronic health care crisis and potentially devastating climate change; problems that are neither black or white or Latino or Asian, but rather problems that confront us all.

Given my background, my politics, and my professed values and ideals, there will no doubt be those for whom my statements of condemnation are not enough. Why associate myself with Reverend Wright in the first place, they may ask? Why not join another church? And I confess that if all that I knew of Reverend Wright were the snippets of those sermons that have run in an endless

loop on the television and You Tube, or if Trinity United Church of Christ conformed to the caricatures being peddled by some commentators, there is no doubt that I would react in much the same way.

But the truth is, that isn't all that I know of the man. The man I met more than twenty years ago is a man who helped introduce me to my Christian faith, a man who spoke to me about our obligations to love one another; to care for the sick and lift up the poor. He is a man who served his country as a U.S. Marine; who has studied and lectured at some of the finest universities and seminaries in the country, and who for over thirty years led a church that serves the community by doing God's work here on Earth—by housing the homeless, ministering to the needy, providing day care services and scholarships and prison ministries, and reaching out to those suffering from HIV/AIDS....

Like other predominantly black churches across the country, Trinity embodies the black community in its entirety—the doctor and the welfare mom, the model student and the former gang-banger. Like other black churches, Trinity's services are full of raucous laughter and sometimes bawdy humor. They are full of dancing, clapping, screaming and shouting that may seem jarring to the untrained ear. The church contains in full the kindness and cruelty, the fierce intelligence and the shocking ignorance, the struggles and successes, the love and yes, the bitterness and bias that make up the black experience in America.

And this helps explain, perhaps, my relationship with Reverend Wright. As imperfect as he may be, he has been like family to me. He strengthened my faith, officiated my wedding, and baptized my children. Not once in my conversations with him have I heard him talk about any ethnic group in derogatory terms, or treat whites with whom he interacted with anything but courtesy and respect. He contains within him the contradictions—the good and the bad—of the community that he has served diligently for so many years.

I can no more disown him than I can disown the black community. I can no more disown him than I can my white grandmother—a woman who helped raise me, a woman who sacrificed again and again for me, a woman who loves me as much as she loves anything in this world, but a woman who once confessed her fear of black men who passed by her on the street, and who on more than one occasion has uttered racial or ethnic stereotypes that made me cringe.

These people are a part of me. And they are a part of America, this country that I love.

Some will see this as an attempt to justify or excuse comments that are simply inexcusable. I can assure you it is not. I suppose the politically safe thing would be to move on from this episode and just hope that it fades into the woodwork....

But race is an issue that I believe this nation cannot afford to ignore right now. We would be making the same mistake that Reverend Wright made in his offending sermons about America—to simplify and stereotype and amplify the negative to the point that it distorts reality.

The fact is that the comments that have been made and the issues that have surfaced over the last few weeks reflect the complexities of race in this country that we've never really worked through—a part of our union that we have yet

to perfect. And if we walk away now, if we simply retreat into our respective corners, we will never be able to come together and solve challenges like health care, or education, or the need to find good jobs for every American.

Understanding this reality requires a reminder of how we arrived at this point. As William Faulkner once wrote, "The past isn't dead and buried. In fact, it isn't even past." We do not need to recite here the history of racial injustice in this country. But we do need to remind ourselves that so many of the disparities that exist in the African-American community today can be directly traced to inequalities passed on from an earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow.

Segregated schools were, and are, inferior schools; we still haven't fixed them, fifty years after *Brown v. Board of Education*, and the inferior education they provided, then and now, helps explain the pervasive achievement gap between today's black and white students.

Legalized discrimination—where blacks were prevented, often through violence, from owning property, or loans were not granted to African-American business owners, or black homeowners could not access FHA mortgages, or blacks were excluded from unions, or the police force, or fire departments—meant that black families could not amass any meaningful wealth to bequeath to future generations. That history helps explain the wealth and income gap between black and white, and the concentrated pockets of poverty that persists in so many of today's urban and rural communities.

A lack of economic opportunity among black men, and the shame and frustration that came from not being able to provide for one's family, contributed to the erosion of black families—a problem that welfare policies for many years may have worsened. And the lack of basic services in so many urban black neighborhoods—parks for kids to play in, police walking the beat, regular garbage pick-up and building code enforcement—all helped create a cycle of violence, blight and neglect that continue to haunt us.

This is the reality in which Reverend Wright and other African-Americans of his generation grew up. They came of age in the late fifties and early sixties, a time when segregation was still the law of the land and opportunity was systematically constricted. What's remarkable is not how many failed in the face of discrimination, but rather how many men and women overcame the odds; how many were able to make a way out of no way for those like me who would come after them.

But for all those who scratched and clawed their way to get a piece of the American Dream, there were many who didn't make it—those who were ultimately defeated, in one way or another, by discrimination. That legacy of defeat was passed on to future generations—those young men and increasingly young women who we see standing on street corners or languishing in our prisons, without hope or prospects for the future. Even for those blacks who did make it, questions of race, and racism, continue to define their worldview in fundamental ways. For the men and women of Reverend Wright's generation, the memories of humiliation and doubt and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and the bitterness of those years. That anger may not get expressed in public, in front

of white co-workers or white friends. But it does find voice in the barbershop or around the kitchen table. At times, that anger is exploited by politicians, to gin up votes along racial lines, or to make up for a politician's own failings.

And occasionally it finds voice in the church on Sunday morning, in the pulpit and in the pews. The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of Reverend Wright's sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the most segregated hour in American life occurs on Sunday morning. That anger is not always productive; indeed, all too often it distracts attention from solving real problems; it keeps us from squarely facing our own complicity in our condition, and prevents the African-American community from forging the alliances it needs to bring about real change. But the anger is real; it is powerful; and to simply wish it away, to condemn it without understanding its roots, only serves to widen the chasm of misunderstanding that exists between the races.

In fact, a similar anger exists within segments of the white community. Most working- and middle-class white Americans don't feel that they have been particularly privileged by their race. Their experience is the immigrant experience—as far as they're concerned, no one's handed them anything, they've built it from scratch. They've worked hard all their lives, many times only to see their jobs shipped overseas or their pension dumped after a lifetime of labor. They are anxious about their futures, and feel their dreams slipping away; in an era of stagnant wages and global competition, opportunity comes to be seen as a zero sum game, in which your dreams come at my expense. So when they are told to bus their children to a school across town; when they hear that an African American is getting an advantage in landing a good job or a spot in a good college because of an injustice that they themselves never committed; when they're told that their fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow prejudiced, resentment builds over time.

Like the anger within the black community, these resentments aren't always expressed in polite company. But they have helped shape the political landscape for at least a generation. Anger over welfare and affirmative action helped forge the Reagan Coalition. Politicians routinely exploited fears of crime for their own electoral ends. Talk show hosts and conservative commentators built entire careers unmasking bogus claims of racism while dismissing legitimate discussions of racial injustice and inequality as mere political correctness or reverse racism.

Just as black anger often proved counterproductive, so have these white resentments distracted attention from the real culprits of the middle class squeeze—a corporate culture rife with inside dealing, questionable accounting practices, and short-term greed; a Washington dominated by lobbyists and special interests; economic policies that favor the few over the many. And yet, to wish away the resentments of white Americans, to label them as misguided or even racist, without recognizing they are grounded in legitimate concerns—this too widens the racial divide, and blocks the path to understanding.

This is where we are right now. It's a racial stalemate we've been stuck in for years. Contrary to the claims of some of my critics, black and white, I have never been so naïve as to believe that we can get beyond our racial divisions in a

single election cycle, or with a single candidacy—particularly a candidacy as imperfect as my own.

But I have asserted a firm conviction—a conviction rooted in my faith in God and my faith in the American people—that working together we can move beyond some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact we have no choice if we are to continue on the path of a more perfect union.

For the African-American community, that path means embracing the burdens of our past without becoming victims of our past. It means continuing to insist on a full measure of justice in every aspect of American life. But it also means binding our particular grievances—for better health care, and better schools, and better jobs—to the larger aspirations of all Americans—the white woman struggling to break the glass ceiling, the white man whose been laid off, the immigrant trying to feed his family. And it means taking full responsibility for own lives—by demanding more from our fathers, and spending more time with our children, and reading to them, and teaching them that while they may face challenges and discrimination in their own lives, they must never succumb to despair or cynicism; they must always believe that they can write their own destiny.


Ironically, this quintessentially American—and yes, conservative—notion of self-help found frequent expression in Reverend Wright's sermons. But what my former pastor too often failed to understand is that embarking on a program of self-help also requires a belief that society can change.

The profound mistake of Reverend Wright's sermons is not that he spoke about racism in our society. It's that he spoke as if our society was static; as if no progress has been made; as if this country—a country that has made it possible for one of his own members to run for the highest office in the land and build a coalition of white and black; Latino and Asian, rich and poor, young and old—is still irrevocably bound to a tragic past. But what we know—what we have seen—is that America can change. That is true genius of this nation. What we have already achieved gives us hope—the audacity to hope—for what we can and must achieve tomorrow.

In the white community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the African-American community does not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination—and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in the past—are real and must be addressed. Not just with words, but with deeds—by investing in our schools and our communities; by enforcing our civil rights laws and ensuring fairness in our criminal justice system; by providing this generation with ladders of opportunity that were unavailable for previous generations. It requires all Americans to realize that your dreams do not have to come at the expense of my dreams; that investing in the health, welfare, and education of black and brown and white children will ultimately help all of America prosper.

In the end, then, what is called for is nothing more, and nothing less, than what all the world's great religions demand—that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. Let us be our brother's keeper, Scripture tells us. Let us be our sister's keeper. Let us find that common stake we all have in one another, and let our politics reflect that spirit as well....

7. A Cartoonist Satirizes Anti-Obama Stereotypes, 2008



8. Eighteen-Year-Old Ola Kaso Provides Testimony on the Dream Act, June 28, 2011

Chairman Durbin and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony.

I was five years old, but I remember it like it was yesterday. Apprehensively, I teetered into the perplexing classroom. Students spoke in a language completely foreign to me. The teacher, too, spoke and pointed in a certain direction.

What did she want me to do? Where did she want me to go? I stood there frozen still and silent like a statue. The children stared and they laughed. After a week of my unrelenting silence, I was directed to the principal's office. My mother was there, too, seated to the right of the translator that had helped her enroll me into school.

The teacher spoke and the translator began speaking, too. She says "Ola might need special attention. She barely socializes with the other kids and she's not learning anything. She suggests that Ola be taken out of the general class and be placed into the ELL program so she can get the extra assistance she needs."

I've come a long way since that day 13 years ago. I've become proficient in the English language and I've excelled in my studies. Since the third grade, I've been placed in advanced programs, all of which I fully utilized.

I have taken every advanced placement course my high school has offered and I've earned a 4.4 GPA doing so. I earned a 30 on ACT with English being my highest score.

In high school I was a varsity athlete. I ran cross-country in the fall and I played tennis in the spring. I was treasurer of Student Council and I was treasurer of the National Honor Society.

Furthermore, I tutor students that are still struggling to become proficient in English, and I've received numerous scholarship offers, and I've been accepted to several universities.

I commit countless hours to community service and charity events because I feel that big change comes through little steps. I juggle all my schoolwork, after-school activities and community service projects while also having a job.

I have completely immersed myself within the American culture of which I so strongly desire to become a citizen. I am currently enrolled in the University of Michigan, one of the most prestigious public universities in the nation, where this fall I will be majoring in Brain, Behavioral and Cognitive Science with a concentration in pre-med.

I ultimately aspire to become a surgical oncologist, but more importantly, despite seemingly endless obstacles, I intend to work for patients that cannot afford the astronomical fees accompanying life-saving surgeries, patients that are denied the medical treatment that they deserve.

My goal is not to increase my bank account. My goal is to decrease the amount of preventable deaths. How can I go to a lucrative job every day knowing that there are mothers wasting away in front of their children because they cannot afford a surgery? I cannot and I will not. I wish to remain in this country to make a difference. I wish to remain in this country to help American citizens.

On March 28th, I was spontaneously told that I would be deported in less than a week, despite the fact that my family has complied with all immigration laws for the last 13 years.

I was two months short of obtaining my high school diploma. I was shocked. How could I be sent to a place that I didn't even remember, a culture that is completely foreign to me?

I'm not even fluent in Albanian, so if I were to be sent back I cannot pursue a college education.

My hard work, my dreams and my future are at risk of being eradicated. I have considered one country and one country only to be my home. America is my home, not Albania.

My community rallied behind me. They asked for my deportation to be suspended, and the Department of Homeland Security responded and granted me deferred action for one year so I can continue my studies.

My family came here legally and we followed the law every step of the way. Despite my compliance with the law, there is no way I can obtain citizenship under the current law.

Despite all my hard work and contributions, I face removal from the only country I've ever considered home. Despite my aspirations and good intentions for my country, I face deportation in less than a year.

I am a DREAM Act student. I was brought to this country when I was five years old. I grew up here. I am an American at heart.

There are thousands of other dreamers just like me. Look around the room and you will see hundreds of them today. All we are asking for is a chance to contribute to the country that we love. Please support the DREAM Act.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of all the dreamers."...

✦ ESSAYS

The following essays focus on the ways in which new forms of racial conflict and oppression have shaped the postindustrial, urban landscape at the turn of the twenty-first century. In the first essay, historian George Sanchez uses 1990s Los Angeles as a case study for exploring the intersections of immigration, race, and nativism. In the second essay, historian Heather Ann Thompson shows how skyrocketing rates of mass incarceration were linked to deindustrialization, the criminalization of inner cities, and the economic gutting of urban communities. In different ways, both historians interpret contemporary racial crises as playing out against the wider backdrop of economic globalization.

Race, Immigration and Nativism

GEORGE J. SANCHEZ

On April 30, 1992, Americans across the nation sat transfixed by a television event that grew to symbolize the sorry state of race relations in late twentieth century urban America. The image of Reginald Denny, a white truck driver, being pulled from his cab at the corner of Florence and Normandie Avenues in South Central Los Angeles, beaten and spat upon by a group of young African-American males, quickly became a counterimage of the inhumane beating of black motorist Rodney King a year earlier. These two events of racial conflict, both captured on videotape, dominated representations of the Los Angeles riots in a city haunted by poverty, racism and police brutality. So focused have all Americans become of a bipolar racial dynamic in this country, usually framed in white/black terms, that we lost an opportunity to dissect one of the most important and complex events of our time. As the perceptive playwright and artist Anna Deveare Smith has observed, "We tend to think of race as us and them—us or them being black or white depending on one's own color." Indeed, the Los Angeles riots provides stark, critical evidence of the rise of a racialized nativism directed at recent immigrants and the American born who racially represent those newcomers, one of the most important social movements of our era.

A closer look at the victims of violence at the corner of Florence and Normandie reveals the way in which the Los Angeles Riots were fundamentally an anti-immigrant spectacle at its very beginning. Most people outside of Los Angeles are surprised to hear that Reginald Denny was not the only person injured on that corner. Mesmerized by video images of a single beating of one white man, it is difficult to imagine that at least 30 other individuals were beaten at that same spot, most pulled from their cars, some requiring extensive hospitalization. Most importantly for my purposes, only one other victim of the violence at that corner besides Denny was white—and he was, like Denny, a truckdriver passing through the region. All others were people of color, including a Mexican couple and their one-year-old child, hit with rocks and bottles; a Japanese-American man, stripped, beaten and kicked after being mistaken for Korean; a Vietnamese manicurist, left stunned and bloodied after being robbed; and a Latino family with five-year-old twin girls, who each suffered shattered glass wounds in the face and upper body. All of these acts of violence occurred before Reginald Denny appeared.

Indeed, the first victims at Florence and Normandie were Latino residents who lived in the neighborhood. Marisa Bejar was driving her car through the intersection at 5:45 pm when a metal-covered phone book sailed through her car window, opening up a wound that took thirteen stitches to close. Her husband, Francisco Aragon, was hit on the forehead with a piece of wood, while

their seven-month-old infant suffered minor scratches when a large metal sign was hurled through the rear window. Minutes later, when Manuel Vaca drove his 1973 Buick into the intersection, Antonine Miller and Damian Williams threw rocks through the windshield, causing Vaca to stop the car. Six men pulled Vaca, his wife and his brother from their car, then beat and robbed them. As Anthony Brown remembered, he kicked at Vaca "because he was Mexican and everybody else was doin' it." Sylvia Castro, a fourth generation Mexican American and prominent activist in South Central, was shocked when bricks and bottles shattered her car window. Having worked closely with gang members in the area, she was able to escape with only a bloodied nose by speeding away.

Later, after Denny's assault was recorded and broadcast worldwide, several shocked black residents of the area risked their lives to save other victims. James Henry left his porch to pull Raul Aguilar, an immigrant from Belize, to safety after he had been beaten into a coma and a car had run over his legs. Donald Jones, an off-duty fireman, protected Sai-Choi Choi after several men beat and robbed him. Gregory Alan-Williams pulled a badly wounded Takao Hirata from the bloody intersection. Another savior at that corner was 59-year-old Reverend Bennie Newton, pastor of the Light of Love Church. He rescued the life of Fidel Lopez, a twenty-year resident of Los Angeles from Guatemala. Lopez, driving to his home one block from the intersection, was pulled from his car and later required 29 stitches in his forehead for a wound received by a blow with an auto stereo, 17 stitches to his ear, which someone had tried to slice off, and 12 stitches under his chin. Laying unconscious in the street from the beating, Lopez had motor oil poured down his throat and his face and genitals spraypainted blue. His life was saved when Newton began praying over his prostrate body with a bible in the air.

Over the four days of the Los Angeles riots, the dynamics of racial and class tensions, rage against the police, and antforeign sentiment came together in violent, unpredictable fashion. From that corner of Florence and Normandie, the mayhem spread to engulf the city, creating the worst modern race riot in American history. Fifty-two lives were lost and 2,383 people were injured. About \$1 billion of damage was done to residences and businesses, and over 14,000 arrests were made. In the first three days of rioting, over 4,000 fires were set and 1,800 people were treated for gunshot wounds. The destruction occurred throughout the Los Angeles basin, and the participants and victims were indeed multiethnic. But at its core, the Los Angeles riots provide stark evidence of the way in which immigrants provided the perfect scapegoat for American populations frustrated with developments in their society.

The decisions made by angry, young African Americans at that corner as they chose whom to hurt speak volumes to anyone interested in the intertwining of issues of race and immigration in late twentieth century America. For some, the decision was not about who was white, but about who was not black. For others it centered around how Latinos and Asians had "invaded the territory" of South Central, one which they claimed as their own turf, despite the fact that South Central Los Angeles had a majority Latino population in 1992. Others

shouted (as heard on various videotapes) to "let the Mexicans go," but "show the Koreans who rules." Although the violence began as a response to a verdict passed by an almost all-white jury against an almost all-white set of police officers, quickly other people of color—those deemed foreign or foreign looking—were engaged in the deadly exchange. The meaning of racial and national identities were consistently at issue at the corner of Florence and Normandie, with serious and sometimes bloody outcomes for all participants.

Since May 1992, more clearly visible evidence has appeared which allows most social commentators to identify our current historical moment as one experiencing a particularly sharp rise in American nativism. Two years after the Los Angeles riots, California voters would resurrect their longstanding history as leaders in anti-immigrant efforts since the days of Chinese Exclusion by passing Proposition 187, a state initiative intended to punish illegal immigrants by restricting their access to schools, medical care, and other social services. This would be accomplished by deputizing social service providers as immigration inspectors, including teachers, social workers and doctors, and forcing them to identify to local law enforcement officials students and clients who had entered the country illegally. Here was legislation that tied issues of crime and immigration into a tidy package and allowed voters to voice nativist fears in the anonymous sanctity of the voting booth, a populist solution long well-known in California. Polls showed that this piece of legislation won widespread approval across a range of ethnic groups, including 67 percent of whites (who formed 80% of the total electorate) and 50 percent of both Asian Americans and African Americans, with only 23 percent of Latinos voting in favor.

One feature of the campaign in favor of Proposition 187 was the prominent role played by California Governor Pete Wilson, a "moderate" Republican that had lost favor with the California electorate when his term coincided with the worst economic performance in the state since the Great Depression. His support of anti-immigrant positions was a centerpiece of his political comeback in California, where he won reelection from rival Kathleen Brown in November 1994 after coming from as much as 20 percentage points behind....

During the past year, we also have witnessed the publication and media hype of a book which can easily be characterized as our era's equivalent to *The Passing of a Great Race*, the 1916 classic by Madison Grant, the man John Higham has called "intellectually the most important nativist in recent American history." Grant's contemporary counterpart is Peter Brimelow, senior editor at *Forbes* and *National Review*. His *Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster* (1995) unabashedly claims that recent immigration is likely "to transform—and ultimately, perhaps, even to destroy ... the American nation." Within the first ten pages of the book, recent immigrants are blamed for rising crime rates, the health care crisis, lowering overall educational standards, and causing Americans to feel alienated from each other. Unlike other nativists, Brimelow wants to be clear to offer an overtly racial argument: "Race and ethnicity are destiny in American politics," declares Brimelow repeatedly, so all Americans should be concerned about restricting immigration of people who are colored differently than they.

Signs, therefore, point to a resurgence of a nativism unparalleled in this country since the 1920s. From attacks on immigrants in urban unrest to legislative action attacking immigration policies to academic and media discussions resonating the familiar intellectualized examinations of racialized dissonance of the past, today's nativism is as virulent as any that has gone before. Yet this era's nativism, like this era's immigration, has unique characteristics which differentiate it from that which appeared in the early twentieth century at the height of European immigration to the United States. Traditional hostility towards new immigrants has taken on a new meaning when those immigrants are racially identifiable and fit established racial categories in the American psyche. With the increase of immigration from Asia and Latin America, a new American racism has emerged which has no political boundaries or ethnic categorizations. From the left and right of the political spectrum, and from both white and black individuals, this new racism continually threatens to explode in contemporary American society.

One point worth making is that while nativist discourse is often decidedly linked to racial discourse, they are not one and the same, and they often lead in different directions. Part of the problem in separating racism from nativism is the fact that our collective understanding of what constitutes racism has become murkier since the 1960s....

Although many philosophers and theorists have stressed that "race matters" in understanding American society, race in the national imagination has usually been reserved to describe boundaries between whites and blacks.... Indeed, the 1990s has produced many important works by noted social commentators that continue to utilize a strick white/black racial dichotomy. Andrew Hacker, author of *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal*, justifies his title and emphasis by claiming that Asians and Hispanics "find themselves sitting as spectators, while the two prominent players (Blacks and Whites) try to work out how or whether they can coexist with one another." While including voices of Asian Americans and Latinos in his collection of oral histories about "race," Studs Terkel subtitles his 1992 book, *How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel about the American Obsession*.

Asian Americans and Latinos, despite their active presence in American society in the mid-nineteenth century, are depicted as only the latest of immigrant groups to America, and they are described as engaging in patterns which more clearly represent early twentieth-century European immigrant groups than separate racial populations. Hacker, for example, rather than using the actual history of Asian groups or Latinos in the United States, argues that second and subsequent generations of Hispanics and Asians are merging into the "white" category, partly through intermarriage and also by personal achievement and adaptation. No more important figure than Nobel Prize winner Toni Morrison has made this claim recently in the newsmagazine, *Time*. In a special issue dedicated to immigration, Morrison writes:

... All immigrants fight for jobs and space, and who is there to fight but those who have both? As in the fishing ground struggle between Texas and Vietnamese shrimpers, they displace what and whom they can.

Although U.S. history is awash in labor battles, political fights and property wars among all religious and ethnic groups, their struggles are persistently framed as struggles between recent arrivals and blacks. In race talk the move into mainstream America always means buying into the notion of American blacks as the real aliens. Whatever the ethnicity or nationality of the immigrant, his nemesis is understood to be African American.

This perspective, for all its insight into the crucial place of African Americans in American history, ignores the long history of racial discrimination aimed specifically at Asian Americans and Latinos in the United States. National scholars have a responsibility to study the whole nation and its history, but too often East Coast social commentators present a very thin knowledge of U.S. history more than a few miles away from the eastern seaboard. Both "Asians" and "Latinos" have been decidedly constructed as races in American history, long before the decade of the 1960s, and today both these subgroups have become lightning rods for discussions of race, equality, and the meaning of citizenship in contemporary America....

It is time to consider what factors are at work during our current age which inform and promote our own brand of American nativism. Let me suggest three different antforeign sentiments which mark the racialized nativism of the end of the twentieth century. The first is an extreme antipathy towards non-English languages and a fear that linguistic difference will undermine the American nation. Despite the fact that English has become the premier international language of commerce and communication, fueled by forces as widespread as multinational corporations, the Internet, popular culture and returning migrants, Americans themselves consistently worry that immigrants refuse to learn English and intend to undermine the preeminence of that language within American borders. Captured by statewide "English Only" proposals, which began in California but spread quickly across the nation, this fear seems to emanate from Americans' own linguistic shortcomings and their feeling of alienation from the discourse—be it personal, on the job, or on the radio—that monolingualism creates.

A second fear is one directly tied into issues of multiculturalism and affirmative action. Like papist conspiracy theories, this fear involves the uneasy belief that racialized immigrants take advantage of, in the words of Michael Lind, "a country in which racial preference entitlements and multicultural ideology encourage them to retain their distinct racial and ethnic identities." Going beyond the denial of white privilege in contemporary U.S. society, this sentiment directly believes that contrived, misguided, and sometimes secretive government policies have tilted against white people in the 1990s. Though tied to a general antipathy towards people of color, the place of immigrants and those perceived as racially connected to Latino and Asian immigrants heighten the nature of some of these fears. Even some pro-affirmative action activists bemoan the extension of programs to non-blacks, having equated the history of U.S. racism as that directed against only one racial group incorrectly defined as wholly nonimmigrant. These programs, then, are deemed to be un-American, not only because they contradict America's supposed commitment to equality of opportunity, but also because they are

literally favoring “non-Americans” in their results. While invoking the name of the CORE national director in the early 1960s, Lind writes:

One wonders what James Farmer, the patron saint of quotas, would have said, if he had been told, in 1960, that by boycotting Northern corporations until they hired fixed numbers of black Americans, he was inspiring a system whose major beneficiaries would ultimately be, not only well-to-do white women, but immigrants and the descendants of immigrants who, at the time of his struggles, were living in Mexico, Cuba, Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.

A third antifooreign sentiment has emerged in the 1990s, embodied in California’s Proposition 187, which is quite unique and has not been seen since the Great Depression. Current anti-immigrant rhetoric focuses on the drain of public resources by immigrants, both legal and illegal, particularly their utilization of welfare, education and health care services. Unlike nativist calls which center around immigrants taking jobs from citizens, this sentiment feeds into stereotypes of nonworking loafers, particularly targeting women who supposedly come to the United States to give birth and sustain their families from the “generous” welfare state.... Even when presented with evidence that immigrants are less likely to seek out government assistance than citizens, today’s nativists scoff at the data and the researchers, like 187 proponent Harold Ezell who retorted to one study showing immigrant underutilization of government-sponsored medical programs by saying, “He’s obviously never been to any of the emergency rooms in Orange County to see who’s using them—it’s non-English speaking young people with babies.” ... The notion that immigrants are now coming to the United States to take advantage of welfare, health and education benefits has led directly to federal legislation which allows states to ban such assistance to even legal immigrants, and this has enabled Governor Wilson to mandate such cut-offs in California.

Although cultural antipathies are often at work in producing fear of newcomers, more often than not economic fears of competition have also played a critical role. Nativism has always cut across political lines, finding adherents on both the right and left.... Today’s nativists similarly stretch across the political spectrum, from rightwingers like Pat Buchanan, to political “moderates” like Pete Wilson, to self-proclaimed liberals like Michael Lind.

What binds these individuals together is a profound sense of the decline of the American nation. With the rise of nativism since 1965, we are once again witnessing a defensive nationalism in the wake of profound economic restructuring. In place of a period of modernization which pushed the U.S. agricultural economy towards widespread industrial production, we are now witnessing rapid deindustrialization, the rise of a service and high tech economy, and the worldwide movement of capital which undercuts the ability of American unions to protect U.S. jobs. This economic transformation, coupled with antagonistic government policies, has certainly undermined central cities in the United States and made for fertile ground for nativist sentiments.

Indeed, underlying much of the frustration of the Los Angeles riot participants was the collapse of the inner-city economy, the negative flipside of the new

"Pacific Rim" global economy. Los Angeles had lost 150,000 manufacturing jobs in the previous three years, and each of these jobs were estimated to take another three associated jobs with them. The new jobs which were created were disproportionately low-wage and dead-end forms of employment; in fact, 40 percent of all jobs created in Los Angeles from 1979 to 1989 paid less than \$15,000 a year. Most of these jobs were taken by recent immigrants to the area, leaving African Americans few viable options for secure employment. The average earnings of employed black men fell 24 percent from 1973 to 1989, and unemployment swelled to record levels in the inner city. Middle-income Los Angeles was rapidly disappearing, leaving little opportunity for anyone to move up the economic ladder. This inequality was also highly racialized; the median household net worth for Anglos in the city in 1991 was \$31,904, while only \$1,353 for non-Anglos....

It is clear that we are in a period of economic transformation which can and should be compared to the period of industrialization that occurred a century ago and that has provided the social context for the rise of nativism in the United States that occurred in both periods. Yet today's economic transformation is intimately tied to an economic globalization propelled by multinational corporations and an age where capital and information flows relatively freely across national borders. From 1890 to the 1920s, the industrial transformation which changed the American economy and fueled international migration led to a breaking down of local community control towards a national interdependency which propelled Americans to "search for order" in new and varied ways. Not only did bureaucracy and science rise to provide this national order, but so did immigration restriction and scientific racism emerge to provide ideological comfort to Americans in search of a glue to keep together a nation undergoing fundamental social and economic change.

Many Americans have been shielded since World War II from the convulsions of the international economic order by the enormous strength of the U.S. economy, and liberal policies of inclusion have been crafted which assume the continuation of this extraordinary growth. Most important in coming to terms with the complexities of race, immigration and nativism in the late twentieth century is a perspective which can deal with the multiple meanings of race and equality in American society in an age of liberal political retrenchment and widespread economic restructuring. During the Reagan/Bush administrations, and the ... era of Republican ascendancy in Congress, hard-fought victories in racial and economic policy were and are continually threatened with extinction. In addition, supposedly "race-neutral" policies, such as tax reform and subsidies to the private sector, have disproportionately and adversely affected racial minorities.

Yet increasingly we must account for the fact that at least the Reagan/Bush era did not see a reversal of government spending despite all the rhetoric, but instead witnessed its redirection towards wealthy and corporate interests and away from long-term investment in education, infrastructure and safety nets for the poor. This "trickle-down" theory of social advancement has become the biggest failure of the 1980s, and it has left in its wake a sizable, disgruntled white electorate, one disaffected with politics that clamors for "change" at every turn. This group helped give the White House to the Democrats in 1992, handed large numbers of votes to

Ross Perot, and offered the Republican Party a majority in both houses of Congress for the first time in thirty years in 1994. In this setting, one in which expectations of newfound prosperity grow with every change of political power, a scapegoat must be found amidst the citizenry that can be blamed for delaying the promised economic security. For many Americans in our era, the poor, especially the black poor, have served this role of scapegoat; increasingly, however, that role is being transferred to or combined with the blaming of the immigrant.

While the industrial economy was being sent through convulsions over the past thirty years, Americans produced largely cultural explanations for structural social problems. The demonization of black families, for example, served for white Americans as a plausible justification for the economic backwardness of African Americans, despite affirmative action and civil rights. Instead of focusing on the ravages of deindustrialization in both black and white communities, white Americans increasingly revived traditional stereotypes of black laziness. While these racialized beliefs were no longer acceptable public discourse in the post-civil rights era, researchers who take anonymous polls can still ferret out extensive negative race stereotyping rampant in the white community.

Indeed, it seems to me that cultural beliefs in innate difference have worked together with structural forces of inequality to frame (and hide) discussions of white privilege. Literary scholar Eric Lott has argued that attitudes towards blackness are shaped by white self-examination and insecurity, rather than by the realities of African-American life. Indeed, contemporary white perceptions of blacks probably tell us more about the dangers of being "white" in this era than about strongly held beliefs regarding black inferiority. In fact, it is the language of liberal individualism that keeps many whites from seeking structural explanations for racial inequality. However, liberalism has always been a two-edged sword. When economic conditions become tenuous for whites, meritocratic rhetoric about the rewards of hard work and self-reliance also generates individual anxiety and a fear of personal victimization. Whites who are faced with economic failure or insecurity in spite of their racial privilege become a sure breeding ground for the scapegoating of racial others. This classic projection further obscures the need to acknowledge or understand the structural and economic sources of one's own oppression....

Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History

HEATHER ANN THOMPSON

As the twentieth century came to a close and the twenty-first began, something occurred in the United States that was without international parallel or historical precedent. Between 1970 and 2010 more people were incarcerated in the

United States than were imprisoned in any other country, and at no other point in its past had the nation's economic, social, and political institutions become so bound up with the practice of punishment. By 2006 more than 7.3 million Americans had become entangled in the criminal justice system. The American prison population had by that year increased more rapidly than had the resident population as a whole, and one in every thirty-one U.S. residents was under some form of correctional supervision, such as in prison or jail, or on probation or parole. As importantly, the incarcerated and supervised population of the United States was, overwhelmingly, a population of color. African American men experienced the highest imprisonment rate of all racial groups, male or female. It was 6.5 times the rate of white males and 2.5 times that of Hispanic males. By the middle of 2006 one in fifteen black men over the age of eighteen were behind bars as were one in nine black men aged twenty to thirty-four. The imprisonment rate of African American women looked little better. It was almost double that of Hispanic women and three times the rate of white women....

This essay will suggest, ... that to understand why so many prosperous American cities became centers of poverty and pessimism during the postwar period—to fully locate the origins of urban crisis—we must reckon with the extent to which postwar urban spaces were compromised by the mass incarceration of the later twentieth century....

Historicizing mass incarceration can provide new perspectives on many of the questions that historians ask about the postwar period. One of the most central of these concerns why America's inner cities came to suffer such crisis toward the end of the twentieth century. Right after World War II cities were, at least in the popular and commercial imagination, the lifeblood of the nation. A mere four decades later, however, few would have subscribed to that view. As the postwar period unfolded not only did numerous urban centers across the country suffer deep racial and political conflicts but these same cities also experienced tremendous distress from substantial economic disinvestment. By the twenty-first century too many urban enclaves had become synonymous with unrelenting and seemingly inescapable poverty. Eulogizing three of America's largest cities, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C., one scholar wrote, "The future once happened here."

Historians have not just lamented the death of inner-city America, they have also done a great deal of important work on the origins of its demise. Thomas Sugrue's pivotal study of Detroit, for example, highlights the role that deindustrialization and white racial conservatism played in creating a crisis from which the city simply could not escape. Others, such as Matthew Lassiter, have pointed to the ways that mass suburbanization in the middle and later decades of the twentieth century also undermined urban America. All of these phenomena clearly mattered, but so did the postwar expansion of the carceral state and its eventual byproduct, mass incarceration.

The dramatic postwar rise of the carceral state depended directly on what might well be called the "criminalization of urban space," a process by which increasing numbers of urban dwellers—overwhelmingly men and women of color—became subject to a growing number of laws that not only regulated bodies and communities in thoroughly new ways but also subjected violators to

unprecedented time behind bars. In the same way that rural African American spaces were criminalized at the end of the Civil War, resulting in the record imprisonment of black men that undermined African American communities in the Reconstruction and Jim Crow-era South, the criminalization of urban spaces of color, in both the South and North, during and after the 1960s civil rights era fundamentally altered the social and economic landscape of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century United States.

As Khalil Muhammad and Donna Murch have both pointed out, the focus of law enforcement on urban African Americans, which became a hallmark of the last third of the twentieth century, was rooted in much earlier decades. As Muhammad shows, northern social scientists throughout the Progressive Era were using census data to try to “prove” that blacks were inherently prone to criminality and thus needed greater police scrutiny. He notes as well that such associations between blackness and crime only deepened as the twentieth century unfolded. One of the most important privileges that working-class whites gained as a result of being courted by, and included in, the New Deal liberal state, he argues, was a new claim on citizenship that finally rid them of many negative assumptions about their class position and thus tended to inoculate them from association with criminality. African Americans, who had been shut out of the New Deal’s largesse, however, were afforded neither equal citizenship nor the privilege of presumed honesty that came with it. In stark contrast to white working-class Americans, who increasingly claimed the mantle of crime victim over the course of the twentieth century, poor blacks were increasingly blamed for any crime problem America had. As Murch also shows clearly, by the first decades of the postwar period, much of white America had come to see the presence of African Americans, and their concentration in inner cities in particular, as inherently threatening and it advocated policing them accordingly.

By the late 1960s, however, with African Americans across the country actively laying claim to equal citizenship, the urban spaces in which they lived were criminalized to an unprecedented extent. One of the most important mechanisms by which urban spaces were newly criminalized after the civil rights sixties was a revolution in drug legislation. The state of New York started this revolution by passing a series of new drug laws in 1973. These laws were somewhat ironically named after the then-governor Nelson Rockefeller, who had actually long favored a rehabilitative approach to his state’s drug problem. In 1971, however, Rockefeller faced a major civil rights challenge to this authority—one that fundamentally changed his outlook on those who had committed crimes and led him to embrace more punitive measures for dealing with all lawbreakers, including those who used and sold illegal drugs.


By the end of the 1960s Rockefeller had already witnessed countless grass-roots protests in his state and, when a massive rebellion of over twelve hundred mostly African American inmates began at New York’s Attica State Correctional Facility in the fall of 1971, he decided that the time had come to take a hard line and rethink how he had been handling New York City’s “fringe elements”—whether inmates, activists, or addicts. Determined to show conservatives in his party that he was tough on crime, Rockefeller not only chose to put down the

Attica rebellion with deadly force but he publicly committed himself to certain “enduring principles” such as society’s need for law and order. According to Rockefeller there was a clear “moral responsibility confronting a leader in moments of crisis”: to uphold the law and make it clear that those who committed crimes in his state would not be coddled. As the Rockefeller staffer Joe Persico put it in a speech he drafted for the governor mere days after the retaking of Attica, “Once the orderly structure of society is breached, where does it end?”

As a result of the decision in New York to draw a line in the sand vis-à-vis drugs in the mid-1970s, the state’s prison population soared. By the 1990s, 32.2 percent of inmates in New York’s prisons were locked up for drug offenses, and significantly, the majority of them hailed from the state’s most urban enclaves. In fact, New York’s urban spaces were so impacted by drug legislation in the last decades of the twentieth century that by the new millennium 66 percent of the prisoners who filled the state’s vast prison system had been arrested in, and were from, New York City.

By the close of the twentieth century, New York-style drug laws had been implemented across the nation, and the incarceration rate of inner-city dwellers everywhere escalated dramatically. While in 1970 there had been only 322,300 drug-related arrests in the United States, in 2000 that figure was 1,375,600, and again, the majority of those taken into custody came from inner cities. There were eventually more Detroiters under correctional supervision than there were holding union jobs in the city’s auto plants.

Law enforcement not only disproportionately targeted cities in its new war on drugs but it also particularly policed the communities of color within them; this, despite extensive and readily available data that these areas were not where



most drug trafficking and usage took place. As studies done by the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse noted in 2000, not only did “white students use cocaine at seven times the rate of black students, use crack cocaine at eight times the rate of black students, and use heroin at seven times the rate of black students,” but whites between the ages of twelve and seventeen were also “more than a third more likely to have sold illegal drugs than African American youth.” In the 1980s alone, however, African Americans’ “share” of drug crimes jumped from 26.9 percent to 46.0 percent, and arrested black juveniles “were 37 percent more likely to be transferred to adult courts, where they faced tougher sanctions.” If convicted, African Americans of every age “were more likely than whites to be committed to prison instead of jail, and they were more likely to receive longer sentences.”

As much as criminalizing drugs impacted urban America in general, and poor neighborhoods of color in particular, both spaces were also disproportionately affected after 1970 by an overhaul of state and federal sentencing guidelines related to drug convictions. Notably, the nation’s drug laws were “not passed in isolation”: one of the first major bills calling for mandatory minimum sentences at the federal level was introduced in the U.S. Senate in 1976, followed by similar bills at the state level. Over the next twenty-five years prison terms across the country lengthened substantially. Between the 1980s and the 1990s “the chances of receiving a prison sentence following arrest increased by more than 50 percent” and “the average length of sentences served increas[ed] by nearly 40 percent.”

Not only did possession of various illegal drugs eventually guarantee decades behind bars, but so did mere association with people who possessed such contraband. In 1978, for example, Michigan passed a “650 lifer law,” which mandated a life sentence for anyone found guilty of the intent to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine. By 1999 this law had resulted in two hundred people receiving a life sentence with no chance of parole—some of whom had not had drugs in their possession but were simply in proximity to someone who did. Indicative of how widespread punitive sentencing practices had become during the later twentieth century, by the new millennium “thirty-three states had abolished limited parole (up from seventeen in 1980), twenty-four states had introduced three strikes laws (up from zero), and forty states had introduced truth-in-sentencing laws (up from three).” The cost of implementing mandatory minimum sentences eventually put a serious financial strain on public coffers, and politicians around the country began proposing reforms. In 2009 there were nevertheless more adult Americans serving life sentences (140,610) than at any other time in the country’s history, and nineteen states had recently passed laws that also allowed minors to be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

Increasingly punitive laws and sentencing affected more than just those accused of committing deeds long agreed to be illegal in America’s cities. By the close of the twentieth century, actions that had earlier not garnered the attention of the nation’s criminal justice apparatus were netting serious sanctions. This played out most clearly in the nation’s urban school districts beginning in the late 1960s. Youth challenges to racial inequality had escalated throughout that decade, targeting numerous civic institutions, including secondary schools.

In response, school district officials across the country not only embraced more punitive policies but also began employing security staffs to enforce them.

Throughout the 1960s Baltimore City Schools had experienced a great deal of civil rights activism, and in 1967 district officers decided to bring in a law enforcement presence of twenty-one officers. During the 1970s, and in no small part through resources made available to the city district from the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Baltimore City Schools, and other districts like it, dramatically increased the policing of their schools. By 1984 Baltimore had concluded that "security" was an insufficient descriptor for the level of policing it had come to expect of its school officers, so it created the Baltimore School Police Force, which was given additional, unprecedented power in 1991. The Maryland General Assembly determined that year that school police officers would be given the same training and be as heavily armed as all other law enforcement personnel in the state.

The process of criminalizing urban space via urban schools continued into the twenty-first century. The school district of New York City eventually had "the tenth largest police force in the country—larger than the police forces of Washington, D.C., Detroit, Boston, or Las Vegas." It employed 4,625 school safety agents and stationed two hundred armed police officers in school buildings. As the law-and-order presence grew in city schools across the nation, students were increasingly subject to police scrutiny for infractions ranging from fighting to having food in class, carrying cell phones, skipping classes, and throwing temper tantrums. The subsequent dramatic rise of "arrests for minor non-criminal violations of school rules" in inner-city America not only disrupted urban learning environments but also ensured that the incarcerated population of America's big cities would become increasingly younger.

Law enforcement more aggressively targeted adult urbanites who committed petty crimes and violated social norms over the course of the postwar period as well. Acts that had before resulted in misdemeanor citations at worst or, more usually, public scorn, could be considered serious criminal matters by the close of the twentieth century. Whether in the inner cities of southern states or the Midwest, or on the public transportation systems of major northeastern urban hubs, by the close of the twentieth century the list of illegal activities included urinating in public, sleeping outside, begging for food, and consuming food on the train. A 1968 Supreme Court decision, *Terry v. Ohio*, had made it much easier for members of law enforcement to "stop and detain someone when, based on their experience, they have a 'reasonable suspicion' that 'criminal activity may be afoot.'" This legal green light, together with civic governments' overall new enthusiasm for so-called quality-of-life policing initiatives and zero tolerance policies, escalated the policing of nonviolent urbanite behaviors in the later decades of the twentieth century. In 2006 alone the New York Police Department "stopped and frisked" over half a million men and women.

It is significant that law enforcement bodies of the later postwar period focused their attention overwhelmingly on urban spaces. Although scholars are now well versed in the devastating effect of white flight on postwar inner cities—severely draining them of both census population and income—they

have underappreciated the extent to which escalating incarceration rates did this as well. As a Columbia University study of incarceration in the boroughs of New York City found, "Like poverty, incarceration is spatially concentrated; much more than is crime," indicating clearly that the greater the incarceration rate a given city experienced, the less possibility there was that it could remain socially stable and economically vibrant. By the close of the twentieth century Detroit sent more citizens to prison than any other city in Michigan, and the percentage of Detroit families living below the poverty line was also more than 72 percent higher than the state average. As one local paper put it: "The community los[t] the resources of its young men because so many are jailed."

The criminalization of urban space and the imposition of lengthy prison terms not only rendered an increasing percentage of urbanites unable to contribute to the cities where they grew up but it also made it difficult for them to provide for the dependents they left behind. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, at the close of the twentieth century, "state and federal prisoners were parents to 1,498,800 children under age 18." By 2002 one in every forty-five minor children had at least one parent in a state or federal prison, and by 2008 "52% of state inmates and 63% of federal inmates reported having an estimated 1,706,600 minor children"—the majority of whom were under the age of ten. That women eventually became the fastest growing population in the nation's jails and prisons only exacerbated the crisis faced by America's cities because so many of them were mothers no longer able to care for their young children still at home. One such child particularly haunted Nell Bernstein, a journalist who conducted detailed interviews about the effects of parental incarceration in the 1990s:

I asked him how he had come to be in foster care. He told me that one day the police came to his house and took his mother—he never found out why—and left him at 9-years-old alone with a baby brother.... This kid spent two weeks alone, giving his brother a bottle, changing his brother's diaper. And he remembered that every day, his mother used to take them out for a walk, so every day, he got out the stroller and took his brother down the street in the stroller. And finally after two weeks of this, somebody noticed and made a phone call.

The increasing imprisonment of "women who are nonbiological caretakers of dependent children [and] women who are arrested while raising their younger siblings, nieces, and nephews, or children in their extended social network" also adversely impacted inner-city kids.

Even when inner-city residents got out of prison and returned to their urban communities their status as formerly incarcerated still negatively impacted their children as well as the inner cities in which they lived. When men and women returned to cities such as Detroit or Brooklyn, the first thing they needed was a job to support themselves and their dependents. As a study of several of America's largest cities revealed in 1996, however, a majority of employers "would not knowingly hire an ex-offender." Several studies indicate that the formerly incarcerated could have their employment options reduced by as

much as 59 percent and, if hired, their annual income reduced by as much as 28 percent, and their hourly wages reduced by as much as 19 percent. The nation's welfare system failed to mitigate much of this post-incarceration poverty because, after passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, offenders with drug-related felonies were saddled with "a life-time ban on eligibility for TANF [Temporary Assistance for Needy Families] ... and food stamps." Even when the formerly incarcerated still qualified for federal and state aid, there was increasingly less to receive over the course of the later postwar period. Almost a decade before the Clinton administration chose to "end welfare as we know it" in the mid-1990s, expenditures on incarceration had already "surpassed AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] by 130 percent and food stamps by 70 percent."

Mass incarceration also eroded inner-city viability in ways less obvious than reducing urbanites' incomes and compromising their access to needed welfare resources. The fact that one in ten children in America had one or both parents under correctional supervision by the first decade of the twenty-first century and the reality that such parents heralded so disproportionately from the nation's urban centers, for example, had vast implications for the educational possibilities of even those city kids who had no connection whatever to the criminal justice system. Such statistics meant that most teachers and students in America's urban classrooms would have to contend to some degree with the social and economic fallout of mass incarceration. As one expert put it, "children of prisoners often suffer from anxiety and attention disorders, or from post-traumatic stress," and the negative behavioral and learning consequences that came from so many kids just having lost "their homes, their safety, their public status and private self-image, their primary source of comfort and affection" affected everyone.

Similarly, urbanites who had never served time behind bars also had to deal with the negative public health consequences of mass incarceration. According to research scientists, by the close of the twentieth century human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) was "up to five times more prevalent in American prisons than in the general population," and given that the majority of inmates were eventually released to urban centers, numerous city residents were eventually at a higher risk for contracting the virus. With prison overcrowding leading to major outbreaks of tuberculosis in penal facilities across the country, inner-city dwellers were also at an increased risk of exposure to a disease that only decades earlier had been virtually eliminated. According to one scholar, "Several of the worst outbreaks of tuberculosis documented in the United States" (such as a 1989 "epidemic of drug-resistant tuberculosis in New York City" that took "more than a billion dollars" to bring to an end) had "their roots in overcrowded prisons and jails."

For America's inner cities, then, the rise of a massive carceral state in the later postwar period had devastating short-term and long-term consequences. Because of mass incarceration, for example, entire urban neighborhoods had atrophied to the point of collapse by the close of the twentieth century. Of all the prisoners released to Wayne County, Michigan, in the year 2000, a full 41 percent returned to only eight particularly devastated zip codes in the city of

Detroit. Entire blocks in the New York City borough of Brooklyn were similarly ravaged by mass incarceration, and they too had become, by the new millennium, little more than boarded up wastelands. Soon such urban spaces had a name: “million-dollar blocks,” a reference to what it cost taxpayers to house the former inhabitants of these inner-city areas in the nation’s penitentiaries.

As the postwar period wore on, America’s urban centers were increasingly trapped in a vicious cycle of imprisonment and want, one that both undergirded and ensured civic distress: mass incarceration increased poverty, increased urban poverty led to even more urban incarceration, and so on. According to analysts, as many as 70 percent of the children whose parents were imprisoned at the close of the twentieth century would end up behind bars themselves, and African American children were more than eight times more likely to have a parent in prison than were white children in major cities such as Chicago. Therefore, to understand the origins of urban crisis in the postwar United States (in its myriad manifestations ranging from population loss to escalating poverty to a compromised educational system to poor public health to the ever-widening racial divide) historians must look much more closely at how the American justice system evolved after the 1960s, in general, and at the implications of mass incarceration for urbanites, in particular. Mass incarceration was not simply, as the sociologist Loïc Wacquant suggests, “a political response to the collapse of the ghetto.” It was a historical phenomenon that—like deindustrialization and white flight—*itself* caused crisis and collapse in America’s inner cities....

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The United States in the World since 9/11

Intelligence services watched with alarm in the 1990s as Islamic terrorists mounted attacks against the United States. Yet few political leaders or other Americans paid much attention to the issue. All that changed on September 11, 2001, when hijackers from the al-Qaeda terrorist network staged the most devastating strike on U.S. soil since the Pearl Harbor attack sixty years earlier. Using box-cutters as weapons, the terrorists commandeered four commercial airplanes, crashing two of them into the World Trade Center in New York and a third into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. Passengers aboard the fourth plane overpowered hijackers intent on smashing into the U.S. Capitol, though all of them perished when the plane crashed in a field in rural Pennsylvania. All told, almost 3,000 Americans died.

The attacks stunned the nation and sparked major shifts in American politics and foreign policy. Americans rallied around President George W. Bush, sending his approval ratings above 90 percent and giving him extraordinary latitude to respond to the attacks as he saw fit. Bush ordered U.S. military forces into action to destroy the Taliban, the Islamic movement that governed Afghanistan and provided a base from which al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had launched the 9/11 operation. Far less predictably, Bush decided to overthrow Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, despite miniscule evidence connecting him to al-Qaeda. On March 20, 2003, U.S. forces invaded Iraq and quickly toppled the government. Bush claimed—wrongly, as it turned out—that Hussein was harboring weapons of mass destruction that could be turned against America or its allies. Commentators and memoirists have suggested other motives for the invasion—a desire to control Iraq’s oil, hopes of spreading democracy in the Middle East, or even Bush’s personal animosity against Hussein.

Whatever the motives, the invasion quickly bogged down into a grueling war against insurgents and terrorists who saw a chance to bloody the United States and to exert control in a country torn apart by sectarianism. By the time U.S. combat forces withdrew in December 2011, more than 4,000 Americans had been killed and more than 32,000 wounded. During the same years, U.S. forces also struggled to impose order in Afghanistan, where initial success gave way, just as in Iraq, to arduous counter-insurgency warfare. But battlefield

problems were only one of the setbacks that befell the United States as it pursued its multi-front “war on terror.” Like the Vietnam conflict four decades earlier, fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan deeply divided the American people, stoking intense political controversy and accelerating polarizing trends already underway. The wars also undermined America’s global reputation, particularly after media reports made clear in 2004 that American guards at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison had abused and tortured Iraqi prisoners. Many commentators viewed the brutal and seemingly endless wars, coupled with a major economic recession that began in 2008, as evidence of America’s permanent decline as a world leader.

Whether and how the United States could regain its global power and prestige loomed as major questions as the country marked the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Diminished U.S. prestige, massive American indebtedness, and the rise of China convinced some commentators that the era of American predominance that had begun with World War II had come to an end. Others were more optimistic, though prescriptions for national resurgence varied. Just as in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, some Americans insisted that national renewal could be achieved only by scaling back U.S. commitments overseas, diverting resources to domestic problems, and refocusing on the country’s core principles. Others called for a rededication to bold international activism, particularly to the spread of democracy and market economics.

◆ DOCUMENTS

While Americans enjoyed enormous prosperity and reveled in their Cold War triumph during the 1990s, a serious threat was quietly gathering overseas. In 1998, Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi who had once fought the Soviets in Afghanistan, issued a call for *jihad*—holy war—against the United States (Document 1). Three years later, terrorists trained by Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda movement carried out the 9/11 attacks. President George W. Bush addressed the American people several times in the days following the catastrophe. In his speech to a joint session of Congress on September 20, Bush attempted to answer a question that loomed large at the time—what motivated the terrorists to carry out such an act? (Document 2).

The attacks led the Bush administration to adopt a new approach to national security that critics considered a sharp break with long-standing traditions in U.S. foreign policy. Asserting that terrorism posed a new type of danger to the nation, the administration declared in September 2002 (Document 3) that the United States was prepared to wage preemptive war against potential aggressors and to use force unilaterally, without seeking the approval of allies or international bodies such as the United Nations. Six months later, the United States invaded Iraq, claiming that Saddam Hussein was in league with al-Qaeda and was building chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. When neither of those charges turned out to be true, critics accused the Bush administration of recklessly taking the nation to war. In Document 4, a speech delivered on October 17, 2003, Democratic Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia accused the president above all of misusing intelligence and manipulating the truth.

The invasion of Iraq quickly toppled Hussein but degenerated before long into a brutal fight against Iraqi insurgents that often left U.S. soldiers confused and frustrated. In Document 5, an Army Reserve civil affairs officer named Oscar R. Estrada recalls the challenges of trying to win the support of the Iraqi people for American objectives. The frustrations of guerrilla war and anxiety about new terrorist attacks led the Bush administration to approve the use of harsh interrogation methods—torture, in the view of opponents—against Iraqi prisoners suspected of withholding information about impending violence. In Document 6, one of several memos that became controversial when it became public, the Justice Department defends certain methods of brutalizing detainees, including “water boarding.”

While American forces struggled to build functional societies in Iraq and Afghanistan, commentators such as cartoonist Mike Keefe bemoaned the lack of attention to urgent problems within the United States, including economic crisis, widening disparities of wealth, deteriorating schools, and crumbling infrastructure (Document 7). Other voices outside and inside government warned that the obsession with terrorism had distracted the nation from potentially graver national security problems looming on the horizon. In Document 8, a report prepared in 2011, Defense Department officials asserted that climate change posed major challenges for the nation in the years ahead.

1. Osama bin Laden Declares Jihad against America, 1998

Praise be to God, who revealed the Book, controls the clouds, defeats factionalism, and says in His Book[,] “But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)”]; and peace be upon our Prophet, Muhammad Bin-’Abdallah, who said “I have been sent with the sword between my hands to ensure that no one but God is worshipped, God who put my livelihood under the shadow of my spear and who inflicts humiliation and scorn on those who disobey my orders.” The Arabian Peninsula has never—since God made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas—been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies now spreading in it like locusts, consuming its riches and destroying its plantations. All this is happening at a time when nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food. In the light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter.

No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone; we will list them, in order to remind everyone:

First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its

bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.

If some people have formerly debated the fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it.

The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, still they are helpless. Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, in excess of 1 million ... despite all this, the Americans are once [again] trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.

So now they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.

Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there.

The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.

All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in "Al-Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al-Bada'i," al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said[,] "As for the militant struggle, it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life."

On that basis, and in compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims[:]

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God[:] "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God."

This is in addition to the words of Almighty God[:] "And why should ye not fight in the cause of God and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated and oppressed—women and children, whose cry is 'Our Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will help!'"

We—with God's help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and

plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.

Almighty God said[:] "O ye who believe, give your response to God and His Apostle, when He calleth you to that which will give you life. And know that God cometh between a man and his heart, and that it is He to whom ye shall all be gathered."

Almighty God also says[:] "O ye who believe, what is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of God, ye cling so heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For God hath power over all things."

Almighty God also says[:] "So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith."

2. President George W. Bush Examines Sources of Anti-Americanism, 2001

On September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking, who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al Qaida. They are some of the murderers indicted for bombing American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the U.S.S. *Cole*. Al Qaida is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money. Its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children.

This group and its leader, a person named Usama bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these

"Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64731&st=&st1=#axzz1nEj231Go>

terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.

The leadership of Al Qaida has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see Al Qaida's vision for the world. Afghanistan's people have been brutalized. Many are starving, and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough....

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.

Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.

Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this Chamber, a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.

They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.

We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism and nazism and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends, in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.

Americans are asking, how will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo 2 years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime....

3. The Bush Administration Declares a New National Security Strategy, 2002

The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with our allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy's use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation.

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were inconceivable.

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction [WMD] against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:

- brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
- reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

- *Proactive counterproliferation efforts.* We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities—detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities—are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.

- *Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.* We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to \$20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward.

- *Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.* Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

■ In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.

■ In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.

■ Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.

We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and
- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.

4. Senator Robert C. Byrd Charges “The Emperor Has No Clothes,” 2003

In 1837, Danish author, Hans Christian Andersen, wrote a wonderful fairy tale which he titled *The Emperor’s New Clothes*. It may be the very first example of the power of political correctness. It is the story of the Ruler of a distant land who was so enamored of his appearance and his clothing that he had a different suit for every hour of the day....

That tale seems to me very like the way this nation was led to war.

We were told that we were threatened by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but they have not been seen.

We were told that the throngs of Iraqis would welcome our troops with flowers, but no throngs or flowers appeared.

We were led to believe that Saddam Hussein was connected to the attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, but no evidence has ever been produced.

We were told in 16 words that Saddam Hussein tried to buy “yellow cake” [uranium] from Africa for production of nuclear weapons, but the story has turned into empty air.

We were frightened with visions of mushroom clouds, but they turned out to be only vapors of the mind.

We were told that major combat was over[,] but [as of October 17, 2003,] 101 Americans have died in combat since that proclamation from the deck of an aircraft carrier by our very own Emperor in his new clothes.

Our emperor says that we are not occupiers, yet we show no inclination to relinquish the country of Iraq to its people.

Those who have dared to expose the nakedness of the Administration’s policies in Iraq have been subjected to scorn. Those who have noticed the elephant in the room—that is, the fact that this war was based on falsehoods—have had

Excerpt from remarks by U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, October 17, 2003. Online at http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd_speeches/byrd_speeches_2003october/byrd_speeches_2003october_list/byrd_speeches_2003october_list_3.html.

our patriotism questioned. Those who have spoken aloud the thought shared by hundreds of thousands of military families across this country, that our troops should return quickly and safely from the dangers half a world away, have been accused of cowardice. We have then seen the untruths, the dissembling, the fabrication, the misleading inferences surrounding this rush to war in Iraq wrapped quickly in the flag....

The Emperor has no clothes. This entire adventure in Iraq has been based on propaganda and manipulation. Eighty-seven billion dollars is too much to pay for the continuation of a war based on falsehoods.

Taking the nation to war based on misleading rhetoric and hyped intelligence is a travesty and a tragedy. It is the most cynical of all cynical acts. It is dangerous to manipulate the truth. It is dangerous because once having lied, it is difficult to ever be believed again. Having misled the American people and stampeded them to war, this Administration must now attempt to sustain a policy predicated on falsehoods. The President asks for billions from those same citizens who know that they were misled about the need to go to war. We misinformed and insulted our friends and allies[,] and now this Administration is having more than a little trouble getting help from the international community....

I cannot stand by and continue to watch our grandchildren become increasingly burdened by the billions that fly out of the Treasury for a war and a policy based largely on propaganda and prevarication....

I cannot support a President who refuses to authorize the reasonable change in course that would bring traditional allies to our side in Iraq.

I cannot support the politics of zeal and "might makes right" that created the new American arrogance and unilateralism which passes for foreign policy in this Administration.

I cannot support this foolish manifestation of the dangerous and destabilizing doctrine of preemption that changes the image of America into that of a reckless bully.

The emperor has no clothes....

5. An Army Officer Ponders the Fight for Hearts and Minds in Iraq, 2004

The General and the Colonel have told us that we are the main effort, at the forefront of helping to rebuild Iraq. But how do you rebuild when all around you destruction and violence continue? Do the facts and figures showing levels of electricity restored, the amount of drinking water available, the number of schools reconstructed or the numbers of police officers hired and trained really convince the Iraqi people that we are here to help? Are we winning their hearts and minds?

Winning hearts and minds is my job, in a nutshell. I'm an Army Reserve civil affairs (CA) officer stationed in Baqubah, 30 miles northeast of Baghdad.

In Vietnam, winning hearts and minds was mostly a Special Forces task, but after that they were smart enough to get out of it, and the responsibility has since fallen into the laps of reservists like me who are trained to deal with every conceivable problem that arises when Big Army meets Little Civilian. And that's why CA soldiers are among those most often deployed overseas in the Reserve.

That's how they get you, actually, with promises of foreign travel, foreign language training, Airborne School, Air Assault School ... and the chance to help others. We're trained in the Army's regimented style to deal with civilians in foreign countries, required to learn a satisfactory number of acronyms, probed, pricked and tested, and then sent overseas to do good.

And here we are, in Iraq, trying to help the Iraqi people as death threats frighten our Iraqi interpreters into quitting to protect their families, and as attacks from mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) become daily and nightly occurrences.

We're told by senior officers that most Iraqis are being influenced by "bad guys" and their anti-coalition messages. The latest acronym for these bad guys is AIF, which stands for Anti-Iraqi Forces. The fact that most AIF members are Iraqi in neatly ignored as we try to win the goodwill of the "good" Iraqis.

One day last week we rolled into the town of Zaghniyah to win some of the local hearts and minds. In a country where most people are unemployed, we offer the townspeople \$1 for every bag of trash they can collect. Our "docs"—medics, assistants and physicians—set up shop in the local health clinic and we try to "engage local leadership." But most of the local leaders, we are told, are not there. Those people who do speak with us do so only to catalogue their concerns—chiefly unemployment and lack of electricity and water. It's the day after the swearing-in of Iraq's new interim government, and so I explain that their concerns have to be presented to their Governing Council, and that we can fund projects only through that council. An old man waves me off and tells me that they know the Americans control everything and will do so as long as they are here. The rest of the men nod in agreement.

As the day wears on, every ray of sun seems to add weight to my Kevlar helmet and body armor. I am at a loss as to why our efforts aren't recognized or appreciated. But then, as I look at the children collecting trash and the main road clogged with military vehicles, as I watch one of our docs try to help a woman carrying a gaunt and sickly baby in her arms, and as I listen to an old sheik struggle with our demands that he hold American-style town meetings, I realize that Iraqis may see our help as something else. I see how paying them to collect trash may be demeaning and remote from their hopes for prosperity in a new Iraq. I see our good faith efforts to provide medical care lead to disappointment and resentment when we have neither the medicine nor the equipment to cure or heal many ailments. And I see how our efforts to introduce representative democracy can lead to frustration.

Some experiences here have reminded me that our sacrifice for the rebuilding of Iraq is minor compared with that of the average Iraqi. A few weeks ago I was on a patrol in the town of Buhriz, near Baqubah. Our mission: to assess the

city's potable water needs. Buhriz is a place where our soldiers are often shot at, so we rolled in with two Bradleys and several Humvees packed with heavily armed troops.

On the way to the water treatment plant, we stop for a psychological operations (psyop) mission. A psyop team walks up and down the market handing out "product," in this case pro-coalition messages in a glossy Arabic-language magazine. Young people take the magazines and seem to enjoy the novelty of the event; some people bombard the team and its interpreter with questions about things the town needs and the whereabouts of detained relatives.

But others return the fancy magazine and pull their kids away from "the occupiers." One man pulls a young boy by the arm and slaps him on the back of the head as he chastises him. I stare at the man and he at me; his hatred is palpable. We're less than five feet apart, but the true separation is far greater. I'm unable to communicate with him without the help of the one interpreter assigned to this patrol of 30 or so soldiers, and the "terp" is with the psyop team. I wish I could ask the man why he hates us, but I doubt anything useful would come of such a conversation. As we drive out of town, a little boy who looks about 3 years old spits at our vehicles as we pass his house.

I flash back to an incident a month earlier when we were returning to our compound by way of "RPG Alley," a route of frequent attacks. A unit ahead of us had reported taking fire and we rushed to the scene. Other patrols and M1 tanks soon arrived and we sat and waited, pointing our weapons into a date palm grove to the north. A small column of Humvees moved down a dirt road toward the grove, and all hell broke loose. I never heard a shot fired from the grove, but someone did, and then everyone was firing.

"Hey, what the hell are we shooting at?" I screamed at my buddy as I continued to squeeze off rounds from my M-16.

"I'm not sure! By that shack. You?"

"I'm just shooting where everybody else is shooting."

But everybody else was shooting all over the place. Small puffs of white erupted in front of us as our own soldiers lobbed grenades at the grove but came up short; tracers from .50-caliber machine guns flew past us, and the smell of cordite filled the air. Then, as suddenly as it had started, the tumult ended. We sat in silence and listened to the crackling radios as a patrol dismounted from a couple of armored Humvees and began to search among the trees.

"Dagger, this is Bravo 6. Do you have anything, over?"

"Roger. We're going to need a terp. We have a guy here who's pretty upset. I think we killed his cow, over."

"Upset how, over?"

"He can't talk; I think he's in shock. He looks scared, over."

"He should be scared. He's the enemy."

"Uhm, ahh, Roger, 6 ... he's not armed and looks like a farmer or something."

"He was in the grove that we took fire from; he's a [expletive] bad guy!"

"Roger."

From my perch in the Humvee, I listened as the patrol found a suspicious bag hanging from a tree and called in an explosive ordnance disposal unit to examine it. On the other side of the road, in the distance, a horse-drawn cart crept on its way from some unknown village to the piece of road we now controlled. I watched it grow larger until the old man on the cart came face to face with the armed soldier waving him off. He slowly turned the cart around and headed back to where he had come from. I wondered where he was going, whether it was important and how much effort he'd put into the trip. I wondered if we had any chance of winning either his heart or his mind.

As we headed back to our compound, I couldn't stop thinking about the man in the grove, frozen in shock at the sight of his dead livestock. Did his family depend on that cow for its survival? Had he seen his world fall apart? Had we lost both his heart and his mind?

Stop thinking about this, I tell myself as our imposing convoy comes to a stop in front of the water treatment plant that serves Buhriz—it's time, once again, to go about my job of winning those hearts and minds. I spend the next half-hour asking people questions and taking notes that I'll later summarize in a neat and orderly report sprinkled with just the right number of Army acronyms, grid coordinates and date-time groups. I'll detail the gallons-per-day requirements and the inoperable pump and the need for high-capacity filters and all the other bits of information that will help someone somewhere request the thousands of dollars it will take to repair the plant. My work is done, and I feel confident I've done it well. I feel as if I've actually accomplished something worthwhile today.

And then I remember: Security, you forgot to ask about security! So I do, and the treatment plant manager tells me that his biggest threat is coalition soldiers, who shoot up the compound whenever the nearby MP station and government building are attacked. He shows me the bullet holes and asks, "Why?" I give the standard response: We have to defend ourselves, and these problems are caused by the insurgents. And I think the people listening are buying it when the plant's caretaker tugs at my elbow, urging me to come see his house on the corner of the plant grounds. We're running late, but I follow the man before the patrol leader can say no.

An old man, the caretaker's father, comes out of the house and gestures for me to come inside. It's a one-level, three-room concrete building, clean but humble. The old man's grandchildren, his daughter-in-law and his wife stare up at me as he leads me by the arm and points out the bullet holes on the side of the house, the shattered windows and the bullet-riddled living room. He's speaking to me in Arabic. I can't understand a word he's saying, and yet I understand it all. I see the anguish in his face as his eyes start to tear up, I see the sadness as he points to old photographs of safer days under Saddam Hussein. I see the shame as he mimics how our soldiers hit him when he was detained, and I see the disappointment as he asks me "Why?" and I stare at him at a loss for words.

"Why?" I don't even remember what I told him, but I think I apologized. The patrol leader was telling me it was time to go. Everyone, even the old man's family, seemed in a hurry to end the encounter. So we quickly walked out, hoping to somehow outpace the wave of shame that threatened to knock us over.

Only I can't outrun it. I stay up that night thinking of the old man and the young soldiers who fired into the darkness in response to bullets and mortars and RPGs hurled at them from somewhere "out there." I think of the man with the dead cow and of the rush of adrenaline I felt firing from the back of that Humvee at the perceived threat. I think of the old man on the cart, the children who burst into tears when we point our weapons into their cars (just in case), and the countless numbers of people whose vehicles we sideswipe as we try to use speed to survive the IEDs that await us each morning. I think of my fellow soldiers and the reality of being attacked and feeling threatened, and it all makes sense—the need to smash their cars and shoot their cows and point our weapons at them and detain them without concern for notifying their families. But how would I feel in their shoes? Would I be able to offer my own heart and mind?

6. U.S. Department of Justice Authorizes CIA to Use Harsh Interrogation Methods, 2005

You have asked us to address whether certain specified interrogation techniques designed to be used on a high value al Qaeda detainee in the War on Terror comply with the federal prohibition on torture....

... Torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to international norms. The universal repudiation of torture is reflected not only in our criminal law, ... but also in international agreements, in centuries of Anglo-American law, ... and in the longstanding policy of the United States, repeatedly and recently reaffirmed by the President. Consistent with these norms, the President has directed unequivocally that the United States is not to engage in torture.

The task of interpreting and applying [U.S. law on interrogation techniques] is complicated by the lack of precision in the statutory terms and the lack of relevant case law. In defining the federal crime of torture, Congress required that a defendant "*specifically intend...* to inflict *severe* physical or mental pain or suffering," and Congress narrowly defined "severe mental pain or suffering" to mean "the *prolonged* mental harm caused by" enumerated predicate acts, including "the threat of *imminent* death" and "procedures *calculated* to disrupt *profoundly* the senses or personality." ... These statutory requirements are consistent with U.S. obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the treaty that obligates the United States to ensure that torture is a crime under U.S. law.... The requirements [of U.S. law] closely track the understandings and reservations required by the Senate when it gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention Against Torture. They reflect a clear intent by Congress to limit the scope of the prohibition on torture under U.S. law. However, many of the key terms used in the statute (for example, "severe," "prolonged," "suffering") are imprecise and necessarily bring a degree of uncertainty to addressing the reach of [U.S. statutes regarding torture]. Moreover, relevant

judicial decisions in this area provide only limited guidance. This imprecision and lack of judicial guidance, coupled with the President's clear directive that the United States does not condone or engage in torture, counsel great care in applying the statute to specific conduct....

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the particular question before us: whether certain specified interrogation techniques may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") on a high value al Qaeda detainee consistent with the federal statutory prohibition on torture.... For the reasons discussed below, and based on the representations we have received from you (or officials of your Agency) about the particular techniques in question, the circumstances in which they are authorized for use, and the physical and psychological assessments made of the detainee to be interrogated, we conclude that the separate authorized use of each of the specific techniques at issue, subject to the limitations and safeguards described herein, would not violate [U.S. law]. Our conclusion is straightforward with respect to all but two of the techniques discussed herein. [U]se of sleep deprivation as an enhanced technique and use of the waterboard involve more substantial questions, with the waterboard presenting the most substantial question....

In asking us to consider certain specific techniques to be used in the interrogation of a particular al Qaeda operative, you have provided background information common to the use of all of the techniques. You have advised that these techniques would be used only on an individual who is determined to be a "High Value Detainee," defined as:

a detainee who, until time of capture, we have reason to believe: (1) is a senior member of al-Qai'da or an al-Qai'da associated terrorist group (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zarqawi Group, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent terrorist threats against the USA, its military forces, its citizens and organizations, or its allies; or that has/had direct involvement in planning and preparing terrorist actions against the USA or its allies, or assisting the al-Qai'da leadership in planning and preparing such terrorist actions; and (3) if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or its allies....

You have also explained that, prior to interrogation, each detainee is evaluated by medical and psychological professionals from the CIA's Office of Medical Services ("OMS") to ensure that he is not likely to suffer any severe physical or mental pain or suffering as a result of interrogation....

We understand that, when approved, interrogation techniques are generally used in an escalating fashion, with milder techniques used first. Use of the techniques is not continuous. Rather, one or more techniques may be applied—during or between interrogation sessions—based on the judgment of the interrogators and other team members and subject always to the monitoring of the on-scene medical and psychological personnel. Use of the techniques may be continued if the detainee is still believed to have and to be withholding actionable intelligence. The use of these techniques may not be continued for more than 30 days without additional approval from CIA Headquarters.... Moreover, even within that 30-day period, any further use of these interrogation techniques

is discontinued if the detainee is judged to be consistently providing accurate intelligence or if he is no longer believed to have actionable intelligence....

At any time, any on-scene personnel (including the medical or psychological personnel, the chief of base, substantive experts, security officers, and other interrogators) can intervene to stop the use of any technique if it appears that the technique is being used improperly, and on-scene medical personnel can intervene if the detainee has developed a condition making the use of the technique unsafe. More generally, medical personnel watch for signs of physical distress or mental harm so significant as possibly to amount to the "severe physical or mental pain or suffering" that is prohibited by [U.S. law]....

You have described the specific techniques at issue as follows:

... *Nudity*. This technique is used to cause psychological discomfort, particularly if a detainee, for cultural or other reasons, is especially modest. When the technique is employed, clothing can be provided as an instant reward for cooperation. During and between interrogation sessions, a detainee may be kept nude, provided that ambient temperatures and the health of the detainee permit. For this technique to be employed, ambient temperature must be at least 68°F. No sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse are permitted. Although each detention cell has full-time closed-circuit video monitoring, the detainee is not intentionally exposed to other detainees or unduly exposed to the detention facility staff. We understand that interrogators "are trained to avoid sexual innuendo or any acts of implicit or explicit sexual degradation." ... Nevertheless, interrogators can exploit the detainee's fear of being seen naked. In addition, female officers involved in the interrogation process may see the detainees naked; and for purposes of our analysis, we will assume that detainees subjected to nudity as an interrogation technique are aware that they may be seen naked by females....

Walling. This technique involves the use of a flexible, false wall. The individual is placed with his heels touching the flexible wall. The interrogator pulls the individual forward and then quickly and firmly pushes the individual into the wall. It is the individual's shoulder blades that hit the wall. During this motion, the head and neck are supported with a rolled hood or towel that provides a C-collar effect to help prevent whiplash. To reduce further the risk of injury, the individual is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall. You have informed us that the false wall is also constructed to create a loud noise when the individual hits it in order to increase the shock or surprise of the technique....

Stress positions. There are three stress positions that may be used. You have informed us that these positions are not designed to produce the pain associated with contortions or twisting of the body. Rather, like wall standing, they are designed to produce the physical discomfort associated with temporary muscle fatigue. The three stress positions are (1) sitting on the floor with legs extended straight out in front and arms raised above the head, (2) kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle, and (3) leaning against a wall generally about three feet away from the detainee's feet, with only the detainee's head touching the wall, while his wrists are handcuffed in front of him or behind his back, and while an interrogator stands next to him to prevent injury if he loses

his balance. As with wall standing, we understand that these positions are used only to induce temporary muscle fatigue.

Water dousing. Cold water is poured on the detainee either from a container or from a hose without a nozzle. This technique is intended to weaken the detainee's resistance and persuade him to cooperate with interrogators. The water poured on the detainee must be potable, and the interrogators must ensure that water does not enter the detainee's nose, mouth, or eyes. A medical officer must observe and monitor the detainee throughout application of this technique, including for signs of hypothermia. Ambient temperatures must remain above 64°F. If the detainee is lying on the floor, his head is to remain vertical, and a poncho, mat, or other material must be placed between him and the floor to minimize the loss of body heat. At the conclusion of the water dousing session, the detainee must be moved to a heated room if necessary to permit his body temperature to return to normal in a safe manner....

Sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours). This technique subjects a detainee to an extended period without sleep. You have informed us that the primary purpose of this technique is to weaken the subject and wear down his resistance.

The primary method of sleep deprivation involves the use of shackling to keep the detainee awake. In this method, the detainee is standing and is handcuffed, and the handcuffs are attached by a length of chain to the ceiling. The detainee's hands are shackled in front of his body, so that the detainee has approximately a two- to three-foot diameter of movement. The detainee's feet are shackled to a bolt in the floor. Due care is taken to ensure that the shackles are neither too loose nor too tight for physical safety. We understand from discussions with OMS that the shackling does not result in any significant physical pain for the subject. The detainee's hands are generally between the level of his heart and his chin. In some cases, the detainee's hands may be raised above the level of his head, but only for a period of up to two hours. All of the detainee's weight is borne by his legs and feet during standing sleep deprivation....

The "waterboard." In this technique, the detainee is lying on a gurney that is inclined at an angle of 10 to 15 degrees to the horizontal, with the detainee on his back and his head toward the lower end of the gurney. A cloth is placed over the detainee's face, and cold water is poured on the cloth from a height of approximately 6 to 18 inches. The wet cloth creates a barrier through which it is difficult—or in some cases not possible—to breathe. A single "application" of water may not last for more than 40 seconds, with the duration of an "application" measured from the moment when water—of whatever quantity—is first poured onto the cloth until the moment the cloth is removed from the subject's face.... When the time limit is reached, the pouring of water is immediately discontinued and the cloth is removed. We understand that if the detainee makes an effort to defeat the technique (e.g., by twisting his head to the side and breathing out of the corner of his mouth); the interrogator may cup his hands around the detainee's nose and mouth to dam the runoff, in which case it would not be possible for the detainee to breathe during the application of the water....

We understand that in the escalating regimen of interrogation techniques, the waterboard is considered to be the most serious, requires a separate approval that may be sought only after other techniques have not worked (or are considered

unlikely to work in the time available), and in fact has been—and is expected to be—used on very few detainees. We accept the assessment of OMS that the waterboard “is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques.” ... This technique could subject a detainee to a high degree of distress. A detainee to whom the technique is applied will experience the physiological sensation of drowning, which likely will lead to panic. We understand that even a detainee who knows he is not going to drown is likely to have this response. Indeed, we are informed that even individuals very familiar with the technique experience this sensation when subjected to the waterboard.

Nevertheless, although this technique presents the most substantial question under the statute, we conclude for the reasons discussed below that the authorized use of the waterboard by adequately trained interrogators, subject to the limitations and conditions adopted by the CIA and in the absence of any medical contraindications, would not violate [U.S. law]... in reaching this conclusion, we do not in any way minimize the experience. The panic associated with the feeling of drowning could undoubtedly be significant. There may be few more frightening experiences than feeling that one is unable to breathe.

However frightening the experience may be, OMS personnel have informed us that the waterboard technique is not physically painful.... As you have informed us, the CIA has previously used the waterboard repeatedly on two detainees, and, as far as can be determined, these detainees did not experience physical pain or, in the professional judgment of doctors, is there any medical reason to believe they would have done so. Therefore, we conclude that the authorized use of the waterboard by adequately trained interrogators could not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause “severe physical pain.”

We also conclude that the use of the waterboard, under the strict limits and conditions imposed, would not be expected to cause “severe physical suffering” under the statute. As noted above, the difficulty of specifying a category of physical suffering apart from both physical pain and mental pain or suffering, along with the requirement that any such suffering be “severe,” calls for an interpretation under which “severe physical suffering” is reserved for physical distress that is severe considering both its intensity and duration. To the extent that in some applications the use of the waterboard could cause choking or similar physical—as opposed to mental—sensations, those physical sensations might well have an intensity approaching the degree contemplated by the statute. However, we understand that any such physical—as opposed to mental—sensations caused by the use of the waterboard end when the application ends. Given the time limits imposed, and the fact that any physical distress (as opposed to possible mental suffering, which is discussed below) would occur only during the actual application of water, the physical distress caused by the waterboard would not be expected to have the duration required to amount to severe physical suffering. Applications are strictly limited to at most 40 seconds, and a total of at most 12 minutes in any 24-hour period, and use of the technique is limited to at most five days during the 30-day period we consider.

Consequently, under these conditions, use of the waterboard cannot be expected to cause “severe physical suffering” within the meaning of the statute, and we conclude that its authorized use by adequately trained interrogators could

not reasonably be considered specifically intended to cause “severe physical suffering.” Again, however, we caution that great care should be used in adhering to the limitations imposed and in monitoring any detainee subjected to it to prevent the detainee from experiencing severe physical suffering....

7. Americans Face Competing Priorities at Home and Abroad, 2010



8. Defense Department Foresees New National Security Threats, 2010

While the effects of climate change are uneven and subject to a complex set of influences, some long-term trends seem clear. For example, to the extent that greenhouse gases are causing land and sea surface warming, the long life of some greenhouse gases in the atmosphere mean that effects will continue to increase and will be long lasting, even with no further addition to the concentration of greenhouse gases (e.g., water vapor (H_2O), carbon dioxide (CO_2), nitrous oxide (N_2O), methane (CH_4), and ozone (O_3)). Hence, this is a challenge that cannot be “solved.” Instead, it must be managed for the long-term. This report addresses the need and prospects for approaches to address the near-term impact on human populations and longer-term adaptation to climate change. The impact on human populations, near- and long-term, translates to impact on national and international security.

Cycles of climate change are not new to the planet. But, an important difference today is that effects are exacerbated by the increased density of populations,

particularly in those areas most vulnerable to climate change. The effects can be further exacerbated by the nature of the human response or the lack of response....

The observable trends over multiple decades include:

- Increasing land and sea surface temperatures
- Changing ocean temperature
- Changing ocean chemistry (acidity and salinity-impact on ecosystems and circulation)
- Declining mass of Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets
- Declining glaciers and snow cover
- Decreasing and thinning Arctic sea ice
- More frequent and longer droughts
- Increased frequency of heavy precipitation events, flooding and landslides
- Increased cyclone intensity
- Rising sea level

There is a complex set of factors influencing atmospheric circulation, cyclone activity and other phenomena impacting the climate that are not well understood. The changes and consequences will present both near and long-term challenges. Some greenhouse gases are long-lived. Even with no addition of these gases to current levels, it will require hundreds of years to see significant reductions in the level in the atmosphere. Current estimates are that if all of the measures currently recommended to reduce emissions from human activity are implemented, the predicted temperature rise will vary from a minimum of 2°C to as much as 7°C by the end of the 21st century. A rise of more than 2°C is likely to have serious consequences for the human habitat. Current projections explicitly exclude feedback cycles, such as those involving the release of methane and nitrous oxide which have the potential to further accelerate surface warming....

Climate change is likely to have the greatest impact on security through its indirect effects on conflict and vulnerability. Many developing countries are unable to provide basic services and improvements, much less cope with repeated, sudden onset shocks and accumulating, slow onset stresses. These effects span the spectrum from the basic necessities of livelihood to social conflict, including protests, strikes, riots, intercommunal violence, and conflict between nations. Climate change is more likely to be an exacerbating factor for failure to meet basic human needs and for social conflict, rather than the root cause. Climate change is already intensifying environmental and resource problems that communities are facing....

The single greatest direct driver of impact on the human habitat is water—too much or too little. Water and water management are key factors to food, health, energy, and economic development. Regional variability in rainfall is an underlying cause, but there is a range of exacerbating factors that are both cause and effect, e.g., population migration, agricultural methods that are no longer sustainable, lack of sanitation and the effect on health and productivity. Population increases demand an increase in agricultural productivity. At the same time, the

combination of climate change, unsuitable agriculture practices, poor management of fisheries, and lack of development and management of water resources, particularly in Africa, are obstacles to the needed progress. Over the past half century, the renewable water resource per capita in Africa has decreased by a factor of three.

Water management is essential to sustaining populations. Energy and water are also essential to economic progress. However, a lack of economic resources is a formidable obstacle to water management. For example, in Africa, 95 percent of agriculture is rain-fed with little or no capability for storing or transporting water to deal with the variability in rainfall. Systems to store and transport water are a feature of wealthier nations. Further, given that river basins encompass multiple nations, the mechanisms to manage water across a viable area can, in themselves, cause conflict and population migration....

Climate change has the potential for significant impacts on all three of the basic elements important to national and international security-defense, diplomacy, and economics. Dealing with these impacts by mitigating the effects on populations and adapting to change will demand the attention of a broad spectrum of agencies in the national government. This will include the Department of Defense, in support of lead US government agencies. While there will be direct effects on the United States from aspects of climate change to include sea level rise and dramatic changes in weather patterns, the most immediate effects with the highest potential for instability will come from the most vulnerable regions of the world where the United States obtains vital fuel and strategic mineral imports and combats terrorism. To deal with these issues, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) will be particularly challenged.

The United States has neither the resources nor the influence for an open-ended commitment to addressing the world's challenges related to the consequences of climate change. The United States does have a vital interest in promoting stability in areas of strategic interest. A key to success will be extensive advanced planning and collaboration with others most influenced by the impacts. Near-term work to deal with the immediate basic needs of populations will demand a multiagency and multinational response. Lasting progress will come from longer-term adaptation to climate change. Adaptation will inevitably include more effective water management, population migration, changes in agricultural practices, and approaches to dealing with hydro-meteorological disasters resulting from extreme changes in weather patterns. The effectiveness of adaptation will have significant national and international security implications.

The most extreme effects will be in areas with limited expertise and financial resources. The United States will need to collaborate with the political, economic, and military leadership in these regions to develop the needed expertise in civil engineering, hydrology, energy, agriculture, land use, and infrastructure planning. The long-term stability of these regions will depend on progress in all of these activities, even with no further climate change....

 ESSAYS

What lessons should the United States draw from its frustrations in the decade following the September 11 attacks? How could the nation establish a sustainable foreign policy and shore up its position of global leadership? These questions have generated intense debate. Almost all commentators agree that some combination of poor decisions and broader historical forces has seriously weakened the nation. One eminent author, the journalist Fareed Zakaria, wrote of a “post-American world” in which the United States would compete for influence alongside rising powers such as China, India, and Brazil. But most commentators stopped short of that view, pointing out the enormous economic, military, and cultural power that the nation still wielded.

The following essays reflect different ideas not only about the global role that the United States should play in the future but also about the impediments that the nation needs to overcome in order to assume that role. In the first essay, historian Niall Ferguson of Harvard University suggests that the whole world benefits from strong American leadership and even from the loose form of imperialism practiced by the United States at the peak of its global influence. But Ferguson argues that the nation is losing its ability to project power in the ways it had done in earlier times. Journalist Thomas L. Friedman of the *New York Times* and political scientist Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University are more comfortable with a rapidly changing global order, calling not so much for the return of past patterns of behavior as for adaptation to a transformed world. The key, Friedman and Mandelbaum argue, is regeneration of the nation’s domestic economy and political system to compete more effectively abroad.

The Benefits of a Liberal Empire

NIALL FERGUSON

The United States today is an empire—but a peculiar kind of empire. It is vastly wealthy. It is militarily peerless. It has astonishing cultural reach. Yet by comparison with other empires it often struggles to impose its will beyond its shores. Its successes in exporting American institutions to foreign lands have been outnumbered by its failures.

In many respects, this American empire shares the same aspirations and ambitions as the last great Anglophone hegemon. Despite originating in a revolt against British imperialism, the United States inherited many of its begetter’s defining characteristics. Styling itself, in good Whig terminology, an “empire of liberty,” the fledgling Republic embarked on an astonishingly rapid colonization of the central belt of the North American continent. If anything, the independent Americans were even more ruthless in the way they expropriated indigenous peoples than they had been as British subjects. However, the differences between

the British and American empires became more apparent as the United States sought to extend its influence overseas. Its experiment with overt imperialism after 1898 had distinctly mixed results, ending unhappily in both the Pacific and the Caribbean, with the notable exceptions of Hawaii and Puerto Rico....

Only when the United States could cast itself in an anti-imperialist role—first against the British Empire during the Second World War and then (more wisely) against the Soviet Union during the cold war—were Americans able to perform their own cryptoimperial role with self-confidence. Even then, there were clear limits to American stamina. The doctrine of limited war led to a draw in Korea and a defeat in Vietnam. Contradictory commitments undermined U.S. predominance in the Middle East too. It took a succession of humanitarian disasters abroad in the 1990s and terrorist attacks at home in 2001 to rekindle public enthusiasm for a more assertive American foreign policy, though even this had to be cloaked in euphemism, its imperial character repeatedly denied.

The United States has invaded and occupied many countries over the past two centuries. Yet in terms of their economic and political institutions relatively few of these have evolved into anything remotely resembling miniature Americas. Will things go any better in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq? And can President Bush live up to his implied threats to deal sooner or later with the other members of the “axis of evil,” Iran and North Korea—to say nothing of Cuba, Libya and Syria, added to the list of rogue states in May 2002, as well as Burma and Zimbabwe, also singled out for presidential opprobrium in November last year?

At the time of writing, simply imposing order in Iraq was proving difficult enough, even with British and Polish assistance. After all the bravado of the Three-Week War, the Bush administration felt constrained to request assistance from the United Nations for its Coalition Provisional Authority. To have any hope of securing this, the United States had to promise to expedite the transfer of power from the Anglo-American coalition to an elected Iraqi government. American power also looked circumscribed in the Middle East. When George W. Bush visited the region in June 2003, some expressed the hope that the overthrow of Saddam would help break the deadlock in the Middle Eastern peace process, sending a signal to Syria and Iran that their support for terrorist organizations bent on the destruction of Israel would no longer be tolerated, bolstering the moderates among the Palestinian leadership and encouraging a skeptical Israeli government to take the route marked on the American “road map.” By the fall, however, Yasser Arafat had reasserted his control over the Palestinian administration, Ariel Sharon was building a replica of the Berlin Wall around the Palestinians and for the first time Americans were being targeted by terrorists in the occupied territories. At the same time, al Qa’eda began to attack the one Arab autocracy that the United States had pledged itself to preserve, the house of Saud.

The Bush administration had meanwhile made equally little headway in dealing with what was surely the most dangerous of all the world’s rogue regimes, North Korea. Pyongyang’s development of long-range missiles and its research into nuclear, chemical and biological weapons—to say nothing of its huge conventional armed forces—plainly posed a huge threat to the stability of East Asia. In December 2002 the North Koreans had repudiated a 1994

agreement shutting down its nuclear reactors and had expelled UN monitors; in October 2003 a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman threatened, somewhat opaquely, to “open [North Korea’s] nuclear deterrent to the public as a physical force.” Could the United States do anything about this? Apparently not—despite the fact that the country continued to depend on American aid to feed its half-starved population. Insisting that it be given not just handouts but a fully fledged nonaggression treaty with the United States, this repulsive little dictatorship defied the American hyperpower with impunity.

The United States even hesitated before sending a tiny force to the one basket case country in Africa for which it can be said to have any historical responsibility, Liberia. In August three ships, carrying around 4,500 sailors and marines, were sent to Liberia after repeated requests for American intervention. In all 225 U.S. personnel went ashore, of whom 50 succumbed to malaria. Two months later the Americans were gone.

This halfhearted African adventure seemed to exemplify the limits of American power. But how are we to explain these limits? As we have seen, by most conventional measures of power—economic, military and cultural—there has never been an empire mightier than the United States today. Its recent difficulties in achieving its foreign policy goals cannot simply be blamed on the Bush administration’s alleged diplomatic ineptitude. Rather, we need fundamentally to rethink what we mean by power, for all too often we confuse that concept with other, quite different things—wealth, weaponry and a winning way with “soft power.” It is in fact perfectly possible to have a great deal of all these things, yet to have only limited power. Indeed, that is precisely the American predicament.

The election of the actor Arnold Schwarzenegger as governor of California in October last year offered an important clue to the nature of American power. In his most recent film, *Terminator 3*, Schwarzenegger plays a muscle-bound and almost indestructible robot, programmed to protect a young man who is destined to save the world. The film abounds in irony, not all of it intentional. In the climactic scene, the Terminator’s operating system becomes corrupted; instead of rescuing the future savior, he comes close to killing him. As his original program battles this contradictory command, the word *ABORT* flashes in bright red letters in his head, all but paralyzing him.

In three distinct ways the Terminator is a perfect, if unwitting, metaphor of American power. Though he has the body of a man half his age, Schwarzenegger himself is in fact just four years short of his sixtieth birthday. His determination to remain forever Mr. Universe typifies the determination of an entire generation never to grow old, though grow old they must—with significant economic consequences. The Terminator is also a very American hero for the simple reason that there is only one of him. In this he personifies the chronic manpower shortage that currently constrains American nation building. Above all, the Terminator exemplifies the limits of American power because the word *ABORT* starts flashing in his head before he has completed his mission. Outwardly, Arnold Schwarzenegger is without question a colossus; it is hard to

imagine the male body looking any bigger and stronger. He is to the human frame what the United States is to the capitalist economy. Yet his character embodies the three key deficits that explain why America only *looks* immensely strong without actually *being* immensely strong.

... [T]here are three fundamental deficits that together explain why the United States has been a less effective empire than its British predecessor. They are its economic deficit, its manpower deficit and—the most serious of the three—its attention deficit.

In the space of four years Americans have intervened militarily against three rogue states in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East. As I write, American troops patrol the streets of Kosovo, Kabul and Kirkuk. Whatever the rationale, each U.S. incursion has led to a change of political regime, of military occupation and an attempt at institutional transformation euphemistically described as nation building. But where will the money come from to make these undertakings successful? How many Americans will be willing to go to these places to oversee how that money is spent? And how long will the American public at home be prepared to support a policy that costs not only money but also lives—even if the quantities in both cases are comparatively modest?

There may be ways of bridging two of these three deficits, at least for a time. Since 1985, as we have seen, the United States has gone from being a net international creditor to being the world's biggest debtor; its net international liabilities are now equivalent to around a quarter gross domestic product. However, that is far from being the maximum ever run up by a developed economy. In the 1990s Australia's net foreign debt touched 60 percent of GDP, while New Zealand's came close to 90 percent. It may therefore be possible to carry on borrowing from abroad since there seems to be an insatiable appetite on the part of foreign investors for dollar-denominated securities, no matter how low the return on them. Unlike Australia and New Zealand, after all, the United States gets to issue debt denominated in the global reserve currency.

Admittedly, America's reliance on foreign capital is a balancing act on a very high wire. One conceivable and troubling scenario is that foreign expectations could shift, leading to simultaneous pressure on the exchange rate and bond prices, with higher interest rates threatening American growth more than a weak dollar boosts it. No one should rule out the possibility that American fiscal profligacy, even with the most accommodating monetary policy in the history of the Fed, could still coincide with a Japanese-style deflation rather than a return to inflation, especially if American consumers began to save more and attempt to reduce their indebtedness. Two generations with no experience of sustained declines in prices would struggle to adjust their behavior in appropriate ways. In particular, people with large accumulations of mortgage and consumer debt would find apparently low nominal interest rates becoming painfully high in real terms if prices fell by more than 1 or 2 percent a year.

Yet the costs of such a crisis would be heavier outside the United States than inside. Even a modest reduction in the growth of American consumer demand in the years ahead would have serious consequences for the rest of the global

economy, given that nearly 60 percent of the total growth in world output since 1995 has come from the United States. And if the United States were to press for a devaluation of the dollar and some measure of protection against Chinese imports, there could be a deflationary chain reaction throughout the world economy. A deflationary world would not necessarily be a disastrously depressed world; it might be more like the 1880s than the 1930s. The original Great Depression that began in the aftermath of the 1873 crash and lasted until 1895 saw prices depressed much more than output (which more than doubled in the United States), and although the period was associated with increases in tariffs, these were not so large as to choke off global trade. If such a Great Deflation were to happen again, America's latent fiscal crisis would not go away, of course; indeed, it might get even worse if real interest rates rose above the real growth rate or if the costs of Medicare continued to rise at a time when other prices were declining. As in the depression of the 1880s, the deflation losers might well turn to radical forms of politics to express their disgruntlement. Populism and socialism thrived as falling prices squeezed farmers and workers, while white-collar workers and small-business owners often turned to new strains of xenophobic nationalism. These were the first harbingers of the "end of globalization" in the mid-twentieth century. On the other hand, the British Empire's strategic position was positively enhanced by the late Victorian slowdown, not least because it discouraged the strategic ambitions of potential rivals. It was only after the deflation was over that the Germans began to build their navy and to pursue their "world policy." A Great Deflation would be likely to hurt Europe and China more than it hurt America.

Nor is America's manpower deficit insuperable. There is undoubtedly something perplexing about the apparent lack of American combat-effective troops at a time when the U.S. population is growing at 1.25 percent per annum, unemployment is proving stubbornly resistant to economic recovery (by one estimate there are 4 million victims of the current "job gap") and the American prison population exceeds 2 million—1 in every 142 American residents. If one adds together the illegal immigrants, the jobless and the convicts, there is surely ample raw material for a larger American army. One of the keys to the expansion of the Roman Empire was, after all, the opportunity offered to non-Romans to earn citizenship through military service. One of the mainsprings of British colonization was the policy of transportation that emptied the prison hulks of eighteenth-century England into ships bound for Australia. Reviving the draft would not necessarily be unpopular, so long as it was appropriately targeted.

The only alternative is to rely on foreign armies to provide auxiliary forces. There are precedents for this too. Without the Indian Army, Britain's empire would have suffered from a chronic manpower deficit. India was, as Lord Salisbury memorably remarked, "an English barrack in the Oriental Seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them." The British Empire relied heavily on its colonies to provide manpower in wartime: roughly a third and just under a half of total British forces during World War I and World War II, respectively. Having rashly dissolved the Iraqi Army, L. Paul Bremer belatedly came to see that resurrecting it might be his best hope of establishing order and reducing unemployment. The alternative, as we have seen, is to go begging to the UN or NATO for reinforcements. If Americans themselves are reluctant

peacekeepers, they must be the peacekeepers' paymasters, and strike such bargains as the mercenaries of the "international community" may demand.

Of the three deficits, however, it is the third that may prove the most difficult to overcome—namely, the attention deficit that seems to be inherent in the American political system and that already threatens to call a premature halt to reconstruction in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not intended as a term of abuse. The problem is systemic; it is the way the political process militates against farsighted leadership. In the words of retired General Anthony Zinni:

There is a fundamental question that goes beyond the military. It's, "What is our obligation to the world?" We preach about values, democracy, human rights, but we haven't convinced the American people to pony up.... There's no leadership that steps up and says, "This is the right thing to do." ... That's the basic problem.... There's got to be the political will and support for these things. We should believe that a stable world is a better place for us. If you had a policy and a forward-leaning engagement strategy, the U.S. would make a much greater difference to the world. It would intervene earlier and pick fights better.

But a "forward-leaning engagement strategy" is much easier for a soldier to imagine than for an elected politician. It is not just that first-term American presidents have only two and a half years in office before the issue of securing reelection begins to loom. It is the fact that even sooner, midterm congressional elections can have the effect of emasculating their legislative program. It is the fact that American politics operates on three tiers simultaneously: the national, the state and the local. How could Californians be expected to pay full attention to the problems of nation building in Baghdad in the summer of 2003, when a self-selected mob of amateur politicians was noisily bidding to recall their incumbent governor? It is the fact that the federal executive itself is anything but a homogeneous entity. Interdepartmental rivalry is of course the norm in most human institutions of any size. But there were times in 2003 when the complete absence of coordination among the Defense Department, the State Department and the Treasury—to say nothing of the Commerce Department, the trade representative, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the host of institutions now notionally concerned with "homeland security"—recalled the worst "polycracy" of Wilhelmine Germany. The presidency is of course an elected rather than a hereditary office, but its recent incumbents have sometimes appeared to conduct business in the style of the last German kaiser, allowing policy to be determined by interagency competition rather than forging a sense of collective responsibility. Small wonder so many American interventions abroad have the spasmodic, undiplomatic quality of Wilhelm II's *Weltpolitik*. Imperial Germany too practiced what Michael Ignatieff has called imperialism in a hurry. It too was "impatient for quick results."

Unlike the kaiser's Germany, however, the United States disclaims any interest in acquiring new "places in the sun." Its conquests are not merely temporary; they are not even regarded as conquests. The Victorian historian J. R. Seeley

famously joked that the British had built their empire “in a fit of absence of mind.” Americans, however, have gone one better; here absent-mindedness has become full-blown myopia. Few people outside the United States today doubt the existence of an American empire; that America is imperialistic is a truism in the eyes of most educated Europeans. But as the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr noted as long ago as 1960, Americans persist in “frantically avoiding recognition of the imperialism [they] in fact exercise.”

Does imperial denial matter? The answer is that it does. Successful empire is seldom solely based on coercion; there must be some economic dividends for the ruled as well as the rulers, if only to buy the loyalty of indigenous elites, and these dividends need to be sustained for a significant length of time. The trouble with an empire in denial is that it tends to make two mistakes when it chooses to intervene in the affairs of lesser states. The first may be to allocate insufficient resources to the nonmilitary aspects of the project. The second, and the more serious, is to attempt economic and political transformation in an unrealistically short time frame. As I write, the United States would seem to be making the second of these mistakes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. By insisting—and apparently intending—that they will remain in Iraq only until a democratic government can be established “and not a day longer,” American spokespeople have unintentionally created a further disincentive for local people to cooperate with them. Who in these countries can feel confident that if he lends support to American initiatives, he will not lay himself open to the charge of collaboration as soon as the Americans go? “If the people of the Balkans realized America would be there,” General John Shalikashvili remarked in the late 1990s, “it would be great.... Why is it such a crime to suggest a similar longevity [to the occupations of West Germany and Japan] in Bosnia and Kosovo?” The answer is a political one. Today’s GIs must be brought home, and soon.

These two points help explain why this vastly powerful economy, with its extraordinary military capability, has had such a very disappointing record when it has sought to bring about changes of political regime abroad. The worst failures—in Haiti, Cuba and Vietnam—were due, above all, to this fatal combination of inadequate resources for nonmilitary purposes and a truncated time horizon. It would be a tragedy if the same process were to repeat itself in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. But not a surprise....

Consuming on credit, reluctant to go to the front line, inclined to lose interest in protracted undertakings: if all this conjures up an image of America as a sedentary colossus—to put it bluntly, a kind of strategic couch potato—then the image may be worth pondering. According to the standard measure of obesity, the body mass index, the percentage of Americans classified as obese has nearly doubled in the past decade, from 12 percent in 1991 to 21 percent in 2001. Nearly two-thirds of all American men are officially considered overweight, and nearly three-quarters of those aged between forty-five and sixty-four....

Yet this should not be taken to vindicate those pessimists who predict imminent decline for the United States, whether relative to Europe or to China. The

trouble with “realist” fears of a coming shift from “unipolarity” to “multipolarity” is that they overlook the possibility of generalized impotence—or, if you like, apolarity. Those fixated on a Bismarckian model of the balance of power tend to assume that international relations resemble the interplay of magnets, with the larger powers attracting satellites as if they were iron filings, sometimes joining together, but more often repelling each another. But what if the great powers of today ceased to be magnetic, losing their powers both to attract and to repel? What if even the United States, ever more preoccupied with its own internal problems, became the strategic equivalent of an inert lump of old iron? In many ways, this is already the fate that has overtaken Japan and the European Union; once economic titans, they are now senescent societies and strategic dwarfs...

[I]n the early 1990s it seemed as if the United States had established a unipolar order. Yet today’s transnational threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and organized crime—to say nothing of disease pandemics, climate change and water shortages—put a premium on cooperation, not competition, between states. The attractions of unilateralism are undeniable, since demanding allies can be more irksome than invisible foes, but a solo strategy offers little prospect of victory against any of these challenges; the successful prosecution of the “wars” against all of them depends as much on multilateral institutions as does the continuation of international free trade. There is, in any case, nothing more dangerous to a great empire than what the Victorian Conservatives called, with heavy irony, splendid isolation. Then as now, the great Anglophone empire needs perforce to work in concert with the lesser—but not negligible—powers in order to achieve its objectives. As G. John Ikenberry has argued, American success after both the Second World War and the cold war was closely linked to the creation and extension of international institutions that at once limited and yet legitimized American power.

Consider again the question of peacekeeping. It has become abundantly clear that the United States is not capable of effective peacekeeping—that is to say, constabulary duties—in countries as far apart as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq without some foreign assistance. Peacekeeping is not what American soldiers are trained to do, nor do they appear to have much appetite for it. It also seems reasonable to assume that the American electorate will not tolerate a prolonged exposure of U.S. troops to the unglamorous hazards of “now-intensity conflict”: suicide bombers at checkpoints, snipers down back streets, rocket-propelled grenades fired at patrols and convoys. The obvious solution, short of a substantial expansion of the U.S. Army, is to continue the now well-established practice of sharing the burdens of peacekeeping with other United Nations members—in particular, America’s European allies, with their relatively generous aid budgets and their large conscript armies. If they are not used for peacekeeping, it is hard to see what these soldiers are for, in a Europe that has declared perpetual peace within its own borders and is no longer menaced by Russia.

Those, like Robert Kagan, who dismiss the Europeans as Kant-reading Venusians—as opposed to America’s Hobbes- (and Clausewitz-) reading Martians—overlook the crucial significance of Pluto in the process of nation building. War and love are all very well, but all empires depend in some measure on money. Without hefty investment in enforcing the rule of law, countries like Afghanistan

and Iraq will stagnate and perhaps disintegrate. Unless the United States is prepared radically to alter its attitudes toward low-intensity conflict, it will have little option but to cooperate with the more generous Europeans. Unilateralism, like isolation, is not so splendid after all. Indeed, it is seldom a realistic option for an empire.

The danger is that great power cooperation could simply break down, not because of rivalry between the United States and the European Union but because neither lacks the will to act beyond its own borders. The internal problems of these huge and complex entities may simply distract them from the problems of failed states and rogue regimes. Some would say that such a Spengleresque decline of the West might create a vacuum that only the rising powers of Asia could fill. Yet those who look at China as a future hegemon may discover that it too has enough to contend with in managing the social and political consequences of its second "Great Leap Forward," this time to the capitalist free market. Likewise, those who see Islam as the West's principal antagonist in a war of civilizations will find it difficult to imagine a political accompaniment to the indisputable demographic expansion of Muslim societies. The future, in short, might prove for a time to be apolar, a world without even *one* dominant imperial power, the ninth century, perhaps, but without the Abbasid caliphate.

The paradox of globalization is that as the world becomes more integrated, so power becomes more diffuse. Thanks to the dynamism of international capitalism, all but the poorest people in the world have significantly more purchasing power than their grandfathers dared dream of. The means of production were never more productive or—as China and India achieve their belated economic takeoffs—more widely shared. Thanks to the spread of democracy, a majority of people in the world now have markedly more political power than their grandfathers. The democratic means of election were never more widely accepted as the optimal form of government. The means of education too are accessible in most countries to much larger shares of the population than was the case two or three generations ago; more people than ever can harness their own brainpower. All these changes mean that the old monopolies on which power was traditionally based—monopolies on wealth, political office and knowledge—have in large measure been broken up. Unfortunately, thanks to the proliferation of modern means of destruction, the power to inflict violence has also become more evenly distributed. Firepower has also been shared out as never before.

Power, let us not forget, is not just about being able to buy whatever you want; that is mere wealth. Power is about being able to get whatever you want at below the market price. It is about being able to get people to perform services or part with goods that they would not ordinarily offer to sell at any price. For empires, those ambitious states that seek to exert power beyond their own borders, power depends on both the resolve of the masters and the consent of the subjects. Yet power diminishes as it is shared. One country with one nuclear bomb is more powerful, if the rest of the world has none, than a country with a thousand nuclear bombs, if everyone else has one.

And this brings us to the final respect in which the United States resembles Arnold Schwarzenegger's Terminator. In military confrontations, the United States has the capability to inflict amazing and appalling destruction, while sustaining only minimal damage to itself. There is no regime it could not terminate if it wanted to—including North Korea's. Such a war might leave South Korea in ruins, of course, but the American Terminator would emerge from the rubble more or less unscathed. What the Terminator is *not* programmed to do, however, is to rebuild. In his wake he leaves only destruction.

During the fall of 2003 President Bush sought to stiffen American morale by declaring that he was "not leaving" Iraq; that America "doesn't run"; that the Middle East "must be a focus of American policy for decades to come." If, nevertheless, the United States finally submits to political pressure at home and abroad by withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan before their economic reconstruction has been achieved, the scene will not be wholly unfamiliar. The limits of American power will be laid bare when the global Terminator finally admits: "I won't be back."

In my book *The Cash Nexus*, written in 2000 and published in the spring of 2001, I tried to make the argument that the United State not only *could* afford to play a more assertive global role but could no afford *not* to. Any historian who ventures to make prognostications has a duty to review them with the benefit of hindsight. The key points I made were as follows:

1. "The means of destruction have never been cheaper.... The main beneficiaries [of cheap weaponry] have been and remain the guerrilla armies of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, the terrorist groups of Western Europe and the drug gangs of the Americas."
2. "Plainly, it is highly unlikely that any state would contemplate a direct attack on the United States in the foreseeable future; though a terrorist campaign against American cities is quite easy to imagine."
3. "Nearly all of the increase in the number of wars in the world since 1945 is due to the spread of civil war.... [But] the United Nations [has a] very patchy record as a global policeman.... Between 1992 and 1999 the Security Council authorized a series of humanitarian interventions.... The majority were at best ineffective, and at worst disastrous."
4. "The question has frequently been asked, and deserves repetition: would it not be desirable for the United States to depose these tyrants and impose democratic government on their countries? The idea of invading a country, deposing its dictators and imposing free elections at gunpoint is generally dismissed as incompatible with American 'values.' A common argument is that the United States could never engage in the kind of overt imperial rule practiced by Britain in the nineteenth century—though this was precisely what was done in Germany and in Japan at the end of the Second World War, and with great and lasting success."
5. "Far from retreating like some giant snail behind an electronic shell, the United States should be devoting a larger percentage of its vast resources to

making the world safe for capitalism and democracy. Contrary to the naïve triumphalism of the ‘end of history,’ these are not naturally occurring, but require strong institutional foundations of law and order. The proper role of an imperial America is to establish these institutions where they are lacking, if necessary ... by military force. There is no economic argument against such a policy, since it would not be prohibitively costly. Imposing democracy on all the world’s ‘rogue states’ would not push the U.S. defense budget much above 5 per cent of GDP. There is also an economic argument for doing so, as establishing the rule of law in such countries would pay a long-run dividend as their trade revived and expanded.”

Writing in the dying days of the Clinton administration, I concluded—somewhat heatedly—that “the greatest disappointment facing the world in the twenty-first century [is] that the leaders of the one state with the economic resources to make the world a better place lack the guts to do it.” Little did I imagine that within a matter of nine months, a new president, confronted by the calamity of September 11, would embark on a policy so similar to the one I had advocated. Since the declaration of the war against terrorism, the question has ceased to be about guts. It is now about grit, the tenacity to finish what has been started.

Unlike most European critics of the United States, then, I believe the world needs an effective liberal empire and that the United States is the best candidate for the job. Economic globalization is working. The rapid growth of per capita incomes in the world’s two most populous countries, China and India, means that international inequality is finally narrowing. But there are parts of the world where legal and political institutions are in a condition of such collapse or corruption that their inhabitants are effectively cut off from any hope of prosperity. And there are states that, through either weakness or malice, encourage terrorist organizations committed to wrecking a liberal world order. For that reason, economic globalization needs to be underwritten politically, as it was a century ago.

The United States has good reasons to play the role of liberal empire, both from the point of view of its own security and out of straightforward altruism. In many ways too it is uniquely well equipped to play it. Yet for all its colossal economic, military and cultural power, the United States still looks unlikely to be an *effective* liberal empire without some profound changes in its economic structure, its social makeup and its political culture.

American neoimperialists like to quote Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden,” written in 1899 to encourage President McKinley’s empire-building efforts in the Philippines. But its language—indeed the entire nineteenth-century lexicon of imperialism—is irrevocably the language of a bygone age. Though I have warned against the dangers of imperial denial, I do not mean to say that the existence of an American empire should instead be proclaimed from the rooftop of the Capitol. All I mean is that whatever they choose to call their position in the world—hegemony, primacy, predominance or leadership—Americans should recognize the *functional* resemblance between Anglophone power present and past and should try to do a better rather than a worse job of policing an unruly world than their British predecessors....

Domestic Dysfunctions and American Decline

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN AND MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

It all seems so obvious now, but on the historic day when the Berlin Wall was cracked open—November 11, 1989—no one would have guessed that America was about to make the most dangerous mistake a country can make: We were about to misread our environment. We should have remembered Oscar Wilde's admonition: "In this world there are only two tragedies. One is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it." America was about to experience the second tragedy. We had achieved a long-sought goal: the end of the Cold War on Western terms. But that very achievement ushered in a new world, with unprecedented challenges to the United States. No one warned us—neither Oscar Wilde nor someone like the statesman who had done precisely that for America four decades earlier: George Kennan.

On the evening of February 22, 1946, Kennan, then the forty-two-year-old deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, dispatched an 8,000-word cable to the State Department in Washington. The "Long Telegram," as it was later known, became the most famous diplomatic communication in the history of the United States. A condensed version, which ran under the byline "X" in *Foreign Affairs* the next year, became perhaps the most influential journal article in American history.

Kennan's cable earned its renown because it served as the charter for American foreign policy during the Cold War. It called for the "containment" of the military power of the Soviet Union and political resistance to its communist ideology. It led to the Marshall Plan for aid to war-torn Europe; to NATO—the first peacetime military alliance in American history—and the stationing of an American army in Europe; to America's wars in Korea and Vietnam; to the nuclear arms race; to a dangerous brush with nuclear war over Cuba; and to a political rivalry waged in every corner of the world through military assistance, espionage, public relations, and economic aid.

The Cold War came to an end with the overthrow of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But the broad message of the Long Telegram is one we need to hear today: "Wake up! Pay attention! The world you are living in has fundamentally changed. It is not the world you think it is. You need to adapt, because the health, security, and future of the country depend upon it."

It is hard to realize today what a shock that message was to many Americans. The world Kennan's cable described was *not* the one in which most Americans believed they were living in or wanted to live in. Most of them assumed that, with the end of World War II, the United States could look forward to good relations with its wartime Soviet ally and the end of the kind of huge national

exertion that winning the war had required. The message of the Long Telegram was that both of these happy assumptions were wrong. The nation's leaders eventually accepted Kennan's analysis and adopted his prescription. Before long the American people knew they had to be vigilant, creative, and united. They knew they had to foster economic growth, technological innovation, and social mobility in order to avoid losing the global geopolitical competition with their great rival. The Cold War had its ugly excesses and its fiascos—Vietnam and the Bay of Pigs, for example—but it also set certain limits on American politics and society. We just had to look across at the Iron Curtain and the evil empire behind it—or take part in one of those nuclear bomb drills in the basements of our elementary schools—to know that we were living in a world defined by the struggle for supremacy between two nuclear-armed superpowers. That fact shaped both the content of our politics and the prevailing attitude of our leaders and citizens, which was one of constant vigilance. We didn't always read the world correctly, but we paid close attention to every major trend beyond our borders.

Americans had just seen totalitarian powers conquer large swaths of the world, threatening free societies with a return to the Dark Ages. The nation had had to sacrifice mightily to reverse these conquests. The Cold War that followed imposed its own special form of discipline. If we flinched, we risked being overwhelmed by communism; if we became trigger-happy, we risked a nuclear war. For all these reasons, it was a serious, sober time.

Then that wall in Berlin came down. And like flowers in spring, up sprouted a garden full of rosy American assumptions about the future. Is it any wonder? The outcome of the global conflict eliminated what had loomed for two generations as by far the most menacing challenge the country had faced: the economic, political, and military threat from the Soviet Union and international communism. Though no formal ceremony of surrender took place and there was no joyous ticker-tape parade for returning servicemen and women as after World War II, it felt like a huge military victory for the United States and its allies. In some ways, it was. Like Germany after the two world wars of the twentieth century, the losing power, the Soviet Union, gave up territory and changed its form of government to bring it in line with the governments of the victors. So, watching on CNN as people in the formerly communist states toppled statues of Lenin, it was natural for us to relax, to be less serious, and to assume that the need for urgent and sustained collective action had passed.

We could have used another Long Telegram. While the end of the Cold War was certainly a victory, it also presented us with *a huge new challenge*. But at the time we just didn't see it.

By helping to destroy communism, we helped open the way for two billion more people to live like us: two billion more people with their own versions of the American dream, two billion more people practicing capitalism, two billion more people with half a century of pent-up aspirations to live like Americans and work like Americans and drive like Americans and consume like Americans. The rest of the world looked at the victors in the Cold War and said, "We want to

live the way they do.” In this sense, the world we are now living in is a world that we invented.

The end of communism dramatically accelerated the process of globalization, which removed many of the barriers to economic competition. Globalization would turn out to be a blessing for international stability and global growth. But it enabled so many more of those “new Americans” to compete for capital and jobs with the Americans living in America. In economic terms, this meant that Americans had to run even faster—that is, work harder—just to stay in place. At the end of the Cold War, America resembled a cross-country runner who had won his national championship year after year, but this time the judge handed him the trophy and said, “Congratulations. You will never compete in our national championship again. From now on you will have to race in the Olympics, against the best in the world—every day, forever.”

We didn’t fully grasp what was happening, so we did not respond appropriately. Over time we relaxed, underinvested, and lived in the moment just when we needed to study harder, save more, rebuild our infrastructure, and make our country more open and attractive to foreign talent. Losing one’s primary competitor can be problematic. What would the New York Yankees be without the Boston Red Sox, or Alabama without Auburn? When the West won the Cold War, America lost the rival that had kept us sharp, outwardly focused, and serious about nation-building at home—because offering a successful alternative to communism for the whole world to see was crucial to our Cold War strategy.

In coastal China, India, and Brazil, meanwhile, the economic barriers had begun coming down a decade earlier. The Chinese were not like citizens of the old Soviet Union, where, as the saying went, the people pretended to work and the government pretended to pay them. No, they were like us. They had a powerful work ethic and huge pent-up aspirations for prosperity—like a champagne bottle that had been shaken for fifty years and now was about to have its cork removed. You didn’t want to be in the way of that cork. Moreover, in parallel with the end of the Cold War, technology was flattening the global economic playing field, reducing the advantages of the people in developed countries such as the United States, while empowering those in the developing ones. The pace of global change accelerated to a speed faster than any we had seen before. It took us Americans some time to appreciate that while many of our new competitors were low-wage, low-skilled workers, for the first time a growing number, particularly those in Asia, were low-wage, *high-skilled* workers. We knew all about cheap labor, but we had never had to deal with *cheap genius*—at scale. Our historical reference point had always been Europe. The failure to understand that we were living in a new world and to adapt to it was a colossal and costly American mistake.

To be sure, the two decades following the Cold War were an extraordinarily productive period for some Americans and some sectors of the American economy. This was the era of the revolution in information technology, which began in the United States and spread around the world. It made some Americans wealthy and gave all Americans greater access to information, entertainment, and one another—and to the rest of the world as well—than ever before. It really was

revolutionary. But it posed a formidable challenge to Americans and contributed to our failure as a country to cope effectively with its consequences. That failure had its roots in what we can now see as American overconfidence.

"It was a totally lethal combination of cockiness and complacency," Secretary of Education Arne Duncan told us. "We were the king of the world. But we lost our way. We rested on our laurels ... we kept telling ourselves all about what we did yesterday and living in the past. We have been slumbering and living off our reputation. We are like the forty-year-old who keeps talking about what a great high school football player he was." It is this dangerous complacency that produced the potholes, loose door handles, and protracted escalator outages of twenty-first-century America. Unfortunately, America's difficulties with infrastructure are the least of our problems.

... The end of the Cold War ... ushered in a new era that poses four major challenges for America. These are: how to adapt to globalization, how to adjust to the information technology (IT) revolution, how to cope with the large and soaring budget deficits stemming from the growing demands on government at every level, and how to manage a world of both rising energy consumption and rising climate threats. These four challenges, and how we meet them, will define America's future.

The essence of globalization is the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital across national borders. It expanded dramatically because of the remarkable economic success of the free-market economies of the West, states that traded and invested heavily among themselves. Other countries, observing this success, decided to follow the Western pattern. China, other countries in East and Southeast Asia, India, Latin America, and formerly communist Europe all entered the globalized economy. Americans did not fully grasp the implications of globalization becoming—if we can put it this way—even more global, in part because we thought we had seen it all before.

All the talk about China is likely to give any American over the age of forty a sense of *déjà vu*. After all, we faced a similar challenge from Japan in the 1980s. It ended with America still rising and Japan declining. It is tempting to believe that China today is just a big Japan.

Unfortunately for us, China and the expansion of globalization, to which its remarkable growth is partly due, are far more disruptive than that. Japan threatened one American city, Detroit, and two American industries: cars and consumer electronics. China—and globalization more broadly—challenges every town in America and every industry. China, India, Brazil, Israel, Singapore, Vietnam, Taiwan, Korea, Chile, and Switzerland (and the list could go on and on) pose a huge challenge to America because of the integration of computing, telecommunications, the World Wide Web, and free markets. Japan was a tornado that blew through during the Cold War. China and globalization are a category-5 hurricane that will never move out to sea in the post-Cold War world.

Charles Vest, the former president of MIT, observed that back in the 1970s and 1980s, once we realized the formidable challenge posed by Japan, "we took

the painful steps that were required to get back in the game. We analyzed, repositioned, persevered, and emerged stronger. We did it. In that case, the 'we' who achieved this was U.S. industry." But now something much more comprehensive is required.

"This time around," said Vest, "it requires a public awakening, establishment of political will, resetting of priorities, sacrifice for the future, and an alliance of governments, businesses, and citizens. It requires truth-telling, sensible investment, a rebirth of civility, and a cessation by both political and corporate leaders of pandering to our baser instincts. Engineering, education, science, and technology are clearly within the core of what has to be done. After all, this is the knowledge age. The United States cannot prosper based on low wages, geographic isolation, or military might. We can prosper only based on brainpower: properly prepared and properly applied brainpower."

If globalization has put virtually every American job under pressure, the IT revolution has changed the composition of work—as computers, cell phones, the Internet, and all their social-media offshoots have spread. It has eliminated old jobs and spawned new ones—and whole new industries—faster than ever. Moreover, by making almost all work more complex and more demanding of critical-thinking skills, it requires every American to be better educated than ever to secure and keep a well-paying job. The days when you could go directly from high school to a job that supported a middle-class lifestyle, the era memorably depicted in two of the most popular of all American situation comedies—*The Honeymooners* of the 1950s, with Jackie Gleason as the bus driver Ralph Kramden, and *All in the Family* of the 1970s, starring Carroll O'Connor as Archie Bunker, the colorful denizen of Queens, New York—are long gone. The days when you could graduate from college and do the same job, with the same skills, for four decades before sliding into a comfortable retirement are disappearing as well. The IT revolution poses an educational challenge—to expand the analytical and innovative skills of Americans—that is no less profound than those created by the transition from plow horses to tractors or from sailing ships to steamships.

The third great challenge for America's future is the rising national debt and annual deficits, which have both expanded to dangerous levels since the Cold War through our habit of not raising enough money through taxation to pay for what the federal government spends, and then borrowing to bridge the gap. The American government has been able to borrow several trillion dollars—a good chunk of it from China and other countries—because of confidence in the American economy and because of the special international role of the dollar, a role that dates from the days of American global economic supremacy.

In effect, America has its own version of oil wealth: dollar wealth. Because its currency became the world's de facto currency after World War II, the United States can print money and issue debt to a degree that no other country can. Countries that are rich in oil tend to be fiscally undisciplined; a country that can essentially print its own dollar-denominated wealth can fall into the same trap. Sure enough, since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since 2001, America has suffered a greater loss of fiscal discipline than ever before in its

history. And it has come at exactly the wrong time: just when the baby boomer generation is about to retire and draw on its promised entitlements of Social Security and Medicare.

The accumulation of annual deficits is the national debt, and here the widely cited numbers, hair-raising though they are, actually understate what is likely to be the extent of American taxpayers' obligations. The figures do not take account of the huge and in some cases probably unpayable debts of states and cities. By one estimate, states have \$3 trillion in unfunded pension-related obligations. The gaps between what New York, Illinois, and California in particular will owe in the coming years and the taxes their governments can reasonably expect to collect are very large indeed.

Vallejo, California, a city of about 117,000 people, which declared bankruptcy in May 2008, was devoting about 80 percent of its budget to salaries and benefits for its unionized policemen, firefighters, and other public safety officials. Tracy, California, made news when it announced in 2010 that citizens were henceforth being asked to pay for 911 emergency services—\$48 per household per year, \$36 for low-income households. The fee rises automatically to \$300 if the household actually calls 911 and the first responder administers medical treatment. The federal government will surely be called upon to take responsibility for some of these obligations. It will also come under pressure to rescue some of the private pension plans that are essentially bankrupt. And most estimates assume that the country will have to pay only modest interest costs for the borrowing it undertakes to finance its budget deficits. Doubts about the U.S. government's creditworthiness could, however, raise the interest rates the Treasury Department has to offer in order to find enough purchasers for its securities. This could increase the total debt significantly—depending on how high future interest rates are. In short, our overall fiscal condition is even worse than we think. There is a website that tracks the "Outstanding Public Debt of the United States," and as of June 15, 2011, the national debt was \$14,344,566,636,826.26. (Maybe China will forgive us the 26 cents?)

As for the fourth challenge, the threat of fossil fuels to the planet's biosphere, it is a direct result of the surge in energy consumption, which, in turn, is a direct result of the growth that has come about through globalization and the adoption (especially in Asia) of free-market economics. If we do not find a new source of abundant, cheap, clean, and reliable energy to power the future of all these "new Americans," we run the risk of burning up, choking up, heating up, and smoking up our planet far faster than even Al Gore predicted.

This means, however, that the technologies that can supply abundant, cheap, clean, and reliable energy will be the next new global industry. Energy technology—ET—will be the new IT. A country with a thriving ET industry will enjoy energy security, will enhance its own national security, and will contribute to global environmental security. It also will be home to innovative companies, because companies cannot make products greener without inventing smarter materials, smarter software, and smarter designs. It is hard to imagine how America will be able to sustain a rising standard of living if it does not have a leading role in this next great global industry.

What all four of these challenges have in common is that they require a collective response. They are too big to be addressed by one party alone, or by one segment of the public. Each is a national challenge; only the nation as a whole can deal adequately with it. Of course, a successful response in each case depends on individuals doing the right things. Workers must equip themselves with the skills to win the well-paying jobs, and entrepreneurs must create these jobs. Americans must spend less and save more and accept higher taxes. Individuals, firms, and industries must use less fossil fuel. But to produce the appropriate individual behavior in each case, we need to put in place the incentives, regulations, and institutions that will encourage it, and putting them in place is a collective task.

Because these are challenges that the nation as a whole must address, because addressing them will require exertion and sacrifice, and because they have an international dimension, it seems natural to discuss them in the language of international competition and conflict. The challenge that Kennan identified in his Long Telegram really was a war of sorts. The four major challenges the country confronts today have to be understood in a different framework. It seems to us that the appropriate framework is provided by the great engine of change in the natural world, evolution. The driving force of evolution is adaptation. Where Kennan was urging Americans to oppose a new enemy, we are calling on Americans to adapt to a new environment.

Over hundreds of millions of years, many thousands of species (plants and animals, including humans) have survived when their biological features have allowed them to adapt to their environment—that is, allowed them to reproduce successfully and so perpetuate their genes. If gray-colored herons are better disguised from their predators than white ones, more and more grays and fewer and fewer whites will survive and reproduce in every generation until all herons are gray. (The phrase “survival of the fittest” that is often used to describe evolution means survival of the best adapted.)

Adaptation becomes particularly urgent when a species’ environment changes. Birds may fly to an island far from their previous habitat. Whether these birds survive will depend on how well adapted they happen to be to their new home, and whether the species as a whole survives there will depend on how successfully those adaptations are passed down to subsequent generations.

Sixty-five million years ago, scientists believe, a large meteor or a series of them struck the Earth, igniting firestorms and shrouding the planet in a cloud of dust. This caused the extinction of three-quarters of all then existing species, including the creatures that at the time dominated the Earth, the dinosaurs.

The end of the Cold War and the challenges that followed brought on a fundamental change in our environment. Only the individuals, the companies, and the nations that adapt to the new global environment will thrive in the coming decades. The end of the Cold War should have been an occasion not for relaxation and self-congratulation but for collective efforts to adapt to the new world that we invented.

We thought of ourselves as the lion that, having just vanquished the leader of the competing pride of lions on the savanna, reigns as the undisputed king of all he surveys. Instead we were, and are, running the risk of becoming dinosaurs.

The analogy between the effects of evolution on particular species and the impact of social, economic, and political change on sovereign states breaks down in a couple of crucial ways, though. For one, adaptation in biology takes place across hundreds of generations, while the adaptation we are talking about will have to happen within a few years. And whether or not a species is well adapted to its environment is the product of uncontrollable genetic coding. Individuals, groups, and nations, by contrast, can understand their circumstances and deliberately make the adjustments necessary to flourish in them. The dinosaurs could do nothing to avoid extinction. The United States can choose to meet the challenges it faces and adopt the appropriate policies for doing so.

The country is not facing extinction, but the stakes involved are very high indeed.

Our success in meeting the four challenges will determine the rate and the shape of U.S. economic growth, and how widely the benefits of such growth are shared. For most of its history the United States achieved impressive annual increases in GDP, which lifted the incomes of most of its citizens. That economic growth served as the foundation for almost everything we associate with America: its politics, its social life, its role in the world, and its national character. Fifty-five years ago the historian David Potter, in *People of Plenty*, argued that affluence has shaped the American character. The performance of the U.S. economy has generally made it possible for most Americans who worked hard to enjoy at least a modest rise in their material circumstances during their lifetimes—and enabled them to be confident that their children would do the same. Economic growth created opportunity for each generation of Americans, and over time most Americans came to expect that the future would be better than the past, that hard work would be rewarded, and that each generation would be wealthier than the previous one. That expectation came to have a name: “the American dream.” The American dream depends on sustained, robust economic growth, which now depends on the country meeting the four major challenges it faces.

As Senator Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican, put it to us: “America needs to think long term just at a time when long-term thinking has never been more difficult to achieve. I hope it is just more difficult, not impossible.” He added: “Those who do not think the American dream is being jeopardized are living in a dark corner somewhere ... It is my hope that the Tea Party, Wall Street, labor unions, and soccer moms will all rally around the idea that ‘I don’t want to lose the American dream on my watch.’”

More and more Americans, though, fear that the American dream is slipping away. A poll published by Rasmussen Reports (November 19, 2010) found that while 37 percent of the Americans polled believed that the country’s best days lay ahead, many more, 47 percent of those polled, thought that the country’s best days had already passed. Failing to take collective action to solve the problems that globalization, IT, debt, and energy and global warming have created risks proving the pessimists right....

Another feature of the four challenges America confronts is the fact that they will require sacrifice, which makes generating collective action much more difficult. This is most obvious in the case of the federal deficits. Americans will have to pay more in taxes and accept less in benefits. Paying more for less is the reverse of what most people want out of life, so it is no wonder that deficits have grown so large. Similarly, Americans won't begin to use less fossil fuel and industry won't invest in nonfossil sources of energy unless the prices of coal, oil, and natural gas rise significantly to reflect the true cost to society of our use of them. Higher American fuel bills will ultimately be good for the country and for the planet because they will stimulate the development of renewable energy sources, but they will be hard on household budgets in the short term. To meet the challenge of globalization and the IT revolution and to achieve the steadily rising standard of living U.S. citizens have come to expect, Americans will have to save more, consume less, study longer, and work harder than they have become accustomed to doing in recent decades.

Ours is "no longer a question of sacrificing or not sacrificing—we gave up that choice a long time ago," notes Michael Maniates, a professor of political science and environmental science at Allegheny College in Pennsylvania, who writes on this theme. We cannot choose whether or not Americans will sacrifice, but only who will bear the brunt of it. The more the present generation shrinks from the nation's challenges now, the longer sacrifice is deferred, the higher will be the cost to the next generation of the decline in America's power and Americans' wealth....

There is an acronym that business consultants use to describe moments like these: VUCA, meaning "volatility, unpredictability, complexity, and ambiguity." We are going through a period of history with a very high VUCA rating. The world is turbulent because it has multiple sources of turbulence: bullying governments, such as China's; repressed and angry societies, such as those in the Arab world; the forces of nature, which are, as ever, powerful and unpredictable, as the devastation in Japan reminded us; and lone individuals, such as the source of the Wiki-Leaks cables, empowered—indeed super-empowered—by two of the defining trends of our era: globalization and the IT revolution.

In this unstable world, the United States stands out as both a beacon and a supplier of stability. Americans sometimes underestimate the importance, and the value, of American power for other countries. (It doesn't help that other countries are not routinely lavish, or even public, in their appreciation for what the United States does in the world, even when they do appreciate it.)

Americans also sometimes misunderstand their country's power. Those on the left often do not fully understand its constructive uses, concentrating instead on the occasional abuses that always attend the exercise of power. Those on the right often do not fully understand its sources—that American power is not simply a matter of will but of means, and those means need to be constantly renewed and refreshed, which depends on our successfully meeting the country's major domestic challenges. The world we grew up in was a world in which

America had a lot of leverage. Indeed, it was a world shaped a certain way because we had the leverage to shape it that way. That is precisely what we are losing. We cannot make ourselves safer abroad unless we change our behavior at home. But our politics rarely connects those two dots anymore. If we want to shape the world, we have to be serious about American strength, and if we want to be serious about American strength, we need to be serious about the sources of American strength—our formula for greatness.

On this matter, we mince no words: A world shaped by a strong America—strong enough to provide political, economic, and moral leadership—will never be a perfect world, but it will be a better world than any alternative we can envision.

In fact, the United States provides to the world many of the services that governments furnish to the societies they govern. With a weakened America, one that has failed to rise to the challenges it confronts and has therefore become less wealthy and less confident, the world will likely enjoy less governance, which will make it more disorderly and less prosperous. In that case, everyone, not just Americans, will suffer.

Will the United States meet its major challenges and thus sustain the American dream for future generations and preserve the country's large and constructive global role? Again, we are ultimately optimistic in our response to this question.

For one thing, whatever the pathologies of the American political system, American society retains the characteristics that made the United States exceptional among the countries of the world; the country remains full of people who have not gotten the word. In general, if you were to design a country ideally suited to flourish in the world we are living in, it would look more like the United States than any other. In a world in which individual creativity is becoming ever more important, America supports individual achievement and celebrates the quirky. In a world in which technological change and creative destruction take place at warp speed, requiring maximal economic flexibility, the American economy is as flexible as any on the planet. In a world in which transparent, reliable institutions, and especially the rule of law, are more important than ever for risk-taking and innovation, the United States has an outstanding legal environment. In an age in which even the cleverest inventors and entrepreneurs have to try and fail, sometimes repeatedly, before finding the business equivalent of a mother lode, the American business culture understands that failure is often the necessary condition for success.

The other reason for our optimism about America's future is that over the course of its history the United States has rarely failed to meet major challenges. It is in fact our failure to meet major challenges that is unusual—or, one might say, "exceptional." When tested, from the days of the revolution in the eighteenth century to the drawn-out Cold War struggle in the twentieth, America and Americans have found ways to excel. The country's past supplies fertile grounds for optimism about its future. That is one reason that we have given a book about that future a backward-looking title. A country that steps up to the challenges that it faces and masters them is the country that used to be us.

In fact, the key to a successful future is to draw on features of American history that made the country successful in the past: understanding, as we have

before, the world in which we are living; renovating our traditional public-private formula to spur economic growth; and removing, perhaps through a method that has worked in the past, the political obstacles that stand in the way of the collective efforts the country needs.

Alexis de Tocqueville originated the idea of American exceptionalism in *Democracy in America*. What he found exceptional was precisely Americans' concentration on the here and now, on their actual circumstances, rather than on abstract or theoretical considerations. "A thousand special causes," he wrote, "have singularly concurred to fix the mind of the American upon purely practical objects. His passions, his wants, his education, and everything about him seem to unite in drawing the native of the United States earthward."

Over the last two decades, this changed. As a country, and as a political system, we lost our characteristic focus on the world we are living in. We misinterpreted the end of the Cold War, failing to recognize that it was not only a great global victory but also the beginning of a great global transformation, one that made the world in some ways more demanding for Americans than it had been during the decades of conflict with communism. We missed the very turn that we, more than any other nation, helped to bring about.

It is hard not to see a parallel between America and IBM, one of the country's iconic companies, which is celebrating its centennial in 2011. America's history has been one of continual reinvention—and so has IBM's. It started out making clocks, scales, cheese slicers, and the like. After generations leading the market in punch-card tabulators, in the early 1960s its boss bet the company on the mainframe computer, and wound up dominating that business. Then, twenty years later, IBM essentially invented the personal computer.

Nevertheless, despite this history of embracing the future and shucking the past, IBM didn't understand the implications of its own creation. It invested too much for too long in the mainframe. Its financial and management models were based on things remaining as they had been, not as they were becoming. It treated the PC as a niche product. And those mistakes nearly brought down the whole company.

How did IBM lose sight of the world it invented? Listen carefully to the answer of Samuel Palmisano, IBM's current chairman and CEO, when we asked him that question: "You spend more time arguing amongst yourselves over a shrinking pie than looking to the future," said Palmisano, and so "you miss the big turn" that you have entered, even a turn that your own company invented. "We missed the PC. It isn't like we didn't have the technology," he explained. "We invented the PC, but we missed what it really was. At the time, everybody [at IBM] thought it was just kind of a neat little personal productivity tool. But instead it became a new platform. And we missed it."

When you start thinking of other departments and colleagues in your own company as the opposition—instead of focusing on the other companies against which you must compete—you have lost touch with the world in which you are living. When you come to see your exceptionalism as permanent, you set yourself up to wind up less than exceptional. This can be lethal for a company—and a country. America's political parties today strayed, said Palmisano, "because

they have focused on themselves” more than on the priorities of the country as a whole.

Under the leadership first of Louis Gerstner and then of Palmisano, IBM got back on track by relentlessly scrutinizing itself and the world in which it was operating. By doing so, it mastered the next big change in technology, which was networking—the hyper-connecting of the world in which the principal platform is no longer the PC but rather billions of interconnected smartphones, sensors, computers, and servers. IBM bet that in such a world the most lucrative business would involve sifting and analyzing all the data being generated and using all that information to advise customers on how to get the most out of their individual businesses. IBM found a new core competency and scaled it. In the process, it reconnected with its history of continual reinvention.

The same can be true of America. It is obvious now what our core competency is. We have greater potential than any other country to thrive in the future by becoming the world’s most attractive launching pad—the place where everyone wants to come to work, invent, collaborate, or start something new in order to get the most out of the new hyper-connected world.

America, of course, not only underappreciated the world it invented, it also overinterpreted the events of September 11, 2001. It devoted more attention, political capital, and resources than were warranted to the threat of terrorism, serious though it was and is. While pursuing the worthy but not vital goals of nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, we recklessly pumped up our annual deficits and cumulative national debt to new and dangerous heights, and pumped out more and more greenhouse gases, heedless of the potentially devastating consequences....



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
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
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
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